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LIBRARY 

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UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 

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Accession  No. 


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University  of  California  •  Berkeley 


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DEFENCE 

OF     THE 

CONSTITUTIONS   OF    GOVERNMENT 

OF      THE 

UNITED      STATES 

OF 

AMERICA,    **    v   < 

AGAINST  THE  ATTACK  OF  M.  TURGOT 

IN     HIS 

LETTER  To  PR-  PRICE, 

BATED  THE  TWENTY-SECOND  DAY  OF  MARCH,  1778. 


BY    JOHN    ADAMS,    LL.  D. 

PRESIDENT  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES. 

ii  ••••^•••••••••i 

All  Nature's  Difference  keeps  all  Nature's  Peace. 


. 
IN    THREE     VOLUMES. 

VOL.     I. 
THE    THIRD    EDITION, 


IVERSITY, 


PHILADELPHIA; 

PRINTED     BY     BUDD     AND     BARTRAM, 

FOR    WILLIAM    COBBETT,    OPPOSITE    CHRIST    CHURCH, 

I797- 


Av 

^  .  & 


5% 


The  publijher  has  prefixed  the  following  Short  Ac* 
count  of  the  Author,  which  he  hopes  the  reader 
'will  not  be  difpleafed  with.  It  is  extracted 
from  the  American  Geography*  by  the  Rev. 
Jedidiah  Morfe. 


,ll 

MR.  ADAMS  is  a  defcendant  of  one  of  the 
firft  families  who  founded  the  colony  of 
Maflachufetts  Bay  in  1630.  He  was  born  at 
Braintree,  in  Maflachufetts,  O6lober  i9th,  1735. 
He  was  by  profefllon  a  lawyer;  and  fuch  were 
his  abilities  and  integrity,  that  he  attra&ed  the 
attention,  the  efteem,  and  the  confidence  of  his 
fellow-citizens.  Not  contented  with  barely  main- 
taining the  rights  of  individuals,  he  early  fig- 
nalized  himfelf  in  the  defence  of  the  rights  of  his 
country,  and  of  mankind  at  large,  by  writing  his 
admirable  Diflertation  on  the  Canon  and  Feudal 
Laws  ;  a  work  well  adapted  to  convince  or  con- 
found the  advocates  either  for  civil  or  ecclefi- 
aftical  tyranny.  It  evinced  that  he  had  abili- 
ties to  afford  powerful  aid  in  the  formation  of 
republics,  on  the  genuine  principles  of  juftice 
and  virtue. 

The 


4  A  Jhort  Account 

The  zeal  and  firmnefs  with  which  Mr.  Adams 
defended  the  liberties  of  his  country,  did  not 
prevent  his  acting  in  the  fervice  of  her  ene- 
mies, where  he  thought  they  were  treated  with 
too  much  feverity.  Called  upon  by  his  profef- 
fion,  he  boldly  flood  forth  as  the  advocate  .  of 
Capt.  Prefton,  who  had  been  imprifoned  as  the 
murderer  of  fome  of  the  citizens  of  Bofton,on  the 
memorable  5th  of  March,  1770.  His  client's 
caufe  was  moft  unpopular.  The  whole  town  had 
been  in  a  ftate  of  irritation,  on  account  of  the 
conduct  of  Governor  Hutchinfon,  and  the  troops 
which  were  ftationed  in  it.  Their  refentment 
now  burfl  into  a  flame.  But  he  felt  the  caufe  to 
be  a  juft  one;  and  the  danger  of  incurring  the 
difpleafure  of  his  countrymen  could  not  deter  him 
from  undertaking  it.  He  conducted  the  caufe 
with  great  addrefs,  by  keeping  off  the  trial  till  the 
paflions  of  the  people  had  time  to  fubfide.  The 
trial  at  length  commenced,  and  lafted  feveral 
days,  during  which  he  difplayed  the  moft  exten- 
iive  knowledge  of  the  laws  of  his  country,  and  of 
humanity;  and  at  the  conclufion  he  had  the  fatif- 
faction  of  proving  to  Great  Britain  herfelf,  -that 
the  citizens  of  Maflachufetts  would  be  juft  and 
humane  to  their  enemies  amidft  the  groflfeft  infults 
and  provocations.  Capt.  Prefton  was  acquitted. 
In  this  moft  delicate  and  important  trial,  Mr. 
Adams  manifefted  that  firmnefs  of  mind,  dilinte- 
refted  and  enlightened  patriotifm,  and  that  love  of 
juftiee  and  humanity,  which  have  uniformly  mark- 
ed his  conduct  in  all  thofe  great  departments 
which  he  has  lince  filled  with  fo  much  ability  and 
dignity. 

He  was  a  member  of  the  firft  Congrefs  in  1774; 
and  was  one  of  the  principal  promoters  of  the 
famous  refolution  of  the  4th  of  July,  1776,  which 

declared 


of  the  Author.  5 

declared  the  American  colonies   FREE,   SOVE- 
REIGN, AND  INDEPENDENT  STATES. 

Having  been  for  a  coniiderable  length  of  time 
one  of  the  commiffioners  of  the  war  department, 
and  a  principal  fuggeftor  of  the  terms  to  be  offer- 
ed to  France,  for  forming  a  treaty  of  alliance 
and  commerce,  he  was  fent  to  the  court  of  Ver- 
failles,  as  one  of  the  minifters  plenipotentiary  of 
the  United  States,  to  confummate  that  important 
bufinefs. 

On  his  return  from  France  he  was  called  upon 
by  Maffachufetts  to  affift  in  forming  a  plan  of  go- 
vernment ;  and  to  him  this  State  is  chiefly  indebt- 
ed for  their  prefent  excellent  conftitution.* 

After  this  important  bufinefs  was  accomplifh- 
ed,  he  returned  to  Europe,  veiled  with  full  pow- 
ers from  Congrefs  to  affift  at  any  conference 
which  might  be  opened  for  the  eftablifhment  of 
peace ;  and  he  foon  after  received  other  powers 
to  negociate  a  loan  of  money  for  the  ufe  of  the 
United  States ;  and  to  reprefent  them  as  their  mi- 
nifter  plenipotentiary  to  their  High  MightinefTes 
the  States  General  of  the  United  Provinces.  Such 
important  trufts  {hew  in  what  high  eftimation  he 
was  held  by  his  country,  and  the  able  and  fatif- 
fadlory  manner  in  which  he  executed  them,  prov- 
ed that  their  confidence  was  well  placed. 

While  in  Europe,  Mr.  Adams  published  the  fol- 
lowing learned  and  celebrated  work,  in  which  he 
advocates,  as  the  fundamental  principles  of  a  free 
government  —  equal  reprefentation,  of  which 
numbers,  or  property,  or  both  fhould  be  the 
rule — a  total  reparation  of  the  executive  from 
the  legiilative  power,  and  of  the  judicial  from 
both — and  a  balance  in  the  legiilature,  by 

three 

*  See  the  American  Conftitutions. 


6  A  fhort  Account  of  the  Author. 

three  independent,  equal  branches.  "  If  there 
<c  is  one  certain  truth,"  fays  he,  "  to  be  collected 
<c  from  the  hiftory  of  all  ages,  it  is  this :  That  the 
"  people's  rights  and  liberties,  and  the  democra- 
"  tical  mixture  in  a  conftitution,  can  never  be 
"  preferved  without  a  ftrong  executive ;  or  in 
cc  other  words,  without  feparating  the  executive 
"  power  from  the  legiflative." 

A  character  who  rendered  fuch  eminent  fer- 
vices  to  his  country,  both  at  home  and  abroad,  in 
feafons  of  the  greateft  gloominefs  and  danger,  and 
who  poflefled  fuch  an  extenfive  knowledge  of  po- 
litics and  government,  did  not  remain  unnoticed 
by  his  grateful  countrymen.  He  was  called,  in 
1 789,  by  the  choice  of  his  country,  to  the  Vice- 
Prelidency  of  the  United  States. 

To  this  account  by  Mr.  Morfe,  it  is  neceflary 
to  add,  that,  in  Nov.  1796,  Mr.  Adams  was  chof- 
en  Prefident  of  the  United  States,  in  the  room 
of  General  WalhingtoH.  To  be  appointed  the 
fuccefTor  of  fuch  a  man,  and  that  by  the  voice  of 
the  freemen  of  America,  is  fuch  an  unequivocal 
teftimony  of  fuperior  talents  and  virtue,  as  ren- 
ders eulogium  fuperfluous,  however  ftrongly  the 
publifher  of  this  work  may  feel  inclined  to  be- 
ftow  it. 


PREFACE. 


TTNIVEBSITY 


PREFACE. 


THE  arts  and  fciences,  in  general,  during 
the  three  or  four  la.il  centuries,  have  had  a 
regular  courfe  of  progreflive  improvement.  The 
inventions  in  mechanic  arts,  the  difcoveries  in  na- 
tural philofophy,  navigation,  and  commerce,  and 
the  advancement  of  civilization  and  humanity, 
have  occafioned  changes  in  the  condition  of  the 
world,  and  the  human  character,  which  would  have 
aftonifhed  the  moft  refined  nations  of  antiquity. 
A  continuation  of  iimilar  exertions  is  every  day 
rendering  Europe  more  and  more  like  one  com- 
munity, or  fingle  family.  Even  in  the  theory  and 
practice  of  government,  in  all  the  fimple  monar- 
chies, conliderable  improvements  have  been  made. 
The  checks  and  balances  of  republican  govern- 
ments have  been  in  foine  degree  adopted  by  the 
courts  of  princes.  By  the  eredion  of  various  tribu- 
nals, to  regifter  the  laws,  and  exercife  the  judicial 
power — by  indulging  the  petitions  and  remon- 
ftrances  of  fubjedls,  until  by  habit  they  are  regard- 
ed as  rights — a  controul  has  been  eftablifhed  over 
minifters  of  ftate,  and  the  royal  councils,  which  ap- 
proaches, in  fome  degree,  to  the  fpirit  of  republics. 
Property  is  generally  fecure,  and  perfonal  liberty 
feldom  invaded.  The  prefs  has  great  influence, 
even  where  it  is  not  exprefsly  tolerated ;  and  the 
public  opinion  muft  be  refpe&ed  by  a  minifter,  or 
his  place  becomes  infecure.  Commerce  begins  to 
thrive :  and  if  religious  toleration  were  eftablifhed, 
and  perfonal  liberty  a  little  more  prote&ed,  by  giv- 
ing an  abfolute  right  to  demand  a  public  trial  in  a 
certain  reafonable  time — and  the  flates  inverted 

with 


11 


Preface* 


with  a  few  more  privileges,  or  rather  reftored  to 
fome  that  have  been  taken  away — thefe  govern- 
ments would  be  brought  to  as  great  a  degree  of 
perfe&ion,  they  would  approach  as  near  to  the 
character  of  governments  of  laws  and  not  of  men, 
as  their  nature  will  probably  admit  of.    In  fo  ge- 
neral a  refinement,  or  more  properly  reformation 
of  manners  and  improvement  in  knowledge,  is 
it  not  unaccountable  that  the  knowledge  of  the 
principles  and  conftru&ion  of  free  governments, 
in  which  the  happinefs  of  life,  and  even  the  fur- 
ther progrefs  of  improvement  in  education  and 
fociety,  in  knowledge  and  virtue,  are  fo  deeply 
interefted,  fhould  have  remained  at  a  full  ftand 
for  two  or  three  thoufand  years  ? — According  to  a 
flory  in  Herodotus,  the  nature  of  monarchy,  arif- 
tocracy,  and  democracy,  and  the  advantages  and 
inconveniences  of  each,  were  as  well  underftood 
at  the  time  of  the  neighing  of  the  horfe  of  Darius, 
as  they  are  at  this  hour*.    A  variety  of  mixtures 
of  thefe  fimple  fpecies  were  conceived  and  at-* 
tempted,  with  different  fuccefs,  by  the  Greeks 
and  Romans.    Reprefentatipns,  inftead  of  collec- 
tions, of  the  people — a  total  feparation  of  the 
executive  from  the  legiflative  power,  and  of  the 
judicial  from  both — and  a  balance  in  the  legifla- 
ture,  by  three  independent,  equal  branches — are 
perhaps  the  three  only  difcoveries  in  the  confti- 
tution  of  a  free  government,  fince  the  inftitution 
of  Lycurgus.     Even  thefe  have  been  fo  unfortu- 
nate, that  they  have  never  fpread :  the  firft  has  been 
given  up  by  all  the  nations,  excepting  one,  who 
had  once  adopted  it;  and  the  other  two,  reduced 
to  practice,  if  not  invented,  by  the  Englifh  nation^ 
have  never  been  imitated  by  any  other,  except 
their  own  defcendants  in  America.  While  it  would 
be  rafh  to  fay,  that  nothing  further  can  be  done  to 

bring 


Preface.  iii 

bring  a  free  government,  in  all  its  parts,  ftill  near- 
er to  perfe&ion — the  reprefentations  of  the  peo- 
ple are  moft  obvioufly  fufceptible  of  improvement. 
The  end  to  be  aimed  at,  in  the  formation  of  a  re- 
prefentative  aflembly,  feems  to  be  the  fenfe  of  the 
people,  the  public  voice :  the  perfe6lion  of  the 
portrait  confifts  in  its  likenefs.  Numbers,  or  pro- 
perty, or  .both,  fhould  be  the  rule;  and  the  pro- 
portions of  eletfors  and  members  an  affair  of  cal- 
culation. The  duration  fhould  not  be  fo  long 
that  the  deputy  fhould  have  time  to  forget  the 
opinions  of  his  conftituents.  Corruption  in  elec- 
tions is  the  great  enemy  of  freedom.  Among  the 
provifions  to  prevent  it,  more  frequent  elections, 
and  a  more  general  privilege  of  voting,  are  not  all 
that  might  be  devifed.  Dividing  the  diftricts, 
diminifhing  the  diftance  of  travel,  and  confining 
the  choice  to  relidents,  would  be  great  advances 
towards  the  annihilation  of  corruption.  The 
modern  ariftocracies  of  Holland,  Venice,  Berne, 
&c.  have  tempered  themfelves  with  innumerable 
multitudes  of  checks,  by  which  they  have  given. 
a  great  degree  of  ftaoility  to  that  form  of  govern- 
ment :  and  though  liberty  and  life  can  never  be 
there  enjoyed  fo  well  as  in  a  free  republic,  none  is 
perhaps  more  capable  of  profound  fagacity.  We 
fhall  learn  to  prize  the  checks  and  balances  of  a 
free  government,  and  even  thofe  of  the  modern 
ariflocracies,  if  we  recolle6l  the  miferies  of  Greece 
which  arofe  from  their  ignorance  of  them.  The 
only  balance  attempted  againfl  the  ancient  kings 
was  a  body  of  nobles ;  and  the  confequences  were 
perpetual  altercations  of  rebellion  and  tyranny, 
and  butcheries  of  thoufands  upon  every  revolution 
from  one  to  the  other.  When  the  kings  were 
abolilhed,  the  ariflocracies  tyrannized  ;  and  then 
no  balance  was  attempted  but  between  arifto- 
VOL.  I.  b  cracy 


iv  Preface. 

cracy  and  democracy.  This,  in  the  nature  of 
things,  could  be  no  balance  at  all,  and  therefore 
the  pendulum  was  for  ever  on  the  fwing.  It  is 
impoflible  to  read  in  Thucidydes,  lib.  iii.  his  ac- 
count of  the  factions  and  confulions  throughout 
all  Greece,  which  were  introduced  by  this  want 
of  an  equilibrium,  without  horror.  During  the 
few  days  that  Eurymedon,  with  his  trpops,  conti- 
nued at  Corcyra,  the  people  of  that  city  extended 
the  mafTacre  to  ail  whom  they  judged  their  ene- 
mies. The  crime  alledged  was,  their  attempt  to 
overturn  the  democracy.  Some  perilhed  merely 
through  private  enmity  ;  fome,  for  the  money 
they  had  lent,  by  the  hands  of  the  borrower. 
Every  kind  of  death,  every  dreadful  acl,  was 
perpetrated.  Fathers  flew  their  children  ;  fome 
were  dragged  from  altars,  fome  were  butchered  at 
them ;  numbers,  immerfed  in  temples,  were  ftarv- 
ed.  The  contagion  fpread  through  the  whole 
extent  of  Greece  :  fadjons  raged  in  every  city ; 
the  licentious  many  contending  for  the  Atheni- 
ans, and  the  afpiring  few  for  the  Lacedaemonians. 
The  confequence  was,  feditions  in  cities,  with  all 
their  numerous  and  tragical  incidents.  Such 
things  ever  will  be,  fays  Thucidydes,  fo  long  as 
human  nature  continues  the  fame.  But  if  this 
nervous  hiftorian  had  known  a  balance  of  three 
powers,  he  would  not  have  pronounced  the  dif- 
temper  fo  incurable,  but  would  have  added— fo 
long  as  parties  in  cities  remain  unbalanced.  He 
adds — Words  loft  their  fignification :  brutal  rafh- 
nefs  was  fortitude ;  prudence,  cowardice ;  modef- 
ty,  effeminacy ;  and  being  wife  in  every  thing,  to 
be  good  for  nothing :  the  hot  temper  was  manly 
valour;  calm  deliberation,  plaufible  knavery;  he 
who  boiled  with  indignation,  was  truft-worthy ; 
and  he  who  prefumed  to  contradift,  was  ever  fuf- 

pecled. 


Preface.  V 

pe£led.     Connexion  of  blood  was  lefs  regarded 
than   tranfient  acquaintance:     aflbciations  were 
not  formed  for  mutual  advantage,  confident  with 
law,  but  for  rapine  againft  all  law :  truft  was  only 
communication  of  guilt :    revenge  was  more  va- 
lued, than  never  to  have  fuffered  an  injury :  per- 
juries were  matter-pieces  of  cunning :  the  dupes 
only  blufhed,  the  villains  moil  impudently  tri- 
umphed.    The  fource  of  all  thefe  evils  is  a  thiril 
of  power,  from  rapacious  or  ambitious  paflions. 
The  men  of  large  influence,  fome  contending  for 
the  jult  equality  of  the  democratical,  and  others 
for  the  fair  decorum  of  ariftocratical  government, 
by  artful  founds,  embarrafled  thofe  communities, 
for  their  own  private  lucre,  by  the  keeneft  fpirit, 
the  mod  daring  proje&s,  and  moft  dreadful  ma- 
chinations.    Revenge,  not  limited  by  juflice  or 
the  public  welfare,  was  meafured  only  by  fuch  re- 
taliation as  was  judged  the  fweeteft — by  capital 
condemnations,  by  iniquitous  fentences,  and  by 
glutting  the  prefent  rancour  of  their  hearts  with 
their  own  hands.     The  pious  and  upright  conduct 
was  on  both  fides   difregarded  :     the    moderate 
citizens  fell  vidims  to  both.     Seditions  introduc- 
ed every  fpecies  of  outrageous  wickednefs  into  the 
Grecian  manners.     Sincerity  was  laughed  out  of 
countenance  :    the  whole   order   of  human  life 
was  confounded  :   the  human  temper,  too  apt  to 
tranfgrefs  in   fpite   of  laws,   now   having   gain- 
ed  the  afcendant  over  law,  feemed  to  glory  that 
it  was  too  ftrong  for  juftice,  and  an  enemy  to  all 
fuperiority. — Mr.  Hume  has  collected,  from  Dio- 
dorus  Siculus  alone,  a  few  maffacres  which  hap*- 
pened  in  only  fixty  of  the  moft  polifhed  years  of 
Greece: — From  Sybaris^oo  nobles  banifhed;  of 
Chians,  600  citizens  ;    at  Ephefus,  340  killed, 
jooo  banifhed;  of  Cyrenians,  500  nobles  killed, 


vi  Preface. 

all  the  reft  banifhed  ;  the  Corinthians  killed 
1 20,  banifhed  500;  Phsebidas  banifhed  300 
Boeotians.  Upon  the  fall  of  the  Lacedemonians, 
democracies  were  reftored  in  many  cities,  and 
fevere  vengeance  taken  of  the  nobles:  the  ba- 
nifhed nobles  returning,  butchered  their  adverfa- 
ries  at  Phials,  in  Corinth,  in  Megara,  in  Phliafia, 
where  they  killed  300  of  the  people;  but  thefe 
again  revolting,  killed  above  600  of  the  nobles, 
and  banifhed  the  reft.  In  Arcadia,  1400  ba- 
nifhed, befides  many  killed :  the  banifhed  retired 
to  Sparta  and  Pallantium ;  the  latter  were  deli- 
vered up  to  their  countrymen,  and  all  killed. 
Of  the  banifhed  from  Argos  and  Thebes,  there 
were  509  in  the  Spartan  army.  The  people,  be- 
fore the  ufurpation  of  Agathocles,  had  banifhed 
600  nobles;  afterwards  that  tyrant,  in  concurrence 
with  the  people,  killed  4000  nobles,  and  banifhed 
6000 ;  and  killed  4000  people  at  Gela ;  his 
brother  banifhed  8000^ from  Syracufe.  The  in- 
habitants of  ^Egefta,  to  the  number  of  40,000, 
were  killed,  man,  woman,  and  child,  for  the  fake 
of  their  money :  all  the  relations  of  the  Libyan 
army,  fathers,  brothers,  children,  killed  :  7000 
exiles  killed  after  capitulation.  Thefe  num- 
bers, compared  with  the  population  of  thofe 
cities,  are  prodigious ;  yet  Agathocles  was  a  man 
of  character,  and  not  to  be  fufpected  of  cruelty, 
contrary  to  the  maxims  of  his  age  :  fuch  were  the 
fafhionable  outrages  of  unbalanced  parties. 

In  the  name  of  human  and  divine  benevolence, 
is  fuch  a  fyflem  as  this  to  be  recommended  to 
Americans,  in  this  age  of  the  world  ?  Human  na- 
ture is  as  incapable  now  of  going  through  revo- 
lutions with  temper  and  fobriety,  with  patience 
and  prudence,  or  without  fury  and  madnefs,  as  it 
was  among  the  Greeks  fo  long  ago.  The  lateft 

revolution 


Preface.  vii 

revolution  that  we  read  of  was  conduced,  at  lead 
on  one  fide,  in  the  Grecian  ftyle,  with  laconic 
energy ;  and  with  a  little  attic  fait ;  at  leaft,  without 
too  much  patience,  foreiight,  and  prudence,  on 
the  other. — Without  three  orders,  and  an  effec- 
tual balance  between  them,  in  every  American  con- 
ftitution,  it  muft  be  deftined  to  frequent  unavoid- 
able revolutions  :  if  they  are  delayed  a  few  years, 
they  muft  come,  in  time.  The  United  States  are 
large  and  populous  nations,  in  comparifon  of  the 
Grecian  commonwealths,  or  even  the  Swifs  can- 
tons ;  and  are  growing  every  day  more  difpropor- 
tionate,  and  therefore  lefs  capable  of  being  held 
together  by  fimple  governments.  Countries  that 
increafe  in  population  fo  rapidly  as  the  States  of 
America  did,  even  during  uich  an  impoveriming 
and  deftru&ive  war  as  the  laft  was,  are  not  to  be 
bound  long  with  filken  threads :  lions,  young  or 
old,  will  not  be  bound  by  cobwebs. — It  would 
be  better  for  America,  it  is  neverthelefs  agreed,  to 
ring  all  the  changes  with  the  whole  fet  of  bells, 
and  go  through  all  the  revolutions  of  the  Grecian 
Hates,  rather  than  eftablifh.  an  abfolute  monarchy 
among  them,  notwithftanding  all  the  great  and 
real  improvements  made  in  that  kind  of  govern- 
ment. 

The  obje&ion  to  thefe  governments  is  not  be- 
caufe  they  are  fupported  by  nobles,  and  a  fubor- 
dination  of  ranks ;  for  all  governments,  even 
the  moft  democratical,  are  fupported  by  a  fubor- 
dination  of  offices,  and  of  ranks  too.  None  ever 
exifted  without  it  but  in  a  ftate  of  anarchy  and 
outrage,  in  a  contempt  of  law  and  juftice,  no  bet- 
ter than  no  government.  But  the  nobles,  in  the 
European  monarchies,  fupport  them  more  by 
oppoiing  than  promoting  their  ordinary  views. 
The  kings  are  fupported  by  their  armies  :  the 

nobles 


viii  preface. 

nobles  fupport  the  crown,  as  it  is  in  full  poffeffion 
of  the  gift  of  all  employments ;  but  they  fupport 
it  flill  more  by  checking  its  miniflers,  and  pre- 
venting them  from  running  into  abufes  of  power, 
and  wanton  defpotifm :  otherwife  the  people  would 
be  puttied  to  extremities  and  infurrections.  It  is 
thus  that  the  nobles  reconcile  the  monarchical  au- 
thority to  the  obedience  of  the  fubjecls ;  but  take 
away  the  Handing  armies,  and  leave  the  nobles  to 
themfelves,  and  they  would  overturn  every  mo- 
narchy in  Europe,  in  a  few  years,  and  eredl  arifto- 
cracies. 

It  is  become  a  kind  of  fafhion  among 
writers,  to  admit,  as  a  maxim,  that  if  you  could 
be  always  fure  of  a  wife,  a&ive,  and  virtuous 
prince,  monarchy  would  be  the  belt  of  govern- 
ments. But  this  is  fb  far  from  being  admifiible, 
that  it  will  for  ever  remain  true,  that  a  free  go- 
vernment has  a  great  advantage  over  a  limpie 
monarchy.  The  befl  and  wifeft  prince,  by  means 
of  a  freer  communication  with  his  people,  and  the 
greater  opportunities  to  collecl;  the  bell  advice 
from  the  bell  of  his  lubjecls,  would  have  an  im- 
menfe  advantage  in  a  free  flate  more  than  in  a 
monarchy.  A  fenate  confilling  of  all  that  is  mofl 
noble,  wealthy,  and  able  in  the  nation,  with  a 
right  to  counfel  the  crown  at  all  times,  is  a  check 
to  miniflers,  and  a  fecurity  againil  abufes,  that  a 
body  of  nobles  who  never  meet,  and  have  no  fuch 
right,  can  never  accomplim.  Another  aflembly, 
compofed  of  reprefentatives  chofen  by  the  peo- 
ple in  all  parts,  gives  the  whole  nation  free  ac- 
cefs,  and  communicates  all  the  wants,  knowledge, 
projeds,  and  wiihes  of  the  nation,  to  government; 
excites  an  emulation  among  all  clafles,  removes 
complaints,  redreffes  grievances,  affords  opportu- 
nities of  exertion  to  genius  though  in  obfcurity, 

and 


Bsr 


Preface.  ix 

and  gives  full  fcope  to  all  the  faculties  of  man ; 
opens  a  pafTage  for  every  fpeculation  to  the  legif- 
lature,  to  adminiftration,  and  to  the  public  :  it 
gives  an  univerfal  energy  to  the  human  chara&er, 
in  every  part  of  the  ftate,  which  never  can  be 
obtained  in  a  monarchy. 

There  is  a  third  particular  which  deferves  atten- 
tion both  from  governments  and  people.  The  mi- 
nifters  of  ftate,  in  a  fimple  monarchy,  can  never 
know  their  friends  from  their  enemies :  cabals  in 
fecret  undermine  their  influence,  and  blaft  their 
reputations.  This  occalions  a  jealoufy  ever  anxi- 
ous and  irritated,  which  never  thinks  the  govern- 
ment fafe  without  an  encouragement  of  informers 
and  fpies,  throughout  every  part  of  the  ftate,  who 
interrupt  the  tranquillity  of  private  life,  deftroy 
the  confidence  of  families  in  their  own  domeftics 
and  one  another,  and  poifon  freedom  in  its  fweet- 
eft  retirements.  In  a  free  government,  on  the 
contrary,  the  minifters  can  have  no  enemies  of 
confequence  but  among  the  members  of  the  great 
or  little  council,  where  every  man  is  obliged  to 
take  his  lide,  and  declare  his  opinion,  upon  every 
queftion.  This  circumftance  alone,  to  every  man- 
ly mind,  would  be  fufficient  to  decide  the  pre- 
ference in  favour  of  a  free  government.  Even 
fecrecy,  where  the  executive  is  entire  in  one  hand, 
is  as  eafily  and  furely  preferved  in  a  free  govern- 
ment, as  in  a  limple  monarchy;  and  as  to  difpatch, 
all  the  iimple  monarchies  of  the  whole  univerfc 
maybe  defied  to  produce  greater  or  more  examples 
of  it  than  are  to  be  found  in  Englifh  hiftory. — An 
Alexander,  or  a  Frederic,  poflefled  of  the  prero- 
gatives only  of  a  king  of  England,  and  leading 
his  own  armies,  would  never  find  himfelf  embar* 
raffed  or  delayed  in  any  honeft  enterprize.  He 
might  be  reftrained,  indeed,  from  running  mad,  and 

from 


x  Preface. 

from  making  eonquefts  to  the  ruin  of  his  nation, 
merely  for  his  own  glory :  but  this  is  no  argu- 
ment againft  a  free  government. — There  can  be  no 
free  government  without  a  democratical  branch  in 
the  conftitution.  Monarchies  and  ariftocracies  are 
in  poffeflion  of  the  voice  and  influence  of  every 
univeriity  and  academy  in  Europe.  Democracy, 
fimple  democracy,  never  had  a  patron  among  men 
of  letters.  Democratical  mixtures  in  govern- 
ment have  loft  almoft  all  the  advocates  they  ever 
had  out  of  England  and  America. 

Men  of  letters  muft  have  a  great  deal  of  praife, 
and  fomeof  the  neceffaries,  conveniencies,  and  or- 
naments of  life.  Monarchies  and  ariftocracies 
pay  well  and  applaud  liberally.  The  people  have 
almoft  always  expected  to  be  ferved  gratis,  and 
to  be  paid  for  the  honour  of  ferving  them ;  and 
their  applaufes  and  adorations  are  beftowed  too 
often  on  artifices  and  tricks,  on  hypocrify  and 
fuperftition,  on  flattery,  bribes,  and  largefles.  It 
is  no  wonder  then  that  democracies  and  democra- 
tical mixtures  are  annihilated  all  over  Europe, 
except  on  a  barren  rock,  a  paltry  fen,  an  inaccef- 
lible  mountain,  or  an  impenetrable  foreft.  The 
people  of  England,  to  their  immortal  honour,  are 
hitherto  an  exception ;  but,  to  the  humiliation  of 
human  nature,  they  fhew  very  often  that  they  are 
like  other  men.  The  people  in  America  have 
now  the  beft  opportunity,  and  the  greateft  truft, 
in  their  hands,  that  Providence  ever  commit- 
ted to  fo  fmall  a  number,  lince  the  tranfgreflion 
pf  the  firft  pair:  if  they  betray  their  truft, 
their  guilt  will  merit  even  greater  punifhment 
than  other  nations  have  fuffered,  and  the  indig- 
nation of  heaven.  If  there  is  one  certain  truth  to 
be  collected  from  the  hiflory  of  all  ages,  it  is  this  : 
That  the  people's  rights  and  liberties,  and  the  de- 
mocratical 


Preface.  ^  xi 

mocratical  mixture  in  a  conftitution,  can  never  be 
preferved  without  a  ftrong  executive,  or,  in  other 
words,  without  feparating  the  executive  power 
from  the  legiflative.  If  the  executive  power,  or 
any  confiderable  part  of  it,  is  left  in  the  hands 
either  of  an  ariftocratical  or  a  democratical  affem- 
bly,  it  will  corrupt  the  legiilature  as  necefTarily  as 
ruft  corrupts  iron,  or  as  arfenic  poifons  the  human 
body;  and  when  the  legiflature  is  corrupted  the 
people  are  undone. 

The  rich,  the  well-born,  and  the  able,  acquire 
an  influence  among  the  people,  that  will  foon  be 
too  much  for  fimple  honefty  and  plain  fenfe,  in 
a  houfe  of  reprefentatives.  The  moft  illuftrious 
of  them  muft  therefore  be  feparated  from  the 
mafs,  and  placed  by  themfelves  in  a  fenate  ;  this 
.  is,  to  all  honeft  and  ufeful  intents,  an  oftracifm.  A  ' 
member  of  a  fenate,  of  immenfe  wealth,  the  moil 
refpe&ed  birth,  and  tranfcendant  abilities,  has  no 
influence  in  the  nation,  in  comparifon  of  what  he 
would,  have  in  a  fingle  reprefentative  aflembly* 
When  a  fenate  exifts,  the  moft  powerful  man  in 
the  ftate  may  be  fafely  admitted  into  the  houfe 
of  reprefentatives,  becaufe  the  people  have  it  in 
their  power  to  remove  him  into  the  fenate  as 
foon  as  his  influence  becomes  dangerous.  The 
fenate  becomes  the  great  objedl  of  ambition  ;  and 
the  richeft  anil  the  rnoft  fagacious  wifh  to  merit 
an  advancement  to  it  by  fervices  to  the  public 
in  the  houfe.  When  he  has  obtained  the  object 
of  his  wifhes,  you  may  ftill  hope  for  the  benefits 
of  his  exertions,*  without  dreading  his  paflions ; 
for  the  executive  power  being  in  other  hands,  he 
has  loft  much  of  his  influence  with  the  people* 
and  can  govern  very  few  votes  more  than  his  own 
among  the  fenators. 

VOL.  I.  c  It 


xii  Preface. 

C  "«.-•• 

It  was  the  general  opinion  of  ancient  nations, 
that  the  divinity  alone  was  adequate  to  the  im- 
portant office  of  giving  laws  to  men.  The  Greeks 
entertained  this  prejudice  throughout  all  their 
difperlions  ;  the  Romans  cultivated  the  fame  po- 
pular delufion ;  and  modern  nations,  in  the  con- 
fecrations  of  kings,  and  in  feveral  fuperftitious 
chimeras  of  divine  rights  in  princes  and  nobles, 
are  nearly  unanimous  in  preferving  remnants  of 
it :  even  the  venerable  magiftrates  of  Amersfort 
devoutly  believe  themfelves  God's  vicegerents. 
Is  it  that  obedience  to  the  laws  can  be  obtained 
from  mankind  in  no  other  manner  ? — Is  the 
jealoufy  of  power,  and  the  envy  of  fuperiority3 
fo  ftrong  in  all  men,  that  no  confiderations  of 
public  or  private  utility  are  fufficient  to  engage 
their  fubmiffion  to  rules  for  their  own  happinefs  ? 
Or  is  the  difpolition  to  impofture  fo  prevalent* 
in  men  of  experience,  that  their  private  views  of 
ambition  and  avarice  can  be  accomplifhed  only 
by  artifice  ? — It  was  a  tradition  in  antiquity  that 
the  laws  of  Crete  were  dictated  to  Minos  by  the 
infpiration  of  Jupiter.  This  legiflator  and  his 
brother  Rhadamanthus,  were  both  his  fons : 
once  in  nine  years  they  went  to  converfe  with 
their  father,  to  propofe  queftions  concerning  the 
wants  of  the  people;  and  his  anfwers  were  record- 
ed as  laws  for  their  government.  The  laws  of 
Lacedcemon  were  communicated  oy  Apollo  to 
Lycurgus;  and,  left  the  meaning  of  the  deity 
fhould  not  have  been  perfectly  comprehended, 
or  corredly  exprefled,  were  afterwards  confirmed 
by  his  oracle  at  Delphos.  Among  the  Romans, 
Numa  was  indebted  for  thofe  laws  which  pro- 
cured the  profperity  of  his  country  to  his  con- 
rerfations  with  Egeria.  The  Greeks  imported 

thefe 


.  Preface.  xiii 

thefe  myfteries  from  Egypt  and  the  Eaft,  whofe 
defpotifms,  from  the  remoteft  antiquity  to  this 
day,  have  been  founded  in  the  fame  folemn  em- 
piricifm ;  their  emperors  and  nobles  being  all  de- 
fcendejd  from  their  gods.  Woden  and  Thor  were 
divinities  too ;  and  their  pofterity  ruled  a  thou- 
fand  years  in  the  north  by  the  ftrength  of  a  like 
credulity.  Manco  Capac  was  the  child  of  the 
fun,  the  vifible  deity  of  the  Peruvians ;  and  tranf- 
mitted  his  divinity,  as  well  as  his  earthly  dignity 
and  authority,  through  a  line  of  incas.  And  the 
Tudefl  tribes  of  favages  in  North  America  have 
certain  families  under  the  immediate  protedlion 
of  the  god  war,  from  which  their  leaders  are  al- 
ways chofen.  There  is  nothing  in  which  man^ 
kind  have  been  more  unanimous;  yet  nothing 
can  be  inferred  from  it  more  than  this,  that  the 
multitude  have  always  been  credulous,  and  the 
few  artful.  The  United  States  of  America  have 
exhibited,  perhaps,  the  firft  example  of  govern- 
ments ere&ed  on  the  limple  principles  of  na- 
ture :  and  if  men  are  now  fufficiently  enlightened 
to  difabufe  themfelves  of  artifice,  impofture,  hy- 
pocrify,  and  fuperftition,  they  will  confider  this 
event  as  an  sera  in  their  hiflory.  Although  the 
detail  of  the  formation  of  the  American  govern- 
ments is  at  prefent  little  known  or  regarded  ei- 
ther in  Europe  or  in  America,  it  may  hereafter  be- 
come an  objedl  of  curiofity.  It  will  never  be 
pretended  that  any  perfons  employed  in  that  fer- 
vke  had  any  interviews  with  the  gods,  or  were 
in  any  degree  under  the  infpiration  of  heaven, 
any  more  than  thofe  at  work  upon  fhips  or 
houfes,  or  labouring  in  merchandife  or  agricul- 
ture :  it  will  for  ever  be  acknowledged  that  thefe?  m 
governments  were  contrived  merely  by  the  ufe  oF 

reafon 


xiy  Preface. 

reafon  and  the  fenfes.  As  Copley  painted  Chatham, 
Weft,  Wolf,  and  Trumbull,  Warren,  and  Mont- 
gomery; as  Dwight,  Barlow,  Trumbull,  and 
Humphries  compofed  their  verfe,  and  Belknap 
and  Ramzay  hiftory;  as  Godfrey  invented  his 
quadrant,  and  Rittenhouie  his  planetarium ;  as 
Boylfton  pra&ifed  inoculation,  and  Franklin 
electricity;  as  Paine  expofed  the  miftakes  of 
Raynal,  and  Jefferfon  thole  of  Buffon,  fo  unphi- 
lofophically  borrowed  from  the  Recherches  Phi- 
lofophiques  fur  les  Americains,  thofe  defpicable 
dreams  of  De  Paw — neithpr  the  people,  nor 
their  conventions,  committees,  or  fab-commit- 
tees, conlidered'  legiilation  in  any  other  light 
than  ordinary  arts  and  fciences,  only  as  of  more 
importance.  Called  without  expe&ation,  and  com- 
pelled without  previous  inclination,  though  un- 
doubtedly at  the  befl  period  of  time  both  for 
England  and  America,  to  erect  fuddenly  new 
fyftenis  of  laws  for  their  future  government, 
they  adopted  the  method  of  a  wife  architect, 
in  creeling  a  new  palace  for  the  relidence  of  his 
fovereign.  They  determined  to  confult  Vitru- 
vius,  Palladio,  and  all  other  writers  of  reputa- 
tion in-^he  art;  to  examine  the  moft  celebrated 
buildings,  whether  they  remain  entire  or  in  ru- 
ins; compare  thefe  with  the  principles  of  writ- 
ers; and  inquire -how  far  both  the  theories  and 
models  were  founded  in  nature,  or  created  by 
fancy:  and,  when  this  ihould  be  done,  as  far 
as  their  circumftances  would  allow,  to  adopt 
the  advantages,  and  reject  the  inconveniencies,  of 
all.  ^  UnembarrafTed  by  attachments  to  noble 
families,  hereditary  lines  and  fuccefiions,  or  any 
confiderations  of  royal  blood,  even  the  pious 

•myftery  of  holy  oil  had  no  more  influence  than 

*>  \,-\.  i 

that 


Preface,  xv 

that  other  of  holy  water :  the  people  univerfally 
were  too  enlightened  to  be  irnpofed  on  by  arti- 
fice; and  their  leaders,  or  more  properly  follow- 
ers, were  men  of  too  much  honour  to  attempt 
it.  Thirteen  governments  thus  founded  on  the 
natural  authority  of  the  people  alone,  without  a 
pretence  of  miracle  or  myflery,  which  are  def- 
tined  to  fpread  over  the  northern  part  of  that 
whole  quarter  of  the  globe,  are  a  great  point 
gained  in  favour  of  the  rights  of  mankind.  The 
experiment  is  made,  and  has  completely  fuc- 
ceeded :  it'can  no  tonger  be  called  in  queftion, 
whether  authority  m  magiftrates,  and  obedience 
^of  citizens,  can  be  grounded  on  reafon,  mora- 
lity, and  the  Chriftian  religion,  without  the 
monkery  of  priefls,  or  the  knavery  of  politi- 
cians. As  the  writer  was  perfonally  acquaint- 
ed with  moft  of  the  gentlemen  in  each  of 
the  flates,  who  had  the  principal  ihare  in  the 
firft  draughts,  the  following  letters  were  really 
written  to  lay  before  the  gentleman  to  whom 
they  are  addrefled,  a  fpecimen  of  that  kind  of 
reading  and  reafoning  which  produced  the  Ame- 
rican conftitutions. 

It  is  not  a  little  furprifing  that  all  this  kind  of 
learning  fhould  have  been  unknown  to  any  illuf- 
trious  philofopher  and  ftatefman,  efpecially  one 
who  really  was,  what  he  has  been  often  called, 
<e  a  well  of  fcience."  But  if  he  could  be  unac- 
quainted with  it,  or  it  could  have  efcaped  his 
memory,  we  may  fuppofe  millions  in  America 
have  occafion  to  be  reminded  of  it. — The  writ- 
er has  long  feen  with  anxiety  the  facility  with 
which  philofophers  of  greateft  name  have  under- 
taken to  write  of  American  affairs,  without 
knowing  any  thing  of  them,  and  have  echoed 

and 


XVI 


Preface. 


and  re-echoed  each  other's  vifions.  Having  nei- 
ther talents,  leifure,  nor  inclination,  to  meet  fuch 
champions  in  the  field  of  literary  controverfy, 
he  little  thought  of  venturing  to  propofe  to  them 
any  queftions  :  circumftances,  however,  have 
lately  occurred,  which  feemed  to  require  that 
fome  notice  mould  be  taken  of  one  of  them. 
If  the  publication  of  thefe  papers  mould  contri- 
bute any  thing  to  turn  the  attention  of  the 
younger  gentlemen  of  letters  in  America  to  this 
kind  of  inquiry^  it  will  produce  an  effe6t  of 
fome  importance  to  their  country.  The  fubjecl: 
is  the  moft  interefting  that  can  engage  the  un- 
derftanding  or  the  heart;  for  whether  the  end  f) 
of  man,  in  this  ftage  of  his  exiftence,  be  en- 
joyment or  improvement,  or  both,  it  can  never 
be  attained  fo  well  in  a  bad  government  as  a 
good  one. 

The  practicability  or  the  duration  of  a  repub- 
lic, in  which  trfere  is  a  governor,  a  fe"nate,  and 
a  houfe  of  reprefentatives,  is  doubted  by  Taci- 
tus, though  he  admits  the  theory  to  be  lauda- . 
ble  :  — "  Cunclas  '  nationes  et  urbes,  populus;  g. 
<c  aut  priores,  aut  finguli,  regunt.  Dele£la  ex 
"  his  et  conftituta  reipublicss  forma,  laudari 
<e  facilius  quam  inveniri;  vel,  fi  evenit,  haud 
"  diuturna  effe  poteft."  Ann.  lib.  iv.— Cicero 
afferts — "  Statuo  efle  optime  "conftitutam  rem- 
"  publicam,  quce  ex  tribus  generibus  illis,  re- 
"  gali,  optimo,  et  populari,  modice  confufa." 
Frag. — in  fuch  peremptory  terms  the  fuperior- 
ity  of  fuch  a  government  to  all  other  forms,  that 
the  lofs  of  his  book  upon  republics  is  much  to  be 
regretted.  From  a  few  paflages  that  have  been 
preferred,  it  is  very  probable  he  entered  more 
largely  into  an  examination  of  thecompofition  of 

monarchical 


Preface.  xvii 

monarchical  republics  than  any  other  ancient 
writer.  He  was  fo  far  from  apprehending  cc  dif- 
"  putes"  from  a  variety  of  orders,  that  he  affirms 
it  to  be  the  firmed  bond  of  juftice,and  the  ftrong- 
eft  anchor  of  fafety  to  the  community.  As  the 
treble,  the  tenor,  and  the  bafs  exift  in  nature,  they 
will  be  heard  in  the  concert :  if  they  are  arrang- 
ed by  Handel,  in  a  fkilful  compofition,  they  pro- 
duce rapture  the  moil  exquiiite  that  harmony  can 
excite ;  but  if  they  are  confufed  together  without 
order,  they  will 

*-  Rend   with   tremendous  found    your  ears 
"  afunder." 

"  Ut  in  fidibus  ac  tibiis,  atque  cantu  ipfo, 
<c  a  vocibus  concentus  eft  quidam  tenendus  ex 
<c  diftinclis  fonis,  quern  immutatum  ac  difcre- 
ec  pantem  aures  eruditse  ferre  non  poffunt;  if- 
"  que  concentus,  ex  dijjimillimarum  vocum  mode- 
"  ratione,  concors  tamen  efficitur  et  congruens :  fie 
"  ex  fummis  et  infimis  et  mediis  interjeflis  ordi- 
"  nibusy  ut  fonis,  moderata  ratione,  civitas  con- 
cc  fenfu  diiTimillimorum  concinit ;  et  quae  har- 
<c  monia  a  muficis  dicitur  in  cantu,  ea  eft  in 
"  civitate  concordia  ardiffimum  atque  optimum 
"  omni  in  republica  vinculum  incolumitatis  ; 
"  quas  fine  juftitia  nullo  pa6lo  efle  poteft."  Ci- 
cero, Frag,  de  Repub. — As  all  the  ages  of  the 
world  have  not  produced  a  greater  ftatefman  and 
philofopher  united  in  the  fame  character,  his  au-* 
thority  mould  have  great  weight.  His  decided 
opinion  in  favour  of  three  branches  is  founded  on 
a  reafon  that  is  unchangeable ;  the  laws,  which  are 
the  only  poflible  rule,  meafure,  and  fecurity  of 

juftice, 


XV111 


Preface. 


juftice,  can  be  fure  of  protection,  for  any  courfe 
of  time,  in  no  other  form  of  government :  and  the 
very  name  of  a  republic  implies,  that  the  proper- 
ty of  the  people  fhould  be  reprefented  in  the  le- 
giilature,  and  decide  the  rule  of  juftice. — "  Ref- 
<c  publica  eft  res  populi.  Populus  autem  non 
"  omnis  coetus  multitudinis,  fed  coetus  juris  con- 
"  fenfu,  et  utilitatis  communione  fociatus." — 
Frag,  de  Rep. 

"  Refpublica  res  eft  populi,  cum  bene  ac  jufte 
"  geritur,  five  ab  uno  rege,  five  a  paucis  opti- 
"  matibu£,  five  ab  univerfo  populo.  Cum  vero 
fc  injuftus  eft  rex,  quern  tyrannum  voco ;  aut  in- 
tc  jufti  optimates,  quorum  confenfus  faclio  eft ; 
"  aut  injuftus  ipfe  populus,  cui  nomen  ufitatum 
"  nulluni  reperio,  nifi  ut  etiam  ipfum  tyrannum 
"  appellem ;  npn  jam  vitiofa,  fed  omnino  nulla 
"  refpublica  eft;  quoniam  non  eft  res  populi,  cum 
"  tyrannus  earn  fa6liove  capefTat ;  nee  ipfe  po- 
<e  pulus  eft  fi  fit  injuftus,  quoniam  non  eft  multi- 
<c  tudinis  juris  confenfu,  et  utilitatis  unione  focia" 
"  ta."  Frag,  de  Repub. 

"  Ubi  vero  juftitia  non  eft,  nee  jus  poteft  efle; 
"  quod  enim  jure  fit/ pro fefto  jufte  fit;  quod  au- 
"  tern  fit  injufte,  nee  jure  fieri  poteft.  Non  enim 
"  jura  dicenda  funt,  vel  putanda,  iniqua  hominum 
"  conftituta,  cum  illud  etiam  ipfi  jus  efle  dicant 
<c  quod  de  juftitias  fonte  manaverit;  falfumque 
cc  fit,  quod  a  quibufdam  non  recle  fentientibus 
cc  dici  folet,  id  jus  efle,  quod  ei,  qui  plus  poteft, 
"  utile  eft."  According  to  this,  a  .fimple  mo- 
narchy, if  it  could  in  reality  be  what  it  pretends 
to  be — a  government  of  laws,  might  be  juftly  de- 
nominated a  republic.  A  limited  monarchy, 
therefore,  eipecially  when  limited  by  two  inde- 
pendent branches,  an  ariftocratical  and  a  demo- 

cratical 


Preface.  xix 

cratical  power  in  the  conftitution,  may  with  ftrift 
propriety  be  called  by  that  name. 

If  Cicero  and  Tacitus  could  revifit  the  earth, 
and  learn  that  the  Engliih  nation  had  reduced 
the  great  idea  to  practice,  and  brought  it  nearly 
to  perfection,  by  giving  each  divifion  a  power 
to  defend  itfelf  by  a  negative ;  had  found  it  the 
mod  folid  and  durable  government,  as  well  as 
the  mod  free;  had  obtained,  by  means  of  it,  a 
profperity  among  civilized  nations,  in  an  enlight- 
ened age,  like  that  of  the  Romans  among  bar- 
barians :  and  that  the  Americans,  after  having 
enjoyed  the  benefits  of  fuch  a  conftitution  a 
century  and  a  half,  were  advifed  by  fome  of  the 
greateft  phiiofophers  and  politicians  of  the  age 
to  renounce  it,  and  fet  up  the  governments  of 
ancient  Goths  and  modern  Indians — what  would 
they  fay?  That  the  Americans  would  be  morere- 
prehenfible  than  the  Cappadocians,  if  they  fhould 
Men  to  fuch  advice.  It  would  have  been  much 
to  the  purpole  to  have  inferted  a  more  accurate 
inveftigation  of  the  form  of  government  of  the 
ancient  Germans  and  modern  Indians;  in  both, 
the  exiftence  of  the  three  divifions  of  power  is 
marked  with  a  precifion  that  excludes  all  contro- 
verfy.  The  democratical  branch,  efpecially,  is 
fo  determined,  that  the  real  fovereignty  reiided  in 
the  body  of  the  people,  and  was  exercifed  in  the 
afTembly  of  king,  nobles,  and  commons  together. 
Thefe  inftitutions, really  colledled  all  authority  in- 
to one  centre  of  kings,  nobles,  and  people.  But 
finall  as  their  numbers,  and  narrow  as  their  terri- 
tories were,  the  confequence  was  confufion ;  each 
part  believed  it  governed  the  whole  ;  the  chiefs 
thought  they  were  fovereign ;  the  nobles  believed 
the  power  to  be  in  their  hands ;  and  the  people 

VOL.  I.  d  flattered 


xx  Preface. 

flattered  themfelves  that  all  depended  upon  them. 
Their  purpofes  .were  well  enough  anfwered,  with- 
out coming  to  an  explanation,  while  they  were 
few  in  numbers,  and  had  no  property ;  but  when 
fpread  over  large  provinces  of  the  Roman  empire, 
now  the  great  kingdoms  of  Europe,  and  grown 
populous  and  rich,  they  found  the  inconvenience 
pf  not  knowing  each  its  place.  Kings,  nobles, 
and  people  claimed  the  government  in  turn  :  and 
after  all  the  turbulence,  wars,  and  revolutions, 
which  compofe  the  hiftory  of  Europe  for  fo  many 
ages,  we  find  fimple  monarchies  eftablifhed  every 
where.  Whether  the  fyftem  will  now  become 
ftationary,  and  laft  for  ever,  by  means  of  a  few 
further  improvements  in  monarchical  govern- 
ments, we  know  not ;  or  whether  fUll  further  rej 
volutions  are  to  come.  The  moft  probable,  or 
rather  the  only  probable  change  is,  the  introduc- 
tion of  democratical  branches  into  thofe  govern- 
ments. If  the  people'  fhould  ever  aim  at  more, 
they  will  defeat  themfelves ;  and  indeed  if  they 
aim  at  this,  by  any  other  than  gentle  means,  and 
by  gradual  advances;  by  improvements  in  gene^ 
ral  education,  and  informing  the  public  mind. 
The  fyftems  of  legiflators  are  experiments  made 
on  human  life  and  manners,  fociety  and  govern- 
ment. Zoroafter,  Confucius,  Mithras,  Odin,  Thor, 
Mahomet,  Lycurgus,  Solon,  Romulus,  and  a  thou- 
fand  others,  may  be  compared  to  philofophers 
making  experiments  on  the  elements.  Unhap- 
pily political  experiments  cannot  be  made  in  a 
laboratory,  nor  determined  in  a  few  hours.  The 
operation  once  begun,  runs  over  whole  quarters 
of  the  globe,  and  is  not  finifhed  in  many  thou- 
^  fands  of  years.  The  experiment  of  Lycurgus 
lafted  feven  hundred  years,  but  never  fpread  be- 
yond 


»  Preface.  xxi 

yond  the  limits  of  Lacoriia.  The  procefs  of  So- 
lon blowed  out  in  one  century ;  that  of  Romulus 
lafted  but  two  centuries  and  a  half;  but  the  Teu- 
tonic inftitutions,  defcribed  by  Csefar  and  Taci- 
tus, are  the  moft  memorable  experiment  merely 
political,  ever  yet  made  in  human  affairs.  They 
have  fpread  all  over  Europe,  and  have  lafted  eigh- 
teen hundred  years.  They  afford  the  ftrongeft 
argument  that  can  be  imagined  in  fupport  of  the 
point  aimed  at  in  thefe  letters.  Nothing  ought  to 
have  more  weight  with  America,  to  determine 
her  judgment  againft  mixing  the  authority  of  the 
one,  the  few,  and  the  many,  confufedly  in  one 
aflembly,  than  the  wide  fpread  miferies  and  final 
flavery  of  almoft  all  mankind,  in  confequence  of 
fuch  an  ignorant  policy  in  the  ancient  Germans. 
What  is  the  ingredient  whiqh  In  England  has 
preferved- the  democratical  authority?  The  ba- 
lance, and  that  only.  The  Englifti  have,  in  re- 
ality, blended  together  the  feudal  inftitutions  with 
thofe  of  the  Greeks  arid  Romans  ;  and  out  of  all 
have  made  that  noble  compofition,  which  avoids 
the  inconveniencies,  and  retains  the  advantages, 
of  both.  The  inftitutions  now  made  in  America 
will  never  wear  wholly  out  for  thoufands  of 
years:  it  is  of  the  laft  importance  then  that 
they  fhould  begin  right ;  if  they  fet  out  wrong, 
they  will  never  be  able  to  return,  unlefs  it  be  by 
accident,  to  the  right  path.  After  having  known 
the  hiftory  of  Europe,  and  of  England  in  par- 
ticular, it  would  be  the  height  of  folly  to  go  back 
to  the  inftitutions  of  Woden  and  of  Thor,  as 
they  are  advifed  to  do  :  if  they  had  been  coun- 
felled  to  adopt  a  lingle  monarchy  at  once,  it 
would  have  been  lefs  myfterious.  Robertfon, 
Hume,  and  Gibbon  have  given  fuch  admirable 

accounts 


xxii  Preface. 

accounts  of  the  feudal  inftitutions,  and  their 
confequences,  that  it  would  have  been  more  dif- 
creet  to  have  referred  to  them,  perhaps,  without 
faying  any  thing  more  upon  the  fubje6t.  To  col- 
left  together  the  legiilation  of  the  Indians,  would 
take  up  much  room,  but  would  be  well  worth 
the  pains.  The  fovereignty  is  in  the  nation,  it  is 
true,  but  the  three  powers  are  ftrong  in  every 
tribe ;  and  their  royal  and  ariftocratical  dignities 
are  much  more  generally  hereditary,  from  the 
popular  partiality  to  particular  families,  and  the 
fuperftious  opinion  that  fuch  are  favourites  of  the 
God  of  War,  than  the  late  writers  upon  this  fub- 
jecl  have  allowed. 

Grofvenor  Square, 
January  i,  /7S7- 


CONTENTS, 


JLIST   OF  THE  SUBSRIBERS.* 


A 

REV.  James  Abercrombie,  A.  M.  Philadelphia 
Rev.  John  Andrews,  Newburyport 
Fifher  Ames,  Efq.  member  of  the  Houfe  of  Representatives  of 

the  United  States 

Mr.  Samuel  Anderfon,  Philadelphia 
Robert  Andrews,  do. 

Jonah  Hewes  Anthony,  do. 
William  AUine,  Bofton 

James   Arthur,  book-feller*  Cheftertown,  Maryland,    it 
copies 

B 

John  Blackwood,  Efq.  New-Jerfey 

Phineas  Bond,  Efq.  Conful-General  of  His  Britannic  Majcfty, 

for  the  middle  and  fouthern  ftates 
Mathew  Barton,  Efq.  member  of  the  Legif.  of  Penn. 
Jofeph  Blackwood,  Efq.  New-Jerfey 
Col.  John  Boyle,  Bofton,  3  copies 
Mr.  Samuel  Blodget,  Philadelphia 

William  Bruce,  do. 

Peter  Burnes,  do. 

Budd  &  Bartram,         do.   2  copies 

John  Bell,  Peterfburgh,  Virginia 

Francis  Fry  Brown,  Philadelphia 

Andrew  Brimmer,  Bofton 

Jeremiah  Smith  Boies,  Milton,  Maflachufetts 

*  Should  any  inaccuracies  or  omiffions  appear  in  this  refpe&able  lift, 
the  patrons  of  the  work  are  requefted  to  afcribe  them  to  the  difficulty 
of  obtaining  timely  communications  from  diftant  correfpondents,  to 
the  imperfeft  manner  in  which  names  are  ufually  written  on  a  fub- 
fcription  lift,  or  to  any  other  caufe  except  that  of  want  of  gratitude 
and  refpeft  on  the  part  of  the  publiflier. 


Lift  of  Subfcribers. 

Mr.  Jofeph  Barrett,  Bofton 
Jofeph  Blake,  jun.  do. 
George  Blight,  Philadelphia 
William  M.  Biddle,  do. 

C 

William  George  Craick,  Efq.  Philadelphia 

Thomas  Charleton,  Efq.  York,  Virginia 

Edward  Coale,  Efq.  Philadelphia 

J.  W.  Condy,  Efq.  do. 

John  Canon,  Efq.  memb.  of  the  Sen.  of  Penn. 

Robert  Coleman,  Efq.  memb.  of  the  H.  of  Rep.  of  Penn. 

Mr.  John  Chew,  Cheftertown,  Maryland 

John  Cooper,  Philadelphia 

Benjamin  Clarke,    do. 

David  Caldwell,      do. 

John  Caldwell,        do. 

William  N.  Caldwell,  M.  D.  do. 

William  Carmichael,  Annapolis  :.  trt< 

Allen  Crocker,  Bofton 

William  Clifton,  jun.  Philadelphia 

Abraham  Carpenter,  do. 

Samuel  Campbell,  book-feller,  New-York,   12  copies 

D 

James  Davenport,  Efq.  memb.  of  the  H.  of  Rep.  of  the  U.  S. 

Daniel  Delany,  Efq.  Philadelphia 

Aaron  Dunham,  Efq.  Trenton,  7  copies 

Mr.  Henry  Drinker,  Philadelphia 
G.  Douglas,  book-feller,  do. 
Benjamin  Davies,  book-feller,  do.  .12  copies 
Cornelius  Davies,  book-feller,  New- York,  6  copies     , 
William  Douglas,  Peterfburgh,  Virginia 
Thomas  Dunn,  Philadelphia  > 
Thomas  Donnellan,  jun.  Annapolis 
Thomas  Dundas,  Reading,  Pennfylvania 
Gideon  Denny,  Gloucefter  County,  New-Jerfey 
Thomas  Dobfon,  book-feller,  Philadelphia,  12  copies 

E 

George  Ege,  Efq.  memb.  of  the  Legif.  of  Penn. 
,Mr.  -William  Englifh,  New-York 
Simon  Elliot,  Bofton 

F 
Dwight  Fofter,  Efq.  memb.  of  the  H.  of  Rep.  of  the  U.  S. 


Lift  of  Subfcribers. 

Nathaniel  Freeman,  Efq.  memb.  of  the  H.  of  Rep.  of  the  U.  6 
Mr.  John  Fenno,  Philadelphia 

Eliflia  Fifher,         do. 

John  Ferrifs,  jun.  Wilmington,  Del. 

Charles  French,  Philadelphia 

Michael  Fifher,  do. 

Robert  Frazer,  Weft-Chefter 

George  Fox,  Philadelphia 

Tench  Francis,  jun.  do. 

B.  Freeman,  do.   2  copies  '    »'   - 

G 

Rev.  Afhbel  Green,  D.  D.  Philadelphia 
E.  Griffin,  Efq.  York,  Virginia 
Oliver  Gallup,  Efq.  Vermont 
Benjamin  Gibbs,  Efa.  Philadelphia 
Mr. Gauvain,     do. 

J.  E.  G.  M.  de  la  Grange,  do. 

Mathew  Gill,  New-Jerfey 

James  Gibbon,  Peterfburgh,  Virginia 

Charles  Goldfborough,  jun.  Maryland 

John  Gardner,  Milton,   Maflachufetts 

Thomas  Greeves,  Philadelphia 

H 

Rev.  Reuben  Holecomb,  Sterling,  Maflachufetts 

Col.  Jofhua  Howell,  New-Jerfey 

Col.  T.  Glafs,  Hefton,         do. 

Robert  G.  Harper,  Efq.  memb.  of  the  H.  of  Rep.  of  the  U.  S. 

John  Hollowell,  Efq.  Philadelphia 

Mr.  William  Hemfley,  jun.  Maryland 

T.  Hollingfworth,  Philadelphia 

John  Hawkins,  Bordentown 

John  Hobart,  Philadelphia 

James  Hopkins,  New-Jerfey 

Samuel  Harrifon,        do. 

Wm.  Henderfon,  Montgomery  County,  Pennfylvania 

James  Henderfon,  Peterlburgh,  Virginia 

Chriftopher  Heydrick,  Chefnut  Hill 

J.  E. -Howard,  Philadelphia 

Samuel  Hall,  Bofton,  3  copies 

James  Hughes,  Bofton 

B.  Humphreville,  Annapolis 

George  Hill,  book-feller,  Baltimore,  to  copies 

Mr.  Cyrus  Jacobs,  Lancafter  County,  Pennfylvania 


Lift  of  Sulfcribcrs* 

Mr.  George  Jennings,  Hagerilown,  Maryland 

K 
Mr.  Hazen  Kihiball,  Concord,  New-Hampfhire 

L 

Robert  tifton,  Efq.  Minifter  Plenipotentiary  from  His  Britan- 
nic Majefty  to  the  United  States 
John  Lawrence,  Efq.  Woodbury,  New-Jerfey 
Wm.  Lee,  Efq.  Philadelphia 
Mr.  Martin  Lincoln,  Hingham,  Maflachufetts 

J.  Lee,  jun.  Bofton 

N.  C.  Lee,       do. 

David  Lewis,  Philadelphia 

Jacob  Lahn,  book-feller,  Lancaster,  2  copies 

M 

Alexander  Martin,  Efq.  memb.  of  the  Sen.  of  the  U.  S. 
Wm.  V.  Murray,  Efq.  memb.  of  the  H.  of  Rep.  of  the  U.  S. 
Benjamin  R.  Morgan,  Efq.  memb.  of  the  Sen,  of  Perm. 
A.  M'Lane,  Efq.  Duck-Creek,  Delaware 
Meflrs.  Morgan  &  Wigmore,  Philadelphia 
Mr.  Michael  Margrath,  do. 

Wm.  Maiben,  do. 

John  Morrifon,  Peterftmrgh,  Virginia 

Francis  Muir,  do. 

James  M'Farland,       do. 

Daniel  Mafon,  Chelfea,  Maflachufetts 

Jofeph  M'Kean,  Berwick,     do. 

Jonathan  Mafon,  jun.  Brooklyn,  do. 

Algernon  Sidney  Magaw,  Philadelphia 

N 

Rev.  Wm.  Niles,  Ifland  St.  Croix 
Wm.  Nichols,  Efq.  Philadelphia 
Mr.  Thomas  Nevein,  Peterfburgh,  Virginia 
,      Richard  North,  Philadelphia 
Thomas  Noble,          do. 
Charles  Newbold,      do. 

Greenbury  Neale,  Eafton,  Maryland,  12  copied 
Jofeph  Nancrede,  book-feller,  Bofton,  3  copies 

O 

Davies  Old,  Efq.  Lancafter  County,  Penn. 

Samuel  Ogden,  Efq.  Newark,  N.  Jerfey 

Mr.  John  Ormrod,  book-feller,  Philadelplu'a,  25  copies* 


Lift  of  Subfcribers. 
P 

Mr.  Edward  Pennington,  Philadelphia 

Samuel  P.  Paul.  N.  Jerfey 

Robert  Pain,  Bofton 

John  Phillips,  Andover,  Maffachufetts 

Wm.  Parfons,  Bofton 

James  Perkins,     do. 

Graham  Parfons,  do. 

Jofeph  Parotte,  Annapolis 

Meflrs.  Pritchard  &  Davidfon,  book-fellers,  Richmond, Virginia, 
30  copies 


Wm.  Rawle,  Efq.  Philadelphia 

Richard  Rundle,  Efq.     do. 

Herman  Witfms  Ryland,  Efq.  Quebec 

John  Read,  Efq.  Philadelphia 

Hugh  Rofe,  Efq.  Ifland  of  Barbadoes 

Mr.  Richard  Renfhaw,  Philadelphia 

James  Robertfon,  do. 

Copely  Rofe,  do. 

John  Wm.  Rufiell,  Prefqu'ifle 

David  Robertfon,  Peterfburgh,  Virginia 

Duncan  Rofe,  do. 

Henry  Rigal,  Philadelphia 

S 

Ld.  Hemy  Stuart 

Wm.  Smith,  Efq.  memb.  of  the  H.  of  Rep.  of  the  U.  S. 

Ifaac  Smith,  Efq.  Trenton 

Zephaniah  Swift,  Efq.  memb.  of  the  H.  of  Rep.  of  the  U.  S. 

Jeremiah  Smith,  Efq.  memb.  of  the  H.  of  Rep.  of  the  U.  S. 

L.  H.  Stockton,  Efq.  Trenton 

Samuel  Sitgreaves,  Efq.  memb.  of  the  H.  of  Rep.  of  the  U.  S* 

Major  John  Shippen,  Shippenfburgh,  Penn. 

Mr.  John  Shields,  Philadelphia 

Wm.  Sanfom,          do. 

V.  Shoemaker,        do. 

Charles  Snowden,   do. 

H.  Sweitzer,  do. 

J.  Wm.  Smith,  Princeton 

John  Sohier,  Bofton 

Daniel  Sergent,  jun.  do. 

Jonathan  Shaw,  Raynham,  Maflachufetts 

VOL.  I.  e 


Lift  of  Subfcribers. 

Mr.  John  Wm.  Seabury,  Taunton,  Maffachufetts 
Ifaac  Smith,  Baltimore 
I.  T.  Sergent,  Bofton 

T 

Uriah  Tracey,  Efq.  memb.  of  the  Sen.  of  the  U.  S. 

Ifaac  Tichenor,  Efq.  memb.  of  the  Sen.  of  the  U.  S. 

George  Thatcher,  Efq.  memb.  of  the  H.  of  Rep.  of  the  U.  S, 

Edward  Thornton,  Efq.  Sec'y  of  the  legation  from  His  Britain 
nic  Majefty  to  the  United  States 

Jofeph  Thomas,  Efq.  Philadelphia 

Mr.  James  Taylor,  do. 

James  Thompfon,  York  County,  Pennfylvania 
James  Taggard,  Gloucefter  County,  New-Jerfey 
Thomas  Thaxter,  jun.  Hingham,  Mafiachufetts 
Alexander  Turner,  Philadelphia 
Richard  B.  Thompfon,  do. 

W 

The  Right  Rev.  Biftiop  White 

Wm.  Walter,  D.  D.  Reftor  of  Chrift  Church,  Bofton 
Rev.  Henry  Ware,  Hingham,  Maffachufetts 
ThomaB  Wilkins,  Efq.  Swedefborough,  N.  Jerfey 
A.  D.  Woodruff,  Efq.  New-Jerfey 
James  Warrington,  Efq.  S.  Car. 
Dr.  Ifaac  Wafburn,  RaynhanvMaffachufetts 
Mr.  Oliver  Wafhburn,  do. 

John  Waddington,  Philadelphia 

J.  G.  Watchfmuth.       do. 

Timothy  Williams,  Bofton 

James  White,  do.     6  Copies 

Y 

John  T.  Young,  M.  D.  Philadelphia 

Meffrs.  Young,  Mills  &  Son,  book-fellers,  Philad.  10  copies 


CONTENTS. 


CONTENTS. 


LETTER  PAGE 

I.     pReliminary  Observations        —  3 

II. 5 

DEMOCRATICAL    REPUBLICS. 

III.  St.  Marino            —          —          —  8 

IV.  Biscay                 —           —         —  16 
The  Grisons             —             —  21 
The  United  Provinces  of  the  Low 

Countries           —            —  22 

V.     Switzerland        —             — .     —  ib. 

.   Appenzel                —             —  23 

VI.     Underwald        —         —           —  26 

VII.     Claris                         —          —  28 

VIII.     Zug  3I 

IX.  Vri 


XXX 


CONTENTS. 


LETTER 

IX.     Uri 
X.     Switz 


PAGE 


—  34 


ARISTOCRATICAL  REPUBLICS. 

XI.     Berne             —  — 

XII.     Fribourg            — *  — 

XIII.  Sokure              ~  — 

XIV.  Lucerne             —  — 
XV.     Zurich        ~  —           — 

XVI.     Schaffhause  — 

Mulhouse — Bienne  -— 

XVIL    St.  Gall            —,  +- 

Geneva        —  —          — - 

XVIII.    Lucca — Genoa  —          • — 

XIX.     Venice        —  —          — 
The  United  Provinces  of  the  Low 

Countries  —          — 


35 

39 
42 

45 
47 
49 


52 
56 
58 

69 


MONARCHICAL    REPUBLICS, 

XX.     England        •—* •          <—• 
XXI. 

xxii, 

XXIII.    Recapitulation  «-••          -— 


70 

7« 
74 


ANCIENT 


CONTENTS. 


BETTER  PAGE 

ANCIENT    REPUBLICS,    AND  OPINIONS  OF 

PHILOSOPHERS. 

XXIV.    Dr.  Swift  —  —         97 

XXV.    Dr.  Franklin  —  105 

XXVI.    Dr.  Price  —         —          121 

MIXED    GOVERNMENTS. 

XXVII.     Machiavel  —         —          141 

Sidney  —  —  148 

XXVIII.    Montesquieu        —          —          153 

ANCIENT  REPUBLICS,  AND  OPINIONS  C?F 
PHILOSOPHERS. 

XXIX.  Harrington        —  —  158 

XXX.  Polybius  —  —  169 

XXXI.  Polylius  —  —  177 

XXXII.  Dionysius  Halicarnassensis  —  Va- 

lerius —         —         184 

XXXIII.  Plato  —      '      —  1  88 

XXXIV.  Sir  Thomas  Smith  ~~~  207 

ANCIENT  DEMOCRATICAL  REPUBLICS. 

XXXV.    Carthage  —  —         210 

ANCIENT 


sxxii  CONTENTS. 

1ETTER  PAGE 

ANCIENT  ARISTOCRATICAL  REPUBLICS. 

XXXVI.    Rome  —  215 

ANCIENT  MONARCHICAL  REPUBLICS. 

XXXVII.     Tacitus  •—  225 

XXXVIII.     Homer—  Phtacia  —  232 

XXXIX.     Homer— Ithaca  237 

Homer            —  —  243 

ANCIENT  ARISTOCRATICAL  REPUBLICS. 

^  XL.    Lacedamon  -*•  249 

ANCIENT  DEMOCRATICAL  REPUBLICS. 

XLI.  ^<w  260 

XLII.  dntalcidas  —  286 

XLIII.  Achaia  —  —          295 

XLIV.  Crete  305 

XLV.  Corinth  308 

XL  VI.  Argos  311 

XLVII.  Iphitus  315 

XLVIII.  rfeiw  318 

ANCIENT  ARISTOCRATICAL  REPUBLICS- 

XLIX.     Crotona — Pythagoras  322 

ANCIENT 


CONTENTS.  xxxiii 


\, 


LETTER  PAGE 
ANCIENT  DEMOCRATICAL  REPUBLICS- 

L.     Sylaris—Charondas  —              327 

LL     Locris^-Zaleucus  -**              331 

LII.    Rome           —  —         334 

CONCLUSION. 

LIII.     Congress            —        —  362; 

LIV.    Locke,  Milton*  and  Hume  365 

LV»     Conclusion            —  —             372 

Postscript            —  —             383 


LETTER 


v-  •  .   r       ^v. 

^  OF  THE  X 

tTNIVERSITY  \ 

~ 


LETTER    i. 

Oflober  4., 


My  dear  Sir, 

THREE  writers  in  Europe  of  great  abili- 
ties, reputation  and  learning,  Mr.  Turgot, 
the  Abbe  De  Mably,  and  Dr.  Price,  have  turned 
their  attention  to  the  conftitutions  of  government 
in  the  United  States  of  America,  and  have  writ- 
ten and  publifhed  their  criticifms  and  advice. 
They  had  all  the  moft  amiable  characters,  and 
unqueftionably  the  pureft  intentions.  They  had 
all  experience  in  public  affairs,  and  ample  in- 
formation in  the  nature  of  man,  the  neceflities 
of  fociety,  and  the  fcience  of  government. 

There  are  in  the  productions  of  all  of  them, 
among  many  excellent  things,  fome  fentiments, 
however,  that  it  will  be  difficult  to  reconcile  to 
reafon,  experience,  the  conftitution  of  human  na- 
ture, or  to  the  uniform  teftimony  of  the  greateft 
ftatefmen,  legiflators,  and  philofophers  of  all  en- 
lightened nations,  ancient  and  modern. 

Mr.  Turgot,  in  his   letter  to  Dr.  Price,  con- 

feffes,  <c  that  he  is  not  fatisfied  with  the  confti- 

"  tutions  which  have  hitherto  been  formed  for 

"  the  different  ftates  of  America."    He  obferves, 

"  that  by  moft  of  them  the  cuftoms  of   England 

'  are   imitated,  without   any  particular  motive. 

:  Inftead  of  collecting  all  authority  into  one  cen- 

"  tre,  that  of  the  nation,  they  have  eftablifhed 

VOL.  I.  A  «  different 


4  Preliminary  Olfervations. 

"  different  bodies,  a  body  of  reprefe  natives,  a 
"  council,  and  a  governor,  becaufe  there  is  in 
"  England  a  houfe  of  commons,  a  houfe  of 
"  lords,  and  a  king.  They  endeavour  to  ba- 
"  lance  thefe  different  powers,  as  if  this  eqiii- 
"  librium,  which  in  England  may  be  a  neceffary 
"  check  to  the  enormous  influence  of  royalty, 
"  could  be  of  any  ufe  in  republics  founded  up- 
"  on  the  equality  of  ail  the  citizens,  and  as  if 
"  eftablifhing  different  orders  of  men  was  not  a 
"  fource  of  divifions  and  difputes." 

There  has  been,  from  the  beginning  of  the  re- 
volution in  America,  a  party  in  every  ftate,  who 
have  entertained  fentiments  fimilar  to  thefe  of  Mr. 
Turgot.  Two  or  three  of  them  have  eflablifhed 
governments  upon  his  principle  :  and,  by  ad- 
vices from  Bofton,  certain  committees  of  coun- 
ties have  been  held,  and  other  conventions  pro- 
pofed  in  the  MafTachufetts,  with  the  exprefs  pur- 
pofe  of  depofing  the  governor  and  fenate  as  ufe- 
lefs  and  expenfive  branches  of  the  confthution ; 
and  as  it  is  probable  that  the  publication  of  Mr* 
Turgot's  opinion  has  contributed  to  excite  fuch 
difcontents  among  the  people,  it  becomes  nece£ 
fary  to  examine  it,  and,  if  it  can  be  fhown  to  be 
an  error,  whatever  veneration  the  Americans  very 
juftly  entertain  for  his  memory,  it  is  to  be  hoped 
they  will  not  be  mi  fled  by  his  authority* 


LETTER 


f  •     ^T**      < 

ITTHIV 

\4^|t^: 
Preliminary  Obfervations.  5 


LETTER     II. 

My  dear  Sir, 

MR.  Turgot  is  offended,  becaufe  the  cuftoms 
of  England  are  imitated  in  moft  of  the 
new  conftitutions  in  America,  without  any  par- 
ticular motive.  But,  if  we  fuppofe  that  Englifh 
cuftoms  were  neither  good  nor  evil  in  themfelves, 
and  merely  indifferent ;  and  the  people,  by  their 
birth,  education,  and  habits,  were  familiarly  at- 
tached to  them  ;  was  not  this  a  motive  particular 
enough  for  their  prefervation,  rather  than  endan- 
ger the  public  tranquillity,  or  unanimity,  by  re- 
nouncing them?  If  thole  cuftoms  were  wife, 
juft,  and  good,  and  calculated  to  fecure  the  li- 
berty, property,  and  fafety  of  the  people,  as  well 
or  better  than  any  other  inftitutions  ancient  or 
modern,  would  Mr.  Turgot  have  advifed  the  na- 
tion to  reject  them,  merely  becaufe  it  was  at  that 
time  juftly  incenfed  againft  the  Englifh  govern- 
ment ? — What  Englifh  cuftoms  have  they  retained 
which  may  with  any  propriety  be  called  evil? 
Mr.  Turgot  has  inftanced  only  in  one,  viz.  "  that 
"  a  body  of  reprefentatives,  a  council,  and  a  go- 
"  vernor,  have  been  eftablifhed,  becaufe  there  is 
"  in  England  a  houfe  of  commons,  a  houfe  of 
"  lords,  and  a  king."  It  was  not  fo  much  be- 
caufe the  legiflature  in  England  confifted  of  three 
branches,  that  fuch  a  divifion  of  power  was 
adopted  by  the  ftates,  as  becaufe  their  own  af- 
femblies  had  ever  been  fo  conftituted.  It  was  not 
fo  much  from  attachment  by  habit  to  fuch  a  plan 
of  power,  as  from  conviction  that  it  was  founded 
in  nature  and  reafon,  that  it  was  continued. 

Mr. 


§  Preliminary  Qbfe 

Mr.  Turgot  feems  to  be  of  a  different  opinion, 
and  is  for  "  collecting  all  authority  into  one  cen-* 
"  tre,  the  nation."     It  is  eafily  underftood  how 
all  authority  may  be  collected  into  "  one  centre" 
in  a  defpot  or  monarch;  but  how  it  can  be  done, 
when  the  centre  is  to  be  the  nation,  is  more  diffi- 
cult to  comprehend,     Before  we  attempt  to  dik 
cufs  the  notions  of  an  author,  we  fhould  be  care^ 
ful  to  afcertain  his  meaning.     It  will  not  be  eafy, 
after  the   moft  anxious  refearch,  to  difcover  the 
true  fenfe  of  this  extraordinary  pafTage.    If,  after 
the  pains  of  "  collecting  all  authority  into,  one 
"  centre,"  that  centre  is  to  be  the  nation,  we 
fhall  remain  exactly  where  we  began,  and  no  col- 
lection of  authority  at  all  will  be  made.    The  na- 
tion will  be  the  authority,  and  the  authority  the 
nation.     The  centre  will  be  the  circle,  and  the 
circle  the  centre.  When  a  number  of  men,  women 
and  children,  are  fimply  congregated  together, 
there  is  no  political  authority  among  them;  nor  any 
natural  authority,  bur  that  of  parents  over  their 
children.    To  leave  the  women  and  children  out 
of  the  queftion  for  the  prefent,  the  men  will  all 
be  equal,  free,  and  independent  of  each  other. 
Not  one  will  have   any  authority  over  any  other. 
The  firft  "  collection''  of  authority  mufi  be  an 
unanimous  agreement  to  form  themfelves  into  a 
nation,  people,  community,  or  body  politic,  and  to 
be   governed    by    the    majority  of  fuffrages  or 
voices.     But  even  in  this  cafe,  although  the  au- 
thority is  collected  into  one  centre,  that  centre  is 
no  longer  the  nation,    but  the  majority  of  the 
nation.     Did  Mr.  Turgot  mean,  that  the  people 
of  Virginia,  for  example,  half  a  million  of  fouls 
fcattered  over  a  territory  of  two  hundred  leagues 
fquare,  fhould  flop  here,  and  have  no  other  au- 
thority 


Preliminary  Olfervations.  tj 

thority  by  which  to  make  or  execute  a  law*  oy 
judge  a  caufe,  but  by  a  vote  of  the  whole  peo* 
pie,  and  the  decifion  of  a  majority!  Where  is 
the  plain  large  enough  to  hold  them ;  and  what 
are  the  means,  and  how  long  would  be  the  time, 
neceflary  to  afTemble  them  together  ? 

A  iimple  and  perfect  democracy  never  yet  ex- 

ifted  among  men.  If  a  village  of  half  a  mile 
fquare,  and  one  hundred  families,  is  capable  of 
exerciiing  all  the  legiflative,  executive,  and  judi-^ 
cial  powers,  in  public  affemblies  of  the  whole, 
by  unanimous  votes,  or  by  majorities,  it  is  more 
than  has  ever  yet  been  proved  in  theory  or  expe- 
rience. In  fuch  a  democracy,  the  moderator 
would  be  king,  the  town-clerk  legislator  and 
judge,  and  the  conftable  Iheriff,  for  the  moft 
part;  and,  upon  more  important  occafions,  com- 
mittees would  be  only  the  counfellors  of  both  the 
former,  and  commanders  of  the  latter. 

Shall  we  fuppofe  then,  that  Mr,  Turgot  in- 
tended, that  an  aflembly  of  reprefentatives  mould 
be  chofen  by  the  nation,  and  vefted  with  all  the 
powers  of  government;  and  that  this  aflembly 
fhall  be  the  centre  in  which  all  the  authority  (hall 
be  colle&ed,  and  fhall  be  virtually  deemed  the 
nation.  After  long  refle&ion,  I  have  not  been 
able  to  difcover  any  other  fenfe  in  his  words,  and 
this  was  probably  his  real  meaning.  To  examine 
this  fyflem  in  detail  may  be  thought  as  trifling  an 
occupation,;  as  the  laboured  reafonings  of  Sidney 
and  Locke,  to  mew  the  abfurdity  of  Filmar's 
fuperftitious  notions,  appeared  to  Mr,  Hume  in 
his  enlightened  days.  Yet  the  miftakes  of  great 
men,  and  even  the  abfurdities  of  fools,  when 
they  countenance  the  prejudices  of  numbers  of 
people,  efpecially  in  a  young  country,  and  under 
new  governments,  cannot  be  too  fully  confuted. 

You 


'•V- 


8  Democratic  a  I  Repullics. 

You  will  not  then  efteem  my  time  or  your  own 
mifpent,  in  placing  this  idea  of  Mr.  Turgot  in 
all  its  lights ;  in  confidering  the  confequences  of 
it;  and  in  colle&ing  a  variety  of  authorities 
againft  it. 


LETTER     III. 

ST.      MARINO. 

My  Dear  Sir, 

SOCIETY  °f  goc*s  would  govern  them- 
"  felves  democratically,"  fays  the  eloquent 
philofopher  of  Geneva;  who  however  would 
have  agreed,  that  his  "  gods"  muft  not  have 
been  the  claffical  deities;  iince  he  knew  from  the 
higheft  authority,  the  poets,  who  had  their  infor- 
mation from  thofe  divinities  the  Mufes,  that  all 
the  terrors  of  the  nod,  the  arm,  and  the  thun- 
derbolts of  Jupiter,  with  all  the  energy  of  his 
undifputed  monarchy,  were  infufficient  to  hold 
them  in  order.  As  it  is  impoffible  to  know  what 
would  have  been  his  definition  of  the  gods,  we 
may  quietly  purfue  our  inquiry,  whether  it  is 
practicable  to  govern  men  in  this  way.  It  would 
be  very  furprifmg,  if,  among  all  the  nations 
that  have  exifted,  not  one  has  difcovered  a  fccret 
of  fo  much  importance.  It  is  not  neceflary  for 
us  to  prove  that  no  fuch  government  has  exifted ; 
it  is  incumbent  on  him  who  fhall  embrace  the 
opinion  of  Mr.  Turgot,  to  name  the  age,  the 
country,  and  the  people,  in  which  fuch  an  ex- 
periment has  been  tried.  It  might  be  eafier  to 
determine  the  queftion  concerning  the  pradicabi- 


<$/<  Marino.  9 

lity  or  impracticability,  the  utility  or  inutility,  of 
a  limple  democracy,  if  we  could  find  a  number 
of  examples  of  it.  From  the  frightful  pictures 
of  a  democratical  city,  drawn  by  the  mafterly 
pencils  of  ancient  philofophers  and  hiitorians,  it 
may  be  conjectured  that  fuch  governments  exifted 
in  Greece  and  Italy,  at  leaft  for  fhort  fpaces  of 
time:  but  no  particular  hiftory  of  any  one  of 
them  is  come  down  to  us;  nor  are  we  able  to 
procure  any  more  fatisfadtion  to  our  curioiity 
from  modern  hiftory.  If  fuch  a  phenomenon  is 
at  this  time  to  be  feen  in  the  world,  it  is  pro- 
bably in  fome  of  thofe  itates  which  have  the 
name  of  democracies,  or  at  leaft  in  fuch  as  have 
preferved  fome  fhare  in  the  government  to  the 
people.  Let  us  travel  to  fome  of  thofe  countries, 
and  examine  their  laws. 

The  republic  of  St.  Marino,  in  Italy,  is  fome- 
times  quoted  as  an  inftance ;  and  therefore  it  is 
of  fome  importance  to  examine,  i.  Whether  in 
fact  this  is  a  iimple  democracy;  and,  2.  Whe- 
ther, if  it  were  fuch,  it  is  not  owing  to  particu- 
lar circumftances,  which  do  not  belong  to  any 
other  people,  and  prove  it  to  be  improper  for  any 
other,  efpecially  the  United  States  of  America, 
to  attempt  to  imitate  it. 

The  republic  of  St.  Marino,  as  Mr.  Addifon 
informs  us,  ftands  on  the  top  of  a  very  high 
and  craggy  mountain,  generally  hid  among  the 
clouds,  and  fometimes  under  Ihow,  even  whea 
the  weather  is  clear  and  warm  in  all  the  country 
about  it. 

This  mountain,  and  a  few  hillocks  that  lie 
fcattered  about  the  bottom  of  it,  is  the  whole 
circuit  of  the  dominion.  They  have,  what  they 
call,  three  caitles,  three  convents,  and  five 

churches, 


Democratical  Republic 


s. 


churches,  and  reckon  about  five  thoufand  fouls  iri 
their  community. 

St.  Marino  was  its  founder,  a  Dalmatian  by 
birth,  and  by  trade  a  mafon.  He  was  employed* 
about  thirteen  hundred  years  ago,  in  the  repara- 
tion of  Rimini,  and  after  he  had  finiihed  his  work, 
retired  to  this  folitary  mountain  as  very  proper 
for  the  life  of  a  hermit,  which  he  led  in  the 
greateft  aufterities  of  religion.  He  had  not  been 
long  here,  before  he  wrought  a  reputed  miracle> 
which,  joined  with  his  extraordinary  fanclityj 
gained  him  fo  great  an  efteem,  that  the  princefs 
of  the  country  made  him  a  prefent  of  the  moun- 
tain, to  difpofe  of  it  at  his  discretion*  His  repu- 
tation quickly  peopled  it,  and  gave  rife  to  the 
republic  which  calls  itfelf  after  his  name.  The 
beft  of  their  churches  is  dedicated  to  the  faint, 
and  holds  his  afhes.  Jftis  ftatue  ftands  over  the 
high  altar,  with  the  figure  of  a  mountain  in  his 
hands,  crowned  with  three  caftles,  which  is  like- 
wife  the  arms  of  the  commonwealth.  They  at- 
tribute to  his  protection  the  long  duration  of  the 
ftate,  and  look  on  him  the  greateft  faint  next  the 
blefled  Virgin.  In  their  ftatute-book  is  a  law 
againft  fuch  as  fpeak  difrefpectfully  of  him,  who 
are  to  be  punilhed  in  the  fame  manner  as  thofe 
who  are  convicted  of  blafphemy.  This  petty 
republic  has  lafted  thirteen  hundred  years,  while 
all  the  Qther  ftates  of  Italy  have  feveral  times 
changed  their  matters  and  forms  of  government^ 
Their  whole  hiftory  coniifts  in  two  purchafes  ojf 
a  neighbouring  prince,  and  two  wars,  in  which 
they  affifted  the  pope  againft  a  lord  of  Rimini. 

They  would  probably  fell  their  liberty  as  dear 
as  they  could  to  any  that  attacked  them  ;  for 
there  is  but  one  road  by  which  to  climb  up  to 

them. 


St.  Marino.  n 

them*     All  that  are  capable  of  bearing  arms,  are 
exercifed,  and  ready  at  a  moment's  call. 

The  fovereign  power  of  the  republic  was 
lodged,  originally,  in  what  they  call  the  arengoy 
a  great  council,  in  which  every  houfe  had  its  re- 
prefentative  j  but,  becaufe  they  found  too  much 
confufion  in  fuch  a  multitude  of  ftatefmen,  they 
devolved  their  whole  authority  into  the  hands  of 
the  council  of  iixty.  The  arengo,  however,  is 
Hill  called  together  in  cafes  of  extraordinary  im- 
portance; and  if,  after  due  tummons,  any  mem- 
ber abfents  himfeif,  he  is  to  be  fined.  In  the 
ordinary  courfe  of  government,  me  council  of 
iixty,  which,  notwithftanding  the  came,  confifts 
but  of  forty  perfons,  has  in  its  hands  the  admi- 
niftration  of  affairs,  and  is  made  up  of  half  out 
of  the  noble  families,  and  half  out  of  the  ple- 
beian. They  decide  all  by  ballotting,  are  not 
admitted  until  five-and-twenty  years  old,  and 
choofe  the  officers  of  the  commonwealth. 

No  fentence  can  (land  that  is  not  confirmed  by 
two-thirds  of  this  council ;  no  fon  can  be  admitted 
into  it  during  the  life  of  his  father,  nor -two  be  in 
it  of  the  fame  family,  nor  any  enter  but  by  ele&ion. 
The  chief  officers  of  the  commonwealth  are  the  two 
capitaneos,  who  have  fuch  a  power  as  the  old  Roman 
confuls  had,  but  are  chofen  every  fix  months.  Some 
have  been  cafitaneos  fix  or  feven  times,  though  the 
office  is  never  to  be  continued  to  the  fame  perfons 
twice  fucceffively.  The  third  officer  is  the  com- 
miffary,  who  judges  in  all  civil  and  criminal 
matters  :  but  becaufe  the  many  alliances,  friend- 
fhips,  and  intermarriages,  as  well  as  the  perfonal 
feuds  and  animofities  that  happen  among  fo  fmall 
a  people,  might  obftrudt  the  courfe  of  juftice,  if 
one  of  their  own  number  had  the  diftribution  of 
it,  they  have  always  a  foreigner  for  this  employ, 

VOL.  I.  B  whom 


1 z  Democratic  at  Republics.  » 

whom  they  choofe  for  three  years,  and  maintain 
out  of  the  public  ftock.  He  muft  be  a  do&or 
of  law,  and  a  man  of  known  integrity.  He  is 
joined  in  commiffion  with  the  capitaneos,  and  a6ts 
fomething  like  the  recorder  of  London  under  the 
lord  Mayor.  The  fourth  man  in  the  ftate  is  the 
phyfician:  another  perfon,  who  makes  no  ordi- 
nary figure  in  the  republic,  is  the  fchoolmafter<, 
Few  in  the  place  but  have  fome  tincture  of 
learning. 

The  people  are  efteemed  very  honeft,  and  ri- 
gorous in  the  execution  of  juftice,  and  feem  to 
live  more  happy  and  contented  among  their  rocks 
and  fnows,  than  others  of  the  Italians  do  in  the 
pleafanteft  vallies  in  the  world.  Nothing  indeed 
can  be  a  greater  initance  of  the  natural  love 
mankind  has  for  liberty,  and  of  their  averfion 
to  arbitrary  government,  than  fuch  a  favage 
mountain  covered  with  people,  and  the  Campa- 
nia of  Rome  which  lies  in  the  fame  country, 
almoft  deftitute  of  inhabitants. 

This  is  the  account  of  St.  Marino.  Yet,  if 
all  authority  is  here  collected  in  one  centre,  that 
centre  is  not  the  nation.  Although  the  original 
reprefentation  in  the  arengo  was  of  houfes,  that  is 
to  fay,  of  property,  rather  than  of  the  perfons 
of  the  citizens,  and  confequently  not  very  equal, 
as  it  excluded  all  perfon al  property,  as  well  as 
all  who  had  no  property;  yet  even  fuch  an 
agrarian,  it  feems,  was  not  a  fufficient  check 
to  licentioufnefs,  and  they  found  it  neceflary  to 
inftitute  a  fenate  of  forty  men.  Here,  at  leaft, 
commenced  as  complete  an  ariftocracy  as  that  of 
ancient  Rome;  or,  to  exprefs  it  more  exadly,  as 
complete  a  feparation  of  the  ariftocratical  from 
the  democratical  part  of  the  community :  and 
there  are  two  remarkable  circumftances  in  confir- 
mation 


St.  Marino.  13 

mation  of  this  ;  one  is,  that  there  are  not  only 
noble  families  in  this  illaftriffima  republicd  Sanfii 
Marini,  but  the  conftitution  has  limited  the  choice 
of  the  eleftors  fo  far  as  to  oblige  them  to  choofe 
one  half  the  fenate  out  of  thefe  nobles  ;  the  other 
is,  that  the  names  of  the  agents  for  the  common- 
wealth, of  the  notary,  and  the  witnefles  to  two 
mftruments  of  purchafes  made  at  feventy  years 
diflance  from  one  another,  one  in  noo,  the  other 
in  1170,  are  the  fame. — It  is  not  credible  that 
they  were  the  fame  perfons  :  they  were  probably 
ions  or  grandfons — which  is  a  ftrong  proof  of 
the  attachment  to  ariftocratical  families  in  this 
little  ftate,  and  of  their  defire  to  continue  the 
fame  blood  and  the  fame  names  in  public  em- 
ployments, like  the  Oranges,  Fagels,  De  Lin- 
dens, &c.  in  Holland,  and  like  innumerable  other 
examples  in  all  nations. 

Another  remarkable  circumftance  is,  the  reluc- 
tance of  the  citizens  to  attend  the  afiembly  of  the 
arengOy  which  obliged  them  to  make  a  law,  oblig- 
ing themfelves  to  attend,  upon  a  penalty.  This  is 
a  defeat,  and  a  misfortune  natural  to  every  de- 
mocratical  conflitution,  and  to  the  popular  part 
of  every  mixed  government.  A  general  or  too 
common  diiinclination  to  attend,  leaves  room  for 
perfons  and  parties  more  a&ive  to  carry  points 
by  faftion  and  intrigue,  which  the  majority,  if 
all  were  prefent,  would  not  approve. 

It  is  curious  to  fee  how  many  checks  and  li- 
mitations are  contrived  for  this  legiilative  afTem- 
bly.  Half  nobles,  half  plebeians — all  upwards 
of  five-and-twenty  years  old — two-thirds  rnuil 
agree — no  fon  can  lit  with  his  father  ;  never  two 
of  the  fame  family. 

The  capitaneos  have  the  executive,  like  the  Ro- 
man confuls,  and  the  commhTary  has  the  judi- 
cial. 


J4  Democratical  Republics. 

cial. — Here  again  are  remarkable  limitations  : 
he  muft  be  a  foreigner,  and  he  is  for  three  years. 
This  is  to  give  fome  degree  of  ftability  to  the  ju- 
dicial power,  and  to  make  it  a  real  and  powerful 
check  both  to  the  executive  and  legiflative. 

We  are  not  indeed  told  whether  the  council  of 
forty  are  eleded  annually  or  for  life.  Mr.  Addi- 
fon  may,  from  his  well-known  character,  be  fup- 
pofed  to  have  been  more  attentive  to  the  grand 
and  beautiful  monuments  of  ancient  arts  of  every 
kind  which  furrounded  him  in  Italy,  than  to  this 
rough  hillock,  although  the  form  of  government 
might  have  excited  his  curiofity,  and  the  fimpli-' 
city  of  manners  his  efteem  ;  he  has  accordingly 
given  a  very  imperfect  fketch  of  its  conftitution. 
and  hiftory,  Yet  enough  appears  to  mew  incon- 
teftibly,  that  St.  Marino  is  by  no  means  a  per-* 
feel:  democracy.  It  is  a  mixture  of  monarchy, 
ariftocracy,  and  democracy,  as  really  as  Sparta 
or  Rome  were,  and  as  the  Maffachufetts,  New- 
York,  and  Maryland  now  are,  in  which  the  pow- 
ers of  the  governor,  fenate,  and  aflembly,  are  more 
exaclly  afcertained  and  nicely  balanced,  but  they 
are  not  more  diftincl:  than  thofe  of  the  cafitaneos, 
council  of  forty,  and  the  arengo  are  in  St.  Ma- 
rino. 

Should  it  be  argued,  that  a  government  like 
this,  where  the  fovereignty  reiides  in  the  whole 
body  of  the  people,  is  a  democracy,  it  may  be 
anfwered,  that  the  right  of  fovereignty  in  all  na- 
tions is  unalienable  and  indivifible,  and  does  and 
can  refide  no  where  elfe;  but  not  to  recur  to  a 
principle  fo  general,  the  exercife,  as  well  as  right 
of  fovereignty,  in  Rome,  refided  in  the  people,  but 
the  government  was  not  a  democracy.  In  Ame- 
rica, the  right  of  fovereignty  refides  indifputably 
in  the  body  of  the  people,  and  they  have  the 

whole 


St.  Marino.  15 

whole  property  of  land.  There  are  no  nobles  or 
patricians — all  are  equal  by  law  and  by  birth. 
The  governors  and  fenates,  as  well  as  reprefenta- 
tive  aflemblies,  to  whom  the  exercife  of  fove- 
reignty  is  committed,  are  annually  chofen.  Go- 
vernments more  democratical  never  exifted ;  they 
are  vaftly  more  fo  than  St.  Marino.  Yet  the  an- 
nual adminiftration  is  divided  into  executive,  le- 
giflative,  and  judicial  powers  ;  and  the  legiflature 
itfelf  is  divided  into  monarchical,  ariftocratical, 
and  democratical  branches ;  and  an  equilibrium 
has  been  anxioufly  fought  for  in  all  their  deli- 
berations and  actions,  with  infinitely  more  art, 
judgment,  and  fkill,  than  appears  in  this  little 
Italian  commonwealth. 

The  liberty  and  the  honefty  of  thefe  people  is 
not  at  all  furpriiing.  In  fo  fmall  a  ftate,  where 
every  man  perfonally  knows  every  other,  let  the 
form  of  government  be  what  it  will,  it  is  fcarcely 
poflible  that  any  thing  like  tyranny  or  cruelty  can 
take  place.  A  king,  or  a  decemvirate  intrufted 
with  the  government,  would  feel  the  cenfures  of 
the  people,  and  be  conftantly  confcious  of  the 
facility  of  aflembling  the  whole,  and  apprehenlive 
of  an  exertion  of  their  ftrength. 

The  poverty  of  this  people  appears,  by  the 
fine  of  one  penny  impofed  upon  ablence  from  the 
arengo ;  and  by  the  law,  that  an  ambaflador 
mould  have  a  milling  a  day.  This  however  is  a 
falary  in  proportion  to  the  numbers  of  the  people, 
as  thirty  guineas  a  day  would  be  to  an  ambaf- 
fador  from  the  United  States.  It  appears  alfo, 
from  the  phyliciau's  being  obliged  to  keep  a 
horfe,  probably  there  is  not  a  carriage,  nor  ano- 
ther faddle-horfe  in  the  commonwealth. 

An  handful  of  poor  people  living  in  the  fim- 
pleft  manner,  by  hard  labour,  upon  the  produce 

of 


1 6  Democratical  Republics. 

of  a  few  cows,  fheep,  goats,  fwine,  poultry,  and 
pigeons,  on  a  piece  of  rocky,  fnowy  ground,  pro- 
tected from  every  enemy  by  their  fituation,  their 
fuperftition,  and  even  by  their  poverty,  having 
no  commerce  nor  luxury,  can  be  no  example 
for  the  commonwealth  of  Pennfylvania,  Georgia, 
or  Vermont,  in  one  of  which  there  are  poflibly 
half  a  million  of  people,  and  in  each  of  the 
other,  at  leafl  thirty  thoufand,  fcattered  over  a 
large  territory. 

Upon  the  whole,  a  ftronger  proof  cannot  be 
adduced  of  the  neceflity  of  different  orders,  and 
of  an  equilibrium  between  them,  than  this  com- 
monwealth of  St.  Marino,  where  there  are  fuch 
ftrong  fymptoms  of  both  in  a  fociety,  where  the 
leaft  occafion  for  them  appears  that  can  be  ima- 
gined to  take  place  in  any  conceivable  fituation. 


LETTER    IV. 


BISCAY. 

Dear  Sir, 

IN  a  refearch  like  this,  after  thofe  people  in 
Europe  who  have  had  the  fkill,  courage,  and 
fortune,  to  preferve  a  voice  in  the  government, 
Bifcay,  in  Spain,  ought  by  no  means  to  be  omit- 
ted. While  their  neighbours  have  long  fince  re- 
ligned  all  their  pretenfions  into  the  hands  of 
kings  and  priefts,  this  extraordinary  people  have 
preserved  their  ancient  language,  genius,  laws, 
government,  and  manners,  without  innovation, 
longer  than  any  other  nation  of  Europe.  Of 
Celtic  extraction,  they  once  inhabited  fome  of 

the 


Bifeay*  17 

the  fineft  parts  of  the  ancient  Boetica ;  but  their 
love  of  liberty,-  and  unconquerable  averfion  to  a 
foreign  fervitude,  made  them  retire,  when  invaded 
and  overpowered  in  their  ancient  feats,  into  thefe 
mountainous  countries,  called  by  the  ancients 
Cantab ria.  They  were  governed  by  counts,  fent 
them  by  the  kings  of  Oviedo  and  Leon,  until 
859,  when  finding  themfelves  without  a  chief, 
becaufe  Zeno,  who  commanded  them,  was  made 
prifoner,  they  rofe^and  took  arms  to  refill  Or- 
dogne,  fon  of  Alfonfus  the  Third,  whofe  domi- 
nation was  too  fevere  for  them,  chofe  for  their 
chief  an  iffue  of  the  blood-royal  of  Scotland,  by 
the  mother's  fide,  and  fon-in-law  of  Zeno  their 
governor,  who  having  overcome  Ordogne,  in  870, 
they  chofe  him  for  their  lord,  and  his  pofterity, 
who  bore  afterwards  the  name  of  Haro,  fucceed- 
ed  him,  from  father  to  fon,  until  the  king  Don 
Pedro  the  Cruel,  having  put  to  death  thole  who 
were  in  pofieflion  of  the  lordfhip,  reduced  them 
to  a  treaty  by  which  they  united  their  country, 
under  the  title  of  a  lordmip,  with  G.jflile,  by 
which  convention  the  king  of  Spain  is  now  lord 
of  Bifcay.  It  is  a  republic ;  and  one  of  the  pri- 
vileges they  have  moft  iniifted  on,  is  not  to  have 
a  king  :  another  was,  that  every  new  lord,  at  his 
acceflion,  mould  come  into  the  country  in  perfon, 
with  one  of  his  legs  bare,  and  take  an  oath  to 
preferve  the  privileges  of  the  lordmip.  The  pre- 
lent  king  of  Spain  is  the  firfl  who  has  been  com- 
plimented with  their  confent,  that  the  oath  fhould 
be  adminiftered  at  Madrid,  though  the  other  hu- 
miliating and  indecent  ceremony  has  been  long 
laid  afide. 

Their  folicitude   for  defence  has  furrounded 
with  walls  all  the  towns  in  the  diftrid.     They 

are 


l8  Democratical  Republics. 

are  one-and-twenty  in  number ;  the  principal  of 
which  are,  Orduna,  Laredo,  Portugal  ete,  Duran- 
go,  Bilbao,  and  St.  Andero.  Bifcay  is  divided 
into  nine  merindades,  a  fort  of  jurifdi&ion  like  a 
bailiwick,  beiides  the  four  cities  on  the  coaft. 
The  capital  is  Bilbao. — The  whole  is  a  colle&ion 
of  very  high  and  very  fteep  mountains,  rugged 
and  rocky  to  fuch  a  degree,  that  a  company  of 
men  pofted  on  one  of  them  might  defend  itfelf  as 
long  as  it  could  fubfift,  by  rolling  rocks  on  their 
enemy.  This  natural  formation  of  the  country, 
which  has  rendered  the  march  of  armies  im- 
pra&icable,  and  the  daring  fpirit  of  the  inhabi- 
tants, have  preferved  their  liberty. 

Active,  vigilant,  generous,  brave,  hardy,  in- 
clined to  war  and  navigation,  they  have  enjoyed, 
for  two  thoufand  years,  the  reputation  of  the  beft 
foldiers  and  failors  in  Spain,  and  even  of  the  beft 
courtiers,  many  of  them  having,  by  their  wit 
and  manners,  raifed  themfelves  into  offices  of  con- 
fequence  under  the  court  of  Madrid.  Their  va- 
luable qualities  have  recommended  them  to  the 
sfteem  of  the  kings  of  Spain,  who  have  hitherto 
left  them  in  pofleflion  of  thofe  great  immunities 
of  which  they  are  fo  jealous.  In  1632,  indeed, 
the  court  laid  a  duty  upon  fait :  the  inhabitants 
of  Bilbao  rofe,  and  mafia cred  all  the  officers  ap- 
pointed to  collect  it,  and  all  the  officers  of  the 
grand  admiral.  Three  thoufand  troops  were  fent 
to  punifh  them  for  rebellion:  thefe  they  fought, 
and  totally  defeated,  driving  moft  of  them  into 
the  fea,  which  difcou raged  the  court  from  pur- 
fuing  their  plan  of  taxation  ;  and  {ince  that  time 
the  king  has  had  no  officer  of  any  kind  in  the 
lordfhip,  except  his  corregidor. 

Many  writers  afcribe  their  flouriftring  com- 
merce 


Bifcay*  19 

merce  to  their  fituation ;  but,  as  this  is  no  better 
than  that  of  Ferrol  or  Corunna,  that  advantage 
is  more  probably  due  to  their  liberty.  In  riding 
through  this  little  territory,  you  would  fancy 
yourfelf  in  Connecticut;  inftead  of  miferable 
huts,  built  of  mud,  and  covered  with  ftraw,  you 
fee  the  country  full  of  large  and  commodious 
houfes  and  barns  of  the  farmer  ;  the  lands  well 
cultivated;  and  a  wealthy,  happy  yeomanry.  The 
roads,  fo  dangerous  and  impaffable  in  moil  other 
parts  of  Spain,  are  here  very  good,  having  been 
made  at  a  vaft  expenfe  of  labour. 

Although  the  government  is  called  a  democra- 
cy, we  cannot  here  find  all  authority  colle6led 
into  one  centre ;  there  are,  on  the  contrary,  as 
many  diftinft  governments  as  there  are  cities  and 
merindades.  The  general  government  has  two 
orders  at  leaft  ;  the  lord  or  governor,  and  the  bi- 
ennial parliament.  Each  of  the  thirteen  fub- 
ordinate  diviiions  has  its  organized  government, 
with  its  chief  magiftrate  at  the  head  of  it.  We 
may  judge  of  the  form  of  all  of  them  by  that  of 
the  metropolis,  which  calls  itfelf,  in  all  its  laws, 
the  noble  and  illuftrious  republic  of  Bilbao. 
This  city  has  its  alcalde,  who  is  both  governor 
and  chief  juilice,  its  twelve  regidores  or  counfel- 
lors,  attorney-general,  &c.  and  by  all  thefe,  af- 
fembled  in  the  coniiftorial  palace  under  the  titles 
of  con$ejo,  jitflicia,  y  regimiento,  the  laws  are 
made  in  the  name  of  the  lord  of  Bifcay,  and 
confirmed  by  him. 

Thefe  officers,  it  is  true,  are  elected  by  the  ci- 
tizens, but  they  nmft  by  law  be  elected,  as  well 
as  the  deputies  to  the  biennial  parliament  or  jun- 
ta general,  out  of  a  few  noble  families,  unftained, 
both  by  the  fide  of  father  and  mother,  by  any 
mixture  with  Moors,  Jews,  new  converts,  peni- 

VOL.  I.  C  tentiaries 


2o  Democratical  Republics. 

tentiaries  of  the  inquifition,  &c.  They  muft  be 
natives  and  refidents,  worth  a  thoufand  ducats, 
and  muft  have  no  concern  in  commerce,  manu- 
factures, or  trades  ;  and,  by  a  fundamental  agree- 
ment among  all  the  merindades,  all  their  depu- 
ties to  the  junta  general,  and  all  their  regidores, 
iindics,  fecretaries,  and  treafurers,  muft  be  no- 
bles, at  leaft  knights,  and  fuch  as  never  exer- 
cifed  any  mechanical  trades  themfelves  or  their 
fathers.  Thus  we  fee  the  people  themfelves  have 
eftablifhed  by  law  a  contracted  ariftocracy,  under 
the  appearance  of  a  liberal  democracy.  Ameri- 
cans, beware! 

Although  we  fee  here  in  the  general  govern- 
ment, and  in  that  of  every  city  and  merindad, 
the  three  branches  of  power,  of  the  one,  the 
few,  and  the  many  ;  yet,  if  it  were  as  democra- 
tical  as  it  has  been  thought  by  fome,  we  could 
by  no  means  infer,  from  this  inftance  of  a  little 
flock  upon  a  few  impracticable  mountains,  in  a 
round  form  of  ten  leagues  diameter,  the  utility 
or  practicability  of  fuch  a  government  in  any 
other  country. 

The  difpontion  to  divilion,  fo  apparent  in  all  de- 
mocratical  governments,  however  tempered  with 
ariftocraticai  and  monarchical  powers,  has  fhewn 
itfelf,  in  breaking  off  from  it  Guipufcoa  and  Ala- 
ba  ;  and  the  only  prefervative  of  it  from  other 
divifions,  has  been  the  fear  of  their  neighbours. 
They  always  knew,  that  as  foon  as  they  fhould 
fall  into  factions,  or  attempt  innovations,  the 
court  of  Spain  would  interpofe,  and  prefcribe 
them  a  government  not  fo  much  to  their  tafte. 


TH-fc 


The  Grifons.  Zi 


THE      GRISONS. 

I  N  the  republic  of  the  Three  Leagues  of  the 
Grifons,  the  fovereign  is  all  the  people  of  a  great 
part  of  the  ancient  Rhetia.  This  is  called  a  de^ 
mocratical  republic  of  three  leagues,  i.  The 
League  of  the  Grifons.  2.  The  League  Caddee. 
3.  The  League  of  Ten  Jurifdi&ions.  Thefe 
three  are  united  by  the  perpetual  confederation 
of  1472,  which  has  been  feveral  times  renewed. 
The  government  refides  fovereignly  in  the  com- 
mons, where  every  thing  is  decided  by  the  plu- 
rality of  voices.  The  commons  elect  andinftrud: 
their  deputies  for  the  general  diet,  which  is  held 
once  a  year.  Each  league  elects  alfo  its  chief  or 
prefident,  who  prefides  at  the  dietes,  each  one  in 
his  league.  The  general  diet  aflembles  one  year 
at  Ilanz,  in  the  league  of  the  Grifons  ;  one  year 
at  Coire,  in  the  league  Caddee ;  and  one  year  at 
Davons,  in  the  league  of  Ten  Jurifdiclions.  There 
is  another  ordinary  affembly,  compofed  of  chiefs 
and  of  three  deputies  from  each  league,  which  is 
held  at  Coire,  in  the  month  of  January.  Befides 
thefe  regular  aflemblies,  they  hold  congreffes 
whenever  the  neceffities  of  the  ftate  require  them ; 
fometimes  of  the  chiefs  alone,  fometimes  of  cer- 
tain deputies  from  each  league,  according  to  the 
importance  of  the  cafe  :  thefe  affemblies  are  held 
at  Coire.  The  three  leagues  form  but  one  body 
in  general  affairs ;  and,  although  one  league  has 
more  deputies  than  another,  they  count  the  voices 
without  diftinclion  of  leagues.  They  conduct 
feparately  their  particular  affairs,  Their  country 
is  thirty-five  leagues  in  length,  and  thirty  in 
Breadth. 

Even 


22  Democratical  Republics. 

Even  in  this  happy  country,  where  there  is 
more  equality  than  in  almofl  any  other,  there  are 
noble  families,  who,  although  they  live  like  their 
neighbours  by  the  cultivation  of  the  earth,  and 
think  it  no  difgrace,  are  very  proud  of  the  im- 
menfe  antiquity  of  their  defcent,  and  boaft  of  it, 
and  value  themfelves  upon  it,  as  much  as  Julius 
Csefar  did,  who  was  defcended  from  a  goddefs. 


THE     UNITED      PROVINCES     OF     THE    LOW 
COUNTRIES. 

THERE  are  in  Friefland  and  Overyflell,  and 
perhaps  in  the  city  of  Dort,  certain  remnants  of 
democratical  powers,  the  fragments  of  an  ancient 
edifice,  which  may  poffiblybe  re-erecled;  but  as 
there  is  nothing  which  favours  Mr.  Turgot's  idea, 
I  fhall  pafs  over  this  country  for  the  prefent. 


LETTER       V. 

SWITZERLAND. 

My  dear  Sir, 

T  is  commonly  faid,  that  ibme  of  the  cantons 
of  Switzerland  are  democratical,  and  others 
ariftocratical :  and  ifthefe  epithets  are  underftood 
only  to  mean,  that  one  of  thefe  powers  prevails 
in  fome  of  thofe  republics,  and  the  other  in  the 
reft,  they  are  juft  enough  ;  but  there  is  neither  a 
iimple  democracy,  norafnnpleariftocracy,  among 
them.  The  governments  of  thefe  confederated 

ftates, 


i 


Switzerland.  23 

ftates,  like  thofe  of  the  United  Provinces  of  the 
Netherlands,  are  very  complicated,  and  there- 
fore very  difficult  to  be  fully  explained;  yet  the 
moft  fuperficial  inquirer  will  find  the  moft  evi- 
dent traces  of  a  competition  of  all  the  three  pow- 
ers in  all  of  them. 

To  begin  with  the  cantons  commonly  reputed 
democratical. 


DEMOCRATICAL  CANTONS. 

APPENZEL. 

THE  canton  of  Appenzel  confifts  of  a  feries 
of  valleys,  fcattered  among  inacceflible  rocks  and 
mountains,  in  all  about  eighteen  miles  fquare. 
The  people  are  laborious  and  frugal,  and  have  no 
commerce  but  in  cattle,  hides,  butter,  cheefe, 
and  a  little  linen  made  of  their  own  flax.  It  has 
no  walled  towns,  and  only  two  or  three  open 
boroughs,  and  a  few  fmall  villages :  it  is,  like  New 
England,  almoft  a  continued  village,  covered  with 
excellent  houfes  of  the  yeomanry,  built  of  wood, 
each  of  which  has  its  territory  of  pafture  grounds, 
commonly  ornamented  with  trees;  neatnefs  and 
convenience  are  ftudied  without,  and  a  remarka- 
ble cleanlinefs  within.  The  principal  part  of  the 
inhabitants  have  preferved  the  Simplicity  of  the 
paftoral  life.  As  there  are  not,  at  moft,  above 
fifty  thoufand  fouls,  there  cannot  be  more  than 
ten  thoufand  men  capable  of  bearing  arms.  It  is 
not  at  all  furpriiing,  among  fo  much  freedom, 
though  among  rocks  and  herds,  to  hear  of  lite- 
rature, and  men  of  letters  who  ^re  an  ornament 
to  their  country. 

Never- 


24  Democratical  Cantons. 

Neverthelefs,  this  fimple  people,  fo  fmall  in 
number,  in  fo  narrow  a  territory,  could  not  agree. 
After  a  violent  conteft,  in  which  they  were  in 
danger  of  a  civil  war,  by  the  mediation  of  the 
other  cantons,  at  the  time  of  the  Reformation, 
they  agreed  to  divide  the  canton  into  two  por- 
tions, the  Outer  and  the  Inner  Appenzel,  or 
Rhodes  Exterior  and  Rhodes  Interior.  Each  dif- 
trict  has  now  its  refpedlive  chief  magiftrate,  court 
of  juftice,  police,  bandaret,  and  deputy  to  the 
general  diet,  although  the  canton  has  but  one 
vote,  and  confequently  lofes  its  voice  if  the  two 
deputies  are  of  different  opinions.  The  canton  is 
divided  into  no  lefs  than  twelve  communities ;  fix 
of  them  called  the  Inner  Appenzel,  lying  to  the 
eaft ;  and  fix  the  Outer,  to  the  weft.  They  have 
one  general  fovereign  council,  which  is  compofed 
of  one  hundred  and  forty-four  perfons,  twelve 
taken  from  each  community. 

The  fovereignty  refidesin  the  general  aflembly, 
which,  in  the  Interior  Rhodes,  meets  every  year 
at  Appenzel,  the  laft  Sunday  in  April ;  but,  in 
the  Exterior  Rhodes,  it  affembles  alternately  at 
Trogen  and  at  Hundwyl.  In  the  Interior  Rhodes 
are  the  chiefs  and  officers,  the  land  amman,  the 
tything-man,  the  governor,  the  treafurer,  the  cap- 
tain of  the  country,  the  director  of  the  buildings, 
the  director  of  the  churches,  and  the  enfign.  The 
Exterior  Rhodes  have  ten  officers,  viz.  two  land 
ammans,  two  governors,  two  treafurers,  two  cap- 
tains, and  two  enfigns.  The  Interior  Rhodes  is 
fubdivided  into  fix  lefler  ones,  each  of  which  has 
fixteen  counfellors,  among  whom  are  always  two 
chiefs.  The  grand  council  in  the  Interior  Rhodes, 
as  allb  the  criminal  jurifdi6Hon,  is  compofed  of 
one  hundred  and  twenty-eight  perfons,  who'af- 

femble 


Appenzel.  25 

Femble  twice  a  year,  eight  days  after  the  general 
aflembly,  and  at  as  many  other  times  as  occafions 
require.  Moreover,  they  have  alfo  the  little 
council,  called  the  weekly  council,  becaufe  it 
meets  every  week  in  the  year.  The  exterior 
Rhodes  are  now  divided  into  nineteen  communi- 
ties ;  and  the  fovereignty  of  them  confifts  in  the 
double  grand  council  of  the  country,  called  the 
old  and  new  council,  which  aflembles  once  a  year, 
eight  days  after  the  affembly  of  the  country,  at 
Trogen  or  at  Herifaw,  and  is  compofed  of  ninety 
and  odd  perfons.  Then  follows  the  grand  coun- 
cil, in  which,  beiides  the  ten  officers,  the  reigning 
chiefs  of  all  the  communities  have  feats,  the  di- 
rectors of  the  buildings,  the  chancellor,  and  the 
fautier,  which  make  thirty-five  perfons ;  the  reign- 
ing land  amman  preiides.  After  this  comes  the 
little  council  from  before  the  fittern,  which  is 
held  every  firft  Tuefday  of  each  month  at  Tro- 
gen ;  the  reigning  land  amman  is  the  prefident, 
to  whom  always  aflifts,  alternately,  an  officer, 
with  a  member  of  council  from  all  the  thirteen 
communities,  the  chancellor,  of  the  country,  and 
the  fautier,  and  confifts  of  twenty  and  odd  perfons. 
The  little  council  from  behind  the  fittern  is  held 
under  the  prefidency  of  the  reigning  land  am- 
man, whenever  occafion  requires  ;  it  is  held  at 
Herifaw,  Hundwyl,  or  Urnaefchen  :  at  it  aflift 
the  chancellor  of  the  country,  and  the  fautier, 
with  the  counfellors  of  the  fix  communities  be- 
hind the  fittern,  appointed  for  this  fervice. 

Let  me  afk,  if  here  are  not  different  orders  of 
men,  and  balances  in  abundance  ?  Such  an 
handful  of  people,  living  by  agriculture,  in  pri- 
mitiye  fimplicity,  one  would  think  might  live 
very  quietly,  almoft  without  any  government  at 
all ;  yet,  inftead  of  being  capable  of  collecting 

all 


z6  Democratical  Cantons. 

all  authority  into  one  affembly,  they  feem  to 
have  been  forcibly  agitated  by  a  mutual  power 
of  repulfion,  which  has  divided  them  into  two 
commonwealths,  each  of  which  has  its  monarchi- 
cal power  in  a  chief  magiftrate ;  its  ariftocratical 
power  in  two  councils,  one  for  legiflation,  and 
the  other  for  execution;  befides  the  two  more 
popular  affemblies.  This  is  furely  no  fimple  de- 
mocracy.— Indeed  a  fimple  democracy  by  repre- 
fentation  is  a  contradi&ion  in  terms. 


LETTER     VI. 


UNDERWALD. 

My  dear  Sir,          '<^>v 

r  |  ^  H  E  canton  of  Underwald  confifts  only  of 
JL  villages  and  boroughs,  although  it  is  twen- 
ty-five miles  in  length,  and  feventeen  in  breadth. 
Thefe  dimenfions,  it  feems,  were  too  extenfive 
to  be  governed  by  a  legiflation  fo  imperfedly  com- 
bined, and  nature  has  taught  and  compelled  them 
to  feparate  into  two  divifions,  the  one  above,  and 
the  other  below,  a  certain  large  foreft  of  oaks, 
which  runs  nearly  in  the  middle  of  the  country, 
from  north  to  fouth.  The  inferior  valley,  below 
the  foreft,  contains  four  communities;  and  the 
fuperior,  above  it,  fix.  The  principal  or  capital 
is  Sarnen.  The  fovereign  is  the  whole  country, 
the  fovereignty  refiding  in  the  general  affembly, 
where  all  the  males  of  fifteen  have  entry  and  fuf- 
frage  ;  but  each  valley  apart  has,  with  refpedl  to 
its  interior  concerns,  its  land  amman,  its  officers 
of  adminiftration,  and  its  public  affembly,  com- 

pofed 


Underwald.  27 

pofed  of  fifty-eight  fenators,  taken  from  the  com- 
munities. As  to  affairs  without,  there  is  a  ge- 
neral council,  formed  of  all  the  officers  of  admi- 
niftration,  and  of  fifty-eight  fenators  chofen  in 
the  faid  councils  of  the  two  valleys.  Befides  this 
there  are,  for  juftice  and  police,  the  chamber  of 
feven,  and  the  chamber  of  fifteen,  for  the  up- 
per valley,  and  the  chamber  of  eleven  for  the 
lower. 

Here  again  are  arrangements  more  complicat- 
ed, and  ariftocratical  preferences  more  decided, 
in  order  to  counterpoife  the  democratical  affem- 
bly,  than  any  to  be  found  in  America,  and  the 
land  amman  is  as  great  a  man  in  proportion  as  an 
American  governor.  Is  this  a  fimple  democracy  ? 
Has  this  little  clan  of  graziers  been  able  to  col- 
led all  authority  into  one  centre  ?  Are  there  not 
three  aflemblies  here  to  moderate  and  balance 
each  other?  And  are  not  the  executive  and  judi- 
cial powers  feparated  from  the  legiflative  ?  Is  it 
not  a  mixed  government,  as  much  as  any  in 
America  ?  Although  its  conftitution  is  not  by  any 
means  fo  well  digefted  as  ten  at  leail  of  thofe  of 
the  United  States  ;  and  although  it  would  never 
be  found  capable  of  holding  together  a  great 
.nation  ? 


LETTER 
VOL.  I.  D 


2 8  •    Democrat  ical  Cantoris. 

f 

LETTER     VII. 

G  1  A  R  I  S. 

My  dear  Sir, 

THE  canton  of  Claris  is  a  mountainous 
country,  of  eight  miles  long  and  four  wide, 
according  to  their  own  authors,  perhaps  intend- 
ing German  miles  ;  but  twenty-five  miles  in  length 
and  eighteen  in  breadth,  according  to  fome  Eng- 
lifh  accounts.  The'  commerce  of  it  is  in  cheefe, 
butter,  cattle,  linen,  and  thread.  Ten  thou- 
iand  cattle,  and  four  thoufand  fheep,  paftured 
in  fummer  upon  the  mountains,  conftitute  their 
wealth. 

The  inhabitants  live  together  in  a  general  equal- 
ity, and  moft  perfeclf  harmony;  even  thofe  of 
the  different  perfuaiions  of  Catholics  and  Protef- 
tants,  who  fometimes  perform  divine  fervice  in 
the  fame  church,  one  after  the  other :  and  all  the 
offices  of  ftate  are  indifferently  adminiftered  by 
both  parties,  though  the  Proteftants  are  more  in 
number,  and  fuperior  both  in  induftry  and  com- 
merce. All  the  houfes  are  built  of  \vood,  large 
and  folid,  thofe  of  the  richeft  inhabitants  differ- 
ing only  from  thole  of  the  poorer,  as  they  are 
larger. 

The  police  is  well  regulated  here,  as  it  is 
throughout  Switzerland.  Liberty  does  not  dege- 
nerate into  licentioufnefs.  Liberty,  independence, 
and  an  exemption  from  taxes,  amply  cornpenfate 
for  a  want  of  the  refinements  of  luxury.  There 
are  none  fo  rich  as  to  gain  an  afcendencyby  lar- 
gefTes.  If  they  err  in  their  councils,  it  is  an 
error  of  the  judgment,  and  not  of  the  heart.  As 

there 


Claris.  29 

there  is  no  fear  of  invafion,  and  they  have  no  con- 
quefts  to  make,  their  policy  confifts  in  maintain- 
ing their  independence,  and  preferving  the  pub- 
lic tranquillity.  As  the  end  of  government  is  the 
greateft  happinefs  of  the  greateft  number,  faving 
at  the  fame  time  the  ftipulated  rights  of  all,  go- 
vernments like  thefe,  where  a  large  mare  of  power 
is  preferved  by  the  people,  deferve  to  be  admired 
and  imitated.  It  is  in  fuch  governments  that  hu- 
man nature  appears  in  its  dignity,  honeft,  brave, 
and  generous. 

Some  writers  are  of  opinion,  that  Switzerland 
was  originally  peopled  by  a  colony  of  Greeks. 
The  fame  greatnefs  of  foul,  the  fame  fpirit  of  in- 
dependence, the  fame  love  of  their  country,  has 
animated  both  the  ancients  and  the  moderns,  to 
that  determined  heroifm  which  prefers  death  to 
flavery.  Their  hiflory  is  full  of  examples  of  vic- 
tories obtained  by  fmall  numbers  of  men  over 
large  armies.  In  1388,  the  Auftrians  made  an 
irruption  into  their  territory,  with  an  army  of  fif- 
teen thoufand  men;  but,  inftead  of  conquering 
the  country  as  they  expe6ted,  in  attacking  about 
four  hundred  men  pofted  on  the  mountains  at 
Nsefel,  they  were  broken  by  the  ftanes  rolled 
upon  them  from  the  fummit :  the  Swifs,  at  this 
critical  moment,  rumed  down  upon  them  with 
fuch  fury,  as  forced  them  to  retire  with  an  im- 
menfe  lofs.  Such  will  ever  be  the  character  of  a 
people,  who  preferve  fo  large  a  mare  to  themfelves 
in  their  legiflature,  while  they  temper  their  con- 
ftitution,  at  the  fame  time,  with  an  executive 
power  in  a  chief  magiflrate,  and  an  ariiiocratical 
power  in  a  wife  fenate. 

The  government  here  is  by  no  means  entirely 
democratical.  It  is  true,  that  the  fovereign  is 
the  whole  country,  and  the  fovereign ty  refides  ia 

the 


4- 


3<D  Democratical  Cantons. 

the  general  aflembly,  where  each  male  of  fifteen, 
with  his  fvvord  at  his  fide,  has  his  feat  and  vote. 
It  is  true,  that  this  afTembly,  which  is  annually 
held  in  an  open  plain,  ratifies  the  laws,  lays 
taxes,  enters  into  alliances,  declares  war,  and 
makes  peace. 

But  it  has  a  firft  magiftrate  in  a  land  amman, 
who  is  the  chief  of  the  republic,  and  is  chofen 
alternately  from  among  the  Proteftants  and  from 
among  the  Catholics.  The  Proteftant  remains 
three  years  in  office;  the  Catholic  two.  The 
manner  of  his  appointment  is  a  mixture  of  elec- 
tion and  lot.  The  people  choofe  five  candi- 
dates, who  draw  lots  for  the  office.  The  other 
great  officers  of  ftate  are  appointed  in  the  fame 
manner.  ";• ; 

There  is  a  council  called  a  fenate,  compofed 
of  the  land  amman,  a  ftadtholder,  and  fixty-two 
fenators,  forty-eight  Proteftants  and  fourteen  Ca- 
tholics, all  taken  from  fifteen  tagwen  or  corvees, 
into  which  the  three  principal  quarters  or  parti- 
tions of  the  country  are  fubdivided  for  its  more 
convenient  government.  In  this  fenate,  called 
the  council  of  regency,  the  executive  power  re- 
fides.  Each  tagwen  or  corvee  furnifhes  four  fe- 
nators ;  befides  the  borough  of  Claris,  which  fur- 
niihes  fix. 

Inftead  of  a  fimple  democracy,  it  is  a  mixed 
government,  in  which  the  monarchical  power  in 
the  land  amman,  ftadtholder  or  pro-conful,  the 
ariftocratical  order  in  the  fenate,  and  the  demo- 
cratical  in  the  general  aflembly,  are  diftmc~tly 
marked.  It  is,  however,  but  imperfe&ly  ba- 
lanced; fo  much  of  the  executive  power  in  an 
ariftocratical  afTembly  would  be  dangerous  in 
the  higheft  degree  in  a  large  ftate,  and  among  a 
rich  people.  If  this  canton  could  extend  its  do- 
minion, 


minion,  or  greatly  multiply  its  numbers,  it  would 
foon  find  the  neceffity  of  giving  the  executive 
power  to  the  land  am  man,  in  order  to  defend  the 
people  againft  the  fenate ;  for  the  fenate,  although 
it  is  always  the  refervoir  of  wifdom,  is  eternally 
the  very  focus  of  ambition. 


LETTER    VIII. 

ZUG. 

My  Dear  Sir, 

THE  canton  of  Zug  is  fmall,  but  ricfi,  and 
divided  into  mountains  and  plains.  The 
fovereign  is  the  city  of  Zug,  and  part  of  the 
country.  It  is  divided  into  five  quarters,  which 
poflefs  the  fovereignty;  the  city  of  Zug  is  two, 
and  the  country  three,  Mentzingen,  Egeri,  and 
Bar.  The  government  is  very  complicated,  and 
the  fovereignty  reiides  in  the  general  aflembly  of 
the  five  quarters,  where  each  male  perfon  of  fif- 
teen years  of  age  has  admittance  and  a  voice.  It 
afTembles  annually  to  ena6t  laws,  and  choofe  their 
magiftrates.  Thus  thefe  five  quarters  make  a 
body  of  a  democratical  republic  which  com- 
mands the  reft  of  the  canton.  They  furnifti  al- 
ternately the  land  amman,  the  head  or  chief  of 
the  ftate,  who  muft  always  reiide  at  Zug  with  the 
regency  of  the  country,  although  he  is  chofen 
by  the  fuffrages  of  all  the  quarters  colle&ively. 
He  continues  three  years  in  office  when  taken 
from  the  diftrift  of  Zug,  and  but  two  when  cho(- 
en  from  any  of  the  others. 

The 


32  Democratical  Cantons. 

The  council  of  regency  to  whom  the  general 
adminiftration  of  affairs  is  intruded,  is  compofed 
of  forty  fenators,  thirteen  from  the  city,  and 
twenty-feven  from  the  country. 

The  city,  moreover,  has  its  chief,  its  council, 
and  its  officers  apart,  and  every  one  of  the  other 
quarters  has  the  fame. 

It  is  a  total  mifapplication  of  words  to  call 
this  government  a  fimple  democracy;  for,  al- 
though the  people  are  accounted  for  fomething, 
and  indeed  for  more  than  in  moft  other  free  go- 
vernments ;  in  other  words,  although  it  is  a  free 
republic,  it  is  rather  a  confederation  of  four  or 
five  republics,  each  of  which  has  its  monarchical, 
ariftocratical,  and  democratical  branches,  than  a 
fimple  democracy.  The  confederation  too  has  its 
three  branches;  the  general  affembly,  the  regen- 
cy of  fenators,  and  the  land  amman ;  being  dif- 
ferent orders  tempering  each  other,  as  really  as 
the  houfe,  council,  and  governor,  in  any  of  the 
United  States  of  America. 


LETTER     IX. 


U    R    I. 

My  dear  Sir, 

E  canton  of  Uri,  the  place  of  the  birth 
and  reiidence  of  William  Tell,  fhook  off 
the  yoke  of  Auftria  in  1308,  and,  with  Switz  and 
Underwald,  laid  the  foundation  of  the  perpetual 
alliance  of  the  cantons,  in  1315-  The  canton 
confifts  only  of  villages  and  little  towns  or  bour- 

gades, 


Uri.  33 

gades,  and  the  whole  is  divided  into  ten  genofla- 
men,  or  inferior  communities.  It  has  no  city. 
Altdorf,  where  the  general  afTemblies  are  held, 
and  the  land  am  man  and  regency  refides,  is  the 
principal  village. 

The  land  amman  and  the  principal  magiftrates 
are  ele&ed  in  the  general  afTembly,  in  which  all 
the  male  perfons  of  fifteen  years  of  age  have  a 
right  to  a  feat  and  a  vote. 

The  fenate  or  council  of  regency,  in  whom  is 
veiled  the  executive  power,  is  compofed  of  fixty 
members,  taken  equally  from  each  genofTamen, 
though  they  refide  at  the  capital  borough.  From 
this  council  are  taken  all  the  neceflary  offi- 
cers. 

There  are  two  other  councils;  one  called  the 
chamber  of  feven,  and  the  other  the  chamber  of 
fifteen,  for  the  management  of  lefler  affairs. 

The  valley  of  Urferen,  three  leagues  in  length 
and  one  in  breadth,  marches  under  the  banners 
of  Uri;  but  it  is  but  an  ally,  connected  by 
treaty  in  1410.  It  has  its  proper  land  amman 
and  council,  and  has  alfo  a  bailiwick  fubjecl:  to 
it. 

The  village  of  Gerfaw  is  a  league  in  breadth, 
and  two  in  length  :  there  are  about  a  thoufand 
inhabitants.  This  is  the  fmalleft  republic  in  Eu* 
rope :  it  has  however  its  land  amman,  its  coun- 
cil of  regency,  and  its  general  aflembly  of  bur- 
gefTes,  its  courts  of  juftice  and  militia,  although 
it  is  faid  there  is  not  a  iingle  horle  in  the  whole 
empire.  Such  a  diminutive  republic,  in  an  ob- 
fcure  corner,  and  unknown,  is  interefling  to 
Americans,  not  only  becaufe  every  fpot  of  earth 
on  which  civil  liberty  rlourilhes  delerves  their  ef- 
teem,  but  upon  this  occafion  is  particularly  im- 
portant, 


34  Democratical  Cantons. — Switz. 

portant,  as  it  fhews  the  impoflibility  of  ere&ing 
even  the  fmalleft  government,  among  the  pooreft 
people,  without  different  orders,  councils,  and 
balances. 


LETTER    X. 

S    W    I    T    Z. 

My  dear  Sir, 

THE  canton  of  Switz  has  the  honour  of  giv- 
ing the  name  to  the  whole  confederation, 
becaufe  the  firfl  battle  for  independency  was  fought 
there :  yet  it  confifts  only  of  villages  divided  into 
fix  quarters,  the  firft  of  which  is  Switz,  where  the 
ordinary  regency  of  the  country  refides.  The 
fovereign  is  the  whole  country ;  that  is  to  fay,  the 
fovereignty  refides  in  the  general  aflembly  of  the 
country,  where  all  the  males  of  fifteen  years  of  * 
age  have  a  right  of  entry  and  fuffrage. 

Yet  they  have  their  land  amman ;  and  their  or- 
dinary regency,  at  which  the  land  amman  pre- 
fides,  compofed  of  fixty  counfellors,  taken  equally 
from  the  fix  quarters.  All  the  neceflary  officers 
are  taken  from  this  council. 

There  are,  befides,  the  fecret  chamber,  the 
chamber  of  feven,  and  the  chamber  of  nine,  for 
finance,  juftice,  and  police. 


LETTER 


Ariftocratical  Cantons* — Berne*  $5 

LETTER    XL 
ARISTOCRATICAL    REPUBLICS* 

THE      CANTON      OF      BERNE* 

My  dear  Sir, 

IT  is  fcarcely  poflible  to  believe  that  Mr.  Tur- 
got,  by  colle&ing  all  authority  into  one  cen- 
tre, could  have  intended  an  ariftocratical  affem- 
bly.  He  muft  have  meant,  however,  a  fimple 
form  of  government  of  fome  kind  or  other ;  and 
there  are  but  three  kinds  of  fimple  forms,  demo- 
cracy, ariftocracy,  and  monarchy.  As  we  have 
gone  through  moft,  if  not  all,  the  governments 
in  Europe  in  which  the  people  have  any  fhare ;  it 
will  throw  much  light  upon  our  fubje6l  if  we 
proceed  to  the  ariftocracies  and  oligarchies ;  for 
we  mall  find  all  thefe  under  a  necefiity  of  eftab- 
lifhing  orders,  checks,  and  balances,  as  much  as 
the  democracies.  As  the  people  have  been  al- 
ways neceflitated  to  eftablifh  monarchical  and 
ariftocratical  powers,  to  check  themfelves  from 
rufhing  into  anarchy ;  fo  have  ariftocratical  bo- 
dies ever  been  obliged  to  contrive  a  number  of 
divifions  of  their  powers  to  check  themfelves 
from  running  into  oligarchy. 

The  canton  of  Berne  has  no  other  fovereign 
than  the  fingle  city  of  Berne.  The  fovereignty 
relides  in  the  grand  council,  which  has  the  legif- 
lative  power,  and  the  power  of  making  peace, 
war,  and  alliances,  and  is  compofed  of  two  hun- 

VOL.  I.  E  dred 


36  Ariftocratical  Cantons. 

dred  counfellors  and  ninety-nine  afTeffors,  the 
ele&ion  of  whom  is  made,  by  the  feizeniers  and 
the  fenate,  from  the  citizens,  from  whom  they 
are  fuppofed  virtually  to  derive  their  power ;  but 
a  general  aflembly  of  the  citizens  is  never  called 
together,  on  any  occafion,  or  for  any  purpofe, 
not  even  to  lay  taxes,  nor  to  make  alliances  or 
war.  To  be  eligible  into  the  grand  council,  one 
muft  be  a  citizen  of  Berne,  member  of  one  of 
the  fbcieties  or  tribes,  and  at  leaft  in  the  thirtieth 
year  of  his  age. 

The  executive  power  is  delegated  by  the  grand 
council  to  the  fenate  or  little  council,  which  is 
compofed  of  twenty-feven  perfons,  including  the 
two  avoyers  or  chiefs  of  the  republic,  the  two 
treafurers  of  the  German  country,  and  of  the 
pays  de  Vaud,  and  the  four  bannerets  or  com- 
manders of  the  militia,  taken  from  the  four  firft 
tribes,  for  the  four  dfftri&s  of  the  city*  Vacan- 
cies in  this  fenate  are  filled  up  by  a  complicated 
mixture  of  ballot  and  lot :  twenty- fix  balls,  three 
of  which  are  gold,  are  drawn  out  of  a  box  by 
the  fevefal  fenators ;  thofe  who  draw  the  golden 
ones  nominate  three  electors  out  of  the  little 
council ;  in  the  fame  manner,  feven  members  are 
defignated  from  the  grand  council,  who  nominate 
feven  electors  from  their  body;  thefe  ten  no- 
minate ten  candidates  to  be  voted  for  in  the 
grand  council :  the  four  of  thefe  who  have  the 
moft  votes,  draw  each  of  them  a  ball  out  of  a 
box,  which  has  in  it  two  of  gold  and  two  of  fil- 
verj  the  two  who  draw  the  gold  are  voted  for  in 
the  grand  council,  and  he  who  has  the  mofi: 
votes  is  chofen,  provided  he  be  married,  and  has 
been  ten  years  in  the  grand  council. 

Vacancies  in  the  grand  council  are  filled  up,  at 
certain  periods  of  about  ten  years,  and  two  new 

members 


Berne.  37 

members  are  appointed  by  each  avoyer,  one  by 
each  feizenier  and  fenator,  and  two  or  three  others 
by  other  officers  of  ftate :  if  there  are  more  va- 
cancies, they  are  filled  by  the  eledlion  of  the  fei- 
zeniers  and  fenators. 

The  feizeniers,  who  have  this  elective  power, 
are  drawn  by  lot  from  among  thofe  members  of 
the  grand  cpuncil  who  have  held  the  office  of 
bailiffs,  and  who  have  finifhed  the  term  of  their 
adminiftration.  The  bannerets  and  feizeniers 
have,  by  the  conftitution,  an  authority,  for  three 
days  in  Eafter,  refembling  that  of  the  cenfors  in 
ancient  Rome,  and  may  deprive  any  member  of 
either  council  of  his  place ;  but,  as  their  fen- 
tence  muft  be  confirmed  by  the  great  council, 
they  never  exercife  their  power.  There  are  fix 
noble  families  at  Berne,  who  enjoy  the  precedence 
of  all  the  other  fenators,  although  more  ancient 
members,  and  have  rank  immediately  after  the 
bannerets. 

The  principal  magiftrates  are,  the  two  avoyers, 
who  hold  their  offices  for  life;  the  two  treafu- 
rers,  who  continue  for  fix  years ;  and  the  four 
bannerets,  who  remain  only  four.  The  avoyers 
officiate  alternately  a  year  ;  and  the  reigning  avo- 
yer, although  he  prefides  in  council,  in  an  ele- 
vated feat  under  a  canopy,  and  has  the  public 
feal  before  him,  has  no  vote  except  in  cafes  of 
equal  divifions,  and  never  gives  his  opinion  un- 
leis  it  is  required.  The  avoyer,  out  of  office, 
is  the  firft  fenator  and  prefident  of  the  fecret 
council. 

The  fecret  council  is  compofed  of  the  avoyer 
out  of  office,  the  four  bannerets,  the  two  trea- 
furers,  and   two   other   fecret  counfellors  taken 
from  the  fenate.     In  this  body  all  affairs  that  re- 
quire 


38  Arijlocratical  Cantons. 

quire  fecrecy,  and  fome  of  thefe  are  of  great  im» 
portance,  are  debated  and  determined. 

The  grand  council  aflembles  and  'deliberates 
by  its  own  authority  at  ftated  times,  and  fuper- 
intends  all  affairs,  although  the  moft  important 
are  delegated  generally  to  the  fenate.  The  whole 
adminiftratipn  is  celebrated  for  its  uncommon 
moderation,  precifion,  and  difpatch, 

There  are  feventy-two  bailiwicks,  diftributed 
in  four  claffes,  comprehending  a  country  of  fixty 
leagues  in  length,  or  a  third  part  of  all  Switzer- 
land, fubje<5l  to  this  city.  The  bailiffs  are  ap- 
pointed by  lot  from  the  grand  council.  They 
were  formerly  chofen,  but  this  method  rendering 
all  the  members  dependent  upon  a  few,  who  had 
the  moft  influence,  it  had  too  ftrong  a  tendency 
to  an  oligarchy.  The  bailiwicks  are  the  mofl 
profitable  places,  and  are  filled  from  the  grand 
council.  ri  he  bailiffs'  live  in  much  fplendour, 
and  are  able  to  lay  up  two  or  three  thoufand 
pounds  fterling  a  year,  befides  difcharging  all 
their  expences.  They  reprefent  the  fovereign  au- 
thority, put  the  laws  in  execution,  collect  the  re- 
venues, adl  as  judges  in  civil  and  criminal  caufes; 
but  an  appeal  lies  to  Berne,  in  civil  caufes  to  the 
courts  of  juftice,  and  in  criminal  to  the  fenate: 
but  as  the  judges  on  appeal  are  perfons  who  ei- 
ther have  been  or  expeft  to  be  bailiffs,  there  is 
great  reafon  to  be  apprehenfive  of  partiality. 

There  is  no  {landing  army,  but  every  male  of 
fixteen  is  enrolled  in  the  militia,  and  obliged  to 
provide  himfelf  an  uniform,  a  mufket,  powder 
and  ball;  and  no  peafant  is  allowed  to  marry, 
without  producing  his  arms  and  uniform.  The 
arms  are  infpeded  every  year,  and  the  men  ex- 
ercifed.  There  are  arfenals  of  arms  at  Berne,  and 

in 


Berne.  39 

in  every  bailiwick,  fufficient  for  the  militia  of  the 
diftri&,  and  a  fum  of  money  for  three  months  pay. 
The  dragoons  are  chofen  from  the  fubftantial  farm- 
ers, who  are  obliged  to  provide  their  own  horfes 
and  accoutrements.  There  is  a  council  of  war, 
of  which  the  avoyer  out  of  place  is  prefident,  in 
peace;  in  war,  a  general  is  appointed  to  com- 
mand all  the  forces  of  the  ftate. 

There  is  a  political  feminary  for  the  youth, 
called  the  exterior  ftate,  which  is  a  miniature  of 
the  whole  government.  The  young  men  aflem- 
ble  and  go  through  all  the  forms;  they  have 
their  grand  council,  fenate,  avoyers,  treafurers, 
bannerets,  feizeniers,  &c.  the  poft  of  avoyer  is 
fought  with  great  afliduity.  They  debate  upon 
political  fubje&s,  and  thus  improve  their  talents 
by  exercife,  and  become  more  capable  of  ferv- 
ing  the  public  in  future  life. 

The  nobility  in  this  country  are  haughty,  and 
much  averfe  to  mixing  in  company,  or  any  fa- 
miliar converfation  with  the  common  people  :  the 
commons  are  taught  to  believe  the  nobles  fuperi- 
ors,  whofe  right  it  is  to  rule  ;  and  they  believe 
their  teachers,  and  are  very  willing  to  be  go* 


LETTER     XII, 

FRIBOURG, 

My  dear  Sir, 

E   canton  of  Fribourg  is   ariftocratical, 
JL     not  having  more  than  forty  families,  who 
can  have  any  part  in  the  government.    Thefe  all 
live  very  nobly  ;  that  is  to  fay  without  commerce, 
manufactures,  or  trades. 

The 


4.0  Ariftocratical  Cantons. 

>  •  i    » 

The  fovereignty  and  legiflative  authority  refides 
in  the  council  of  two  hundred  perfons,  compofed 
of  the  two  avoyers,  who  are  for  'life ;  twenty- 
two  counfellors ;  four  bannerets;  fixty  other  coun- 
fellors, frqrn  whom  the  twenty-four  who  com- 
pofe  the  fenate,  in  which  refides  the  executive 
power,  are  taken  when  they  are  to  be  replaced ; 
and  one  hundred  and  twelve  others,  whom  they 
call  the  grand  fenate  of  two  hundred. 

The  two  avoyers  are  elected  by  the  plurality 
of  fuffrages  of  all  the  citizens.  They  hold  their 
offices  for  life,  and  prefide  alternately  a  year. 
The  twenty-two  counfellors  are  alfo  for  life,  and 
are  defignated  by  lot,  as  wrell  as  the  bannerets, 
whofe  charges  continue  but  three  years.  The 
iixty  alfo  are  nominated  by  lot,  and  are  drawn 
from  the  hundred  and  twelve,  called  the  two 
hundred.  Thefe  laft  x:oine  forward  in  the  ftate 
by  the  prefentation  and  nomination  of  the  fecret 
chamber,  compofed  of  twenty-four,  befides  the 
bannerets,  who  are  the  chiefs  of  it.  This  cham- 
ber, which  is  fovereign,  befides  the  right  of  no- 
mination to  the  ftate,  has  alone  that  of  correcti- 
on, and  of  propofmg  regulations. 

The  two  avoyers,  the  twenty-two  counfellors, 
and  the  four  bannerets,  form  the  little  fenate, 
which  hears  and  determines  civil  caufes,  and  af- 
fembles  every  day. 

The  affairs  of  ftate  are  carried  before  the  grand 
fenate  of  two  hundred. 

The  tribes  are  corporations  of  tradefmen,  who 
have  no  part  in  government,  and  who  aifemble 
in  their  abbays,  only  for  the  affairs  of  their  oc- 
cupations, and  all  their  ftatutes  are  approved  or 
rejected  by  the  fenate. 

There  are  thirty-one  bailiwicks  fubjedl  to  this 
canton.  The  method  of  determining  the  mem- 
bers 


OF    T'~  • 

r  rVK 

\     . 

Frilourg*  sj|, 

bers  of  the  little  fenate  and  fecret  council  is  ano- 
ther check.  The  names  of  the  candidates  in 
nomination  are  placed  in  a  box,  containing  as  ma- 
ny partitions  as  there  are  perfons  :  the  ballots  are 
thrown  into  this  box  by  the  ele&ors,  without 
knowing  how  the  names  are  placed;  and  the  can- 
didate whofe  name  occupies  the  divifion,  which 
receives  by  accident  the  moft  ballots,  has  the  lot. 
This  is  to  guard  againil  the  influence  of  families ; 
for,  among  thofe  few  families  from  which  alone 
any  candidate  can  be  taken,  fome  have  more  in- 
fluence than  others.  The  canton  contains  fixty- 
fix  thoufand  fouls.  Its  land  produces  good  paf- 
ture,  fome  corn,  and  little  wine ;  it  has  no  com- 
merce, and  not  much  literature.  It  has  more  troops 
in  foreign  fervice,  than  any  other  canton  in  pro- 
portion. As  the  rivers  and  lakes  have  a  diredl 
communication  with  the  fea,  they  might  have  a 
valuable  commerce ;  but  as  none  of  the  perfons 
concerned  in  government  can  be  merchants,  no 
commerce  can  ever  be  in  fafhion,  except  that  of 
their  noble  blood  to  foreign  fovereigns.  It  is  no 
doubt  much  to  the  honour  of  their  fidelity  and 
valour  to  be  chofen-  fo  generally  to  be  the  life- 
guards of  princes  ;  but  whether  they  can  vindicate 
fuch  a  traffic,  upon  principles  of  juftice,  huma- 
nity, or  policy,  or  from  the  imputation  of  a 
more  mercenary  fpirit  than  that  of  ordinary  com- 
merce, is  for  them  to  confider.  The  confervation 
of  the  oligarchy  is  entirely  owing  however  to  this 
cuftom  :  for  a  youthful  fiery  nobility,  at  home  in 
idienefs,  would  neceffarily  become  ambitious  of 
popularity,  and  either  procure,  by  intrigues  and 
infurre&ions,  a  greater  ihare  of  importance  to  the 
people,  or  fet  up  one  of  the  greateft  genius  and 
enterprize  among  them  for  a  defpot.  Jn  foreign 
fervice  they  exhauft  their  reftlcfs  years,  and  re- 
turn, 


42  Ariftocratical  Cantons. 

turn,  after  the  deaths  of  their  fathers,  fatigued 
with  difh'pation,  to  enjoy  their  honours  and 
eftates ;  to  fupport  thofe  laws  which  are  fo  par- 
tial to  their  whiles ;  and  to  re-affume  the  manly 
fimplicity  of  manners  of  their  native  country. 


LETTER    XIII. 

S  O  L  E   U   R  E. 

My  dear  Sir, 

THE  canton  of  Soleure,  feven  leagues  in 
breath  and  twelve  in  length,  contains  fifty 
thoufand  fouls,  and  the  Patrician  families  are  in. 
quiet  pofleffion  of  all  the  public  offices.  The 
fovereign  is  the  city  of  Soleure;  and  the  fove- 
reignty  refides  in  the  grand  council,  confifting  of 
two  avoyers,  who  preiide  alternately,  and  whofe 
ele6tion  depends  upon  the  council,  and  all  the  ci- 
tizens in  general,  who  are  divided  into  eleven 
tribes ;  of  twenty-three  of  the  thirty-three  fena- 
tors  taken  from  the  tribes,  each  of  which  furnifhes 
three ;  and  of  fixty-fix  members  who  reprefent 
the  citizens,  and  are  taken  alfo  from  the  tribes  in 
equal  numbers,  viz.  fix  from  each  tribe. 

The  fenate  is  compofed  of  the  two  avoyers,  and 
the  thirty-three  fenators  taken  from  the  tribes, 
making  thirty-five  in  all,  who  are  called  the  little 
council,  conduct  the  affairs  of  date,  and  judge 
caufes  civil  and  criminal.  The  two  councils 
make  together  the  number  of  one  hundred,  with- 
out computing  the  avoyer  in  office,  who  prefides 
in  chief.  "This  body,  named  the  grand  council, 
makes  laws  and  ftatutes ;  treats  of  alliances,  peace 

and 


43 

and  war;  decides  appeals  in  the  laft  refort;  elecls 
the  treafurer,  the  fourth  in  rank  in  the  ffo.te,  and 
the  exterior  bailiffs.  .The  thirty- three  fenators 
confift  of  eleven  alt- raths  or  fenior  counfellors,  and 
twenty-two  yunk-raths  or  juniors.  Upon  the 
removal  by  death  of  one  of  the  alt-raths,  the 
eldeft  of  the  yunk-raths  fucceeds  him,  and  this 
vacancy  is  filled,  out  of  the  great  council,  by 
election  of  the  eleven  alt-raths.  From  among  the 
alt-raths,  the  two  avoyers,  the  banneret,  and  the 
treafurer,  the  four  principal  magiftrates  of  the 
commonwealth,  are  chofen ;  and  on  the  death  of 
an  avoyer,  the  banneret  fucceeds  to  his  place, 
after  having  gone  through  the  formality  of  a  no- 
mination by  the  general  affembly  of  citizens. 
Vacancies  in  the  grand  council  are  fupplied  by 
the  alt-raths,  from  the  fame  tribe  to  which  the 
deceafed  member  belonged*  There  is  an  annual 
meeting  of  the  whole  body  of  the  citizens,  in 
which  the  avoyers  and  banneret  are  confirmed  in 
their  places :  the  fenior  and  junior  counfellors 
at  the  fame  time  mutually  confirm  each  other. 
All  thefe  confirmations  are  matters  of  courfe, 
and  mere  form.  All  other  public  employments 
are  difpofed  of  by  the  fenate. 

The  revenues  of  the  public,  and  falaries  of  of- 
fices, are  very  confiderable,  and  afford  the  few 
diflinguifhed  families  very  profitable  emoluments. 
The  grand  fautieris  annually  elected  by  all  the  citi- 
zens. There  are  feveral  tribunals  and  chambers : 
the  fecret  council,  formed  of  the  two  avoyers, 
the  banneret,  the.  treafurer,  the  moft  ancient  of 
the  fenators  of  the  firft  order  or  alt-raths,  the 
fecretary  of  ftate,  and  attorney-general:  the 
council  of  war  :  the  council  of  juftice,  which  is 
compofed  of  fix  members  of  the  little  council, 
and  eleven  members  of  the  grand  council,  one 

VOL.  I.  F  of 


44  Ariftocratical  Cantons. 

of  whom  is  furnifhed  by  each  tribe ;  the  grand 
fautier  prefides  in  it,  inftead  of  the  avoyer  in  of- 
fice: the  confiftory,  and  the  chamber  of  or- 
phans. This  canton  has  a  large  country  fubjeft 
to  it,  comprehending  eleven  bailiwicks. 

The  foil  is  extremely  fertile,  yet  there  is  a  want 
of  hands  for  agriculture,  and  population  decreafes; 
although  commodioufly  fituated  for  commerce, 
they  have  none.  Thefe  circumftances  are  enough 
to  fhew  the  bleflings  of  a  government  by  a  few 
noble  families.  They  mew  another  thing,  ftill 
more  curious ;  to  wit,  the  confequences  of  mix- 
ing the  nobles  and  commons  together.  The  latter 
have  here  been  induced  to  reduce  their  own  con- 
ftitutional  ft  are  in  the  government  to  a  mere  form, 
and  complaifantly  to  reiign  all  the  fubftance  into 
the  hands  of  thole  whom  they  think  their  natu- 
ral fuperiors:  and  this  will  eternally  happen, 
fooner  or  later,  in  every  country,  in  any  degree 
confiderable  for  extent,  numbers,  or  wealth, 
where  the  whole  legiflative  and  executive  power 
are  in  one  aflembly,  or  even  in  two,  if  they  have 
not  a  third  power  to  balance  them. 

Let  us  by  no  means  omit,  that  there  is  a  grand 
arfenal  at  Soleure,  as  there  is  at  Berne,  well  ftored 
with  arms  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  inhabi- 
tants in  the  canton,  and  ornamented  with  the  tro- 
phies of  the  valour  of  their  anceftors. 

Nor  fhould  it  be  forgotten,  that  a  defenfive 
alliance  has  fubfifted  between  France  and  feveral 
of  thefe  cantons  for  more  than  a  century,  to  the 
great  advantage  of  both.  Thefe  republicans  have 
found  in  that  monarchy,  a  fteady,  faithful,  and 
generous  friend.  In  1777  the  alliance  was  renew- 
ed in  this  city  of  Soleure,  where  the  French 
ambaffador  relides ;  and  extended  to  all  the  can- 
tons. In  the  former  treaty  an  article  was  inferted, 

that 


Lucerne.  45 

that  if  any  diflenfions  fhould  arife  between  the 
cantons,  his  majefty  fhould,  at  the  requeft  of  one 
of  the  parties,  interpofe  his  mediation  by  all  gen- 
tle means  to  bring  about  a  reconciliation  :  but  if 
thefe  mould  fail,  he  mould  compel  the  aggreffor 
to  fulfil  the  treaties  between  the  cantons  and  their 
allies.  As  this  article  was  manifeflly  incompa- 
tible with  that  independence  which  republicans 
ought  to  value  above  all  things,  it  has  been 
wifely  omitted  in  the  new  treaty ;  and  it  would 
have  become  the  dignity  of  the  Swifs  character 
to  have  renounced  equally  thofe  peniions,  which 
are  called  Argents  de  Paix  et  de  Alliance,  as  in- 
confiftent  not  only  with  a  republican  fpirit,  but 
with  that  equality  which  ought  to  be  the  founda- 
tion of  an  alliance. 


LETTER    XIV. 

LUCERNE. 

My  dear  Sir, 

TH  E  canton  of  Lucerne  comprehends  a 
country  of  fixteen  leagues  long  and  eight 
wide,  containing  fifteen  bailiwicks,  belides  feveral 
cities,  abbays,  monafteries,  feigniories,  &c.  The 
inhabitants  are  almoft  wholly  engaged  in  agricul- 
ture, and  the  exportation  of  their  produce. 
Their  commerce  might  be  greatly  augmented,  as 
the  river  Reufs  iffues  from  the  lake,  pafles  through 
the  town,  and  falls  into  the  Rhine. 

The  city  contains  lefs  than  three  thoufand 
fouls,  has  no  manufactures,  little  trade,  and  no 
encouragement  for  learning :  yet  the  fovereign  is 
this  fmgle  city,  and  the  fovereignty  refides  in  the 

little 


46  Ariflocratical  Cantons. 

little  and  great  council,  having  for  chiefs  two 
avoyers,  who  are  alternately  regents.  There  are 
five  hundred  citizens  in  the  town,  from  whom  a 
council  of  one  hundred  are  thofen,  who  are  no^ 
ininally  the  fovereignty ;  out  of  this  body  are 
formed  the  two  divifions,  the  little  council,  fe- 
nate,  or  council  of  ftate,  confifting  of  thirty:fix 
members,  divided  into  two  equal  parts  of  eighteen 
each,  one  of  which  makes  choice  of  the  other 
every  half  year.  The  whole  power  is  actually 
exercifed  by  this  body,  the  two  divifions  of  which 
adminifter  the  government  by  turns.  They  are 
fubject  to  no  controul,  are  neither  confirmed  by 
the  fovereign  council,  nor  by  the  citizens;  the  di- 
vifion  which  retires  confirming  that  which  comes 
in.  As  the  vacancies  in  the  fenate  are  filled  up 
by  themfelves,  all  power  is  in  pofleffion  of  a  few 
Patrician  families.  The  fon  fucceeds  the  father, 
and  the  brother  his  brother. 

The  grand  council  coniifts  of  fixty-four  per- 
fons,  taken  from  the  citizens,  who  are  faid  to  have 
their  privileges ;  but  i{  is  hard  to  guefs  what  they 
are,  as  the  elections  are  made  by  the  little  and 
great  council  conjointly. 

The  adminiftration,  the  police,  the  finances, 
and  the  whole  executive  power,  is  in  the  fenate, 
which  is  conftantly  fitting. 

The  grand  council  is  afTembled  only  upon  par- 
ticular occafions,  for  the  purpofe  of  legiflation. 
The  fenate  has  cognizance  of  criminal  caufes,  but 
in  capital  cafes  the  grand  council  is  convoked  to 
pronounce  fentence  :  in  civil  caufes  an  appeal 
lies  from  the  fenate  to  the  grand  council ;  but 
thefe  appeals  can  be  but  mere  forms,  the  fame  fe- 
nators  being  in  both  courts. 

As  the  fenate  constitutes  above  a  third  of  the 
council,  choofe  their  own  members,  confer 

all 


Zurich.  47 

all  employments,  have  the  nomination  to  ecclefi- 
aftical  benefices,  two-thirds  of  the  revenues  of  the 
canton  belonging  to  the  clergy,  their  influence 
muft  be  uncontroulable. 

The  two  avoyers  are  chofen  from  the  fenate  by 
the  council  of  one  hundred,  and  are  confirmed 
annually.  The  relations  of  the  candidates  are 
excluded  from  voting :  but  all  fuch  checks  againft 
influence  and  family  connexions  in  an  oligarchy 
are  futile,  as  all  laws  are  cyphers.  There  are  al- 
fo  certain  chambers  of  jultice  and  police. 

In  fome  few  inftances,  fuch  as  declaring  war 
and  making  peace,  forming  alliances  or  impoling 
taxes,  the  citizens  muft  be  aflembled  and  give 
their  confent,  which  is  one  check  upon  the  pow- 
er of  the  nobles, 


LETTER     XV.  " 

ZURICH. 

My  dear  Sir, 

TH  E  canton  of  Zurich  contains  one  hun- 
dred and  fifty  thoufand  fouls,  upon  an  area 
of  forty  miles  by  thirty,  abounds  in  corn,  wine, 
and  all  the  ordinary  produ&ions  of  excellent  paf- 
tures.  Literature  has  been  encouraged,  and  has 
conftantly  flourifhed  in  this  country,  from  the 
time  of  Zuinglius  to  that  of  Gefner  and  Lavater. 
The  inhabitants  are  induftrious,  their  manufactures 
confiderable,  and  their  commerce  exteniive. 

In  the  city  is  a  public  granary,  an  admirable 
refource  againft  fcarcity,  and  a  magnificent  arfe- 
nal  well  filled  with  cannon,  arms,  and  ammuni- 
tion, particularly  mufquets  for  thirty  thoufand 

men ; 


48  Ariflocratical  Cantons. 

men ;  the  armour  of  the  old  Swifs  warriors,  and 
the  bow  and  arrow  with  which  William  Tell  fhot 
the  apple  on  the  head  of  his  fon- — 

Who  with  the  generous  ruftics  fate, 
On  Uri's  rock,  in  clofe  divan, 
And  wing'd  that  arrow,  fure  as  fate, 
Which  fix'd  the  facred  rights  of  man. 

The  fovereign  is  the  city  of  Zurich.  The 
fovereignty  refides  in  the  two  burgomafters,  in 
the  little  council  compofed  of  forty-eight  mem- 
bers, and  the  grand  council  compofed  of  one  hun- 
dred and  lixty-two  members ;  all  taken  from  thir- 
teen tribes,  one  of  which  is  of  the  nobles,  and  the 
other  twelve  of  citizens. 

Although  there  are  twelve  thoufand  fouls  in 
the  capital,  and  one  hundred  and  fifty  in  the  can- 
ton, there  are  not  moire  than  two  thoufand  citi- 
zens. In  early  times,  when  the  city  had  no  ter- 
ritory round  it,  or  a  fmall  one,  the  citizens  were 
in  pofleffion  of  the  government;  when  they  af- 
terwards made  additions  by  conqueft  or  purchafe, 
they  ftill  obftinately  held  this  power,  and  exclud- 
ed all  their  new  fubjecls.  It  is  an  hundred  and 
fifty  years  fince  a  n«w  citizen  has  been  ad- 
mitted :  befides  ele&ing  all  the  magiftrates  and 
holding  all  offices,  they  have  maintained  a  mono- 
poly of  commerce,  and  excluded  all  ftrangers,  and 
even  fubje6ls  of  the  canton,  from  conducing  any 
in  the  town.  Such  are  commons,  as  well  as  no- 
bles and  princes,  whenever  they  have  power  un- 
checked in  their  hands ! 

There  is  even  in  this  commercial  republic  a 
tribe  of  nobles,  who  conlider  trade  as  a  humi- 
liation. \  •; 

The 


Zurich*  49 

The  legiilative  authority  is  vefted  in  the  grand 
council' of  two  hundred  and  twelve,  including 
the  fenate. 

The  fenate  coniifts  of  twenty-four  tribunes, 
and  four  counfellors  chofen  by  the  nobles,  to 
thefe  are  added  twenty,  ele&ed  by  the  fovereign 
couticil ;  making,  in  all,  with  the  two  burgoniafters, 
fifty :  half  of  them  adminifter  fix  months,  and  are 
then  fucceeded  by  the  reft.  The  burgomafters 
are  chofen  annually  by  the  fovereign  council,  and 
one  of  them  is  preiident  of  each  divifion  of  the 
fenate,  which  has  the  judicial  power,  in  criminal 
matters,  without  appeal,  and  in  civil,  with  an 
appeal  to  the  grand  council. 

The  members  of  the  fenate  are  liable  to  be 
changed,  and  there  is  an  annual  revifion  of  them, 
which  is  a  great  reftraint. 

The  ftate  is  not  only  out  of  debt,  but  faves 
money  every  year  againft  any  emergency.  By  this 
fund  they  fupported  a  war  in  1712,  without  any 
additional  taxes.  There  is  not  a  carriage  in  the 
town,  except  it  be  of  a  ftranger. 

Zurich  has  great  influence  in  the  general  'diet, 
which  me  derives  more  from  her  reputation  for 
integrity,  and  original  Swifs  independence  of 
fpirit,  than  from  her  power. 


LETTER    XVI. 

SCHAFFHAUSE. 

My  dear  Sir, 

THE  fovereign   is   the   city  of  Schaff haufe. 
The  citizens,  about   fixteen  hundred,  are 
divided  into  twelve. tribes,  one  of  which  confifts 
of  nobles,  and  eleven  are  ordinary  citizens. 

The 


5o  Ariftocratical  Republics. 

The  fovereignty  refides  in  the  little  and  grand 
councils. 

The  fenate,  or  little  council  of  twenty-five,  has 
the  executive  power. 

The  great  council  comprizing  the  fenate,  has 
the  legiilative,  and  finally  decides  appeals. 

The  burgomafters  are  the  chiefs  of  the  repub- 
lic, and  alternately  prefide  in  both  councils. 

Befides  thefe  there  are,  the  fecret  council,  of 
feven  of  the  higheft  officers;  the  chamber  of 
juftice,  of  twenty-five,  including  the  prefident ; 
the  praetorian  chamber,  of  thirteen,  including 
the  prefident;  the  confiftory,  of  nine;  and  the 
chamber  of  accounts,  of  nine.  The  city  has 
ten  bailiwicks  fubjecl:  to  it. 


THE    CITY^OF    M  U  L  H  O  U  S  E. 

THE  fovereign  is  the  city:  the  fovereignty  re- 
fides  in  the  little  and  the  grand  council.  The 
lefler  council  is  compofed  of  twenty- four  perfons ; 
viz.  three  burgomafters  who  prefide  by  turns, 
each  one  fix  months,  nine  counfellors,  and 
twelve  tribunes,  who  fucceed  by  ele&ion,  and 
are  taken  from  the  grand  council. 

The  grand  council  is  compofed  of  feventy- 
eight,  viz.  the  twenty-four  of  the  leffer  council, 
thirty-fix  members  of  the  tribes,  fix  from  each, 
and  eighteen  taken  from  the  body  of  the  citizens, 
and  ele&ed  three  by  each  one  of  the  fix  tribes. 


THE     CITY     OF     BIENNE. 

THE  republic  of  Bienne  contains  lefs  than  fix 
thoufand  fouls. 

The 


ffie  City  of  Bienne.  51 

The  regency  is  compofed  of  the  great  council, 
in  which  the  legiflative  authority  refides,  confift- 
ing  of  forty  members ;  and  of  the  little  council, 
compofed  of  twenty-four,  who  have  the  execu- 
tive. 

Each  of  thefe  councils  elect  their  own  mem- 
bers, from  the  fix  confraternities  of  the  city. 

The  burgomafter  is  chofen  by  the  two  coun- 
cils, prefides  at  their  meetings,  and  is  the  chief 
of  the  regency ;  he  continues  in  office  for  life, 
although  he  goes  through  the  form  of  an  annual 
confirmation  by  the  two  councils,  when  the  other 
magiftrates  fubmit  to  the  fame  ceremony.  The 
burgomafter  keeps  the  feal,  and,  with  the  ban- 
neret, the  treafurers,  and  the  fecretary,  forms  the 
ceconomical  chamber,  and  the  chamber  of  or- 
phans* 

This  town  fends  deputies  to  the  general  diets, 
ordinary  and  extraordinary. 


LETTER     XVIL 


THE    REPUBLIC    OF    ST»    GALL. 

My  dear  Sir, 

H  E  republic  of  St.  Gall  is  a  league  and  a 
JL     half  in  circumference,  and  contains  nine 
thoufand  fouls.     The  inhabitants  are  very  induf- 
trious  in  manufactures  of  linen,  muflin,  and  em- 
broidery, have  an  extenfive  commerce,  and  arts, 
fciences,  and  literature  are  efteemed  and  culti- 
VOL.  I.  G  vated 


52  Ariftocratical  Republics. 

vated  among  them.  They  have  a  remarkable 
public  library,  in  which  are  thirteen  volumes  of 
original  manufcript  letters  of  the  firft  reformers. 
To  fee  the  different  effects  of  different  forms  of 
government  on  the  human  character,  and  the 
happinefs  and  profperity  of  nations,  it  would  be 
worth  while  to  compare  this  city  with  Conftance, 
in  its  neighbourhood. 

This  happy  and  profperous,  though  diminutive 
republic,  has  its  grand  council  of  ninety  perfons, 
its  little  council  of  twenty- four,  and  three  burgo- 
mafters.  The  little  council  confifts  of  the  three 
burgomafters,  nine  fenators,  and  twelve  tribunes. 
The  grand  council  confifts  of  all  the  little  coun- 
cil, and  eleven  perfons  from  each  tribe  ;  for  the 
city  is  divided  into  the  fociety  of  the  nobles,  and 
iix  tribes  of  the  artifans,  of  whom  the  weavers 
are  the  principal. 

Befides  thefe,  there  are,  the  chamber  of  juflice, 
the  chamber  of  five,  and  fome  others. 


G  E  N  E  v 


IN  the  republic  of  Geneva,  the  fovereignty  fe* 
fides  in  the  general  council,  lawfully  convened, 
which  comprehends  all  the  orders  of  the  ftate, 
and  is  compofed  of  four  findics,  chiefs  of  the 
republic,  prefidents  of  all  the  councils ;  of  the 
leffer  council  of  twenty-five  ;  of  the  grand  coun* 
cil  of  two  hundred,  though  it  conlifts  of  two 
hundred  and  fifty  when  it  is  complete;  and  of 
all  the  citizens  of  twenty-five  years  of  age.  The 
rights  and  attributes  of  all  thefe  orders  of  the 
ftate  are  fixed  by  the  laws.  The  hiftory  of  this 
city  deferves  to  be  ftudied  with  anxious  attention 

by 


Geneva.  53 

by  every  American  citizen.  The  principles  of 
government,  the  neceffity  of  various  orders,  and 
the  fatal  effe&s  of  an  imperfe6l  balance,  appear 
no  where  in  a  ftronger  light.  The  fatal  {lumbers 
of  the  people,  their  invincible  attachment  to  a 
few  families,  and  the  cool  deliberate  rage  of  thofe 
families,  if  fuch  an  expreffion  may  be  allowed, 
to  grafp  all  authority  into  their  own  hands,  when 
they  are  not  controuled  or  over-awed  by  a  power 
above  them  in  a  firft  magiftrate,  are  written  in 
every  page.  I  need  only  refer  you  to  Dr.  d'lver- 
nois's  Hiftorical  and  Political  View  of  the  Con- 
ftitution  and  Revolutions  of  Geneva  in  the  Eigh- 
teenth Century,  which  you  received  from  the  au^ 
thor,  to  convince  you  of  this. 

Let  me  add  here,  that  the  facls  relating  to  the 
Swifs  cantons,  and  their  environs,  mentioned  in 
thefe  letters,  are  taken  from  the  Quarante  Tables 
Politiques  de  la  Suisse,  par  C.  E.  Faber,  Bernois, 
Pajleur,  a  Bi/hviller,  in  1746;  with  fome  addi- 
tional obfervations  from  the  beautiful  Sketches  of 
Mr.  Coxe,  which  I  fend  you  with  this  letter; 
and  which  you  will  find  as  inftru6live  as  they  are 
entertaining. 

The  petty  council  is  indifferently  called  the 
council  of  twenty -five,  the  petit  council,  or  the 
fenate. 

The  council  of  iixty  is  a  body  elected  by  the 
fenate,  and  meets  only  for  the  difcuflion  of  fo- 
reign affairs. 

The  grand  council,  and  council  of  two  hun- 
dred, are  one  and  the  fame  body  ;  it  is  flill  called 
the  council  of  two  hundred,  though  it  now  con- 
lifts  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  members. 

The  general  council,  called  indifcriminately 
thejbverezgn  council,  the  general  assembly,  thefove- 

reign 


54  Ariftocratical  Republics. 

reign  assembly ',  the  assembly  of  the  people,  or  the 
council  general,  is  compofed  of  all  the  citizens  or 
freemen  of  twenty-five  years  of  age. 

At  the  time  of  the  Reformation,  every  affair, 
important  or  trifling,  was  laid  before  the  general 
affembly ;  it  was  both  a  deliberating  and  acting 
body,  that  always  left  the  cognizance  of  details 
to  four  lindics :  this  was  neceflfary,  in  that  time 
of  danger,  to  attach  the  affections  of  the  citizens 
to  the  fupport  of  the  commonwealth  by  every  en- 
dearing tie.  The  city  was  governed  by  two  fin- 
dics  of  its  own  annual  election.  The  multipli- 
city of  affairs  had  engaged  each  iindic  to  nomi- 
nate fome  of  the  principal  citizens  to  ferve  as  af- 
feflbrs  during  his  adminiftration  ;  thefe  afleflbrs, 
called  counfellors,  formed  a  council  of  twenty- 
five  perfons.  In  1457  the  general  council  decreed, 
that  the  council  of  twenty-five  fhould  be  augment- 
ed to  iixty.  This  body,  in  1526,  was  augmented 
to  two  hundred. 

Thus  far  the  ariftocratical  gentlemen  proceeded 
upon  democratical  principles,  and  all  is  done  by 
the  general  afTembly.  At  this  inftant  commences 
-'  the  firft  overt  act  of  ariftocratical  ambition. — 
Warm  in  their  feats,  they  were  loth  to  leave  them, 
or  hold  them  any  longer  at  the  will  of  the  peo- 
ple. With  all  the  fubtlety,  and  all  the  fagacity 
and  addrefs  which  is  characteristic  of  this  order 
of  men  in  every  age  and  nation,  they  prevailed  on 
the  people  to  relinquish  for  the  future  the  right 
of  electing  counfellors  in  the  general  aflembly ; 
and  the  pe6ple,  with  their  chara6ieriftic  iimpli- 
city,  and  unbounded  confidence  in  their  rulers 
when  they  love  them;  became  the  dupes,  and 
pafied  a  law,  that  the  two  councils  fhould  for  the 
future  elect,  or  at  leaft  approve  and  affirm,  each 

other. 


Geneva.  55 

other.  This  is  a  natural  and  unavoidable  effect 
of  doing  all  things  in  one  aflembly,  or  collecting 
all  authority  into  one  centre.  When  magiftrates 
and  people  meet  in  one  aflembly,  the  former  will 
for  ever  do  as  they  pleafe,  provided  they  proceed 
with  any  degree  of  prudence  and  caution. 

The  confequence  was,  that  the  annual  reviews 
were  a  farce;  only  in  a  very  few  inftances,  for 
egregious  faults,  were  any  excluded :  and  the  two 
councils  became  perpetual,  and  independent  of 
the  people  entirely.  The  illufions  of  ambition 
are  very  fubtle :  if  the  motives  of  thefe  magif- 
trates, to  extend  the  duration  of  their  authority, 
were  the  public  good,  we  muft  confefs  they  were 
very  ignorant.  It  is  moft  likely  they  deceived 
themfelves  as  well  as  their  conftituents,  and  mif- 
took  their  own  ambition  for  patriotifm :  but  this 
is  the  progreflive  march  of  all  aflemblies ;  none 
can  confine  themfelves  within  their  limits,  when 
they  have  an  opportunity  of  tranfgreflinj*  them. 
Thefe  magiftrates  foon  learned  to  confider  their 
authority  as  a  family  property,  as  all  others  in 
general,  in  limilar  circumftances,  ever  did,  and 
ever  will. 

They  behaved  like  all  others  in  another  refpecl; 
too  :  their  authority  being  now  permanent,  they 
immediately  attack  the  iindics,  and  transfer  their 
power  to  themfelves. 

The  whole  hiftory  of  Geneva,  fince  that  pe- 
riod, follows  of  courfe  :  the  people,  by  their  fu- 
pinenefs,  had  given  up  all  balances,  and  betrayed 
their  own  privileges,  as  well  as  the  prerogatives 
of  their  firft  magiftrates,  into  the  hands  of  a  few 
families. 

The  people  of  Geneva,  as  enlightened  as  any, 
have  never  considered  the  neceffity  of  joining  with 
the  fmdics,  nor  the  iindics  that  of  joining  the 

people, 


56  Ariftocratical  Republics. 

people,  but  have  conftantly  aimed  at  an  impoffi- 
bility,  that  of  balancing  an  ariftocratical  by  a 
democratical  afiembly,  without  the  aid  of  a  third 
power. 


LETTER     XVIII. 

LUCCA. 

',.<»'.  :iv:}f/;iji>  •;,.!.' '*:.,;-:•     •  ~l     •;>'£•:* 
My  dear^Sir, 

THE  government  of  this  republic  is  faid  to 
be  purely  ariftocratical ;  yet  the  fupreme 
power  is  lodged  in  the  hands  of  two  hundred  and 
forty  nobles,  with  tKe  chief  magiftrate  at  their 
head,  who  is  called  confalloniero,  or  ftandard- 
bearef?  and  has  the  executive  power.  This  ma- 
giftrate is  aflifted  by  nine  counfellors,  called  am- 
ziani,  whofe  dignity  lafts  but  nine  months ;  he 
has  a  life-guard  of  fixty  Swifs,  and  lives  in  the 
republic's  palace,  as  do  his  counfellors,  at  the 
public  expence :  after  fix  years  he  may  be  re- 
chofen.  The  election  of  all  officers  is  decided 
in  the  fenate  by  ballot. 


GENOA. 

L¥.      .,  »'•    *.  j.-ii/'ii.i     -.)-»"•'/>•-"'.    ''  '*   ~     .       '•  •    '   'Jr    ;*.-," '  ' 

THE  legiflative  authority  of  Genoa  is  lodged 
in  the  great  fenate,  confifting  of  feniors,  or  the 
doge  and  twelve  other  members,  with  four  hun- 
dred noblemen  and  principal  citizens,  annually 
eleded.  All  matters  of  ftate  are  tranfaded  by 

the 


Genoa.  57 

the  feniors,  the  members  of  which  hold  their 
places  for  two  years,  affifted  by  fome  other  coun- 
cils; and  four  parts  in  five  of  the  fenate  mufl 
agree  in  paffing  a  law.  The  doge  is  obliged  to 
refide  in  the  public  palace  the  two  years  he  en- 
joys his  office>  with  two  of  the  feniors,  and  their 
families.  The  palace  where  he  refides,  and  where 
the  great  and  little  council,  and  the  two  colleges 
of  the  procuratori  and  gouvernatori  aflemble,  is 
a  large  ftone  building  in  the  centre  of  the  city. 
At  the  expiration  of  his  time,  he  retires  to  his 
own  houfe  for  eight  days,  when  his  adminiftra- 
tion  is  either  approved  or  condemned ;  and  in  the 
latter  cafe,  he  is  proceeded  againft  as  a  criminal. 
At  the  ele&ion  of  the  doge,  a  crown  of  gold  is 
placed  on  his  head,  and  a  fceptre  in  his  hand,  as 
ting  of  Cornea;  he  is  attended  with  life-guards, 
is  clothed  in  crimfon  velvet,  and  ftyled  Moft  Se- 
rene, the  fenators  Excellencies,  and  the  nobility 
Illuftrious. 

The  nobility  are  allowed  to  trade  in  the  whole- 
rale  way;  to  carry  on  velvet,  iilk,  and  cloth  ma- 
nufa&ures ;  and  to  have  lhares  in  merchant  Ihips : 
and  fome  of  them,  as  the  Palavacini,  are  actually 
the  greateft  merchants  in  Genoa. 

The  extent  is  about  one  hundred  and  fifty-two 
miles,  the  breadth  from  eight  to  twenty  miles. 


LETTER 


Ariftocratical  Republics* 

LETTER    XIX. 

j* .'  *ii .  -1* <\' '  ^*3 1  i >' •* 

VENICE. 

My  dear  Sir, 

THE  republic  of  Venice  has  exifted  longer 
than  thofe  of  Rome  or  Sparta,  or  any  other 
that  is  known  in  hiilory.  It  was  at  firfl  demo- 
cratical ;  and  their  magiftrates,  under  the  name 
of  tribunes,  were  chofen  by  the  people  in  a  ge- 
neral affembly  of  them.  A  tribune  was  appointed 
annually,  to  diftribute  juftice  on  each  of  thofe 
iflands  which  this  people  inhabited.  Whether 
this  can  be  called  collecting  all  authority  into 
one  centre,  or  whether  it  was  not  rather  dividing 
it  into  as  many  parcels  as  there  were  iflands,  this 
iimple  form  of  government  fufficed,  in  fo  fmall  a 
community,  to  maintain  order  for  fome  time ;  but 
the  tyrannical  adminiftration  of  the  tribunes,  and 
their  eternal  difcords,  rendered  a  revolution  ne- 
ceffary;  and  after  long  altercations,  and  many 
projects,  the  people,  having  no  adequate  idea  of 
the  only  natural  balance  of  power  among  three 
\  orders,  determined  that  one  magiftrate  fhould  be 
\  chofen,  as  the  centre  of  all  authority — the  eter- 
nal refource  of  every  ignorant  people,  harrafTed 
with  democratical  diftraclions  or  ariftocratical  en- 
croachments. This  magiftrate  muft  not  be  called 
king,  but  duke,  and  afterwards  doge ;  he  was  to 
be  for  life,  but  at  his  death  another  was  to  be 
chofen ;  he  was  to  have  the  nomination  of  all 
magiftrates,  and  the  power  of  peace  and  war. 
The  unbounded  popularity  and  great  real  merit 
of  Paul  Luc  Anafefte,  added  to  the  prefliire  of 
tribunary  tyranny,  and  the  danger  of  a  foreign 

enemy, 


Venice*  59 

enemy,  accomplifhed  this  revolution.  The  new 
doge  was  to  confult  only  fuch  citizens  as  he 
.fhould  judge  proper:  this,  inftead  of  giving  him 
a  conftitutional  council,  made  him  the  mafter; 
he  however  fent  polite  meffages  to  thofe  he  liked 
beft,  praying  that  they  would  come  and  advife 
him.  Thefe  were  foon  called  pregadi,  as  the 
doge's  council  is  ftill  called,  though  they  are  now 
independent  enough  of  him.  The  firft  and  fe- 
cond  doge  governed  mildly;  but  the  third  made 
the  people  repent  of  their  confidence  :  after  ferv- 
ing  the  ftate  by  his  warlike  abilities,  he  enflaved 
it ;  and  the  people,  having  no  conftitutional  means 
to  reflrain  him,  put  him  to  death  in  his  palace, 
and  refolved  to  abolifh  the  office*  Hating  alike 
the  name  of  tribune  and  of  doge,  they  would  have 
a  mafter  of  the  militia,  and  he  Ihould  be  annu- 
ally eligible.  Factions  too  violent  for  this  tran- 
iient  authority  arofe ;  and,  only  five  years  after, 
the  people  abolifhed  this  office,  and  reftored  the 
power  of  the  doge,  in  the  perfon  of  the  fon  of 
him  whom  in  their  fury  they  had  aflaffinated.  For 
a  long  courfe  of  years  after  this,  the  Venetian 
hiftory  difclofes  fcenes  of  tyranny,  revolt,  cruel- 
ty, and  affaffmation,  which  excite  horror.  Doges, 
endeavouring  to  make  their  power  hereditary,  af- 
fociating  their  eldeft  fons  with  them  in  office,  and 
both  together  oppreffing  the  people  ;  thefe  rifing, 
and  murdering  them,  or  driving  them  into  ba- 
nifhment,  never  once  thinking  of  introducing  a 
third  order,  between  them  and  their  firft  magif- 
trate,  nor  any  other  form  of  government  by 
which  his  power  or  theirs  might  be  limited.  In 
the  tenth  century,  a  fon  of  their  doge  took  arms 
againft  his  father,  but  was  defeated,  baniihed, 
and  declared  incapable  of  ever  being  doge  ;  yet 
no  fooner  was  the  father  dead,  than  this  worthlefs 
VOL.  I.  H  fon 


60  Arijlocratical  Republics. 

fon  was  ele&ed,  and  brought  back  in  great  pomp 
to  Venice :  he  became  foon  a  tyrant  and  a  mon- 
fter,  and  the  people  tore  him  to  pieces,  but  took 
no  meafure  to  frame  a  legal  government.  The 
city  increafed  in  commerce,  and  by  conquefts, 
and  the  new  fubjefts  were  not  admitted  to  the 
privileges  of  citizens  :  this  acceflion  of  dominion 
augmented  the  influence  of  the  doge.  There  was 
no  affembly  but  that  of  the  people,  and  another 
called  the  council  of  forty,  for  the  adminiftra- 
tion  of  juftice.  This  body,  in  the  twelfth  cen- 
tury, formed  fomething  like  a  plan  of  govern- 
ment. 

Although  the  defendants  of  the  ancient  tri- 
bunes and  doges  were  generally  rich,  and  had  a 
fpontaneous  refpect  fhewn  to  the  antiquity  of  their 
families,  they  were  not  properly  a  nobility,  hav- 
ing no  legal  rights,  titles,  or  jurifdi&ions.  As 
any  citizen  might  be  elected  to  a  public  office, 
and  had  a  vote  in  the  affemblies,  it  was  neceflary 
for  the  proudeft  among  them  to  cultivate  the  good 
will  of  the  multitude,  who  made  and  murdered 
doges.  Through  all  thefe  contefts  and  diflen- 
lions  among  a  multitude,  always  impatient,  often 
capricious,  demanding,  at  the  fame  time,  all  the 
promptitude  and  fecrecy  of  an  abfolute  monar- 
chy, with  all  the  licence  of  a  fimple  democracy, 
two  things  wholly  contradictory  to  each  other, 
the  people  had,  to  their  honour,  ftill  maintained 
their  right  of  voting  in  afTembly,  which  was  a 
great  privilege,  and  nobody  had  yet  dared  to 
aim  a  blow  at  this  acknowledged  right  of  the 
people. 

The  council  of  forty  now  ventured  to  propofe 
a  plan  like  that  of  Mr.  Hume  in  his  idea  of  a 
perfect  commonwealth,  and  like  that  which  our 

friend;, 


Venice.  61 

friend,  Dr.  Price,  informs  us  was  propofed  in  the 
convention  of  MafTachufetts. 

The  city  was  divided  into  fix  diftricls,  called 
feftiers.  The  council  of  forty  propofed,  that 
each  of  thefe  partitions  fhould  name  two  elec- 
tors, amounting  to  twelve  in  all,  who  fhould 
have  the  power  of  chooiing,  from  the  whole  city, 
four  hundred  and  feventy,  who  fhould  have  the 
whole  power  of  the  general  alTembly,  and  be  call- 
ed the  grand  council. 

The  people  were  amufed  with  fine  promifes  of 
order  and  regularity,  and  confoled  with  aiTertions 
that  their"  right  of  eledion  ftill  continued,  and 
that  thofe  who  fhould  not  be  chofen  one  >  year, 
might  be  the  next;  and,  not  perceiving  that  this 
law  would  be  fatal  to  their  power,  fuffered  that 
ariftocracy  to  be  thus  founded,  which  fubfifts  to 
this  hour.  The  next  propofal  was,  that  a  com- 
mittee of  eleven  fhould  be  appointed,  to  name  the 
doge.  Though  the  defign  of  reducing  the  people 
to  nothing  might  have  been  eafily  feen  in  thefe 
manoeuvres,  yet  the  people,  wearied,  irritated, 
and  difcouraged,  by  eternal  difcords,  agreed  to 
both. 

The  council  of  forty,  having  thus  fecured  the 
people,  turned  their  eyes  to  the  doge,  whofe  au- 
thority had  often  been  perverted  to  the  purpofes 
<of  oppreffion,  and,  having  no  legal  check,  had 
never  been  retrained  but  by  violence,  and  all 
the  confufions  which  accompany  it.  They  pro- 
pofed that  a  privy  council  of  fix  fhould  be  ap- 
pointed for  the  doge,  one  from  each  divifion  of 
the  city,  by  the  grand  council  themfelves,  and 
that  no  orders  fhould  be  valid  without  their  con- 
currence :  this  paffed  into  a  law,  with  unanimous 
applaufe.  They  then  propofed  a  fenate  of  fixty, 
who  were  to  be  ele&ed  out  of  the  grand  council, 

a,nd 


6a  Arijlocratical  Republics. 

and  to  be  called  the  pregadi :  this  too  was  ap- 
proved. The  grand  council  of  four  hundred  and 
feventy,  the  fenate  of  iixty,  the  fix  counfellors, 
and  eleven  electors,  were  accordingly  all  chofen, 
and  the  laft  were  fworn  to  choofe  a  doge,  without 
partiality,  favour,  or  affedlion  :  and  the  new-choir 
en  doge,  having  taken  care  to  diftribute  money 
among  the  multitude,  was  received  with  univerfai 
acclamations.  In  his  reign  was  inftituted,  by  per- 
miflion  of  the  pope,  the  curious  ceremony  of 
wedding  the  fea,  by  a  ring  caft  into  it,  injignum 
<veri  et  perpetui  imperil.  Under  the  next  doge  the 
avogadors  were  inftituted,  to  fee  that  the  laws 
were  fully  executed. 

In  the  thirteenth  century,  fix  new  magiftrates, 
called  correctors,  were  created  by  the  fenate,  to 
inquire  into  all  abufes  during  the  reign  of  a  de- 
ceafed  doge,  and  report  them  to  the  fenate ;  and 
it  was  ena&ed,  that  the'fortune  of  the  doge  mould 
indemnify  the  ftate  for  whatever  damage  it  had 
fufFered  during  his  adminiftration :  and  thefe  cor- 
rectors have  been  appointed,  at  the  deceafe  of 
every  doge  fince  that  time.  In  the  next  reign,  a 
new  tribunal  of  forty  was  ere&ed,  for  the  trial  of 
civil  caufes.  In  the  thirteenth  century,  a  new 
method  of  appointing  the  doge,  by  the  famous 
ballot  of  Venice,  a  complicated  mixture  of  choice 
and  chance,  was  adopted. 

Each  of  the  grand  counfellors,  now  augmented 
to  forty-one  to  avoid  the  inconvenience  of  an 
equal  diviiion,  draws  a  ball  out  of  a  box,  con- 
taining thirty  gilt,  and  the  reft  white  ;  thole  who 
draw  the  gilt  ones,  go  into  another  room,  where 
is  a  box  with  thirty  balls,  nine  of  which  are 
gilt ;  draw  again,  and  thofe  who  obtain  the  gilt 
balls  are  the  jirft  eleflors  ;  who  choofe  forty,  com- 
prehending themfelves  in  that  number;  the  forty, 

by 


Venice.  63 

by  repeating  the  whole  procefs,  are  reduced  to 
twelve  fecond  eleftors,  the  firft  of  .whom  names 
three,  and  the  reft  two  a  piece  :  thefe  twenty-five 
draw  again  from  as  many  balls,  nine  of  which  are 
gilt ;  this  reduces  them  to  nine  third  eleffors,  each 
of  whom  choofes  five  :  which  forty-five  are  re- 
duced, by  a  repetition  of  the  ballot,  to  eleven 
fourth  eieftors,  and  they  have  the  appointment  of 
forty-one,  who  are  the  direct  electors  of  the  doge. 
The  choice  generally  turns  upon  two  or  three 
candidates,  whofe  names  are  put  into  another  box, 
and  drawn  out :  the  firft  whofe  name  is  drawn 
retires,  and  proclamation  is  made  for  obje&ions 
agamft  him ;  if  any  are  made,  he  comes  in,  and  is 
Jbeard  in  his  defence ;  then  the  electors  proceed 
to  determine  by  ayes  and  noes ;  if  there  are  twen- 
ty-five ayes,  he  is  chofen,  if  not,  another  name 
is  read,  and  the  fame  deciiion  repeated,  until 
there  are  twenty-five  in  the  affirmative. 

The  grand  council,  ever  anxious  to  limit  the 
power  of  the  doge,  foon  thought  it  improper  that 
the  public  a&s  fhould  be  figned  by  chancellors 
appointed  by  him,  and  accordingly  determined 
to  appoint  this  officer  themfelves. 

The  fenate  then  began  to  think  it  too  great  a 
refpecl:  to  the  people  to  have  the  new  doge  pre- 
fented  to  them  for  their  acclamations,  and  or- 
dained that  a  fyndic  fhould  congratulate  him  in 
the  name  of  the  people  on  his  election.  The 
populace,  who  had  weekly  furrendered  their  rights, 
were  very  angry  at  being  deprived  of  this  Ihow, 
and  proclaimed  a  doge  of  their  own  ;  but  he  was 
afraid  of  the  conteft,  and  retired,  and  the  people 
having  no  man  of  weight  to  head  them,  gave  up 
this  point. 

The  new  doge,  who  had  much  contempt  for 
popular  government,  and  ibme  refentment  for  the 

night 


64  Ariftocratical  Republics. 

flight  oppofition  he  had  met  with,  procured  a 
law  to  be  patted,  that  all  the  members  of  the 
grand  council  fhould  hold  their  places  for  life, 
and  tranfmit  them  to  their  pofterity,  and  that  their 
elections  by  the  people's  ele&ors  mould  ceafe. 
This  eftablifhment  of  a  hereditary  legiflative  no- 
bility, no  doubt  fhocked  the  citizens  in  general, 
but  chiefly  thofe  of  ancient  families,  who  were 
not  at  that  moment  members  of  the  grand  coun- 
cil ;  to  filence  thefe,  the  moft  powerful  of  them 
were  received  into  the  grand  council,  and  others 
were  promifed  that  they  mould  be  admitted  at  a 
future  time.  Commerce1  and  wars  foon  turned  the 
attention  of  the  reft  of  the  people  from  all  thought 
about  the  lofs  of  their  privileges.  Some  few,  how- 
ever, fome  time  after,  formed  a  plan,  not  to  con- 
vene the  'people  in  a  body,  and  new  model  the 
conftitution,  but  to  aflaffinate  the  doge  and  coun- 
cil all  together.  The  plot,  which  was  carried  on 
by  the  plebeians,  was  difcovered,  and  the  chiefs 
executed.  Another  originated  among  the  nobles, 
fome  of  them  of  the  grand  council,  who  being  of 
very  ancient  families,  could  not  bear  to  fee  fo 
many  citizens  raifed  to  a  level  with  themfelves, 
and  others  of  the  moft  diftinguifhed  of  thefe,  who 
were  not  of  the  grand  council,  and  had  not  been 
received  afterwards  according  to  promife.  This 
produced  a  fkirmifh  in  the  city,  but  fome  of  the 
confpiring  nobles  were  killed,  the  reft  routed, 
and  many  executed,  but  it  was  thought  prudent 
to  admit  feveral  of  the  moft  diftinguifhed  fami- 
lies. Thefe  two  confpiracies  produced  a  council 
of  ten,  upon  which  were  afterwards  engrafted 
the  ftate  inquifition. 

Great  care  is  taken  in  Venice,  to  balance  one 
court  again  ft  another,  and  render  their  powers 
mutual  checks  to  each  other.  The  college  called 

the 


Venice.  65 

the  feigniory  was  originally  compofed  of  the 
doge  and  fix  counfellors;  to  thefe  were,  added  fix 
of  the  grand  council  chofen  by  the  fenate,  and 
called  the  favii  or  fages  ;  then  five  more  for  land 
affairs,  and  then  five  for  fea  affairs,  in  the  room  of 
whom,  five  young  noblemen  are  now  chofen  every 
fix  months,  who  attend,  without  a  vote,  for  their 
education ;  to  thefe  were  added  the  three  chiefs  of 
the  criminal  court,  from  a  jealoufy  of  the  power 
of  the  college,  which  is  both  the  cabinet  council, 
and  the  reprefentative  of  the  ftate,  giving  audience 
and  anfwers  to  ambafiadors,  to  agents  of  towns, 
and  generals  of  the  army  ;  receives  all  petitions, 
fummons  the  fenate,  and  arranges  its  bufinefs. 

There  is  one  inftance  of  a  doge's  concerting  a 
confpiracy,  to  lhake  off  the  controul  of  the  fenate; 
but  as  it  was  an  old  man  of  fourfcbre,  whofe 
young  wife,  on  whom  he  doated,  was  not  treated 
with  fufficient  refpecl:  by  the  nobility,  we  need  not 
wonder,  that  he  had  not  fenfe  enough  to  think  of 
introducing  a  regular,  well-balanced  conftitution, 
by  a  joint  concurrence  of  the  people,  and  the  no- 
bility :  the  whole  plan  was  to  mafTacre  the  grand 
council ;  and  although  he  engaged  in  his  defign 
fome  of  the  higheft  officers,  and  a  large  party, 
the  plot  was  difcovered,  the  doge  himfelf  tried, 
condemned  and  beheaded,  as  fo  infamous  a  piece 
of  mad  villainy  juftly  deferved. 

A  punctual  execution  of  the  laws,  is  no  doubt 
effential  to  the  exiftence  of  this  ftate,  and  there 
are  ftriking  inftances  of  perfons  puniming  their 
neareft  relations,  with  the  moft  unrelenting  fe ve- 
rity; without  this,  the  doge  on  one  hand,  or  the 
people  on  the  other,  would  foon  think  of  an  uni- 
on againft  the  ruling  nobility.  The  ariftocracy  is 
always  fagacious,  and  knows  the  neceffity  of  a 
rigorous  impartiality,  in  order  to  preferve  its 

power. 


66  Ariflocratical  Republics. 

power,  and  all  the  barriers  we  have  defcribed 
have  been  ere&ed  for  this  purpofe :  but  all  would 
be  infufficient  to  reftrain  their  pafiions,  without  the 
lions  mouths  and  the  ftate  inquifitors ;  thefe  were 
engrafted  on  the  council  of  ten.  This  terrible 
tribunal,  is  fovereign  in  all  crimes  againft  the 
ftate ;  it  confifts  often  chofen  yearly  by  the  grand 
council ;  the  fix  of  the  feigniory  aflift,  and  the 
doges  prefide  when  they  pleafe.  Three  chiefs, 
appointed  monthly  by  lot,  to  open  all  letters, 
feize  the  accufed,  take  examinations,  and  profe- 
cute  the  prifoner;  who  is  clofely  confined,  al- 
lowed no  council,  and  finally  acquitted  or  con- 
demned to  death,  in  public  or  private,  by  the  plu- 
rality of  voices.  This  was  the  original  tribunal, 
but  it  was  not  found  fufficient,  and  the  ftate  in- 
quiiitors  were  ere&ed  in  the  beginning  of  the  fix- 
teenth  century.  This-  tribunal  confifts  only  of 
three  perfons,  all  taken  from  the  council  of  ten, 
who  have  authority  to  decide,  without  appeal,  on 
the  life  of  every  citizen,  the  doge  himfelf  not  ex- 
cepted.  They  employ  what  fpies  they  pleafe  ;  if 
they  are  unanimous,  they  may  order  a  prifoner  to 
be  ftrangled  in  goal,  or  drowned  in  the  canal, 
hanged  in  the  night,  or  by  day,  as  they  pleafe ; 
if  they  are  divided,  the  caufe  muft  go  before  the 
council  of  ten,  but  even  here,  if  the  guilt  is 
doubtful,  the  rule  is  to  execute  the  prifoner  in 
the  night.  The  three  may  command  accefs  to  the 
houfe  of  every  individual  in  the  ftate,  and  have 
even  keys  to  every  apartment  in  the  ducal  palace, 
may  enter  his  bed-chamber,  break  his  cabinet, 
and  fearch  his  papers.  By  this  tribunal,  have 
doge,  nobility,  and  people,  been  kept  in  awe, 
and  reftrained  from  violating  the  laws,  and  to 
this  is  to  be  afcribed  the  long  duration  of  this 
ariftocracy. 

Such 


Venice*  67 

Such  are  the  happy  effefts  of  the  fpirit  of  fa- 
milies, when  they  are  not  bridled  by  an  executive 
authority,  in  the   hands  of  a  firft  magiftrate  on 
one  hand,  and  by  an  aflembly  of  the  people  in 
perfon,  or  by   adequate   reprefentation,  on   the 
other.     Such  are  the  bleflings  which,  in  courfe  of 
ages,  fpring  from  a  negleft  in  the  beginning,  to 
eftablifh  .three  orders,  and  a  perfect  balance  be- 
tween  them.     There  can  be,  in  the  nature   of 
things,  no   balance  without  three  powers.     The 
ariftocracy  is  always  more  fagacious  than  an  af- 
fembly  of  the  people  collectively,  or  by  repre- 
fentation, and  always  proves  an  overmatch  in  po- 
licy, fooner  or  later.     They  are  always  more  cun- 
ning too  than  a  firft  magiftrate,  and  always  make 
of  him  a  doge  of  Venice,  a  mere  ceremony,  un- 
lefs  he  makes  an  alliance  with  the  people  to  fup- 
port  him  againft  them.     What  is  the  whole  hif- 
tory  of  the  wars  of  the  barons  but  one  demon- 
ftration  of  this  truth !  What  are  all  the  ftanding 
armies  in  Europe,  but  another.     Thefe  were  all 
given   to  kings  by  the  people,  to  defend   them 
againft  ariftocracies.     The  people  have  been  ge- 
nerally  of  Mr.   Turgot's   mind,   that   balances, 
and  different  orders,  were  unneceflary,  and,  harra£ 
fed  to  death  with  the  domination  of  noble  fa- 
milies, they  have  generally  furrounded  the  thrones 
with  troops,  to  humble  them.     They  have  fuc- 
ceeded  fo  far  as  generally  to  make  the  nobles  de- 
pendent  on   the   crown,    but  having  given   up 
the  balance  which  they  might  have  held  in  their 
own   hands,  they  are   ftill   fubjecl:   to  as   much 
ariftocratical   domination,    as   the   crowns  think 
proper  to  permit.  In  Venice,  the  ariftocratical  paf- 
fion  for  curbing  the  prince  and  the  people,  has 
been  carried  to  its  utmoft  length.     It  is  aftonifh- 
VOL.  I.  I  ing 


68  Ariftocratical  Republics. 

ing  to  many,  that  any  man  will  accept  the  officd 
of  doge.     Thefe   fagacious   nobles,  who  always 
know  at  leaft  the  vices  and  weaknefles  of  the  hu- 
man heart  better  than  princes  or  people,  faw  that 
there  would  be  generally  vanity  enough  in  an  in- 
dividual to  flatter  himfelf,  that  he  had  qualities 
to  go  through  his  adminiftration  without  incur- 
ring  cenfure,  and  with  applaufe;    and  farther, 
that  the  frivolous  diftin6tion  of  living  in  the  ducal 
palace,  and  being  the  firft  man  in  the  nation, 
though  it  were  only  the  firft  among  equals,  would 
tempt  moft  men  to  rifque  their  lives  and  fortunes, 
and  accordingly  it  has  fo  happened.     There  has 
been  an  uncommon  folicitude  all  along  to  reftrain 
his  power :  this  no  doubt  was  to  prevent  him  from 
a  poflibility  of  negociating  with  the  people  againft 
them :  on  the  other  hand,  there  has  been  uncom- 
mon exertions  to  annihilate  every  power,  every 
'hope  in   the  people:  this  was  to  prevent  them 
from  having  a  legal  poflibility  of  applying  to  the 
doge  for  affiffance.     All  this  together  would  not 
however  have  fucceeded,  if  death,  in  the  fhape 
of  the  inquifltion,  had  not  been  made  to  flare 
both  doge  and  people  in  the  facey  upon  the  firft 
thought  of  conferring  together. 

The  nobles  are  divided  into  fix  clafles. 
I.  Twelve  of  the  moft  ancient  families.  2.  Four 
families  that  in  the  year  880  fubfcribed  to  the 
building  of  the  abbey  of  St.  George.  3.  Thofe 
whofe  names  were  written  in  the  golden  book,  in 
1 296.  4*  Thofe  that  were  ennobled  by  the  public 
in  1385.  5.  Thofe  who  purehafed -their  nobility 
for  one  hundred  thoufand  ducats  in  1646.  And 
6.  The  ftrangers  who  have  been  received  into  the 
number  of  nobility:  the  whole  make  about  two* 
thoufand  five  hundred* 

There 


Venice.  69 

There  are  four  councils  :  i.  The  doge  and  fix 
fignoria.  2.  The  configlio  grande,  in  which  all 
the  nobles  have  feats  and  voices.  3.  Configlio 
de  pregadi,  of  250,  and  is  the  foul  of  the  reput> 
lie.  4.  Configlio  proprio  delli  dieci— and  the 
ftate  mquiiitors. 


THE     REPUBLIC     OF     THE    U  N  I  T.E  D     PRO- 
VINCES    OF    THE     LOW     COUNTRIES. 

HERE  were  a  Stadtholder,  an  aflembly  of  the 
States  General,  a  council  of  ftate :  the  Stadtholder 
hereditary  had  the  command  of  armies  and  navies, 
and  appointment  of  all  officers,  &c. 

Every  province  had  an  aflembly  beiides,  and 
every  city,  burgomafters,  counfellors,  and  fche- 
pens  or  judges,  befides  an  hooft  officer,  and  his 
dienders,  for  the  police. 

The  hiftory  of  this  country,  and  its  compli- 
cated conftitutions,  affords  an  inexhauftible  ftore 
of  materials  to  our  purpofe,  but,  confide  ring  the 
critical  fituation  of  it,  prudence  di&ates  to  pafs  it 
over:  with  all  the  fagacity,  and  more  wifdom 
than  Venice  or  Berne,  it  has  always  had  more 
confideration  of  the  people  than  either,  and  has 
given  more  authority  to  the  firft  magiftrate :  they 
have  never  had  any  exclufive  preferences  of  fa- 
milies or  nobles.  Offices  have,  by  law  at  leaftj 
been  open  to  all  men  of  merit, 


LETTER 


7Q  Monarchical  or  regal  Republics, 

LETTER    XX. 

ENGLAND, 

My  dear  Sir, 

POLAND  and  England.  The  hiftories  of 
thefe  countries  would  confirm  the  general 
principle  we  contend  for :  the  laft  efpecially.  But 
who  can  think  of  writing  upon  this  fubjedt  after 
De  Lolme,  whofe  book  is  the  befl  defence  of 
the  political  balance  of  three  powers  that  ever 
was  written. 

If  the  people  are  not  equitably  reprefented  in 
the  houfe  of  commons,  this  is  a  departure  in 
pra&ice  from  the  theory. — If  the  lords  return 
members  of  the  houfe  of  commons,  this  is  an 
additional  difturbance  'of  the  balance :  whether 
the  crown  and  the  people  in  fuch  a  cafe  will  not 
fee  the  neceffity  of  uniting  in  a  remedy,  are 
queftions  beyond  my  preteniions :  I  only  contend 
\  that  the  Engiiih  conftitution  is,  in  theory,  the  moil 
ftupendous  fabric  pf  human  invention,  both  for 
the  adjurtment  of  the  balance,  and  the  prevention, 
of  its  vibrations;  and  that  the  Americans  ought 
to  be  applauded  inftead  of  cenfured,  for  imitating 
it,  as  far  as  they  have.  Not  the  formation  of  lan- 
guages, not  the  whole  art  of  navigation  and  fliip 
building  does  more  honour  to  the  human  under- 
Handing  than  this  fyflem  of  government.  The 
Americans  have  not  indeed  imitated  it  in  giving  a 
negative,  upon  their  legiflature  to  the  executive 
power;  in  this  refpect  their  balances  are  incom- 
plete, very  much  1  confefs  to  my  mortification : 
in  other  refpe&s,  they  have  fome  of  them  fallen 

Ihort 


England.  71 

fhort  of  perfection,  by  giving  the  choice  of  fome 
militia  officers,  &c.  to  the  people — thefe  are  how- 
ever fmall  matters  at  prefent.  They  have  notj 
made  their  firft  magiftrates  hereditary,  nor  their 
fenators  :  here  they  differ  from  the  Englifh.  confti- 
tution,  and  with  great  propriety. 

The  Agrarian  in  America,  is  divided  into  the 
hands  of  the  common  people  in  every  ftate,  in 
fuch  a  manner,  that  nineteen  twentieths  of  the 
property  would  be  in  the  hands  of  the  commons, 
let  them  appoint  whom  they  could  for  chief  ma- 
giftrate  and  fenators  :  the  fovereignty  then,  in  fac~l, 
as  well  as  morality,  muft  refide  in  the  whole  body 
of  the  people ;  and  an  hereditary  king  and  nobi- 
lity, who  mould  not  govern  according  to  the  public 
opinion,  would  infallibly  be  tumbled  inftantly  from 
their  places,  it  is  not  only  moftprudenjt  then, but 
abfolutely  neceflary,  to  avoid  continual  violence, 
to  give  the  people  a  legal,  conftitutional,  and 
peaceable  mode  of  changing  thefe  rulers,  whene- 
ver they  difcover  improper  principles  or  difpoii- 
tions  in  them.  In  the  prefent  ftate  of  fociety,  and 
with  the  prefent  manners,  this  may  be  done,  not 
only  without  inconvenience,  but  greatly  for  the 
happinefs  and  profperity  of  the  country.  In  fu- 
ture ages,  if  the  prefent  ftates  become  great  na- 
tions, rich,  powerful,  and  luxurious,  as  well  as 
numerous,  their  own  feelings  and  good  fenfe  will 
di&ate  to  them  what  to  do :  they  may  make  tran- 
fitions  to  a  nearer  refemblance  of  the  Britifh  con- 
fritution,  by  a  frefh  convention,  without  the  fmall- 
eft  interruption  to  liberty.  But  this  will  never  be- 
come neceffary,  until  great  quantities  of  property 
fhall  get  into  few  hands. 

The  truth  is,  that  the  people  have  ever  go- 
verned in  America :  all  the  weight  of  the  royal 
governors  and  councils,  even  backed  with  fleets 

and 


^2  Monarchical  Republics. 

and  armies,  have  never  been  able  to  get  the  ad- 
vantage of  them,  who  have  always  flood  by  their 
houfes  of  reprefentatives  in  every  inftance,  and 
carried  all  their  points ;  and  no  governor  ever 
Hood  his  ground  againfta  reprefentative  affembly ; 
as  long  as  he  governed  by  their  advice  he  was 
happy ;  as  foon  as  he  differed  from  them  he  was 
wretched,  and  foon  obliged  to  retire. 


LETTER    XXL 


POLAND, 

My  Dear  Sir, 

TH  E  king  of  Ppland  is  the  firft  magiftrate 
in  the  republic,  derives  all  his  authority 
from  the  nation.— He  has  not  the  power  to  make 
laws,  raife  taxes,  contraft  alliances,  or  declare 
war,  nor  to  coin  money,  nor  marry,  without  the 
ratification  of  the  diet. 

The  fenate  is  compofed  of  the  clergy  and  no- 
bility ;  the  third  eftate,  or  people,  is  not  fo  much 
as  known.  The  grand  marfhal,  the  marfhal  of 
the  court,  the  chancellor,  vice  chancellor,  and 
the  treafurer,  are  the  firft  fenators. 

The  nobility,  or  gentry,  pofTefs  the  dignities 
and  employments,  in  which  they  never  permit 
ftrangers,  or  the  commonality,  to  have  any  partici- 
pation :  they  ele&  their  king,  and  would  never 
fuffer  the  fenate  to  make  themielves  matters  of  this 
ele&ion.  The  peafants  are  flaves  to  the  gentry  ; 
having  no  property,  all  their  acquifitions  are  made 
for  their  matters,  and  are  expofed  to  all  their  paf- 
fions,  and  are  opprefled  with  impunity. 


Poland.  73 

The  general  diets,  which  are  ufually  held  at 
Warfaw  or  Grodno,  are  preceded  by  particular 
affemblies  of  palatinates,  in  which  the  deputies 
are  chofen  for  the  general  affembly,  and  inftruct* 
ed :  the  deputies  aflembled  in  general  diet,  pro* 
ceed  to  the  ele&ion  of  a  marihal,  who  has  a  very 
extraordinary  power,  that  of  impoling  lilence  on 
whom  he  pleafes ;  he  is  the  chief  or  fpeaker  of 
the  affembly. 

At  the  death,  abdication,  or  depofition  of  a 
king,  the  primate  calls  the  affembly  of  the  elec-> 
tors  to  an  open  field  near  Warfaw.  Here  the 
electors  take  an  oath,  not  to  feparate  until  they 
fhall  have  unanimoufly  elected  a  king,  nor  to 
render  him  when  elected  any  obedience,  until  he 
has  fworn  to  obferve  the  Paha  Conventa,  and  the 
laws. 

The  candidates  muft  let  their  gold  glitter,  and 
give  fplendid  entertainments,  which  muft  be  car- 
ried into  debauch :  the  nobility  are  captivated, 
with  the  attractions  of  magnificence  and  Hunga- 
rian wine,  and  infallibly  declare  in  favour  of  the 
candidate  who  caufes  it  to  flow  in  the  greateft 
profufion/  The  ambaffadors  enter  upon  intrigues, 
even  in  public :  the  nobility  receive  their  prefents, 
fell  their  fuffrages  with  impunity,  and  render  the 
throne  venal,  but  often  behave  with  little  fidelity 
to  the  candidate  in  whofe  intereft  they  pretend  to 
be  engaged,  and,  forgetting  the  prefents  they  have 
received,  efpoufe  the  caufe  of  a  more  wealthy 
competitor  without  hefitation.  When  the  candi- 
date has  gained  all  the  fuffrages,  he  is  declared 
king,  and  fworn  to  obferve  the  Patfa  Conventa, 
and  the  laws,  and  then  crowned.  The  Poles  are 
polite  and  friendly,  but  magnificence  is  the  foible 
of  the  nobility,  and  they  facrifice  all  things  to 
luxury :  as  they  feldom  fee  any  perfon  fuperior  to 


74  Monarchical  Republics. 

them  in  their  own  country,  and  treat  their  infe- 
riors with  an  air  of  abfolute  authority,  they  live 
in  all  the  fplendor  of  princes.  This  is  the  account 
of  the  Abbe  des  Fontaines  in  the  year  1736;  it 
is  to  be  hoped  things  have  fince  changed  for  the 
better,  but  if  this  account  was  then  true,  who  can 
wonder  at  what  has  happened  lince. 

Here  again  is  no  balance ;  a  king,  and  an  aflem- 
bly  of  nobles,  and  nothing  more  :  the  nobles  here 
difcover  their  unalterable  difpolition,  whenever 
they  have  the  power,  to  limit  the  king's  authority ; 
and  there  being  no  mediating  power  of  the  people, 
collectively  or  reprefentatively,  between  them,  the 
confequence  has  been,  what  it  always  will  be  in 
fuch  a  cafe,  confufion  and  calamity. 


LETTER    XXII. 

POLAND. 

My  dear  Sir, 

SINCE  the  letter  concerning  Poland  was  fent 
you,  Mr.  Coxe's  travels  into  that  kingdom, 
&c.  have  fallen  into  my  hands  :  and  they  con- 
tain fo  many  fadls  material  to  our  argument,  that 
it  is  very  proper  to  fend  you  the  fubfiance  of  this 
account ;  indeed  there  is  fcarcely  a  book  in  the 
world,  in  any  manner  relative  to  the  hiftory  of 
government,  or  to  thofe  branches  of  philofophy 
on  which  it  depends,  which  is  not  much  to  our 
purpofe. 

In  the  moft  ancient  times,  which  records  or 
hiftory  elucidate,  the  monarchy  of  Poland",  like 

all 


Poland.  75 

all  others  denominated  feudal,  was  in  theory^  and 
preteniion,  abfolute.  The  barons  too,  in  this 
country,  as  in  all  others,  were  very  often  impa- 
tient under  fuch  reftraint.  When  the  prince  was, 
an  able  ftatefman  and  warrior,  he  was  able  to 
preferve  order ;  but  when  he  was  weak  and  indo- 
lent, it  was  very  common  for  two  or  three  barons 
in  conjunction  to  make  war  upon  him;  and  fonie- 
times  it  happened  that  all  together  leagued  agamft 
him  at  once.  In  every  feudal  country,  where  the 
people  had  not  the  fenfe  and  fpirit  to  make  them- 
felves  of  importance,  the  barons  became  an  arif- 
tocracy,  inceffantly  encroaching  upon  the  crown, 
and,  under  pretence  of  limiting  its  authority, 
took  away  from  it  one  prerogative  after  another, 
until  it  was  reduced  down  to  a  mere  doge  of  Ve- 
nice, or  avoyer  of  Berne ;  until  the  kings,  by  in- 
corporating cities  and  granting  privileges  to  the 
people,  fet  them  up  againft  the  nobles,  and  ob- 
tained by  their  means  ftanding  armies,  fufficient 
to  controul  both  nobles  and  commons. 

The  monarchy  of  Poland,  nearly  abfolute, 
funk  in  the  courfe  of  a  few  centuries,  without  any 
violent  convulfion,  into  an  ariilocracy. 

It  came  to  It  difputed  whether  the  monarchy 
was  hereditary  or  elective,  and  whether  its  autho- 
rity was  fovereign  or  limited.  The  firft  queftion 
is  refolved,  by  fuppofing  that  the  crown  continu- 
ed always  in  the  fame  family,  although,  upon  the 
death  of  a  king,  his  fucceffor  was  recognized 
in  an  aflembly  of  the  nobles.  The  fecond, 
may  be  anfwered  by  fuppoiing,  that  when  the 
king  was  a6live  and  capable,  he  did  as  he 
pleaied ;  but  when  he  was  weak,  he  was  dictated 
to  by  a  licentious  nobility.  Callimir  the  Great 
retrenched  the  authority  of  the  principal  barons, 
and  granted  immunities  to  the  leffer  nobility  and 

VOL.  I.  K  gentry; 


7  6  Monarch ical  Rep  ubtics . 

gentry ;  well  aware  that  no  other  expedient  coulcf 
introduce  order,  except  a  limitation  of  the  vaft 
influence,  poffeffed  by  the  Palatines  or  principal 
nobility.  If  this  prince  had  been  pofTeffed  of  any 
ideas  of  a  free  government,  he  might  eafiiy  have 
formed  the  people  and  inferior  gentry  into  an  af- 
fembly  by  themfelves,  and,  by  uniting  his  power 
with  theirs,  againft  the  encroachments  of  the  no- 
bles upon  both,  have  preserved  it.  His  nephew, 
Louis  of  Hungary,  who  fticceeded  him,  being  a 
foreigner,  was  obliged  by  the  nobility  to  fubicribe 
conditions  at  his  acceflion,  not  to  impofe  any 
taxes  by  his  royal  authority,  without  the  conlent 
of  the  nation,  that  is  of  the  nobles,  for  no  other 
nation  is  thought  on  :  that  in  cafe  of  his  demife 
without  male  heirs,  the  privilege  of  appointing  a 
king  mould  revert  to  the  nobles.  In  confequence 
of  this  agreement  Louis  was  allowed  to  afcend 
the  throne :  having  no  fon,  with  a  view  of  infur- 
ing  the  fucceflion  to  Sigifmund  his  fon-in-law,  he 
promifed  to  diminim  the  taxes,  repair  the  for- 
trefles  at  his  own  expence,  and  to  confer  no  offices 
or  dignities  on  foreigners. 

Louis  died :  but  Sigifmund  was  emperor,  and 
therefore  powerful,  and  might  be  formidable  to 
the  new  immunities.  The  Poles,  aware  of  this,- 
violated  the  compact  with  Louis,  neglected  Sigif- 
mund, and  elected  Ladiflaus,  upon  his  ratifying 
Louis's  promiies,  and  marrying  his  daughter. 

Ladiflaus,  having  relinquifhed  the  right  of  im- 
poiing  taxes,  called  an  aflembly  of  prelates,  ba- 
rons, and  military  gentlemen,  in  their  refpedive 
provinces,  in  order  to  obtain  an  additional  tribute. 
Thefe  provincial  aflemblies  gave  birth  to  the  Die- 
tines  ;  which  now  no  longer  retain  the  power  of 
railing  money  in  their  leveral  diftrids,  but  only 
eleft  the  nuncios  or  reprefentatives  for  the  diet. 

Ladlilaiis 


Poland.  77 

Ladiflaus  the  third,  the  fon  of  the  former, 
purchafed  his  right  to  the  fucceffion,  during  the 
life  of  his  father,  by  a  confirmation  of  all  the 
concefiions  before  granted,  which  he  folenmly  ra- 
tified at  his  acceflion.  Caffimir  the  third,  bro- 
ther of  Ladiflaus  the  third,  confented  to  feveral 
further  innovations,  all  unfavourable  to  regal 
prerogative. — One  was  the  convention  of  a  na- 
tional diet,  inverted  with  the  fole  power  of  grant- 
ing fupplies.  Each  palatinate  or  province  was 
allowed  to  fend  to  the  general  diet,  befides  the 
Palatines  and  other  principal  barons,  a  certain 
number  of  nuncios  or  reprefentatives,  chofen  by 
the  nobles  and  burghers.  Is  it  not  ridiculous, 
that  this  reign  fhould  be  conlidered  by  the  popu- 
lar party,  as  the  aera,  at  which  the  freedom  of  the 
constitution  was  permanently  eftablifhed  ?  This 
freedom,  which  conlifts  in  a  king  without  autho- 
rity; a  body  of  nobles  in  a  ftate  of  uncontrouled 
anarchy ;  and  a  peafantry  groaning  under  the  yoke 
of  feudal  defpotifm;  the  greateff  inequality  of 
fortune  in  the  world;  the  extremes  of  riches  and 
poverty,  of  luxury  and  mifery,  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  each  other;  an  univerfal  corruption  and 
venality  pervading  all  ranks  :  even  the  firft  no- 
bles not  blufhing  to  be  penfioners  of  foreign 
courts;  one  profeffing  himfelf  publicly  an  Auf- 
trian,  another  a  Pruffian,  a  third  a  Frenchman, 
and  a  fourth  a  Ruffian;  a  country  without  manu- 
factures, without  commerce,  and  in  every  view 
the  moil  diftreffed  in  the  wosld. — But  to  proceed, 
with  an  enumeration  of  the  meafures  by  which 
they  have  involved  themfelves  in  thefe  pitiable 
circumftances  : 

Caffirnir  was  involved  in  feveral  unfuccefsful 
Wars,  which  exhaufted  his  treafures :  he  applied 
tp  the  diet  for  fubfidies. 

Every 


78  Monarchical  Republics. 

Every  fupply  was  accompanied  with  a  lift  of 
grievances,  and  produced  a  diminution  of  the 
royal  prerogative.  The  barons,  at  the  head  of 
their  vafials,  were  bound  to  fight,  and  the  king 
could  require  fuch  feudal  fervices  in  defence  of 
the  kingdom :  but  Caffimir  the  third,  to  obtain 
pecuniary  aids,  gave  up  the  power  of  fummon- 
ing  the  nobles  to  his  ftandard,  and  of  enacling 
any  law  without  the  concurrence  of  the  diet. 
John  Albert,  to  procure  an  eledion  in  preference 
to  his  elder  brother,  affented  to  all  the  immunities 
extorted  from  his  predeceffors,  and  fwore  to  their 
obfervance,  in  1469.  Alexander,  his  fucceffor, 
declared  in  1505,  the  following  limitations  of 
fovereign  authority  to  be  fundamental  laws  of  the 
kingdom.  i.  The  king  cannot  impofe  taxes. 
2.  He  cannot  require  the  feudal  fervices.  3.  Nor 
alieaate  the  royal  domains.  4.  Nor  enacl:  laws. 
5.  Nor  coin  money.  6.  Nor  alter  the  procefs  in 
the  courts  of  juftice.  Sigifmund  the  firft,  fuc- 
ceeded  Alexander,  and  under  his  reign  the  Polifh 
conftkution  was  the  moil  tolerable,  as  the  pro- 
perty of  the  fubjec~l  was  beft  fe  cured,  and  the  crown 
had  confiderable  influence  :  but  this  did  not  fa- 
tisfy  the  nobles.  Under  Sigifmund  Auguflus, 
fon  and  fucceffor  of  Sigifmund  the  firfr,  that  fa- 
vourite objecl:  of  the  Polifh  nobles,  the  free  elec- 
tion of  the  king,  was  publicly  brought  forward, 
and  the  king  obliged  to  agree,  that  no  future 
monarch  fhould  fuccecd  to  the  throne,  unlefs 
freely  ele6led  by  the  nation  :  before  this,  the  fo- 
vereigns  upon  their  acceiTion,  though  formally 
raifed  by  the  confent  of  the  nation,  frill  refted 
their  pretenfions  upon  hereditary  right,  always 
ftyling  themfelves  heirs  of  the  kingdom  of  Poland. 
Sigifmund  Augufius  was  the  Lift  who  bore  that 
title ;  at  his  death,  in  1572,  all  title  to  the  crown 

from 


Poland.  79 

from  hereditary  right  was  formally  abolifhed,  and 
the  abfolute  freedom  of  election  eftablifhed  upon 
a  permanent  bafts  :  a  charter  of  immunities  was 
drawn  up  at  a  general  diet,  a  ratification  of  which 
it  was  determined  to  exact  of  the  new  fov^reign, 
prior  to  his  election.  This  charter,  called  pafta 
convent a>  contained  the  whole  body  of  privileges 
obtained  from  Louis  and  his  fucceflbrs,  with  the 
following  additions  :  i .  That  the  king  fhould  be 
elective,  and  that  his  fucceffor  mould  never  be 
appointed  during  his  life.  2.  That  the  diets, 
the  holding  of  which  depended  folely  upon  the 
will  of  the  king,  mould  be  afTembled  every  two 
years.  3.  That  every  nobleman  or  gentleman 
in  the  realm  fhould  have  a  vote  in  the  diet  of  elec- 
tion. 4.  That  in  cafe  the  king  fhould  infringe 
the  laws  and  privileges  of  the  nation,  his  fubjects 
fhould  be  abfolved  from  their  oaths  of  allegiance. 
From  this  period  the  pafta  conventa,  occalionally 
enlarged,  have  been  confirmed  by  every  fovereigii 
at  his  coronation. 

Henry  of  Valois,  brother  of  Charles  the  ninth 
of  France,  who  afcended  the  throne  after  the 
conflitution  was  thus  new  modelled,  fecured  his 
election  by  private  bribes  to  the  nobles,  and  by 
ftipulating  an  annual  penfion  to  the  republic  from 
the  revenues  of  France.  His  example  has  been 
followed  by  every  fucceeding  king,  who,  belides 
an  unconditional  ratification  of  the  pacta  conven- 
ta,  has  always  been  conftrained  to  purchafe  the 
crown  by  a  public  largefs,  and  private  corruption. 
Such  is  Poliih  liberty,  and  fiich  the  bleflings  of  a 
monarchy  elective  by  a  body  of  nobles. 

Under  Stephen  Bathori,  the  royal  authority, 
or  rather  the  royal  dignity,  was  farther  abridged, 
by  the  appointment  of  fixteen  fenators,  chofen 
at  each  diet,  to  attend  the  king,  and  to  give  their 

opinion 


So  Monarchical  "Republics. 

opinion  in  all  matters  of  importance,  fo  that  he 
could  not  iffue  any  decree  without  their  confent. 
Another  fatal  blow  was  given  to  the  prerogative 
in  1578, "by  taking  from  the  king  the  fupreme 
jurifdi&ion  of  the  caufes  of  the  nobles :  it  was 
enacted,  that  without  the  concurrence  of  the  king, 
each  palatinate  ihould  elect  in  their  dietines  their 
own  judges,  who  fhould  form  fupreme  courts  of 
juflice,^  called  tribunalia  regni,  in  which  the  caufes 
of  the  nobles  fhall  be  decided  without  appeal,  a 
mode  which  prevails  to  this  day. 

In  the  reign  of  John  Caflimir,  in  1652,  was 
introduced  the  lilerum  veto,  or  the  power  of  each 
nuncio  to  interpofe  a  negative,  and  break  up  a  diet, 
a  privilege  which  the  king  himfelf  does  not  enjoy. 
When  the  diet  was  debating  upon  tranfactions  of 
the  utmoft  importance,  which  required  a  fpeedy 
decilion,  a  nuncio  cried  out,  "  I  flop  the  pro- 
"  ceedings,"  and  quitted  the  affembly  :  and  a 
venal  faction,  who  fupported  his  protelt,  unheard 
of  as  it  was,  obtained  the  majority,  and  broke  up 
the  affembly  in  confufion.  1'he  conftitution 
was  thus  wholly  changed,  and  an  unlimited  fcope 
given  to  faction.  The  innovation  was  fupported 
by  the  great  officers  of  ftate,  the  general  trea- 
furer,  and  marfhal,  who  being  once  nominated 
by  the  king,  enjoyed  their  offices  for  life,  refpon- 
fible  only  to  the  diets,  confcious  that  they  could 
at  all  times  engage  a  nuncio  to  proteft,  and  thus 
elude  an  inquiry  into  their  adminiftration  ;  it  was 
alfo  fupported  by  the  adherents  of  many  nobles 
accufed  of  capital  crimes  before  the  diet,  the  only 
tribunal  before  which  they  could  be  tried  :  all  the 
nuncios  who  oppofed  the  railing  of  additional 
fubfidies  by  taxes,  which  the  exigencies  of  the 
ftate  then  demanded,  feconded  the  propofal  of 
putting  an  end  to  the  affembly.  But  the  principal 

caufe 


Poland.  8 1 

fcaufe  of  all  were  the  foreign  powers,  interefted  to 
foment  confufions  in  the  Polifh  councils.  Before 
this,  they  were  obliged  to  fecure  a  majority ;  af- 
terwards, they  might  put  an  end  to  any  diet,  un- 
friendly to  their  views,  by  corrupting  a  fingle 
member.  This  veto  broke  up  feven  diets  in  the 
reign  of  John  Caffimir,  four  under  Michael,  fe- 
ven under  John  Sobiefki,  and  thirty  during  the 
reigns  of  the  two  Augufti.  In  confequence  of 
this  neceffity  of  unanimity,  which  they  call  the 
deareft  Palladium  of  Polifh  liberty,  Poland  has 
continued  above  a  hundred  years  almoft  without 
laws. 

But  as  the  king  ftill  beftowed  the  ftarofties,  or 
royal  fiefs,  which  are  held  for  life,  and  confer- 
red the  principal  dignities  and  great  offices  of 
Hate,  he  was  ftill  the  fountain  of  honour,  and 
maintained  great  influence  in  the  councils  of  the 
nation ;  but  this  laft  branch  of  the  royal  prero- 
gative was  lately  wrefted  from  the  crown  at  the 
eftablifhment  of  the  permanent  council. 

Thus  it  appears  in  the  hiftory  of  Poland,  as  «. 
in  that  of  Venice,  Genoa,  Berne,  Soleure,  and 
all  others,  that  the  nobles  have  continued  with- 
out interruption  to  fc ramble  for  diminutions  of 
the  regal  authority,  to  grafp  the  whole  executive 
power,  and  augment  their  own  privileges;  and 
have  attained  a  direct  ariftocracy,  under  a  mo- 
narchical name,  where  a  few  are  above  the  con- 
troul  of  the  laws,  while  the  many  are  deprived 
of  their  prote&ion. 

The  prefent  wretched  ftate  of  the  towns,  com- 
pared with  their  former  flourifhing  condition; 
the  poverty  of  the  peafants,  whole  opprefiions 
have  increafed  in  proportion  to  the  power  of  the 
nobles,  having  loft  a  prote&or  when  the  king 

loft 


82  Monarchical  or  regal  Republics. 

loft  his  weight  in  the  conftitution ;  the  total  con- 
fuiion  in  all  public  affairs ;  the  decleniion  of  im- 
portance, and  lofs  of  territory — all  fhew  that  ab- 
folute  monarchy  is  preferable  to  fuch  a  republic. 
Would  twelve  millions  of  inhabitants,  under  an 
Englifh  conftitution,  or  under  the  conftitution 
of  any  one  of  the  United  States,  have  been  par- 
titioned and  difmembered  ?  No ;  not  by  a  league 
of  all  the  abfolute  ibvereigns  of  Europe  againft 
them  at  once. — Such  are  the  effects  of  colle&ing 
all  authority  into  one  centre,  of  negle&ing  an 
equilibrium  of  powers,  and  of  not  having  three 
branches  in  the  legiflature. 

The  practice  of  cantoning  a  body  of  foldiers 
near  the  plain  were  the  kings  are  elected,  has 
been  adopted  by  feveral  foreign  powers  for  near  a 
century;  and,  although  it  may  be  galling  to  the 
nobility,  prevents  the  effufion  of  blood  that  for- 
merly deluged  the  affembly.  This  was  done,  at 
the  election  of  Staniflaus  Auguftus,  by  the  em- 
prefs  of  Ruffia  and  the  king  of  Pruffia ;  five 
thoufand  Ruffian  troops  were  Rationed  at  a  fmall 
diftance  from  the  plain  of  Vola. 

Staniflaus  was  in  the  thirty-fecond  year  of  his 
age  when  he  afcended  the  throne,  in  1764.  From 
his  virtues  and  abilities,  the  faireft  hopes  were 
conceived  of  his  railing  Poland  from  its  deplo- 
rable lituation ;  but  his  exertions  for  the  public 
good  were  fettered  by  the  conftitution,  by  the 
factions  of  a  turbulent  people,  and  the  intrigues 
of  neighbouring  powers.  His  endeavours  to  in- 
troduce order  at  home,  and  independence  abroad, 
which  would  have  increafed  the  power  of  his 
country,  and  her  con fideration  with  foreign  na- 
tions, alarmed  the  neighbouring  powers.  The 
fpirit  of  religious  intolerance  produced  a  civil 

war, 


Poland.  83 

war,  and  the  fenate  petitioned  the  ambaflador 
from  Peterlburg,  not  to  withdraw  the  Ruffian 
troops.  The  royal  troops,  aided  by  the  Ruf- 
fians, whofe  difcipline  was  fuperior,  were  in  fa- 
vour of  religious  liberty.  The  confederates,  fe- 
cretly  encouraged  by  Auftria,  affifled  by  the 
Turks,  and  fupplied  with  money  and  officers  by 
the  French,  were  able  to  protract  hoftilities  from 
1768  to  1772*  during  this  period  the  attempt 
was  made  to  aflaffinate  the  king. 

Count  Pulafki,  who  was  killed  in  the  fervice 
of  the  United  States,  is  laid  to  have  planned  an. 
enterprize  fo  much  to  his  difhonour.  No  good 
caufe  ever  was,  or  ever  will  be,  ferved  by  affaffi- 
nation ;  and  this  is  happily,  in  the  prefent  age, 
the  univerfal  fenfe  of  mankind.  If  a  papal  nun- 
cio was  found  in  Poland,  capable  of  bleffing  the 
weapons  of  confpirators  againft  this  tolerant  king, 
he  was  a  monfter,  whofe  bloody  bigotry  the  libe- 
ral fpirit  of  the  Pope  himfelf  muft,  at  this  en- 
lightened period,  abominate.  The  king  did  him- 
felf immortal  honour,  by  his  interceffion  with  the 
diet  to  remit  the  tortures  and  horrid  cruelties  de- 
creed by  the  laws  of  moft  kingdoms  in  Europe 
againft  treafon,  and  by  his  moderation  towards 
all  the  confpirators. 

We  are  now  arrived  at  the  confummation  of  all 
panegyrics  upon  a  fovereignty  in  a  fiugle  affem- 
bly — The  Partition. 

Pruffia  was  formerly  in  a  ftate  of  vaflalage  to 
this  republic;  Ruffia  once  law  its  capital  and 
throne  poffefTed  by  the  Poles ;  and  Auftria  was 
indebted  to  John  Sobielki,  a  fovereign  of  this 
country,  for  compelling  the  Turks  to  raife  the 
fiege  of  Vienna,  but  a  century  ago.  A  republic 
fo  lately  the  protedor  of  its  neighbours,  would 
not,  without  the  moft  palpable  imperfections  in 

VOL.  I.  L  the 


84  Monarchical  or  regal  Republics. 

the  orders  and  balances  of  its  government,  have 
declined  in  an  age  of  general  improvement,  and 
become  a  prey  to  any  invader — much  lefs  would 
it  have  forced  the  world  to  acknowledge,  that 
the  tranflation  of  near  five  millions  of  peopley 
from  a  republican  government  to  that  of  abfb- 
lute  empires  and  monarchies,  whether  it  were  done 
by  right  or  by  wrong,  is  a  bleffing  to  them. 
The  partition  was  projected  by  the  king  of  Pruf- 
iia,  who  communicated  it  to  the  emperor  and  em- 
prefs.  The  plague  was  one  cireumftance,  and 
the  Ruffian  war  againft  the  Turks  another,  that 
favoured  the  delign ;  and  the  partition-treaty  was 
iigned  at  Peterlburg,  in  February  1772,  by  the 
Ruffian,  Auftrian,  and  Pruffian  plenipotentiaries. 
The  troops  of  the  three  courts  were  already  in 
pofleffion  of  the  greateft  part  of  Poland,  and 
the  Confederates  we-re  foon  difperfed.  The  par- 
titioning powers  proceeded  with  fuch  fecrecy,  that 
only  vague  conjectures  were  made  at  Warfaw, 
and  that  lord  Cathcart,  the  Englifh  minifter  at 
Peterlburg,  obtained  no  authentic  information  of 
the  treaty  until  two  months  after  its  fignature. 
The  formal  notification,  to  the  king  and  fenate 
at  Warfaw,  was  made  by  the  Imperial  and  Pruf- 
fian a  mbafladors,  in  September  1772,  of  the  pre- 
tenfions  of  their  courts  to  the  Poliiri  territory. 
The  remonftrances  of  the  king  and  fenate,  as  well 
as  thofe  of  the  courts  of  London,  Paris,  Stock- 
holm, and  Copenhagen,  had  no  effe6t ;  and  the 
rnoft  humiliating  record,  that  ever  appeared  in 
the  annals  of  a  republic,  is  feen  in  the  king's 
fummons — "  Since  there  are  no  hopes  from  any 
"  quarter,  and  any  further  delays  will  only  tend 
*c  to  draw  down  the  moft  dreadful  calamities 
<£  upon  the  remainder  of  the  dominions  which 
"  are  left  to  the  republic,  the  diet  i-s  convened 

"  for 


Poland.  85 

ct  for  the  i  pth  of  April,  1773,  according  to  the 
"  will  of  the  three  courts  ;  neverthelefs,  in  order 
"  to  avoid  all  caufe  of  reproach,  the  king,  with 
"  the  advice  of  the  fenate,  again  appeals  to  the 
4<  guarantees  of  the  treaty  of  Oliva."  It  is  not  to 
be  doubted,  that  if  there  had  been  in  Poland  a 
people  in  exiftence,  as  there  is  in  Holland,  to  have 
given  this  amiable  prince  only  the  authority  of  a 
ftadt  holder,  he  would  have  laid,  "  1  will  die  in 
"  the  laft  ditch." 

Of  the  difmembered  provinces,  the  Ruffian, 
which  is  the  largeft  territory,  contains  only  one 
million  and  a  half  of  fouls;  the  Auftrian,  which 
is  the  moft  populous,  contains  two  millions  and  a 
half;  the  Pruffian,  which  is  the  moft  commercial, 
commanding  the  navigation  of  the  Viftula,  con- 
tains only  eight  hundred  and  fixty  thoufand,  and 
has  given  a  fatal  blow  to  the  commerce  of  Po- 
land, by  transferring  it  from  Dantzic  to  Memel 
and  Konigflburg. 

The  finifhing  ftroke  of  all  remains. — 

The  three  ambafladors,  on  the  i3th  of  Septem- 
ber, 1773,  delivered,  "  A  part  of  thofe  cardinal 
cc  laws,  to  the  ratification  of  which  our  courts 
"  will  not  fuffer  any  contradiction. 

"  I.  The  crown  of  Poland  fhall  be  for  ever 
"  elective,  and  all  order  of  fucceflion  profcribed : 
"  any  perfon  who  fhall  endeavour  to  break  this 
"  law  fhall  be  declared  an  enemy  to  his  country, 
"  and  liable  to  be  punifhed  accordingly. 

"  II.  Foreign  candidates  to  the  throne,  being 
"  the  frequent  caufe  of  troubles  and  divilions, 
"  fhall  be  excluded ;  and  it  fhall  be  enacted, 
"  that,  for  the  future,  no  perfon  can  be  chofen 
"  king  of  Poland,  and  great  duke  of  Lithuania, 
c  excepting  a  native  Pole,  of  noble  origin,  and 
"  poflfefling  land  within  the  kingdom.  The  fon, 

«  or 


86  Monarchical  or  regal  Republics. 

"  or  grandfon,  of  a  king  of  Poland,  cannot  be 
"  ele&ed  immediately  upon  the  death  of  their 
"  father  or  grandfather;  and  are  not  eligible, 
cc  excepting  after  an  interval  of  two  reigns. 

"  III.  The  government  of  Poland  ftiall  be  for 
"  ever  free,  independent,  and  of  a  republican 
<c  form. 

<e  IV.  The  true  principle  of  faid  government 
'*  confiftirig  in  the  ftricl  execution  of  its  laws, 
<c  and  the  equilibrium  of  the  three  eftates,  viz. 
"  the  king,  the  fenate,  and  the  equeftrian  order, 
"  a  permanent  council  fhall  be  eftablifhed,  in 
"  which  the  executive  power  fhall  be  vefted.  In 
"  this  council  the  equeftrian  order,  hitherto  ex- 
^  eluded  from  thelidminiftration  of  affairs  in  the 
cc  intervals  of  the  diets,  lhall  be  admitted,  as  fhall 
"  be  'more  clearly  laid  down  in  the  future  ar- 
"  rangements." 

Thus  the  fupreme  legiflative  authority  relides 
in  the  three  eftates  of  the  realm,  the  king,  the 
fenate,  and  equeftrian  order,  afTembled  in  a  na- 
tional diet ;  bu.t  each  eftate  has  no  negative  upon 
the  other,  and  therefore  is  no  balance,  and  very 
little  check.  The  great  families  and  principal 
palatines  will  flill  govern,  without  any  effectual 
controul. 

The  executive  power  is  now  vetted  in  the  fu- 
preme permanent  council ;  but  here  neither  have 
they  any  checks,  all  being  decided  by  the  majo- 
rity, and  the  fai«e  principal  families  will  always 
prevail. 

Thefe  auguft  legifiators  have  acknowledged 
the  principle  of  2  free  republican  government, 
that  it  confifts  in  a  ftricl  execution  of  the  laws, 
and  an  equilibrium  of  eftates  or  orders :  but  how 
are  the  laws  to  govern  ?  and  how  is  the  equili- 
brium to  be  prderved  ? .  Like  air,  oil,  and  water, 

fhaken 


Poland.  87 

fliaken  together  in  one  bottle,  and  left  in  repofe  ; 
the  firft  will  rife  to  the  top,  the  laft  fmk  to  the 
bottom,  and  the  fecond  fwim  between. , 

Our  countrymen  will  never  run  delirious  after 
a  word  or  a  name.  The  name  republic  is  given 
to  things,  in  their  nature  as  different  and  contra- 
dictory as  light  and  darknefs,  truth  and  falfehood, 
virtue  and  vice,  happinefs  and  mifery,.  There 
are  free  republics,  and  republics  as  tyrannical  as 
an  oriental  defpotifm.  A  free  republic  is  the 
beft  of  governments,  and  the  grekteft  bleffing 
which  mortals  can  afpire  to.  Republics  which 
are  not  free,  by  the  help  of  a  multitude  of  ri- 
gorous checks,  in  very  fmall  ftates,  and  for  fhort 
fpaces  of  time,  have  preferred  fome  reverence  for 
the  laws,  and  been  tolerable ;  but  there  have  been 
oligarchies  carried  to  fuch  extremes  of-  tyranny, 
that  the  defpotifm  of  Turkey,  as  far  as  the  hap- 
pinefs of  the  nation  at  large  is  concerned,  would 
perhaps  be  preferable.  An  empire  of  laws  is  a 
charaderiftic  of  a  free  republic  only,  and  mould 
never  be  applied  to  republics  in  general.  If 
there  mould  ever  be  "a  people  in  Poland,  there 
will  foon  be  a  real  king ;  and  if  ever  there  ihould 
be  a  king  in  reality,  as  well  as  in  name,  there 
will  foon  be  a  people :  for,  inflead  of  the  trite 
faying,  "  no  bifhop,  no  king,"  it  would  be  much 
more  exact  and  important  truth  to  fay,  no  peo- 
ple, no  king,  and  no  king,  no  people,  meaning 
by  the  word  king,  a  firiYmagiftrate  poflefifed  ex- 
cluiively  of  the  executive  power.  It  may  be  laid 
down  as  an  univerfal  maxim,  that  every  govern- 
ment that  has  not  three  independent  branches  in 
its  legiflature  will  foon  become  an  abfolute  mo- 
narchy; or,  an  arrogant  nobility,  increasing  eve- 
ry day  in  a  rage  for  fplendor  and  magnificence, 
will  annihilate  the  people,  and,  attended  with 

their 


88  Monarchical  or  regal  Republics. 

their  horfes,  hounds,  and  vaflals,  will  run  down 
the  king  as  they  would  hunt  a  deer,  wifhing  for 
nothing  fo  much  as  to  be  in  at  the  death. 

The  philofophical  king  Staniflaus  felt  moft  fe- 
verely  this  want  of  a  people.  In  his  obfervations 
on  the  government  of  Poland,  publifhed  in  the 
OEuvres  du  Phihfophe  bienfaifant,  torn.  iii.  he  la- 
ments, in  very  pathetic  terms,  the  miferies  to 
which  they  were  reduced. 

"  The  violences,"  fays  he,  cc  which  the  patri- 
"  cians  at  Rome  exercifed  over  the  people  of  that 
<c  city,  before  they  had  recourfe  to  open  force, 
**  and,  by  the  authority  of  their  tribunes,  balanc- 
*c  ed  the  power  of  the  nobility,  are  a  ftriking  pic- 
*c  ture  of  the  cruelty  with  which  we  treat  our 
"  plebeians.  This  portion  of  our  ftate  is  more 
<c  debafed  among  us  than  they  were  among  the 
<c  Romans,  where  they  enjoyed  a  fpecies  of  li- 
<c  berty,  even  in  the  times  when  they  were  moft 
"  enflaved  to  the  firft  order  of  the  republic. 
"  We  may  fay  with  truth,  that  the  people  are, 
«c  in  Poland,  in  a  ftate  of  extreme  humiliation. 
"~  We  muft,  neverthelefs,  confider  them  as  the 
"  principal  fupportof  the  nation  ;  and  I  am  per- 
"  fuaded,  that  the  little  value  we  fet  on  them 
"  will  have  very  dangerous  confequences. — Who 
cc  are  they,  in  fad,  who  procure  abundance  in 
«*  the  kingdom  ?  who  are  they  that  bear  the  bur- 
"  thens,  and  pay  the  taxes  ?  who  are  they  that 
«c  furnifh  men  to  our  armies  ?  who  labour  our 
a  fields  ?  who  gather  in  the  crops  ?  who  fuftain 
*c  and  nourifh  us  ?  who  are  the  caufe  of  our  inac- 
"  tivity  ?  the  refuge  of  our  lazinefs  ?  the  refource 
c<  for  our  wants?  the  fupport  of  our  luxury? 
"  and  indeed  the  fource  of  all  our  pleafures  ? 
w  Is  it  not  that  very  populace  that  we  treat  with 

«  fo 


Poland  89 

**  fo  much  rigour  ?  Their  pains,  their  fweat, 
"  their  labours,  do  not  they  merit  any  bet- 
"  ter  return  than  our  fcorn  and  difdain  ?  We 
cc  fcarcely  diflinguifh  them  from  the  brutes, 
"  which  they  maintain  for  the  cultivation  of  our 
"  lands !  we  frequently  have  lefs  confideration 
<c  for  their  flrength,  than  we  have  for  that  of 
<c  thofe  animals !  and  too  frequently  we  fell  them 
"  to  mailers  as  cruel  as  ourfelves,  who  imme- 
sc  diately  force  them,  by  an  excefs  of  hard  la- 
cc  bour,  to  repay  the  price  of  their  new  ilavery  ? 
c<  I  cannot  recollect  without  horror  that  law 
«  which  impofes  only  a  fine  of  fifteen  livres  upon 
«  a  gentleman  who  fhall  have  killed  a  peafant. — 
«  Poland  is  the  only  country  where  the  populace 
cc  are  fallen  from  all  the  rights  of  humanity;  we 
"  alone  regard  thefe  men  as  creatures  of  another 
"  fpecies,  and  we  would  almoft  refufe  them  the 
c<  fame  air  which  they  breathe  with  us.  God,  ia 
fC  the  creation  of  man,  gave  him  liberty — what 
<c  right  have  we  to  deprive  him  of  it  ?  As  it  is 
*c  natural  to  ihake  off  a  yoke  that  is  rough,  hard, 
"  and  heavy,  may  it  not  happen  that  this  people 
"  may  make  an  effort  to  wrefl  themfelves  from 
"  our  tyranny  ?  Their  murmurs  and  complaints 
(c  muft,  fooner  or  later,  lead  to  this.  Hitherto, 
<c  accuftomed  to  their  fetters,  they  think  not  of 
"  breaking  them;  but  let  one  iingle  man  arife, 
"  among  thefe  unfortunate  wretches,  with  a  maf- 
"  culine  and  daring  fpirit,  to  concert  and  foment 
"  a  revolt,  what  barrier  fhall  we  oppofe  to  the 
"  torrent  ?  We  have  a  recent  in  fiance,  in  the 
"  infurre&ion  in  the  Ukraine,  which  was  only 
"  occafioned  by  the  vexations  of  thofe  among  us 
"  who  had  there  purchafed  lands.  We  defpifed 
"  the  courage  of  the  poor  inhabitants  of  that 

"  country 


po     Monarchical  or  regal  Republics. — Poland. 

"  country — they  found  a  refource  in  defpair,  and 
<c  nothing  is  more  terrible  than  the  defpair  of 
<e  thofe  who  have  no  courage.  What  is  the  con- 
cc  dition  to  which  we  have  reduced  the  people  of 
"  our  kingdom  ?  Reduced  by  mifery  to  the  ftate 
cc  of  brutes,  they  drag  out  their  days  in  a  lazy 
"  ftupidity,  which  one  would  almoft  miftake  for  a 
"  total  want  of  fentiment :  they  love  no  art,  they 
"  value  themfelves  on  no  induftry ;  they  labour 
"  no  longer  than  the  dread  of  chaftifement  forces 
<c  them ;  convinced  that  they  cannot  enjoy  the 
<c  fruit  of  their  ingenuity,  they  ftifle  their  ta- 
"  lents,  and  make  no  effays  to  difcover  them. — 
<c  Hence  that  frightful  fcarcity  in  which  we  find 
<c  ourfelves  of  the  molt  common  artifans !  Should 
*c  we  wonder  that  we  are  in  want  of  things  the 
cc  moft  neceflary,  when  thofe  who  ought  to  fur- 
<c  nifh  them,  cannot  xhope  for  the  fmalleft  profit 
<c  from  their  cares  to  furnim  us  !  It  is  only 
"  where  liberty  is  found,  that  emulation  can 
«  exift." 

It  would  be  a  pleafure  to  tranilate  the  whole  ; 
but  it  is  too  long.  It  is  a  pity  that  the  whole 
people,  whofe  mifery  he  defcribes  and  laments, 
were  not  as  feniible  of  the  neceflity  of  a  lefs  cir- 
cumfcribed  royal  authority. 


LETTER 


Recaf  itulation ;  9 1 


LETTER    XXIIL 


RECAPITULATION; 

My  dear  Sir, 

AS  we  have  taken  a  curfory  view   of  thofe 
countries  in  Europe,  where  the  government 
may  be  called,  in  any  reafonable  conftruclion  of 
the  word,  republican  ;    let  us  now  paufe  a  few 
moments,  and  reflecl:  upon  what  we  have  feen. 

Among  every  people,  and  in  every  fpecies  of 
republics,  we  have  conftantly  found  a  firft  magif- 
irate?  a  head,  a  chief,  under  various  denominations 
indeed,  and  with  different  degrees  of  authority, 
with  the  title  of  ftadtholder,  burgomafter,  avoyer, 
doge,  confalloniero,  prefident,  fyndic,  mayor,  al- 
calde, capitaneo,  governor,  or  king :  in  every  na- 
tion we  have  met  with  a  diftinguiihed  officer :    if 
there  is  no  example  in  any  free  government,  any 
more  than  in  thole  which  are  not  free,  of  a  focie- 
ty  without  a  principal  perfonage,  we  may  fairly 
conclude,   that  the   body   politic   cannot  fubfift 
without  one,  any  more  tnan  the  animal  body  with- 
out a  head.     If  Mr.  Turgot  had  made  any  difco- 
very,  which  had  efcaped  the  penetration  of  all 
the  legiflators  and  philofophers,  who  had   lived 
before  him,  he  ought  at  leaft  to  have  communi- 
cated it  to  the  world  for  their  improvement;    but 
as  he  has  never  hinted  at  any  fuch  invention,  we 
may  fafely  conclude  that  he  had  none ;  and  there- 
fore, that  the  Americans  are  not  juftly  liable  to 
cenfures,  for  inftituting  governors. 

VOL.  I.  M  In 


52  Recapitulation. 

In  every  form  of  government,  we  have  feen  a 
fenate,  or  little  council,  a  competition,  generally, 
of  thofe  officers  of  ftate,  who  have  the  moft  expe- 
rience and  power,  and  a  few  other  members  fe- 
le&ed  from  the  higheft  ranks,  and  moft  illuftrious 
reputations.  On  thefe  lefTer  councils,  with  the 
firft  magiftrate  at  their  head,  generally  refts  the 
principal  burden  of  adminiftration,  a  fhare  in  the 
legi  dative,  as  well  as  executive  and  judicial  au- 
thority of  government.  The  admiffion  of  fuch 
fenates  to  a  participation  of  thefe  three  kinds  of 
power,  has  been  generally  obferved  to  produce  in 
the  minds  of  their  members  an  ardent  ariftocrati- 
cal  ambition,  grafping  equally  at  the  prerogatives 
of  the  firft  magiftrate,  and  the  privileges  of  the 
people,  and  ending  in  the  nobility  of  a  few  fami- 
lies, and  a  tyrannical  oligarchy  :  but  in  thofe 
ftates,  where  the  fenates  have  been  debarred  from 
all  executive  power,  and  confined  to  the  legifla- 
tive,  they  have  been  obferved  to  be  firm  barriers 
againft  the  encroachments  of  the  crown,  and  often 
great  fupporters  of  the  liberties  of  the  people. 
The  Americans  then,  who  have  carefully  confin- 
ed their  fenates  to  the  legiflative  power,  have  done 
wifely  in  adopting  them. 

We  have  feen,  in  every  inftance,  another  and 
a  larger  afTembly,  compefed  of  the  body  of  the 
people,  in  fome  little  ftates ;  o/f  reprefentatives 
chofen  by  the  people  in  others;  of  members  ap- 
pointed by  the  fenates,  and  fuppoied  to  reprefent 
the  people,  in  a  third  fort ;  and  of  perfons  ap- 
pointed by  themfelves  or  the  fenate,  in  certain 
ariftocracies;  to  prevent  them  from  becoming 
oligarchies.  The  Americans  then,  whofe  affem- 
blies  are  the  moft  adequate,  proportional,  and 
equitable  reprefentations  of  the  people,  that  are 

known 


Recapitulation.  93 

known  in  the  world,  will  not  be  thought  erroneous 
in  appointing  houfes  of  reprefentadves. 

In  every  republic,  in  the  fmalleft  and  moft  po- 
pular, in  the  larger  and  more  ariftocratical,  as 
well  as  in  the  largeft  and  moft  monarchical,  we 
have  obferved  a  multitude  of  curious  and  inge- 
nious inventions  to  balance,  in  their  turn,  all 
thole  powers,  to  check  the  paffions  peculiar  to 
them,  and  to  controul  them  from  rufhing  into 
thofe  exorbitancies  to  which  they  are  moft  ad- 
dicted— the  Americans  will  then  be  no  longer 
cenfured  for  endeavouring  to  introduce  an  equi- 
librium, which  is  much  more  profoundly  medi- 
tated, and  much  more  effectual  for  the  protection 
of  the  laws,  than  any  we  have  feen,  except  in 
England : — we  may  even  queftion  whether  that  is 
an  exception. 

In  every  country  we  have  found  a  variety  of 
orders,  with  very  great  diftinclions.  In  America, 
there  are  different  orders  of  offices,  but  none  of 
men ;  out  of  office  all  men  are  of  the  fame  fpecies, 
and  of  one  blood  ;  there  is  neither  a  greater  nor 
a  lefler  nobility — Why  then  are  they  accufed  of 
eftablifhing  different  orders  of  men  ?  To  our 
inexpreflible  mortification  we  muft  have  remark- 
ed, that  the  people  have  preferved  a  fhare  of 
power,  or  an  exiftence  in  the  government,  in  no 
country  out  of  England,  except  upon  the  tops 
of  a  few  inacceffible  mountains,  among  rocks  and 
precipices,  in  territories  fo  narrow  that  you  may 
ipan  them  with  an  hand's  breadth,  where,  living 
unenvied,  in  extreme  poverty,  chiefly  upon  paf- 
turage,  deftitute  of  manufactures  and  commerce, 
they  ftill  -exhibit  the  moft  charming  picture  of 
life,  and  the  moft  dignified  character  of  human 
nature. 

Wherever 


94  Recapitulation. 

Wherever  we  have  feen  a  territory  fomewhat 
larger,  arts  and  fciences  more  cultivated,  com- 
merce floiirifhing,  or  even  agriculture  improved 
to  any  great  degree,  an  ariftocracy  has  rifen  up 
in  a  courfe  of  time,  confifting  of  a  few  rich  and 
honourable  families,  who  have  united  with  each 
other  againft  both  the  people  and  the  firft  magif- 
trate ;  wrefted  from  the  former,  by  art  and  by 
force,  all  their  participation  in  the  government, 
and  even  infpired  them  with  fo  mean  an  efteem 
of  themfelves,  and  fo  deep  a  veneration  and  ftrong 
attachment  to  their  rulers,  as  to  believe  and  con- 
fefs  them  a  fuperior  order  of  beings. 

We  have  feen  thefe  noble  families,  although 
neceflitated  to  have  a  head,  extremely  jealous  of 
his  influence,  anxious  to  reduce  his  power,  and 
conftrain  him  to  as  near  a  level  with  themfelves 
as  poflible ;  always  endeavouring  to  eftablifh  a 
rotation  by  which  they  may  all  equally  in  turn 
be  entitled  to  the  pre-eminence,  and  equally 
anxious  to  preferve  to  themfelves  as  large  a  fhare 
of  power  as  poflible  in  the  executive  and  ju- 
dicial, as  well  as  the  legiflative  departments  of 
the  ftate. 

Thefe  patrician  families  have  alfo  appeared 
in  every  inftance  to  be  equally  jealous  of  each 
other,  and  to  have  contrived,  by  blending  lot 
and  choice,  by  mixing  various  bodies  in  the  elec- 
tions to  the  fame  offices,  and  even  by  the  horrors 
of  an  inquilition,  to  guard  againft  the  fin  that  fo 
eaflly  befets  them,  of  being  wholly  influenced 
and  governed  by  a  junto  or  oligarchy  of  a  few 
among  themfelves. 

We  have  feen  no  one  government,  in  which  is 
a  diftindt  feparation  of  the  legiflative  from  the 
(executive  power,  and  of  the  judicial  from  both, 

or 


Recapitulation.  95 

or  in  which  any  attempt  has  been  made  to  balance 
thefe  powers  with  one  another,  or  to  form  an 
equilibrium  between  the  one,  the  few,  and  the 
many,  for  the  purpofe  of  ena&ing  and  executing 
equal  laws,  by  common  confent,  for  the  general 
intereft,  excepting  in  England. 

Shall  we  conclude,  from  thefe  melancholy  ob- 
fervations,  that  human  nature  is  incapable  of  li- 
berty, that  no  honeft  equality  can  be  preferved 
in  fociety,  and  that  fuch  forcible  caufes  are  al- 
ways at  work  as  muft  reduce  all  men  to  a  fub- 
miffion  to  defpotifm,  monarchy,  oligarchy,  or  arif- 
tocracy  ? 

By  no  means.— We  have  feen  one  of  the  firfl 
nations  in  Europe,  pofTefled  of  ample  and  fertile 
territories  at  home,  and  extenlive  dominions 
abroad,  of  a  commerce  with  the  whole  world, 
immenfe  wealth,  and  the  greateft  naval  power 
which  ever  belonged  to  any  nation,  who  have 
ftill  preferved  the  power  of  the  people,  by  the 
equilibrium  we  are  contending  for,  by  the  trial 
by  jury,  and  by  conftantly  refuting  a  ftanding 
army.  The  people  of  England  alone,  by  pre- 
ferving  their  fhare  in  the  legiflature,  at  the  ex- 
pence  of  the  blood  of  heroes  and  patriots,  have 
enabled  their  kings  to  curb  the  nobility,  without 
giving  him  a  Handing  army. 

After  all,  let  us  compare  every  conftitution 
we  have  feen,  with  thofe  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  and  we  fhall  have  no  reafon  to  blulli 
for  our  country ;  on  the  contrary,  we  fhall  feel 
the  ftrongeft  motives  to  fall  upon  our  knees,  in 
gratitude  to  heaven  for  having  been  gracioufly 
pleafed  to  give  us  birth  and  education  in  that 
country,  and  for  having  deftined  us  to  live  under 
her  laws !  We  fhall  have  reafon  to  exult,  if  we 

make 


96  Recapitulation. 

make  our  comparifon  with  England  and  the  Eng- 
lifh  conflitution.  Our  people  are  undoubtedly 
fovereign — all  the  landed  and  other  property  is 
in  the  hands  of  the  citizens — not  only  their  re- 
prefentatives,  but  their  fenators  and  governors, 
are  annually  chofen — there  are  no  hereditary  ti- 
tles, honours,  offices,  or  diftin&ions — the  legif- 
lative,  executive,  and  judicial  powers  are  careful- 
ly feparated  from  each  other — the  powers  of  the 
one,  the  few,  and  the  many,  are  nicely  balanced 
in  their  legiflatures — trials  by  jury  are  preferred -in 
all  their  glory,  and  there  is  no  ftanding  army — 
the  habeas  corpus  is  in  full  force — the  prefs  is  the 
moft  free  in  the  world — and  where  all  thefe  cir- 
cumftances  take  place,  it  is  unnecefiary  to  add, 
that  the  laws  alone  can  govern. 


LETTER 


LETTER     XXIV. 

ANCIENT  REPUBLICS,  AND  OPINIONS 
OF  PHILOSOPHERS. 

DR.       SWIFT. 

My  dear  Sir, 

THE  authority  of  legiflators  and  philofo- 
phers,  in  fupport  of  the  fyftem  we  contend 
for,  is  not  difficult  to  find.  The  greateft  lights 
of  humanity,  ancient  and  modern,  have  approved 
it,  which  renders  it  difficult  to  explain  how  it 
comes,  in  this  enlightened  age,  to  be  called  in 
queflion,  as  it  certainly  has  been,  by  others  as 
well  as  Mr.  Turgot.  I  fhall  begin  with  one, 
who,  though  feldom  quoted  as  a  legiflator,  ap- 
pears to  have  cbnfidered  this  fubje&,  and  fur- 
niihed  arguments  enough,  for  ever  to  determine 
the  queftion.  Dr.  Swift,  in  his  Contefts  and 
Difleriiions  between  the  Nobles  and  Commons  of 
Athens  and  Rome,  obferves,  thatf(the  beft  legif- 
lators of  all  ages  agree  in  this,  that  the  abfolute 
power,  which  originally  is  in  the  whole  body,  is 
a  truft  too  great  to  be  committed  to  any  one  man 
or  affembly ;  and  therefore,  in  their  feveral  infli- 
tutions  of  government,  power  in  the  laft  refort, 
was  always  placed  by  them  in  balance,  pmojig  the 
one,  the  few,  and  the  many;  and  it  will  be  an 
eternal  rule  in  politics,  among  every  free  people, 
that  there  is  a  balance  of  power  to  be  held  by 
every  ftate  within  itfelf.  A  mixed  government, 
partaking  of  the  known  forms  received  in  the 

fchools 


98  Ancient  Republics, 

fchools,  is  by  no  means  of  Gothic  invention,  but 
hath  place  in  nature  and  reafon,  and  feems  very 
well  to  agree  with  the  fentiments  of  moft  legifla- 
tors :  for,  not  to  mention  the  feveral  republics 
of  this  compolition  in  Gaul  and  Germany,  de- 
fcribed  by  Csefar  and  Tacitus,  Polybius  tells  us, 
the  beft  government  is  that  which  confifts  of  three 
forms,  regno,  optimatium,  et  populi  imperio.  Such 
was  that  of  Sparta  in  its  primitive  inftitution  by 
Lycurgus,  who,  obferving  the  depravations  to 
which  every  one  of  thefe  was  fubjecTt,  com- 
pounded his  fcheme  out  of  all;  fo  that  it  was 
made  up  of  reges,  feniores,  et  populus.  Such  alfo 
was  the  ftate  of  Rome,  under  its  confuls;  and 
fuch,  at  Carthage,  was  the  power  in  the  laft  re- 
fort  :  they  had  their  kings,  fenate,  and  people. 
A  limited  and  divided  power  feems  to  have  been 
the  moft  ancient  and  inherent  principle,  both  of 
the  Greeks  and  Italians,  in  matters  of  govern- 
ment. The  difference  between  the  Grecian  mo- 
narchies and  Italian  republics  was  not  very  great. 
The  power  of  thofe  Grecian  princes,  who  came 
to  the  fiege  of  Troy,  was  much  of  a  lize  with 
that  of  the  kings  of  Sparta,  the  archon  of  Athens, 
the  fuffetes  at  Carthage,  and  the  confuls  at  Rome. 
Thefeus  eftablifhed  at  Athens  rather  a  mixed  mo- 
narchy than  a  popular  ftate,  affigning  to  himfelf 
the  guardianfhip  of  the  laws,  and  the  chief  com- 
mand in  war.  This  inftitution  continued  during 
the  feries  of  kings  to  the  death  of  Codrus,  from 
whom  Solon  was  defcended,  who,  finding  the 
people  engaged  in  two  violent  factions,  of  the 
poor  and  the  rich,  and  in  great  confufion,  refu- 
ting the  monarchy  which  was  offered  him,  chofe 
rather  to  call  the  government  after  another  mo- 
del, wherein  he  made  due  proviiion  for  fettling 
the  balance  of  power,  choofing  a  fenate  of  four 

hundred^ 


Dr.  Swift.  99 

hundred,  and  difpofing  the  magiftracies  and  of- 
fices according  to  men's  eftates,  leaving  to  the 
multitude  their  votes  in  electing,  and  the  power 
of  judging  certain  proceffes  by  appeal.  This 
council  of  four  hundred  was  chofen,  one  hundred 
out  of  each  tribe,  and  feeras  to  have  been  a  body 
reprefentative  of  the  people,  though  the  people 
collective  referred  a  mare  of  power  to  them- 
felves. 

In  all  free  ftates,  the  evil  to  be  avoided  is  ty- 
ranny ;  that  is  to  fay,  the  fumma  imperil  y  or  unlimit- 
ed power,  folely  in  the  hands  of  the  one,  the  few, 
or  the  many.  Though  we  cannot  prolong  the 
period  of  a  commonwealth  beyond  the  decree  of 
heaven,  or  the  date  of  its  nature,  any  more  than 
human  life  beyond  the  ftrength  of  the  feminal 
virtue;  yet  we  may  manage  a  fickly  conftitution, 
and  preferve  a  ftrong  one;  we  may  watch,  and 
prevent  accidents ;  we  may  turn  off  a  great  blow 
from  without,  and  purge  away  an  ill  humour 
that  is  lurking  within;  and  render  a  ftate  long- 
lived,  though  not  immortal.  Some  phyficians 
have  thought,  that  if.it  were  practicable  to  keep 
the  feveral  humours  of  the  body  in  an  exa6l  ba- 
lance of  each  with  its  oppoiite,  it  might  be  im- 
mortal ;  and  fo  perhaps  would  a  political  body, 
if  the  balance  of  power  could  be  always  held  ex- 
a6lly  even. 

All  independent  bodies  of  men  feem  naturally 
to  divide  into  the  three  powers,  of  the  one,  the 
few,  and  the  many.  A  free  people  met  toge- 
ther, as  foon  as  they  fall  into  any  a&s  of  civil 
fociety,  do  of  themfelves  divide  into  three  ranks. 
The  firft  is,  that  of  fome  one  eminent  fpirit,  who, 
having  fignalized  his  valour*  and  fortune  in  de- 
e  nee  of  his  country,  or  by  the  practice  of  po- 
ular  arts  at  home,  comes  to  have  great  influence 

VOL.  I.  N  on 


I oo  Ancient  Republics)  £sfc. 

on  the  people;  to  grow  their  leader  in  warlike 
expeditions ;  and  to  preiide,  after  a  fort,  in  their 
civil  aflemblies.  The  fecond  is,  of  fuch  men  as 
have  acquired  large  poffeffions,  and  confequently 
dependencies,  or  defcend  from  anceftors  who 
have  left  them  great  inheritances,  together  with  an 
hereditary  authority;  thefe,  eafily  uniting  in  opi- 
nions, and  acting  in  concert,  begin  to  enter  upon 
meafures  for  fecuring  their  properties,  which 
are  heft  upheld  by  preparing  againft  invafions 
from  abroad,  and  maintaining  peace  at  home: 
this  commences  a  great  council,  or  fenate,  for 
the  weighty  affairs  of  the  nation.  The  laft  divi- 
fion  is,  of  the  mafs  of  the  people,  whofe  part  of 
power  is  great  and  indifputable,  whenever  they 
can  unite,  either  collectively  or  by  deputation,  to 
exert  it. 

The  true  meaning  of  a  balance  of  power  is  beft 
conceived  by  confidering  what  the  nature  of  a  ba- 
lance is.  It  fuppofes  three  things:  firft,  the  part 
which  is  held,  together  with  the  hand  that  holds  it ; 
and  then  the  two  fcales,  with  whatever  is  weighed 
therein.  In  a  ftate  within  itfelf,  the  balance  muft  be 
held  by  a  third  hand,  who  is  to  deal  the  remaining 
power,  with  the  utmoft  exa6tnefs  into  the  feveral 
fcales.  The  balance  may  be  held  by  the  weakeft, 
who  by  his  addrefs,  removing  from  either  fcale, 
and  adding  his  own,  may  keep  the  fcales  duly 
poifed :  when  the  balance  is  broken  by  mighty 
weights  falling  into  either  fcale,  the  power  will 
never  continue  long,  in  equal  divifion,  between 
the  two  remaining  parties ;  but,  till  the  balance  is 
fixed  anew,  will  run  entirely  into  one.  This  is 
made  to  appear  by  the  examples  of  the  Decemviri 
in  Rome,  the  Ephpr*in  Sparta,  the  four  hundred 
in  Athens,  the  thirty  in  Athens,  and  the  Domi- 
natio  Plebis  in  Carthage  and  Argos. 

In 


Dr.  Swift.  I  or 

In  Rome,  from  the  time  of  Romulus  to  Julius 
Caefar,  the  commons  were  growing  by  degrees 
Into  power,  gaining  ground  upon  the  patricians, 
inch  by  inch,  until  at  laft  they  quite  overturned 
the  balance,  leaving  all  doors  open  to  popular  and 
ambitious  men,  who  deftroyed  the  wifeft  republic, 
and  enflaved  the  nobleft  people,  that  ever  entered 
on  the  ftage  of  the  world.  Polybius  tells  us,  that 
in  the  fecond  Punic  war,  the  Carthaginians  were 
declining,  becaufe  the  balance  was  got  too  much 
on  the  fide  of  the  people ;  whereas  the  Romans 
were  in  their  greateft  vigour,  by  the  power  re- 
maining in  the  fenate.  The  ambition  of  private 
men  did  by  no  means  begin,  or  occafion  the  war, 
between  Pompey  and  Caefar,  though  civil  diffen- 
tions  never  fail  to  introduce  and  fpirit  the  ambi- 
tion of  private  men;  for  while  the  balance  of 
power  is  equally  held,  the  ambition  of  private  men, 
whether  orators  or  commanders,  gives  neither 
danger  nor  fear,  nor  can  poilibly  enilave  their 
country ;  but  that  once  broken,  the  divided  par- 
ties are  forced  to  unite  each  to  its  head,  under 
whofe  condu6l  or  fortune  one  fide  is  at  firft  vic- 
torious, and  at  laft  both  are  flaves.  And  to  put  it 
paft  difpute,  that  the  entire  fubveriion  of  Roman 
liberty  was  altogether  owing  to  thofe  meafures, 
which  had  broken  the  balance  between  the  patri- 
cians and  plebeians,  whereof  the  ambition  of  pri- 
vate men  was  but  the  effedl  and  confequence; 
we  need  only  confider,  that  when  the  uncorrupted 
•part  of  the  fenate,  by  the  death  of  Caefar,  had 
made  one  great  effort  to  i-eftore  their  liberty,  the 
fuccefs  did  not  anfwer  their  hopes ;  but  that  whole 
affembly  was  fo  funk  in  its  authority,  that  thefe 
patriots  were  obliged  to  fly,  and  give  way  to  the 
madnefs  of  the  people,  who  by  their  own  difpofi- 

tions 


Ancient  Republics,  &c. 

tions,  ftirred  up  by  the  harangues  of  their  ora- 
tors, were  now  wholly  bent  upon  {ingle  and  def- 
potic  flavery ;  elfe  how  could  fuch  a  profligate 
as  Anthony,  or  a  boy  of  eighteen  like  Octavius, 
ever  dare  to  dream  of  giving  law  to  fuch  an  em- 
pire and  fuch  a  people  ?  Wherein  the  latter  fuc- 
ceeded,  and  entailed  the  vileft  tyranny,  that 
Heaven  in  its  anger,  ever  infli&ed  on  a  corrupt 
and  poifoned  people. 

It  is  an  error  to  think  it  an  uncontroulable 
maxim,  that  power  is  always  fafer  lodged  in  many 
hands  than  in  one :  for  if  thefe  many  hands  be 
made  up  from  one  of  thofe  three  divifions,  it  is 
plain,  from  the  examples  produced,  and  eafy  to  be 
paralleled  in  other  ages  and  countries,  that  they 
are  as  capable  of  enilaving  the  nation,  and  of 
ading  all  manner  of  tyranny  and  oppreffion,  as  it 
is  poflible  for  a  fingle  perfon  to  be,  though  we 
fhould  fuppofe  their  number  not  only  to  be  four 
or  five  hundred,  but  three  thoufand.  In  order 
to  preferve  a  balance  in  a  mixed  ftate,  the  limits 
of  power  depofited  with  each  party,  ought  to  be 
afcertained  and  generally  known :  the  defecl:  of 
.this  is  the  caufe  of  thofe  ftruggles  in  a  ftate,  about 
prerogative  and  liberty ;  about  encroachments  of 
the  few  upon  the  rights  of  the  many,  and  of  the 
many  upon  the  privileges  of  the  few  ;  which  ever 
did,  and  ever  will,  conclude  in  a  tyranny ; .  firft 
either  of  the  few  or  the  many,  butatlaft,  infallibly, 
of a  fingk  per  Jon :  for  whichever  of  the  three  divi- 
fions in  a  ftate  is  upon  the  fcramble  for  more  powec 
than  its  own,  as  one  of  the  three  generally  is 
(unlefs  due  care  be  taken  by  the  other  two) ;  upon 
every  new  queftion  thatarifes,  they  will  be  lure  to 
decide  in  favour  of  themfelves;  they  will  make 
large  demands,  and  fcanty  conceffions,  evej*  com- 
ing 


Dr.  Swift.  ^   103 

ing  off  confiderable  gainers; — thus  at  length  the 
balance  is  broke,  and  tyranny  let  in,  from  which 
door  of  the  three  it  matters  not. 

The  delires  of  men,  are  not  only  exorbitant, 
but  endlefs :  they  grafp  at  all ;  and  can  form  no 
fcheme  of  perfect  happinefs  with  lefs.  Ever  fince 
men  have  been  formed  into  governments,  the  en- 
deavours after  univerfal  monarchy  have  been  ban- 
died among  them :  the  Athenians,  the  Spartans, 
the  Thebans,  and  the  Achaians,  feveral  times 
aimed  at  the  univerfal  dominion  of  Greece :  the 
commonwealths  of  Carthage  and  Rome  affec~l- 
ed  the  univerfal  empire  of  the  world  :  in  like 
manner  has  abfolute  power  been  purfued,  by  the 
feveral  powers  in  each  particular  Hate,  wherein 
{ingle  perfons  have  met  with  moft  fuccefs,  though 
the  endeavours  of  the  few  and  the  many  have 
been  frequent  enough  ;  yet  being  neither  fo  uni- 
form in  their  deligns,  nor  fo  dire6l  in  their 
views,  they  neither  could  manage  nor  maintain 
the  power  they  had  got,  but  were  deceived  by 
the  popular  ambition  of  fome  fmgle  perfon :.  fo 
that  it  will  be  always  a  wrong  ftep  in  policy,  for 
the  nobles  or  commons  to  carry  their  endeavours 
after  power  fo  far  as  to  overthrow  the  balance. 
With  all  refpecl;  for  popular  affemblies  be  it 
fpoken,  it  is  hard  to  recoiled  one  folly,  infirmity, 
or  vice,  to  which  a  fingle  man  is  fubjec~l,  and 
from  which  a  body  of  commons,  either  colle&ive 
or  reprefented,  can  be  wholly  exempt;  from 
whence  it  comes  to  pafs,  that  in  their  refults  have 
fometimes  been  found  the  fame  fpirit  of  cruelty 
and  revenge,  of  malice  and  pride ;  the  fame  blind- 
nefs,  and  obftinacy,  and  unfteadinefs ;  the  fame 
ungovernable  rage  and  anger;  the  fame  injuftice, 
fophiftry,  and  fraud,  that  ever  lodged  in  the  breaft 
of  any  individual.  When  a  child  grows  eafy  by 

being 


IO4  Ancient  Republics,  &c. 

being  humoured,  and  a  lover  fatisfied  by  fmall 
compliances  without  further  purfuits,  then  expect 
popular  aflemblies  to  be  content  with  fmall  con- 
ceffions.  If  there  could  one  fingle  example  be 
brought  from  the  whole  compafs  of  hiflory,  of 
any  one  popular  affembly  who,  after  beginning 
to  contend  for  power,  ever  fat  down  quietly  with 
a  certain  fhare ;  or  of  one  that  ever  knew,  or  pro- 
pofed,  or  declared,  what  lhare  of  power  was  their 
due,  then  might  there  be  fome  hopes,  that  it  was 
a  matter  to  be  adjufted  by  reafonings,  confer- 
ences, or  debates.  An  ufurping  populace  is  its 
own  dupe,  a  mere  under-worker,  and  a  purchafer 
in  trull:  for  fome  fingle  tyrant,  whofe  ftate  and 
power  they  advance  to  their  own  ruin,  with  as 
blind  an  inftincl,  as  thofe  worms  that  die  with 
weaving  magnificent  habits  for  beings  of  a  fupe- 
rior  order.  The  people  are  more  dexterous  at 
pulling  down  and  fetting  up,  than  at  preferving 
what  is  fixed ;  and  they  are  not  fonder  of  feizing 
more  than  their  own,  than  they  are  of  delivering 
it  tip  again  to  the  worft  bidder,  with  their  own 
into  the  bargain.  Their  earthly  devotion  is  fel- 
dom  paid  to  above  one  at  a  time,  of  their  own 
creation,  whofe  oar  they  pull  with  lefs  murmuring 
and  more  fkill,  than  when  they  lhare  the  leading, 
or  even  hold  the  helm. 

You  will  perceive  by  the  ftyle,  that  it  is  Dr. 
Swift  that  has  been  fpeaking ;  otherwife  you 
might  have  been  deceived,  and  imagined  that  I 
was  entertaining  you  with  further  reflect  ions  upon 
the  fhort  account  previoufly  given  you  in  thefe 
letters,  of  the  modern  republics.  There  is  not 
an  obfervation  here  that  is  not  juftified  by  the 
hiftory.of  every  government  we  have  confider- 
ed.  How  much  more  maturely  had  this  writer 
weighed  the  fubjecl,  than  Mr.  Turgot — Perhaps 

there 


Dr.  Franklin  105 

there  is  not  to  be  found,  in  any  library,  fo  many 
accurate  ideas  of  government  exprefied  with  fo 
much  perfpicuity,  brevity,  and  preciiion. 


LETTER    XXV* 

DR.    FRANKLIN. 

My  dear  Sir, 

AS  it  is  impoflible  to  fuppofe  that  Mr.Turgot 
intended  to  recommend  to  the  Americans 
a  fimple  monarchy  or  ariftocracy,  we  have  admit- 
ted, as  a  fuppofition  the  moft  favourable  to  him, 
that,  by  collecting  all  authority  into  one  centre, 
he  meant  a  fingle  affembly  of  reprefentatives  of 
the  people,  without  a  governor,  and  without  a 
fenate ;  and  although  he  has  not  explained,  whe- 
ther he  would  have  the  affembly  chofen  for  life, 
or  years,  we  will  again  admit,  as  the  moft  benign 
conftru&ion,  that  he  meant  the  reprefentatives 
ihould  be  annually  chofen. 

Here  we  fhall  be  obliged  to  confider  the  reputed 
opinion  of  another  philofopher,  I  mean  Dr.  Frank- 
lin :  I  fay  reputed,  becaufe  I  am  not  able  to  af- 
firm that  it  is  really  his :  it  is,  however,  fo  gene- 
rally underftood  and  reported,  both  in  Europe 
and  America,  that  his  judgment  was  in  oppoii- 
tion  to  two  affemblies,  and  in  favour  of  a  fingle 
one,  that  in  a  difquiiition  like  this  it  ought  not  to 
be  omitted.  To  be  candid  with  you,  a  little  be- 
fore the  date  of  Mr.  Turgot's  letter,  Dr.  Franklin 
had  arrived  in  Paris  with  the  American  conftitu- 
tions,  and  among  the  reft  that  of  Pennfylvania,  ia 

which 


io6  Ancient  Republics,  &c. 

which  there  was  but  one  aflembly :  it  was  report" 
ed  too,  that  the  dodor  had  preiided  in  the  con- 
vention when  it  was  made,  and  there  approved  it. 
Mr.  Turgot,  reading  over  the  conftitutions,  and 
admiring  that  of  Pennfylvania,  was  led  to  cenfure 
the  reft,  which  were  fo  different  from  it. — I 
know  of  no  other  evidence,  that  the  dodor  ever 
gave  his  voice  for  a  {ingle  aflembly,  but  the  com- 
mon anecdote  which  is  known  to  every  body.  It 
is  faid,  that  in  1776,  in  the  convention  of  Penn- 
fylvania,  of  which  the  dodor  was  prefident,  a 
projed  of  a  form  of  government  by  one  affembly, 
was  before  them  in  debate  :  a  motion  was  made  to 
add  another  affembly  under  the  name  of  a  fenate 
or  council;  this  motion  was  argued  by  feveral 
members,  fome  for  the  affirmative,  and  fome  for 
the  negative;  and  before  the  queftion  was  put  the 
opinion  of  the  prefident  was  requefted :  the  pre- 
fident rofe5  and  faid,  "that  "  Two  affemblies  ap- 
"  peared  to  him,  like  a  pradice  he  had  fome- 
<c  where  feen,  of  certain  waggoners  who,  when 
<c  about  to  defcend  a  fteep  hill,  with  a  heavy  load, 
"  if  they  had  four  cattle,  took  off  one  pair  from 
"  before,  and  chaining  them  to  the  hinder  part 
"  of  the  waggon,  drove  them  up  hill;  while  the 
"  pair  before,  and  the  weight  of  the  load,  over- 
"  balancing  the  ftrength  of  thofe  behind,  drew 
"  them  flowly  and  moderately  down  the  hill." 

The  prefident  of  Pennfylvania  might,  upon  fuch 
an  occafion,  have  recolleded  one  of  Sir  Ifaac 
Newton's  laws  of  motion,  viz.  "  that  re-adion 
"  muft  always  be  equal  and  contrary  to  adion," 
or  there  can  never  be  any  reft. — He  might  have 
alluded  to  thofe  angry  aflemblies  in  the  Heavens, 
which  fo  often  overfp read  the  city  of  Philadelphia, 
fill  the  citizens  with  apprehenfion  and  terror, 
threatening  to  fet  the  world  on  fire,  merely  be- 

caufe 


Xv* 

/^KIVEIV^TT) 


Dr.  Franklin.  107 

caufe  the  powers  within  them  are  not  lufficiently 
balanced.  He  might  have  recolledled,  that  a 
pointed  rod,  a  machine  as  limple  as  a  waggoner, 
or  a  monarch,  or  a  governor,  would  be  fufficient 
at  any  time,  lilently  and  innocently,  to  difarm 
thofe  aflemblies  of  all  their  terrors,  by  reftoring 
between  them  the  balance  of  the  powerful  fluid, 
and  thus  prevent  the  danger  and  deftru&ion  to 
the  properties  and  lives  of  men,  which  often  hap* 
pen  for  the  want  of  it. 

However,  allufions  and  illuftrations  drawn 
from  paftoral  and  rural  life  are  never  difagreeable, 
and  in  this  cafe  might  be  as  appofite  as  if  they  had 
been  taken  from  the  fciences  and  the  Ikies. — - 
Harrington,  if  he  had  been  prefent  in  convention, 
would  have  exclaimed,  as  he  did  when  he  men- 
tioned his  two  girls  dividing  and  chooling  a  cake, 
"  Oh !  the  depth  of  the  wifdom  of  God,  which  in 
the  limple  invention  of  a  carter,  has  revealed  to 
mankind  the  whole  myfteryofa  commonwealth; 
which  confilts  as  much  in  dividing  and  equalizing 
forces ;  in  controuling  the  weight  of  the  load  and 
the  aftivity  of  one  part  by  the  ftrength  of  another, 
as  it  does,  in  dividing  and  chooling."  Harrington 
too,  inftead  of  his  children  dividing  and  choofing 
their  cake,  might  have  alluded  to  thofe  attrac- 
tions and  repuliions,  by  which  the  balance  of 
nature  is  preferred :  or  to  thofe  centripetal  and 
centrifugal  forces,  by  which  the  heavenly  bodies 
are  continued  in  their  orbits,  inftead  of  rulhing 
to  the  fun,  or  flying  off  in  tangents  among  co- 
mets and  fixed  ftars  :  impelled,  or  drawn  by  dif- 
ferent forces  in  different  directions,  they  are  bidd- 
ings to  their  own  inhabitants  and  the  neighbour- 
ing fyftems  ;  but  if  they  were  drawn  only  by  one, 
they  woujd  introduce  anarchy  wherever  they 
mould  go.  There  is  no  objection  to  fuch  allu- 

VOL.  I.  O  fions, 


io8  Ancient  Republics,  6?c. 

fions,  whether  fimple  or  fublime,  as  they  may 
amufe  the  fancy  and  illuflratean  argument:  all  that 
is  infifted  on  is,  that  whatever  there  is  in  them  of 
wit  or  argument,  is  all  in  favour  of  a  complica- 
tion of  forces,  of  more  powers  than  one;  of  three 
powers  indeed,  becaufe  a  balance  can  never  be 
eftablifhed  between  two  orders  in  fociety,  without 
a  third  to  aid  the  weakeft. 

All  that  is  furprifmg  here  is,  that  the  real  force 
of  the  limile  fhoujd  have  been  mifunderftood :  if 
there  is  any  fimilitude,  or  any  argument  in  it,  it 
is  clearly  in  favour  of  two  afTemblies.  The 
weight  of  the  load  hfelf  would  roll  the  waggon 
on  the  oxen,  and  the  cattle  on  one  another,  in  one 
fcene  of  deftruction,  if  the  forces  were  not  divid- 
ed and  the  balance  formed ;  whereas  by  check- 
ing one  power  by  another,  all  defcend  the  hill  in 
fafety,  and  avoid  the  danger.  It  mould  be  re- 
membered too,  that  it  is  only  in  defcending  un- 
common declivities  that  this  divifion  of  ftrength 
becomes  neceflary.  In  travelling  in  ordinary 
plains,  and  always  in  afcending  mountains,  the 
whole  team  draws  together,  and  advances  fafter 
as  well  as  eafier  on  its  journey :  it  is  alfo  certain, 
there  are  oftener  arduous  fteeps  to  mount,  which 
require  the  united  ftrength  of  all,  with  all  the 
fkill  of  the  diredor,  than  there  are  precipices  to 
defcend,  which  demand  a  diviiion  of  it. 

Let  us  now  return  to  Mr.  Turgot's  idea  of  a 
government  confiding  in  a  fingle  affembly. — He 
tells  us,  our  republics  are  "  founded  on  the  equal- 
"  ity  of  all  the  citizens,  and  therefore  "  orders" 
"  and  "  equilibriums,"  are  unneceffary,  and  occa- 
"  iion  difputes." — But  what  are  we  to  underftand 
here  by  equality  ?  Are  the  citizens  to  be  all  of 
the  fame  age,  fex,  fize,  ftrength,  ftature,  a&ivity* 
courage,  hardinefs,  induftry,  patience,  ingenui- 

ty, 


Dr.  Franklin.  109 

i 

ty,  wealth,  knowledge,  fame,  wit,  temperance, 
conftancy  and  wifdom  ?  Was  there,  or  will  there 
ever  be,  a  nation,  whofe  individuals  were  all  equal, 
in  natural  and  acquired  qualities,  in  virtues,  ta- 
lents, and  riches?  The  anfwer  of  all  mankind 
muft  be  in  the  negative. — It  muft  then  be  ac- 
knowledged, that  in  every  ftate,  in  the  Maflachu- 
fetts  for  example,  there  are  inequalities  which 
God  and  nature  have  planted  there,  and  which 
no  human  legiflator  ever  can  eradicate.  I  fhould 
have  chofen  to  have  mentioned  Virginia,  as  the 
moft  ancient  ftate,  or  indeed  any  other  in  the 
union,  rather  than  the  one  that  gave  me  birth, 
if  I  were  not  afraid,  of  putting  fuppofitions,  which 
may  give  offence,  a  liberty  which  my  neighbours 
will  pardon :  yet  I  mall  fay  nothing  that  is  not 
applicable  to  all  the  other  twelve. 

In  this  fociety  of  Maflachufettenfions  then, 
there  is,  it  is  true,  a  moral  and  political  equal- 
ity of  rights  and  duties  among  all  the  individu- 
als, and  as  yet  no  appearance  of  artificial  ine- 
qualities of  condition,  fuch  as  hereditary  digni- 
ties, titles,  magiftracies,  or  legal  diftin&ions ;  and 
no  eftablifhed  marks,  as  ftars,  garters,  erofTes 
or  ribbons :  there  are,  neverthelefs,  inequalities  of 
great  moment  in  the  confideration  of  a  legiflator, 
becaufe  they  have  a  natural  and  inevitable  influ- 
ence in  fociety.  Let  us  enumerate  fome  of  them  : 
i.  There  is  an  inequality  of  wealth  :  fome  indivi- 
duals, whether  by  defcent  from  their  anceftors, 
or  from  greater  fkill,  induftry,  and  fuccefs  in 
bufinefs,  have  eftates  both  in  lands  and  goods  of 
great  value ;  others  have  no  property  at  all ;  and 
all  the  reft  of  the  fociety,  much  the  greater  num- 
ber, are  pofTefled  of  wealth,  in  all  the  variety  of 
degrees,  between  thefe  extremes :  it  will  eafily  be 
conceived,  that  all  the  rich  men  will  have  many 

of 


no  Ancient  Republics,  &c. 

of  the  poor,  in  the  various  trades,  manufactures, 
and  other  occupations  in  life,  dependent  upon 
them  for  their  daily  bread  :  many  of  fmaller  for- 
tunes will  be  in  their  debt,  and  in  many  ways 
under  obligations  to  them :  others,  in  better  cir- 
cumitances,  neither  dependent  nor  in  debt,  men 
of  letters,  men  of  the  learned  profefiions,  and 
others,  from  acquaintance,  converfation,  and  civi- 
lities, will  be  connected  with  them,  and  attached 
to  them.  Nay  farther,  it  will  not  be  denied,  that 
among  the  wifeft  people  that  lives,  there  is  a 
degree  of  admiration,  abftracted  from  all  depen- 
dence, obligation,  expectation,  or  even  acquaint- 
ance, which  accompanies  fplendid  wealth,  en- 
fures  fome  refpedt,  and  beftows  forne  influence. 
2.  Birth.  Let  no  man  be  furprifed,  that  this 
fpecies  of  inequality  is  introduced  here.  Let  the 
page  in  hiftory  be  quoted,  where  any  nation,  an^ 
cient  or  modern,  civilized  or  favage,  is  men- 
tioned, among  whom  no  difference  was  made  be- 
tween the  citizens,  on  account  of  their  extraction. 
The  truth  is,  that  more  influence  i  sallowed  to 
this  advantage  in  free  republics,  than  in  defpo- 
tic  governments,  or  than  would  be  allowed  to  it 
in  fimple  monarchies,  if  fevere  laws  had  not  been 
made  from  age  to  age  to  fecure  it.  The  children 
of  illuftrious  families,  have  generally  greater  ad- 
vantages of  education,  and  earlier  opportunities 
to  be  acquainted  with  public  characters,  and  in- 
formed of  public  affairs,  than  thofe  of  meaner 
ones,  or  even  than  thofe  in  middle  life ;  and  what 
is  more  than  all,  an  habitual  national  veneration 
for  their  names,  and  the  characters  of  their  ancef- 
tors  defcribed  in  hiftory,  or  coming  down  by  tra- 
dition, removes  them  farther  from  vulgar  jealoufy, 
and  popular  envy,  and  fecures  them  in  fome  de- 
gree the  favour,  the  affection,  and  refpect  of  the 

public. 


Dr.  Franklin.  Ill 

public.     Will  any  many  pretend  that  the  name  of 
Androfs,  and  that  of  Winthrop,  are  heard  with 
the  fame  fenfations  in  any  village   of  New  Eng- 
land? Is  not  gratitude  the  fentiment  that  attends 
the  latter,  and  difgufl  the  feeling  excited  by  the 
former?  In  the  Maflachufett's  then,  there  are  per- 
fons  defcended  from  fome  of  their  ancient  gover- 
nors, counfellors,  judges,  whofe  fathers,  grandfa- 
thers, and  great   grandfathers,  are   remembered 
with  efleem  by  many  living,  and  who  are  men- 
tioned in  hiftory  with  applaufe,  as  benefactors  to 
the  country,  while  there  are  others  who  have  no 
fuch  advantage.     May  we  go  a  ftep  farther — Know 
thyfelf,  is  as  ufeful  a  precept  to  nations  as  to  men. 
Go  into  every  village  in  New  England,  and  you 
will  find  that  the  office  of  juftice  of  the  peace, 
and  even  the  place  of  repre tentative,  which  has 
ever  depended  only  on  the  freeft  ele&ion  of  the 
people,  have  generally  defcended  from  generation 
to  generation,  in  three  or  four  families  at  moft. 
The  prefent  fubje&  is  one  of  thofe  which  all'  men 
refped,  and  all  men  deride.     It  may  be  faid  of 
this   part  of  our  nature,    as    Pope   faid  of   the 
whole : 

Of  human  nature,  wit  her  worft  may  write, 
We  all  revere  it,  in  our  own  defpight. 

If,  as  Harrington  fays,  the  ten  command- 
ments, were  voted  by  the  people  of  Ifrael,  and 
have  been  ena&ed  as  laws  by  all  other  nations ; 
and  if  we  fhould  prefume  to  fay,  that  nations  had 
a  civil  right  to  repeal  them,  no  nation  would 
think  proper  to  repeal  the  fifth,  which  enjoins 
honour  to  parents  :  if  there  is  a  difference  between 
right  and  wrong ;  if  any  thing  can  be  facred ;  if 

there 


112  Ancient  Republics,  &c. 

there  is  one  idea  of  moral  obligation ;  the  decree 
of  nature  mufl  force  upon  every  thinking  being, 
and  upon  every  feeling  heart,  the  conviction  that 
honour,  affection,  and  gratitude  are  due  from  chil- 
dren, to  thofe  who  gave  them  birth,  nurture,  and 
education.  The  fentiments  and  affections  which 
naturally  arife,  from  reflecting  on  the  love,  the 
cares,  and  the  bleflings  of  parents,  abftracted 
from  the  coniideration  of  duty,  are  fome  of  the 
moft  forcible  and  molt  univerfal.  When  religion, 
law,  morals,  affection,  and  even  fafhion,  thus 
confpire  to  fill  every  mind  with  attachment  to 
parents,  and  to  ftamp  deep  upon  the  heart  their 
impreflions,  is  it  to  be  expected  that  men  ihould 
reverence  their  parents  while  they  live,  and  begin 
to  defpife  or  neglect  their  memories  as  foon  as 
they  are  dead  ?  This  is  in  nature  impoffible  ;  on 
the  contrary,  every  little  unkindnefs  and  feverity 
is  forgotten,  and  nothing  but  endearments  re- 
membered with  pleafure. 

The  fon  of  a  wife  and  virtuous  father,  finds  the 
world  about  him  fometimes  as  much  difpofed  as 
he  himfelf  is,  to  honour  the  memory  of  his 
father ;  to  congratulate  him  as  the  fucceflbr  to 
his  eftate;  and  frequently,  to  compliment  him 
with  eledtions  to  the  offices  he  held.  A  fenfe  of 
duty,  his  paffions  and  his  interefl,  thus  confpir- 
ing  to  prevail  upon  him  to  avail  himfelf  of  this 
advantage,  he  finds  a  few  others  in  limilar  cir- 
cumftances  with  himfelf;  they  naturally  afibciate 
together,  and  aid  each  other.  This  is  a  faint 
Iketch  of  the  fource  and  rife  of  the  family  fpirit : 
very  often  the  difpofition  to  favour  the  family  is 
as  ftrong,  in  the  town,  county,  province,  or  king- 
dom, as  it  is  in  the  houfe  itfelf.  'The  enthufiafm 
is  indeed  fometimes  wilder,  and  carries  away, 
like  a  torrent,  all  before  it. 

Thefe 


Df*  Franklin*  113 

Thefe  obfervations  are  not  peculiar  to  any  age ; 
We  have  feeii  the  effeds  of  them  in  St.  Marino, 
Bifcay,  and  the  Grifons,  as  well  as  in  Poland, 
and  all  other  countries.  Not  to  mention  any 
notable  examples*  which  have  lately  happened 
near  us,  it  is  not  many  months  fince  I  was  wit- 
nefs  to  a  converfation  between  fome  citizens  of 
Maflachufett's :  one  was  haranguing  on  the  jealoufy 
which  a  free  people  ought  to  entertain  of  their 
liberties,  and  was  heard  by  all  the  company  with 
pleafure;  in  lefs  than  ten  minutes  the  converfa- 
tion turned  upon  their  governor;  and  the  jealous 
republican  was  very  angry  at  the  oppofition  to 
him.  "  The  prefent  governor,"  fays  he,  "  has 
"  done  us  fuch  fervices,  that  he  ought  to  rule 
"  us,  he  and  his  pofterity  after  him  for  ever  and 
"  ever."  Where  is  your  jealoufy  of  liberty? 
demanded  the  other.  "  Upon  my  honour,"  replies 
the  orator,  "  I  had  forgot  that ;  you  have  caught 
"  me  in  an  inconfiftency ;  for  I  cannot  know  whe- 
<c  ther  a  child  of  five  years  old  will  be  a  fon  of 
<c  liberty  or  a  tyrant."  His  jealoufy  was  the  dic- 
tate of  his  underftanding :  his  confidence  and  en- 
thufiafm  the  impulfe  of  his  heart. 

The  pompous  trumpery  of  enfigns,  armorials* 
and  efcutcheons,  are  not  indeed  far  advanced  in 
America.  Yet  there  is  a  more  general  anxiety  to 
know  their  originals,  in  proportion  to  their  num- 
bers, than  in  any  nation  of  Europe ;  arifing  from 
the  eaiier  circumftances  and  higher  fpirit  of  the 
common  people  :  and  there  are  certain  families  ia 
every  ftate,  as  attentive  to  all  the  proud  frivoli- 
ties of  heraldry.  That  kind  of  pride  which  looks 
down  on  commerce  and  manufa&ures  as  degrad- 
ing, may  indeed,  in  many  countries  of  Europe, 
be  a  ufeful  and  neceflary  quality  in  the  nobility : 
it  may  prevent,  in  fome  degree,  the  whole  nation 

from 


1 14  Ancient  Republics,  &c. 

from  being  delivered  up  entirely  to  the  fpirit  of 
avarice :  it  may  be  the.  caufe,  why  honour  is  pre- 
ferred by  forne  to  money :  it  may  prevent  the 
nobility  from  becoming  too  rich,  and  acquiring 
too  large  a  proportion  of  the  landed  property.  In 
America,  it  would  not  only  be  mifchievous,  but 
would  expofe  the  highefl  pretenfions  of  the  kind 
to  univerfal  ridicule  and  contempt.  Thofe  other 
hauteurs,  of  keeping  the  commons  at  a  diftance, 
and  difdaining  to  converfe  with  any  but  a  few  of 
a  certain  race,  may  in  Europe  be  a  favour  to  the 
people,  by  relieving  them  from  a  multitude  of 
afliduous  attentions  and  humiliating  compliances, 
which  would  be  troublefome ;  it  may  prevent  the 
nobles  from  caballing  with  the  people,  and  gain- 
ing too  much  influence  with  them  in  ele&ions  and 
otherwife.  In  America,  it  would  juflly  excite 
univerfal  indignation ;  the  vaineft  of  all  muft  be 
of  the  people,  or  be  nothing.  While  every  office 
is  equally  open  to  every  competitor,  and  the 
people  muft  decide  upon  every  pretenfion  to  a 
place  in  the  legiilature,  that  of  governor  and  fe- 
nator,  as  well  as  reprefentative,  no  fuch  airs  will 
ever  be  endured.  It  muft  be  acknowledged  ftill, 
that  fome  men  muft  take  more  pains  to  defer ve 
and  acquire  an  office  than  others,  and  muft  be- 
have better  in  it,  or  they  will  not  hold  it. 

We  cannot  prefume  that  a  man  is  good  or  bad, 
merely  becaufe  his  father  was  one  or  the  other; 
and  fhould  always  inform  ourfelves  firft,  whether 
the  virtues  and  talents  are  inherited,  before  we 
yield  our  confidence.  Wife  men  beget  fools, 
and  honeft  men  knaves;  but  thefe  inftances,  al- 
though they  may  be  frequent  are  not  general. 
If  there  is  often  a  likenefs  in  feature  and  figure, 
there  is  generally  more  in  mind  and  heart,  becaufe 
education  contributes  to  the  formation  of  thefe  as 

well 


Dr.  Franklin.  115 

Well  as  nature.  The  influence  of  example  is  very 
great,  and  almoft  univerfal,  efpecially  of  parents 
over  their  children.  In  all  countries  it  has  been 
obferved,  that  vices,  as  well  as  virtues,  run  down 
in  families,  very  often,  from  age  to  age.  Any  man 
may  run  over  in  his  thoughts  the  circle  of  his 
acquaintance,  and  he  will  probably  recollect  in- 
flances  of  a  difpofitioa  to  mifchief,  malice,  and 
revenge,  defcending,  in  certain  breeds,  from  grand- 
father to  father  and  fon.  A  young  woman  was 
lately  convicted  at  Paris  of  a  trifling  theft,  barely 
within  the  law,  which  decreed  a  capital  punifh- 
ment.  There  were  circumftances,  too,  which 
greatly  alleviated  her  fault;  fome  things  in  her 
behaviour  that  feemed  innocent  and  modeft  :  eve- 
ry fpe&ator,  as  well  as  the  judges,  was  affected  at 
the  fcene,  and  ihe  was  advifed  to  petition  for  a 
pardon,  as  there  was  no  doubt  it  would  be  grant- 
ed. "  No,"  fays  fhe,  "  my  grandfather,  father, 
"  and  brother,  were  all  hanged  for  ftealing ;  it 
"  runs  in  the  blood  of  our  family  to  fteal,  and  be 
cc  hanged ;  if  I  am  pardoned  now,  I  fhall  fteal 
"  again  in  a  few  months  more  inexcufably :  and 
"  therefore  I  will  be  hanged  now."  An  hereditary 
paffion  for  the  halter  is  a  ftrong  inflance,  to  be 
lure,  and  cannot  be  very  common :  but  fomething 
like  it  too  often  defcends,  in  certain  breeds,  from 
generation  to  generation. 

If  vice  and  infamy  are  thus  rendered  lefs  odi- 
ous, by  being  familiar  in  a  family,  by  the  exam- 
ple of  parents,  and  by  education,  it  would  be  as 
unhappy  as  unaccountable,  if  virtue  and  honour 
were  not  recommended  and  rendered  more  amia- 
ble to  children  by  the  fame  means. 

There  are,  and  always  have  been,  in  every  ftate, 
numbers  poffefled  of  fome  degree  of  family  pride, 
who  have  been  invariably  encouraged,  if  not  flat- 

VOL.  I.  P  tersd 


Ii6  Ancient  Republics >  &c. 

tered  in  it,  by  the  people.  Thefe  have  moft  ac- 
quaintance, efteern,  and  friendlhip,  with  each 
other,  and  mutually  aid  each  other's  fchemes  of 
intereft,  convenience,  and  ambition.  Fortune,  it 
is  true,  has  more  influence  than  birth ;  a  rich  man 
of  an  ordinary  family,  and  common  decorum  of 
conduct,  may  have  greater  weight  than  any 
family  merit  commonly  confers  without  it. 
3.  It  will  be  readily  admitted,  there  are  great  in- 
equalities of  merit,  or  talents,  virtues,  fervices, 
and,  what  is  of  more  moment,  very  often  of  re- 
putation. Some,  in  a  long  courfe  of  fervice  in 
an  army,  have  devoted  their  time,  health,  and  for- 
tunes, fignalized  their  courage  and  addrefs,  ex- 
pofed  themfelves  to  hardfhips  and  dangers-,  loft 
their  limbs,  and  ftied  their  blood,  for  the  people. 
Others  have  difplayed  their  wifdom,  learning,  and 
eloquence  in  council,  and  in  various  other  ways 
acquired  the  confidence  and  affection  of  their  fel- 
low citizens,  to  fuch  a  degree,  that  the  public  have 
fettled  into  a  kind  of  habit  of  following  their 
example  and  taking  their  advice.  4.  There  are 
a  few,  in  whom  all  thefe  advantages  of  birth,  for- 
tune, and  fame  are  united. 

Thefe  fources  of  inequality,  which  are  com- 
mon to  every  people,  and  can  never  be  altered  by 
any,  becaufe  they  are  founded  in  the  conftitution 
of  nature ;  this  natural  ariftocracy  among  mankind, 
has  been  dilated  on,  becaufe  it  is  a  fact  effential 
to  be  confidered  in  the  inftitution  of  a  govern- 
ment. It  is  a  body  of  men  which  contains  the 
greateft  collection  of  virtues  and  abilities  in  a 
free  government;  is  the  brighteft  ornament  and 
glory  of  the  nation;  and  may  always  be  made  the 
greateft  bleffing  of  fociety,  if  it  be  judicioufly 
managed  in  the  conftitution.  But  if  it  is  not,  it 
is  always  the  moft  dangerous;  nay,  it  may  be 

added, 


Dr.  Franklin.  117 

.added,  it  never  fails  to  be  the  deftru6lion  of  the 
commonwealth.  What  ihall  be  done  to  guard 
againft  it?  Shall  they  be  all  mafTacred?  This  expe- 
riment has  been  more  than  once  attempted,  and 
once  at  leaft  tried.  Guy  Faux  attempted  kin  Eng- 
land; and  a  king  of  Denmark,  aided  by  a  popular 
party,  effe&ed  it  once  in  Sweden ;  but  it  anfwered 
no  good  end.  The  moment  they  were  dead,  ano- 
ther ariftocracy  inftantly  arofe,  with  equal  art  and 
influence,  with  lefs  delicacy  and  difcretion,  if  not 
principle,  and  behaved  more  intolerably  than  the 
former.  The  country,  for  centuries,  never  reco- 
vered from  the  ruinous  confequences  of  a  deed  lb 
horrible,  that  one  would  think  it  only  to  be  met 
with  in  the  hiftory  of  the  kingdom  of  darknefs. 

There  is  but  one  expedient  yet  diicovered,  to 
avail  the  fociety  of  all  the  benefits  from  this  body 
of  men,  which  they  are  capable  of  affording,  and 
at  the  fame  time  to  prevent  them  from  under- 
mining or  invading  the  public  liberty;  and  that 
is,  to  throw  them  all,  or  at  leaft  the  mort  re- 
markable of  them,  into  one  affembly  together, 
in  the  legiflature;  to  keep  all  the  executive  power 
entirely  out  of  their  hands  as  a  body;  to  erecl  a 
firft  magiftrate  over  them,invefted  with  the  whole 
executive  authority :  to  make  them  dependent  on 
that  executive  magiftrate  for  all  public  executive 
employments;  to  give  that  firft  magiftrate  a  ne- 
gative on  the  legiflature,  by  which  he  may  defend 
both  himfelf  and  the  people  from  all  their  enter- 
prizes  in  the  legiflature ;  and  to  ere6l  on  the  other 
fide  of  them  an  impregnable  barrier  again  ft  them, 
in  a  houfe  of  commons,  fairly,  fully,  and  ade- 
quately reprefenting  the  people,  who  ftiall  have 
the  power  both  of  negativing  all  th^ir  attempts 
at  encroachments  in  the  legiilature>  and  of  with- 
holding  both  from  them  and  the  crown  all  Ap- 
plies, 


II 8  Ancient  Republics,  £sfc. 

plies,  by  which  they  may  be  paid  for  their  fervices 
in  executive  offices,  or  even  the  public  fervice 
carried  on  to  the  detriment  of  the  nation. 

We  have  feen,  both  by  reafoning  and  in  ex- 
perience, what  kind  of  equality  is  to  be  found  or 
expe&ed  in  the  fimpleft  people  in  the  world. 
There  is  not  a  city  nor  a  village,  any  more  than 
a  kingdom  or  commonwealth,  in  Europe  or  Ame- 
rica ;  not  a  hord,  clan,  or  tribe,  among  the  ne- 
groes of  Africa,  or  the  favages  of  North  or  South 
America;  nor  a  private  club  in  the  world,  in 
which  fuch  inequalities  are  not  more  or  lefs  vifi- 
ble.  There  is  then  a  certain  degree  of  weight, 
in  the  public  opinion  and  deliberations,  which 
property,  family,  and  merit  will  have:  if  Mr. 
Turgot  had  difcovered  a  mode  of  afcertaining  the 
quantity  which  they  ought  to  have,  and  had  re- 
vealed it  to  mankind,  ib  that  it  might  be  known 
to  every  citizen,  he  would  have  delerved  more  of 
their  gratitude  than  all  the  inventions  of  philo- 
fophers.  But,  as  long  as  human  nature  fhali  have 
paflions  and  imagination,  there  is  too  much  rea- 
fon  to  fear  that  thefe  advantages,  in  many  in- 
flances,  will  have  more  influence  than  reafon  and 
equity  can  juftify. 

Let  us  then  reflecl,  how  the  fingle  afTembly  in 
the  Maffachufetts,  in  which  our  great  flatefman 
wifhes  all  authority  concentered,  will  be  com- 
pofed.  There  being  no  fenate  nor  council,  all  the 
rich,  the  honourable,,  and  meritorious,  will  fiand 
candidates  for  feats  in  the  houfe  of  reprefentatives, 
and  nineteen  in  twenty  of  them  obtain  ele&ions. 
The  houfe  will  be  found  to  have  all  the  inequali- 
ties in  it,  that  prevailed  among  the  people  at  large. 
Such  an  aflembly  will  be  naturally  divided  into 
three  parts. — The  firft  is,  of  ibme  great  genius, 
fome  mafterly  fpirit,  who  unites  in  himielf  all 

the 


Dr.  Franklin.  119 

the  qualities  which  conftitute  the  natural  founda- 
tions of  authority ;  fuch  as  benevolence,  wifdom, 
and  power :  and  all  the  adventitious  attractions  of 
refpeft  ;  fuch  as  riches,  anceftry,  and  perfonal 
merit.  All  eyes  are  turned  upon  him  for  their 
prefident  or  fpeaker. — The  fecond  divifion  com- 
prehends a  third,  or  a  quarter,  or,  if  you  will,  a 
iixth  or  an  eighth  of  the  whole ;  and  confifts  of 
thofe  who  have  the  moft  to  boaft  of  refembling 
their  head. — In  the  third  clafs  are  all  the  reft, 
who  are  nearly  on  a  level  in  underftanding,  and 
in  all  things.  Such  an  aflembly  has  in  it,  not 
only  all  the  perfons  of  the  nation,  who  are  moft 
eminent  for  parts  and  virtues,  but  all  thofe  who 
are  moft  inflamed  with  ambition  and  avarice,  and 
who  are  moft  vain  of  their  defcent.  Thefe  latter 
will  of  courfe  conftantly  endeavour  to  increafe 
their  own  influence,  by  exaggerating  all  the  attri- 
butes they  poflefs,  and  by  augmenting  them  in 
every  way  they  can  think  of ;  and  will  have  friend? 
whofe  only  chance  for  riling  into  public  view 
will  be  under  their  protection,  who  will  even 
be  more  adive  and  zealous  than  themfelves  in 
their  fervice.  Notwithftanding  all  the  equality 
that  can  ever  be  hoped  for  among  men,  it  is 
eafy  to  fee  that  the  third  clafs  will  in  general  be 
but  humble  imitators  and  followers  of  the  fecond. 
Every  man  in  the  fecond  clafs  will  have  con- 
ftantly about  him  a  circle  of  members  of  the 
third,  who  will  be  his  admirers ;  perhaps  afraid 
of  his  influence  in  t&e  diftricls  they  reprefent, 
related  to  him  by  blood,  connected  with  him  in 
trade,  or  dependent  upon  him  for  favours. 
There  will  be  much  envy  too,  among  individuals 
of  the  fecond  clafs,  againft  the  fpeaker,  although 
a  fin  cere  veneration  is  fhewn  him  by  the  majori- 
ty, and  great  external  refpecl  by  all.  I  laid  there 

would 


I2O  Ancient  Republics,  £?<;. 

.would  be  envy;  becaufe  there  will  be,  among  the 
fecond  clafs,  feveral,  whofe  fortunes,  families,  and 
merits,  in  the  acknowledged  judgment  of  all,  ap- 
proach near  to  the  firft ;  and,  from  the  ordinary 
illufions  of  felf-love  and  felf-intereft,  they  and 
their  friends  will  be  much  difpofed  to  claim  the 
firft  place  as  their  own  right.  This  will  introduce 
controverfy  and  debate,  as  well  as  emulation ;  and 
thofe  who  wifli  for  the  firft  place,  and  cannot  ob- 
tain it,  will  of  courfe  endeavour  to  keep  down  the 
fpeaker  as  near  upon  a  level  with  themfelves  as 
poflible,  by  paring  away  the  dignity  and  import- 
ance of  his  office,  as  we  faw  in  Venice,  Poland, 
and  eve*y  where  elfe. 

A  {ingle  aflembly  thus  conftituted,  without  any 
counterpoife,  balance,  or  equilibrium,  is  to  have 
all  authority,  legiflative,  executive,  and  judicial, 
concentered  in  it.  'It  is  to  make  a  conftitution 
and  laws  by  its  own  will,  execute  thofe  laws  at 
its  pleafure,  and  adjudge  all  controverfies,  that 
arife  concerning  the  meaning  and  application  of 
them,  at  difcretion.  What  is  there  to  reftrain 
them  fron^  making  tyrannical  laws,  in  order  to  ex- 
ecute them  in  a  tyrannical  manner. 

Will  it  be  pretended,  that  the  jealoufy  arid 
vigilance  of  the  people,  and  their  power  to  diicard 
them  at  the  next  ele&ion,  will  reftrain  them  ? 
Even  this  idea  fuppofes  a  balance,  an  equili- 
brium, which  Mr.  Turgot  holds  in  fo  much  con- 
tempt; it  fuppofes  the  people  at  large  to  be  a 
check  and  controul  to  the  Veprefentative  affembly. 
But  this  would  be  found  a  mere  delufion.  A  jea- 
loufy between  the  electors  and  the  elected  neither 
ought  to  exift,  nor  is  poflible  to  exift.  It  is  a 
contradiction  to  fuppofe,  that  a  body  of  electors 
fhould  have  at  one  moment  a  warm  affection  and 
entire  confidence  in  a  man,  fo  as  to  intruft  him 

with 


Dr.  Price.  121 

with  authority,  limited  or  unlimited,  over  their 
lives  and  fortunes ;  and  the  next  moment  after  his 
eledion,  to  commence  afufpicion  of  him,  thatfhall 
prompt  them  to  watch  all  his  words,  adtions,  and 
motions,  and  difpofe  them  to  renounce  and  punifh 
him.  They  choofe  him,  indeed,  becaufe  they 
think  he  knows  more,  and  is  better  difpofed, 
than  the  generality,  and  even  than  themfelves 
very  often.  Indeed  the  befl  ufe  of  a  reprefenta- 
tive  affembly,  arifes  from  the  cordial  aflfe&ion 
and  unreferved  confidence  which  fubiifts  between 
it  and  the  collective  body  of  the  people.  It  is 
by  fuch  a  kind  and  candid  intercourfe  alone,  that 
the  wants  and  defires  of  the  people  can  be  made 
known,  on  the  one  hand,  or  the  neceflities  of  the 
public  communicated  or  reconciled  to  them,  on 
the  other.  In  what  did  fuch  a  confidence  in  one 
aflembly  end,  in  Venice,  Geneva,  Bifcay,  Poland, 
but  an  ariftocracy,  and  an  oligarchy  ?  There  is 
no  fpecial  providence  for  Americans,  and  their 
natures  are  the  fame  with  others. 


LETTER     XXVI. 


DR.       P    R   I    C   E. 

Dear  Sir, 

TO  demonftrate  the  neceffity  of  two  afiem- 
blies  in  the  legiilature,  as  well  as  of  a  third 
branch  in  it,  to  defend  the  executive  authority ; 
it   may  be  laid  down  as  a  firft   principle,    that 
neither  liberty  nor  juftice  can  be  iecured  to  the 
individuals  of  a^  nation,  nor  its  profperity  pro- 
moted, 


122  Ancient  Republics,  &c. 

moted,  but  by  a  fixed  confutation  of  government, 
and  ftated  laws,  known  and  obeyed  by  all. — 
Mr.  Turgot,  indeed,  cenfures  the  "  faliity  of  the 
"  notion,  fo  frequently  repeated  by  almoft  all 
cc  republican  writers,  ( that  liberty  confifts  in  be- 
"  ing  fubject  only  to  the  laws ;'  as  if  a  man  could 
"  be  free  while  opprefled  by  an  unjuft  law. 
"  This  would  not  be  true,  even  if  we  could  fup- 
"  pofe,  that  all  laws  were  the  work  of  an  afTem- 
<c  bly  of  the  whole  nation  ;  for  certainly  every 
"  individual  has  his  rights,  of  which  the  nation 
"  cannot  deprive  him,  except  by  violence,  and 
"  an  unlawful  ufe  of  the  general  power." 

We  often  hear  and  read  of  free  ftates,  a  free 
people,  a  free  nation,  a  free  country,  a  free  king- 
dom, and  even  of  free  republics;  and  we  under- 
ftand,  in  general,  what  is  intended,  although  every 
man  may  not  be  qualified  to  enter  into  philofo- 
phical  difquifitions  concerning  the  meaning  of 
the  word  liberty  or  to  give  a  logical  definition 
of  it. 

Our  friend  Dr.  Price  has  diftinguifhed  very 
well,  concerning  phyfical,  moral,  religious,  and 
civil  liberty :  and  has  defined  the  laft  to  be 
cc  the  power  of  a  civil  fociety  to  govern  itfelf, 
tc  by  its  own  difcretion,  or  by  laws  of  its  own 
"  making,  by  the  majority,  in  a  collective  body, 
"  or  by  fair  reprefentation.  In  every  free  (late, 
fc  every  man  is  his  own  legiflator.  Legitimate 
"  government  confifts  only  in  the  dominion  of 
"  equal  /aws,  made  with  common  conjent,  and 
*e  not  in  the  dominion  of  any  men  over  other 


men." 


Mr.  Turgot,  however,  makes  the  do&or  too 
great  a  compliment,  at  the  expence  of  former 
Englifh  writers,  when  he  reprefents  him  as  "  the 
"  firft  of  his  countrymen  who  have  given  a 

m 


£>r.  Price*  12,$ 

*c  juft  idea  of  liberty,  and  fhewn  the  falfity,  fo 
"  often  repeated  by  almoft  all  republican  writers,* 
"  that  liberty  coniifts  in  being  fubjeft  only  to  the 
"  laws." 

I  lhall  cheerfully  agree  with  Mr.  Turgot,  that 
it  is  very  poflible  that  laws,  and  even  equal  laws 
made  by  common  confent,  may  deprive  the  mi- 
nority of  the  citizens  of  their  rights.  A  fociety, 
by  a  majority,  may  govern  itfelf,-  even  by  equal 
laws,  that  is  by  laws  to  which  all,  majority  and 
minority,  are  equally  fubjedl,  fo  as  to  opprefs  the 
minority.  It  may  eftablifh  an  uniformity  in  re- 
ligion; it  may  reftrain  trade;  it  may  confine 
perfonal  liberty  of  all  equally,  and  againft  the 
judgment  of  many,  even  of  the  beft  and  wifeftj 
without  reafonable  motives,  ufe,  or  benefit.  We 
may  go  farther,  and  fay,  that  a  nation  may  be  una- 
nimous in  confenting  to  a  law  reftraining  their 
natural  liberty,  property,  and  commerce,  and 
their  moral  and  religious  liberties  too,  to  a  de- 
gree that  may  be  prejudicial  to  the  nation  and 
every  individual  in  it.  A  nation  of  Catholics 
might  unanimoufly  confent  to  prohibit  labour 
upon  one  half  the  days  ia  the  year,  as  feaft  days. 
The  whole  American  nation  might  unanimoufly 
confent  to  a  Sunday  law,  and  a  warden  a6l,  which 
fhould  deprive  them  of  the  ufe  of  their  limbs  one 
day  in  feven.  A  nation  may  unanimoufly  agree  to 
a  navigation  ad,  which  fhould  fhackle  the  com- 
merce of  all.  Yet  Dr.  Price's  definition  of  civil 
liberty  is  as  liable  to  this  objection  as  any  other. 
Thefe  would  be  all  equal  laws,  made  with  common 
confent:  thefe  would  all  be  a6ls  of  legitimate 
government.  To  take  in  Mr.  Turgot's  idea,  then, 
we  muft  add  to  Dr.  Price's  ideas  of  equal  laws  by 
common  confent,  this  other — for  the  general  inter  eft  &i 
the  public  good.  But  it  is  generally  fuppofed,  that 

VOL.  I.  nations 


Ancient  Republics, 

nations  tmderftand  their  own  intereft  better  than 
another;  and  therefore  they  may  be  trufted  to- 
judge  of  the  public  good :  and  in  all  the  cafes 
above  fuppofed,  they  will  be  as  free  as  they 
delire  to  be ;  and  therefore  may  with  great  pro- 
priety be  called  free  nations,  and  their  conftitu- 
tions  free  republics.  There  can  be  no  way  of 
compelling  nations  to  be  more  free  than  they 
choofe  to  be* 

But  Mr.  Turgot  has  miftaken  the  fenfe  of 
republican  writers,  efpecially  of  the  Englifh  ones. 
What  republican  writers  he  had  in  view  I  know 
not.  There  is  none  that  I  remember,  of  any 
name,  who  has  given  fo  abfurd  a  definition  of 
liberty.  His  countryman  Montefquieu,  who  will 
fcarcely  be  denominated  a  republican  writer,  has 
faid  fomething  the  rnoft  like  it;  but  it  is  manifeft 
that  his  meaning  was  confined  to  equal  laws,  made 
by  common  confent.  Although  there  may  be 
unjuft  and  unequal  laws,  obedience  to  which 
would  be  incompatible  with  liberty;  yet  no  man 
will  contend,  that  a  nation  can  be  free,  that  is 
not  governed  by  fixed  laws.  All  other  govern- 
ment than  that  of  permanent  known  laws,  is  the 
government  of  mere  will  and  pleafure,  whether  it 
be  exercifed  by  one,  a  few,  or  many.  Republican 
writers  in  general,  and  thofe  of  England  in  parti- 
cular, have  maintained  the  fame  principle  with 
Dr.  Price,  and  have  faid,  that  legitimate  govern- 
ments, or  well-ordered  commonwealths,  or  well- 
conftituted  governments,  were  thofe  where  the 
laws  prevailed;  and  have  always  explained  their 
meanings  to  be  equal  laws  made  by  common  confent, 
or  the  general  will — that  is  to  fay,  made  by  the 
majority,  and  equally  binding  upon  majority  and 
minority.  As  it  is  of  importance  to  refcue  the 
good  old  republican  writers  from  fuch  an  impu- 
tation. 


Dr.  Price.  125 

tation,  let  me  beg  your  patience  while  we  look 
into  fome  of  them. 

Ariftotle  fays,  that  cc  a  government  where  the 
<c  laws  alone  fhould  prevail,  would  be  the  king- 
"  dom  of  God."  This  indeed  fhows  that  this 
great  philofopher  had  much  admiration  of  fuch  a 
government :  but  is  not  the  aflertion  that  Mr. 
Turgot  condemns,  viz.,  that  liberty  confifts  in 
being  fubjecl  to  the  laws  only. 

Ariftotle  fays  too,  in  another  place,  "  Order  is 
"  law,  and  it  is  more  proper  that  law  fhould  go- 
"  vern,  than  any  one  of  the  citizens  :  upon  the 
<c  fame  principle,  if  it  is  advantageous  to  place 
"  the  fupreme  power  in  fome  particular  perfons, 
<e  they  fhould  be  appointed  to  be  only  guardi- 
<c  ans,  and  the  fervants  of  the  laws."  Thefe  too 
are  very  juft  fentiments,  but  not  a  formal  defini- 
tion of  liberty. 

Livy  too  fpeaks  of  happy,  profperous,  and 
glorious  times,  when  "  Imperia  legum  poten- 
<c  tiora  fuerunt  quam  hominum."  But  he  no 
where  fays  that  liberty  confifts  in  being  fubjedl 
only  to  the  legum  imperio. 

Sidney  fays,  "No  fedition  was  hurtful  to  Rome, 
<c  until,  through  their  profperity,  fome  men  gain- 
"  ed  a  power  above  the  laws." 

In  another  place  he  tells  us  too,  from  Livy, 
that  fome,  whofe  ambition  and  avarice  were  impa- 
tient of  reftraint,  complained  that  "  leges  rem 
"  furdam  efle,  inexorabilem,  falubriorem  inopi 
"  quam  potenti." 

And  in  another,  that  "  no  government  was 
"  thought  to  be  well  conftituted,  unlefs  the  laws 
"  prevailed  againft  the  commands  of  men."  But 
he  has  no  where  defined  liberty  to  be  fubje&ion 
to  the  laws  only. 

Harrington 


Ancient  Republics,  &c. 

Harrington  fays,  "  Government  dej-ure,  or  ae<* 
fc  cording  to  ancient  prudence,  is  an  art,  where^ 
"  by  a  civil  fociety  of  men  is  inftituted  and  pre- 
<c  ferved  upon  the  foundation  of  common  inter  eft ; 
^  or,  to  follow  Ariftotle  and  Livy,  it  is  an  em- 
"  pire  of  laws  and  not  of  men.  And  govern- 
*c  ment,  to  define  it  according  to  modern  pru- 
"  dence,  or  de  fafto,  is  an  art,  by  which  fome 
"  man,  or  fome  few  men, .  fubjecl  a  city  or  a  na- 
(C  tion,  and  rule  it  according  to  his  or  their  pri- 
"  vate  intereft;  which,  becaufe  the  laws  in  fuch 
<c  cafes  are  made  according  to  the  intereft  of  a 
"  man,  or  a  few  families,  may  be  faid  to  be  the 
"  empire  of  men  and  not  of  laws." 

Harrington,  Politicafter,  fcene  2,  agrees,  that 
law  proceeds  from  the  will  of  man,  whether  a 
monarch  or  people ;  and  that  this  will  muft  have 
a  mover;  and  that  this  mover  is  intereft  :  but  the 
interefi  of  the  people  is  one  thing — it  is  the  pub- 
lic intereft;  and  where  the  public  intereft  go- 
verns, it  is  a  government  of  laws,  and  not  of 
men:  the  intereft  of  a  king,  or  of  a  party,  is 
another  thing — it  is  a  private  intereft ;  and  where 
private  intereft  governs,  it  is  a  government  of 
men,  and  not  of  laws.  If,  in  England,  there 
has  ever  been  any  fuch  thing  as  a  government  of 
laws,  was  it  not  magna  charta  ?  and  have  not  our 
kings  broken  magna  charta  thirty  times?  Did 
the  law  govern  when  the  law  was  broken?  or 
was  that  a  government  of  men  ?  On  the  contrary, 
hath  not  magna  c/iartajdeen  as  often  repaired  by 
the  people  ?  and,  the  law  being  fo  reftored,  was  it 
not  a  government  of  laws,  and  not  of  men  ? 
Why  have  our  kings,  in  fo  many  ftatutes  and 
oaths,  engaged  themfelves  to  govern  by  law,  if 
there  were  not  in  kings  a  capacity  of  govern- 
ing otherwife  ?  It  is  true,  that  laws  are  neither 

made 


Dr.  Price.  127 

made  by  angels,  nor  by  horfes,  but  by  men. 
The  voice  of  the  people  is  as  much  the  voice  of 
men,  as  the  voice  of  a  prince  is  the  voice  of  a 
man ;  and  yet  the  voice  of  the  people  is  the  voice 
of  God,  which  the  voice  of  a  prince  is  not.  The 
government  of  laws,  faid  Ariftotie,  is  the  go- 
vernment of  God.  In  a  monarchy,  the  laws,  be- 
ing made  according  to  the  intereft  of  one  man,  or 
a  few  men,  muft  needs  be  more  private  and  par- 
tial than  fuits  with  the  nature  of  juftice ;  but  in 
a  commonwealth,  the  laws,  being  made  by  the 
whole  people,  muft  come  up  to  the  public  inte- 
reft, which  is  common  right  and  juftice — and  if 
a  man  know  not  what  is  his  own  intereft,  who 
mould  know  it  ?  and  that  which  is  the  intereft  of 
the  moft  or  greateft  number  of  particular  men, 
being  fummed  up  in  the  common  vote,  is  the 
public  intereft. 

Sidney  fays,  "  Liberty  confifts  folely  in  an 
"  independency  on  the  will  of  another ;  and,  by 
"  a  flave,  we  underftand  a  man  who  can  neither 
"  difpofe  of  his  perfon  or  goods,  but  enjoys  all 
"  at  the  will  of  his  mafter."  And  again,  "  As 
"  liberty  con  lifts  only  in  being  fubje6l  to  no 
"  man's  will,  and  nothing  denotes  a  flave  but  a 
"  dependence  upon  the  will  of  another ;  if  there 
"  be  no  other  law  in  a  kingdom  but  the  will  of  a 
."  prince,  there  is  no  fuch -thing  as  liberty." 

Mr.  Turgot  might  have  perceived  in  thefe  writ- 
ers, that  a  government,  of  laws  and  not  of  men, 
was  intended  by  them  as  a  defcription  of  a  com- 
monwealth, not  a  definition  of  liberty.  There 
may  be  various  degrees  of  liberty  eftabliftied  by 
the  laws,  and  enjoyed  by  the  citizens,  in  differ- 
ent commonwealths;  but  ftill  the  general  will, 
as  well  as  the  general  intereft,  as  far  as  it  is  un- 
derftood  by  the  people,  prevails  in  all  that  can 

be 


Ancient  Republics, 

be  denominated  free :  as  the  fociety  governs  it- 
felf,  it  is  free,  according  to  the  definition  of  Dr. 
Price.  The  inquiry  of  thefe  writers,  in  fuch  paf- 
fages,  was  not  into  the  higheft  point  of  liberty, 
or  greateft  degree  of  it,  which  might  be  efta- 
bliihed  by  the  general  will,  and  the  common  fenfe 
of  intereft,  in  their  refults  or  laws.  They  have 
taken  it  for  granted,  that  human  nature  is  fo 
fond  of  liberty,  that,  if  the  whole  fociety  were 
confulted,  a  majority  would  never  be  found  to 
put  chains  upon  themfelves,  by  their  own  a&  and 
voluntary  confent. 

But  all  men,  as  well  as  republican  writers, 
muft  agree,  that  there  can  be  no  uninterrupted 
enjoyment  of  liberty,  nor  any  good  government, 
in  fociety,  without  laws,  or  where  {landing  laws 
do  not  govern.  In  defpotic  ftates,  in  iimple  mo- 
narchies, in  ariftocracies,  in.  democracies,  in  all 
poffible  mixtures  of  thefe,  the  individual  enjoys 
continually  the  benefit  of  law,  as  he  does  thofe 
of  light  and  air,  although,  in  moft  of  thofe  go- 
vernments, he  has  no  fecurity  for  the  continuance 
of  it.  If  the  laws  were  all  repealed  at  once,  in 
any  great  kingdom,  and  the  event  made  known 
fuddenly  to  all,  there  would  fcarcely  a  houfe  re- 
main in  pofleflion  of  its  prefent  inhabitant,  in  the 
great  cities.  • 

The  great  queftion  therefore  is,  What  combi- 
nation of  powers  in  fociety,  or  what  form  of  go- 
vernment, will  compel  the  formation  of  good  and 
equal  laws,  an  impartial  execution,  and  faithful 
interpretation  of  them,  fo  that  the  citizens  may 
conflantly  enjoy  the  benefit  of  them,  and  be  fure 
of  their  continuance.  The  controverfy  between 
Mr.  Turgot  and  me  is — whether  a  fingle  aflembly 
of  reprefentatives  be  this  form.  He  maintains 
the  affirmative.  I  am  for  the  negative  :  becaufe 

fuch 


Dr.  Price. 

iuch  an  affembly  will,  upon  the  firft  day  of  its 
exiftence,  be  an  ariftocracy;  in  a  few  days,  or 
years  at  leaft,  an  oligarchy ;  and  then  it  will  foon 
divide  into  two  or  three  parties,  who  will  fooa 
have  as  many  armies;  and,  when  the  battle  is 
decided,  the  vi&orious  general  will  govern  with- 
out or  with  the  advice  of  any  council  or  affembly, 
as  he  pleafes  :  or,  if  the  aflembly  continues  unit- 
ed, they  will  in  time  exclude  the  people  from  all 
ihare  even  in  elections,  and  make  the  government 
hereditary  in  a  few  families.  In  order  to  be  fully 
convinced  of  this,  we  rnuft  take  an  extenfive  view 
of  the  fubjecl:;  and  the  firft  inquiry  mould  be, 
what  kind  of  beings  men  are?  You  and  I  ad- 
mire the  fable  of  Triftram  Shandy  more  than  the 
fable  of  the  Bees,  and  agree  with  Butler  rather 
than  Hobbes.  It  is  weaknefs  rather  than  wicked- 
nefs  which  renders  men  unfit  to  be  trufted  with 
unlimited  power.  The  paflions  are  all  unlimit- 
ed ;  nature  has  left  them  fo :  if  they  could  be 
bounded,  they  would  be  extinct;  and  there  is 
no  doubt  they  are  of  indifpenfable  importance  in 
the  prefent  fyftem.  They  certainly  increafe  too, 
by  exercife,  like  the  body.  The  love  of  gold 
grows  f after  than  the  heap  of  acquiiition :  the 
love  of  praife  increafes  by  every  gratification, 
till  it  ftings  like  an  adder,  and  bites  like  a 
ferpent;  till  the  man  is  miferable  every  mo- 
ment when  he  does. not  fnuff  the  incenfe:  am- 
bition ftrengthens  at  every  advance,  and  at  laft 
takes  pofleffion  of  the  whole  foul  fo  abfolutely, 
that  the  man  fees  nothing  in  the  world  of  im- 
portance to  others,  or  himfelf,  but  in  his  object. 
The  fubtilty  of  thefe  three  paflions,  which  have 
been  feleded  from  all  the  others  becaufe  they 
are  ariftocratical  paflions,  in  fubduing  all  others, 

and 


130  Ancient  Republics,  &c. 

and  even  the  under-Handing  itfelf,  if  not  the  con- 
fcience  too,  until  they  become  abfolute  and  im- 
perious matters  of  the  whole  mind,  is  a  curious 
fpeculation.  The  cunning  with  which  they  hide 
themfelves  from  others,  and  from  the  man  him- 
felf  too;  the  patience  with  which  they  wait  for 
opportunities ;  the  torments  they  voluntarily  fuf- 
fer  for  a  time,  to  fecure  a  full  enjoyment  at 
length;  the  inventions,  the  difcoveries,  the  con- 
trivances they  fuggeft  to  the  underftanding,  fome- 
times  in  the  dulleft  dunces  in  the  world,  if  they 
could  be  defcribed  in  writing,  would  pafs  for 
great  genius. 

We  are  not  enough  acquainted  with  the  phy- 
lical  or  metaphyiical  effe&s  they  may  have  on 
our  bodies  or  minds,  to  be  able  to-  explain  the 
particular  reafon  why^every  inftance  of  indulgence 
ftrengthens  and  confirms  the  fubfequent  emo- 
tions of  defire.  The  caufe  has  been  hitherto  too 
deep,  remote,  and  fubtle,  for  the  fearch  of  cor- 
poreal or  intelle&ual  microfcopes ;  but  the  fa6l 
is  too  decided  to  deceive  or  efcape  our  obfer- 
vation.  Men  fhould  endeavour  at  a  balance  of 
affe&ions  and  appetites,  under  the  monarchy  of 
reafon  and  confcience,  within,  as  well  as  at  a  ba- 
lance of  power  without.  If  they  furrender  the 
guidance,  for  any  courfe  of  time,  to  any  one  paf- 
fion,  they  may  depend  upon  finding  it,  in  the  end, 
an  ufurping,  domineering,  cruel  tyrant.  They 
were  intended  by  nature  to  live  together  in  focie- 
ty,  and  in  this  way  to  reftrain  one  another,  and 
in  general  are  very  good  kind  of  creatures;  but 
they  know  each  other's  imbecility  fo  well,  that 
they  ought  never  'to  lead  one  another  into  temp- 
tation. The  paflion  that  is  long  indulged,  and 
continually  gratified,  becomes  mad ;  it  is  a  fpe- 

cies 


Dr.  Price. 

cies  of  delirium;  it  fhould  not  be  called  guilt, 
but  infanity  :  but  who  would  truil:  his  life,  liber- 
ty, and  property,  to  a  madman,  or  an  aflembly 
of  them  ?  it  would  be  fafer  to  confide  in  knaves. 
Five  hundred  or  five  thoufand  together,  in  an  af- 
fembly,  are  not  lefs  liable  to  this  extravagance 
than  one.  The  nation  that  commits  its  affairs  to 
a  fingle  aflembly,  will  afliiredly  find  that  its  paf- 
fions  and  defires  augment  as  faft  as  thofe  of  a  king  ; 
and  therefore  fuch  a  conftitution  muft  be  eflen- 
tially  defective. 

Others  have  feen  this  quality  in  human  nature 
through  'a  more  gloomy  medium. 

Machiavel  fays,  thofe  who  have  written  on  ci- 
vil government  lay  it  down  as  a  firft  principle, 
and  all  hiftorians  demonftrate  the  fame,  that  who- 
ever would  found  a  ftate,  and  make  proper  laws 
for  the  government  of  it,  muft  prefume  that  air 
men  are  bad  by  nature ;  and  that  they  will  not 
fail  to  ihew  that  natural  depravity  of  heart, 
whenever  they  have  a  fair  opportunity  5  and, 
though  pombly  it  may  lie  concealed  for  a  while, 
on  account  of  fome  fecret  reafon,  which  does  not 
then  appear  to  men  of  fmall  experience,  yet  time, 
which  is  therefore  juftly  called  the  father  of  truth, 
commonly  brings  it  to  light  in  the  end.  Ma- 
chiavel's  tranflator  remarks,  that  although  this 
feems  a  harfh  fuppofition,  does  not  every  Chrif- 
tian  daily  juftify  the  truth  of  it,  by  confefling  it 
before  God  and  the  world  ?  and  are  we  not  ex- 
prefsly  told  the  fame  in  feveral  paffages  of  the 
holy  Icriptures,  and  in  all  fyftems  of  human  phi- 
lofophy  ? 

Montefquieu  fays,  "  Conftant  experience  fhews 

c  us,  that  every  man  inverted  with  power  is  apt 

"  to  abufe  it:  he  pufhes   on,  till  he   comes  to 

u  fomething  that  limits  him.     Is  it  not  ftrange, 

VOL.  I.  R  "though 


1 3 2  Ancient  Republics,  £sfc. 

though  true,  to  fay  that  virtue  itfelf  has  need  of 
limits  ?  To  prevent  the  abufe  of  power,  it  is  ne- 
ceflary,  that,  by  the  very  difpofition  of  things, 
power  fhould  be  a  check  to  power.  A  govern- 
ment may  be  fo  conftituted,  as  no  man  Ihall  be 
compelled  to  do  things  to  which  the  law  does  not 
oblige  him,  nor  forced  to  abftain  from  things 
which  the  law  permits. 

Swift.  So  endlefs  and  exorbitant  are  the  deiires 
of  men,  that  they  will  grafp  at  all,  and  can  form 
no  fcheme  of  perfect  happinefs  with  lefs.  It  is 
hard  to  recolleft  one  folly,  infirmity,  or  vice,  to 
which  a  lingle  man  is  fubje&ed,  and  from  which 
a  body  of  commons,  collective  or  reprefentative 
(and  he  might  have  added  a  body  of  nobles)  can 
be  wholly  exempt. 

Junius.   Laws  are  intended,  not  to  truft  to  what 

en  will  do,  but  to  guard  againft  what  they  may 
o. 

P      Beccaria.  Ogni  uomo  Ji  fa  centre  di  tutte  h  combi** 
nazioni  del  globo. 

Rochefaucault.  The  ambitious  deceive  them- 
felves,  when  they  propofe  an  end  to  their  ambition ; 
for  that  end,  when  attained,  becomes  a  means. 

DeLolme.  Experience  evinces,  that  the  happieft 
difpofitions  are  not  proof  againft  the  allurements 
of  power,  which  has  no  charms  but -as  it  leads  on 
to  new  advances.  Authority  endures  not  the  very 
idea  of  reftraint;  nor  does  it  ceafe  to  ftruggle,  till 
it  has  beaten  down  every  boundary. 

Hobbes,  Mandeville,  Rochefaucault,  have  drawn 
ftill  more  deteftable  pi&ures;  and  RoufTeau,  in  his 
Inequalities  among  Mankind,  gives  a  defcription 
of  a  civilized  heart,  too  black  and  horrible  to  be 
tranfcribed. 

Even   our   amiable   friends,  thofe   benevolent 

Chriftian  philofophers',  Dr.  Price  and  Dr.  Prieftley, 

*  acquaint 


Dr.  Price.  135 

acquaint  us,  that  they  are  conftrained  to  believe 
human  nature  no  better  than  it  fhould  be.  The 
latter  fays,  there  is  no  power  on  earth  but  has  grown 
exorbitant  when  it  has  met  with  no  controul. 

The  former."Such  are  the  principles  that  govern 
"  human  nature;  fuch  the  weaknefs  and  folly  of 
"  men;  fuch  their  love  of  domination,  felfifhnefs, 
"  and  depravity,  that  none  of  them  can  be  raifed 
<e  to  an  elevation  above  others,  without  the  utmoft 
"  danger.  The  conftant  experience  of  the  world 
"  has  verified  this,  and  proved  that  nothing  intox- 
<c  icates  the  human  mind  fo  much  as  power.  In 
<(  the  eftablimment,therefore,  of  civil  government, 
ff  it  would  be  prepofterous  to  rely  on  the  difcretion 
cc  of  any  men.  A  people  will  never  opprefs  them- 
"  felves,  or  invade  their  own  rights ;  but  if  they 
"  truft  the  arbitrary  will  of  a  body  or  fucceffion  of 
fe  men,  they  truft  enemies." 

Shall  we  fay  that  all  thefe  philofophers  were  ig- 
norant of  human  nature?  With  all  my  foul,  I  wifh 
it  were  in  my  power  to  quote  any  paflages  in  hif- 
tory  or  philofophy,  which  might  demonftrate  all 
thefe  fatires  on  our  fpecies  to  be  falfe.  But  the 
phenomena  are  all  in  their  favour;  and  the  only 
queftion  to  be  raifed  with  them  is,  whether  the 
caufe  is  wickednefs,  weaknefs,  or  infanity  ?  In  all 
events,  we  muft  agree,  that  human  nature  is  not 
fit  to  be  trufted  with.  Mr.  Turgot's  fyftem,  of  all 
authority  in  a  fmgle  affejnbly. 

A  iingle  aflembly  will  never  be  a  fteady  guardian 

of  the  laws,  if  Machiavel  is  right,  when  he  fays, 

"  Men  are  never  good  but  through  neceffity:  on 

c  the  contrary,  when  good  and  evil  are  left  to  their 

"  choice,  they  will  not  fail  to  throw  every  thing 

c  into  diforder  and  confufion.  Hunger  and  poverty 

f  may  make  men  induftrious,  but  laws  only  can 

fe  make 


134  Ancient  Republics,  &c. 

"  make  them  good;  for,  if  men  were  fo  of  them- 
"  felves,  there  would  be  no  occafion  for  laws ;  but, 
"  as  the  cafe  is  far  otherwife,  they  are  abfolutely 
*c  neceflary.  After  the  Tarquins  were  dead,  who 
"  had  been  fuch  a  check  upon  the  nobility,  fome 
"  other  expedient  was  wanting  to  have  the  fame 
^  effect ;  fo  that,  after  much  confufion  and  difor- 
"  der,  and  many  dangerous  contefts  between  the 
fc  patricians  and  plebeians,  certain  officers,  called 
"  tribunes,  were  created  for  the  fecurity  of  the  lat- 
"  ter ;  who,  being  vefted  with  fuch  privileges  and 
<c  authority  as  enabled  them  to  become  arbiters 
"  betwixt  thofe  two  eftates,  effectually  curbed  the 
fc  infolence  of  the  former :?}  or,  in  the  language  of 
Dr.  Franklin,  the  people  infilled  upon  hitching  a 
yoke  of  cattle  behind  the  waggon,  to  draw  up  hill, 
when  the  patricians  before  mould  attempt  to  go 
too  faft :  or,  in  the  ftyle  of  Harrington,  the  commons 
finding  the  patricians  difpofed  to  divide  the  cake 
unequally,  demanded  the  privilege  of  choofing. 

If  Harrington's  authority  is  not  of  great  weight 
with  fome  men, the  reafon s  he  affigns  in  fupport  of 
his  judgment  are  often  eternal,  and  unanfwerable 
by  any  man.  In  his  Oceana  he  fays,  "  Be  the  in- 
"  tereft  of  popular  government  right  reafon,  a 
"  man  does  not  look  upon  reafon  as  it  is  right  or 
<c  wrong  in  itfelf,  but  as  it  makes  for  him  or 
cc  againft  him :  wherefore,  unlefs  you  can  fhew 
"  fuch  orders  of  a  government,  as,  like  thofe  of 
cc  God  in  nature,  fhall  be  able  to  couftrain  this  or 
"  that  creature  to  fhake  off  that  inclination  which 
"  is  more  peculiar  to  it,  and  take  up  that  which 
"  regards  the  common  goodorintereft;  alfthisis 
"  to  no  more  end,  than  to  perfuade  every  man,  in 
"  a  popular  government,  not  to  carve  for  himfelf 
f  of  that  which  he  likes  beft  or  defires  molt,  but 

"  to 


Dr.  Price.  135 

cc  to  be  mannerly  at  the  public  table,  and  give  the 
"  beft  from  himfelf  to  decency  and  the  common  in- 
"  tereft.  But  that  fuch  orders  may  be  eftablifhed, 
cc  as  may,  nay  muft,  give  the  upper  hand  in  all 
"  cafes  to  common  right  and  intereft,  notwithitand- 
"  ing  the  nearnefs  that  fticks  to  every  man  in  pri- 
"  vate,  and  this  in  a  way  of  equal  certainty  and 
"  facility,  is  known  even  to  girls;  being  po  other 
"  than  thofe  which  are  of  common  pra&ice  with 
"  them  in  diverfe  cafes.  For  example  :  Two  of 
"  them  have  a  cake,yet  undivided,which  was  given 
"  between  them.  That  each  of  them,  therefore, 
"  might  have  that  which  is  due,  "  Divide,"  fays 
"  one,  "  and  I  will  choofe ;  or  let  me  divide,  and 
"  you  fhall  choofe."  If  this  be  but  once  agreed 
"  upon,  it  is  enough;  for  the  one  dividing  un- 
"  equally,  lofes,  in  regard  that  the  other  takes  the 
"  better  half;  wherefore  ihe  divides  equally,  and 
"  fo  both  have  right.  And  thus,  what  great  phi- 
"  lofophers  are  disputing  upon  in  vain,  is  brought 
"  to  light  by  two  harmlefs  girls ;  even  the  whole 
"  myftery  of  a  commonwealth,  which  lies  only  in 
"  dividing  and  choofing." 

Now,  if  all  authority  is  to  be  colle&ed  into  one 
central  afTembly,  it  will  have  the  whole  power  of 
diviiion  and  choice;  and  we  may  ealily  conjecture 
what  divifion  and  choice  it  will  be.  It  will  foon 
have  poffefilon  of  all  the  cakes,  loaves,  and  fifties. 

Harrington  proceeds :  "  Nor  has  God,  if  his 
*e  works  in  nature  be  underftood,  left  fo  much  to 
cc  mankind  to  difpute  upon,  as  who  fhall  divide 
"  and  who  choofe,  but  diftributed  them  for  ever 
<c  into  two  orders ;  whereof  the  one  has.the  natural 
"  right  of  dividing,  and  the  other  of  choofing. 
cc  For  example  :  A  commonwealth  is  but  a  civil 
"  fociety  of  men :  let  us  take  any  number  of  men, 

"  as 


136  Ancient  Republics,  &c. 

"  as  twenty,  and  immediately  make  a  common- 
"  wealth.  Twenty  men,  if  they  be  not  all  ideots, 
"  perhaps  if  they  be,  can  never  come  fo  together 
"  but  there  will  be  fuch  a  difference  in  them,  that 
cc  about  a  third  will  be  wifer,or  at  leafl  lefs  foolifh, 
"  than  all  the  reft.  Thefe,  upon  acquaintance, 
"  though  it  be  but  fmall,  will  be  difcovered,  and 
"  (as  flags  that  have  the  largeft  heads)  lead  the 
"  herd :  for  while  the  fix,  dicourfing  and  arguing 
<c  one  with  another,  mew  the  eminence  of  their 
"  parts,  the  fourteen  difcover  things  that  they 
"  never  thought  on,  or  are  cleared  in  diverfe  truths 
"  that  formerly  perplexed  them :  wherefore,  in 
cc  matters  of  common  concernment,  difficulty,  or 
"  danger,  they  hang  upon  their  lips,  as  children 
"  upon  their  fathers ;  and  the  influence  thus  ac- 
"  quired  by  the  fix,  the  eminence  of  whole  parts 
"  are  found  to  be  a  ftay  and  comfort  to  the  four- 
cc  teen,is  the  authority  of  the  fathers — aucloritaspa- 

trum.  Wherefore  this  can  be  no  other  than  a  na- 
"  turd  ariftocracyydiffukd  by  God  throughout  the 
"  whole  body  of  mankind,  to  this  end  and  purpofe ; 

and  therefore  fuch  as  the  people  have  not  only  a 

natural,  but  a  pofitive  obligation  to  make  ufe  of  as 
"  their  guides ;  as  where  the  people  of  Ifrael  are 

commanded  to  take  wife  men,  and  underftanding, 
c  and  known  among  their  tribes,  to  be  made  rulers 

over  them.  The  fix  then  approved  of,  as  in  the 
c  prefent  cafe,  are  the  fenate ;  not  by  hereditary 
c  right,  or  in  regard  to  the  greatnefs  of  their  eftates 

only,  which  would  tend  to  fuch  power  as  would 
c  force  or  draw  the  people ;  but  by  ele&ion  for 

their  excellent  parts,  which  tends  to  the  advance- 

ment  of  the  influence  of  their  virtue  or  authority ; 

that  leads  the  people.  Wherefore  the  office  of 
*  the  fenate  is  not  to  be  commanders,  but  coun- 

"  fellors 


Dr.  Price.  137 

<c  fellors  of  the  people  ;  and  that  which  is  proper 
<c  for  counfellors  is  firft  to  debate,  and  after- 
<c  wards  to  give  advice  in  the  bufinefs  whereon 
"  they  have  debated;  whence  the  decrees  of  the 
<c  fenate  are  never  laws,  nor  fo  called — -fenatus  con- 
"fu/ta;  and  thefe,  being  maturely  framed,  it  is 
(c  their  duty  to  propofe  to  the  people :  wherefore 
cc  the  fenate  is  no  more  than  the  debate  of  the  com- 
cc  monwealth.  But  to  debate  is  to  difcern,  or 
cc  put  a  difference  between  things,  that,  being 
"  alike,  are  not  the  fame  ;  or  it  is  feparating  and 
"  weighing  this  reafon  againft  that,  and  that  reafon 
f:  againft  this  ;  which  is  dividing. 

"  The  fenate  then  having  divided,  who  fhall 
cc  choofe  ?  Afk  the  girls ;  for  if  fhe  that  divided 
"  muft  have  chofen  alfo,  it  had  been  little  worfe 
"  for  the  other,  in  cafe  fhe  had  not  divided  at 
cc  all,  but  kept  the  whole  cake  to  herfelf ;  in  re- 
<c  gard  that,  being  to  choofe  too,  me  divided  ac- 
"  cordingly. 

"  Wherefore,  if  the  fenate  have  any  further 
fc  power  than  to  divide,  the  commonwealth  can 
"  never  be  equal.  But,  in  a  commonwealth  confifling 
"  of  a  Jingle  council,  there  is  no  other  to  choo/e  than 
"  that  which  divided:  whence  it  is,  that  fuch  a 
<c  council  fails  not  to  fcr  amble,  that  is,  to  be  fac- 
cc  tious ;  there  being  no  dividing  of  the  cake,  in 
"  that  cafe,  but  among  themfelves :  nor  is  there  any 
"  other  remedy,  but  to  have  another  council  to  ckoo/e. 
"  The  wifdom  of  the  few  may  be  the  light  of 
<c  mankind;  but  the  interefl  of  the  few  is  not  the 
"  profit  of  mankind,  nor  of  a  commonwealth  : 
"  wherefore,  feeing  we  have  granted  intereft  to  be 
"  reafon,  they  muft  not  choofe,  left  they  put  out 
<f  their  light.  But  as  the  council  dividing  confifts 
"  of  the  wifdom  of  the  commonwealth,  fo  the  af- 

"  fembly 


138  ,  Ancient  Republics,  £fc. 

<c  fembly  or  council  choofing  fhould  confift  of  the 
cc  intereft  of  the  commonwealth ;  as  the  wifdom  of 
"  the  commonwealth  is  in  the  ariftocracy,  fo  the  in- 
"  tereft  of  the  commonwealth  is  in  the  whole  body 
"  of  the  people  :  and  whereas  this,  in  cafe  the 
'c  commonwealth  confifts  of  a  whole  nation,  is  too 
<€  unwieldy  a  body  to  be  aflembled,  this  council  is 
cc  to  confift  of  fuch  a  reprefentative  as  may  be 
"  equal,  and  fo  conftituted  as  it  can  never  contra6l 
cc  any  other  interefl  than  that  of  the  whole  people. 
"  But,  in  the  ptefent  cafe,  the  fix  dividing,  and  the 
"  fourteen  choofing,  mufl  of  neceffity  take  in  the 
"  whole  interefl  of  the  twenty.  Dividing  and 
"  choofing,  in  the  language  of  a  commonwealth,  is 
"  debating  and  refolving ;  and  whatever,  upon  de- 
<f  bate  of  the  fenate,  is  propofed  to  the  people,  and 
"  refolved  by  them,  is  enacled  by  the  authority  of 
"  the  fathers,  and  by  the  power  of  the  people — 
<c  autforitate  patrum  et  jujfu  populi ;  which  con- 
"  curring  make  a  law." 

Upon  thefe  principles,  and  to  eftabliih  a  method 
of  ena&ing  laws  that  muft  of  necetfity  be  wife 
and  equal,  the  people  of  moft  of  the  United  States 
of  America  agreed  upon  that  division  of  the  le- 
giilative  power  into  two  houfes,  the  houie  of  repre- 
fentatives  and  the  fenate,  which  has  given  fo  much 
difguft  to  Mr.  Turgot.  Harrington  will  ihew  us, 
equally  well,  the  propriety  and  neceffity  of  the 
other  branch,  the  governor :  but  before  we  proceed 
to  that,  it  may  be  worth  while  to  obferve  the  fimi- 
litude  between  this  paflage,  and  fome  of  thofe  fenti- 
ments  and  expreffions  of  Swift,  which  were  quoted 
in  a  former  letter;  and  there  is  in  the  Idea  of  a 
Patriot  King,  written  by  his  friend  Lord  Boling- 
broke,  a  paflage  to  the  fame  purpofe,  fo  nobly  ex- 
prefled,  that  I  cannot  forbear  the  pleafure  of  tran- 

fcribing 


Price*  139 

fcribing  it.  cc  It  feems  to  me,  that,  in  order  to 
"  maintain  the  moral  fyftem  of  the  univerfe  at 
"  a  certain  point,  far  below  that  of  ideal  perfec- 
<c  tion  (for  we  are  made  capable  of  conceiving 
"  what  we  are  not  capable  of  attaining),  it  has 
"  pleafed  the  Author  of  Nature  to  mingle,  from 
"  time  to  time,  among  the  focieties  of  men,  a  few, 
"  and  but  a  few  of  thofe  on  whom  he  has  been 
"  graciouily  pleafed  to  confer  a  larger  proportionof 
"  the  etherial  fpirit,  than,  in  the  ordinary  courfe  of 
"  his  providence,  he  beftows  on  the  fons  of  men. 
"  Thefe  are  they  who  engrofs  almoft  the  whole 
cc  reafon  of  the  fpecies.  Born  to  direct,  to  guide, 
cc  and  to  preferve,  if  they  retire  from  the  world 
cc  their  fplendour  accompanies  them,  and  en- 
ce  lightens  even  the  darknefs  of  their  retreat.  If 
cc  they  take  a  part  in  public  life,  the  effect  is  never 
cc  indifferent :  they  either  appear  the  inftruments 
<c  of  divine  vengeance,  and  their  courfe  through  the 
<c  world  is  mariked  by  defolation  and  oppreffion, 
cc  by  poverty  and  fervitude;  or  they  are  the  guar- 
cc  dian  angels  of  the  country  they  inhabit,  ftudi- 
<c  ous  to  avert  the  moft  diftant  evil,  and  to  pro- 
c£  cure  peace,  plenty,  and  the  greateft  of  human 
"  bleffings— liberty." 

If  there  is  then,  in  fociety,  fuch  a  natural  arifto- 
cracy  as  thefe  great  writers  pretend,  and  as  all 
hiftory  and  experience  demonftrate,  formed  partly 
by  genius,  partly  by  birth,  and  partly  by  riches, 
how  lhall  the  legiflator  avail  himfelf'  of  their  in- 
fluence for  the  equal  benefit  of  the  public  ?  and 
how,  on  the  other  hand,  fhall  he  prevent  them  from 
difturbing  the  public  happineis?  I  anfwer,  by  ar- 
ranging them  all,  or  at  leaft  the  moil:  confpicuous 
of  them,  together  in  one  affembly,  by  the  name  of 
a  fen  ate ;  by  feparatmg  them  from  all  pretenfions  to 
VOL.  I.  S  the 


140  Ancient  Republics,  &c. 

the  executive  power,  and  by  controuling,  in  the 
legiflature,  their  ambition  and  avarice,  by  an  a£ 
fembly  of  reprefentatives  on  one  fide,  and  by  the 
executive  authority  on  the  other.  Thus  you  will 
have  the  benefit  of  their  wifdom,  without  fear  of 
their  pafiions.  If  among  them  there  are  fome  of 
Lord  Bolingbroke's  guardian  angels,  there  will  be 
fome  of  his  inftruments  of  divine  vengeance  too: 
the  latter  will  be  here  reftrained  by  a  three-fold 
tie ;  by  the  executive  power,  by  the  reprefentative 
aflembly,  and  by  their  peers  in  the  fenate.  But  if 
thefe  were  all  admitted  into  a  {ingle  popular  aflem- 
bly, the  worft  of  them  might  in  time  obtain  the  af- 
cendency  of  all  the  reft.  In  fuch  a  fingle  aflembly, 
as  has  been  obferved  before,  almoft  the  whole  of 
this  ariftocracy  will  make  its  appearance;  being  re- 
turned members  of  it  by  the  election  of  the  people: 
thefe  will  be  one  clafs.  There  will  be  another  fet 
of  members,  of  middling  rank  and  circumftances, 
who  will  juftly  value  themfelves  upon  their  inde- 
pendence, their  integrity,  and  unbiafled  affection  to 
their  country,  and  will  pique  themfelves  upon  be- 
ing under  no  obligation.  But  there  will  be  a  third 
clals,  every  one  of  whom  will  have  his  leader 
among  the  members  of  the  firft  clafs,  whofe  cha- 
racter he  will  celebrate,  and  whofe  voice  he  will 
follow;  and  this  party,  after  a  courfe  of  time,  will 
be  the  moft  numerous.  The  queftion  then  will  be, 
whether  this  ariftocracy  in  the  houfe  will  unite  or 
divide  ?  and  it  is  too  obvious,  that  deftrudlion  to 
freedom  muft  be  the  confequence  equally  of  their 
union  or  of  their  divifion.  If  they  unite  generally  in 
all  things,  as  much  as  they  certainly  will  in  refpedt- 
ing  each  others  wealth,  birth,  and  parts,  and  con- 
dud  themfelves  with  prudence,  they  will  ftrengthen 
themfelves  by  infenfible  degrees,  by  playing  into 

each 


Dr.  Price-  141 

each  others  hands  more  wealth  and  popularity,  until 
they  become  able  to  govern  elections  as  they  pleafe, 
and  rule  the  people  at  difcretion.  An  independent 
member  will  be  their  averlion ;  all  their  artifices  will 
be  employed  to  deflroy  his  popularity  among  his 
conftituents,  and  bring  in  a  difciple  of  their  own 
in  his  place. 

But  if  they  divide,  each  party  will,  in  a  courfe 
of  time,  have  the  whole  houfe,  and  confequently  ' 
the  wHole  ftate,  divided  into  two  factions,  which  will 
ftruggle  in  words,  in  writing,  and  at  laft  in  arms, 
until  Casfar  or  Pornpey  muftbe  emperor,  and  en- 
tail an  endlefs  line  of  tyrants  on  the  nation.  But 
long  before  this  cataftrophe,  and  indeed  through 
every  fcene  of  the  drama,  the  laws,  inftead  of  being 
permanent,  and  affording  conftant  protection  to  the 
lives,  liberties,  and  properties  of  the  citizens,  will 
be  alternately  the  fport  of  contending  factions,  and 
the  mere  vibrations  of  a  pendulum.  From  the  be- 
ginning to  the  end  it  will  be  a  government  of  men, 
now  of  one  fet,  and  then  of  another ;  but  never  a 
government  of  laws, 


LETTER     XXVII. 
MIXED    GOVERNMENTS. 

MACHIAVEL'S  DISCOURSES  UPON  THE  FIRST 
DECADE  OF  LIVY,     BOOK  I.  C,  2 

My  dear  Sir, 

TH  E  whole  chapter  is  very  much  to  the  pur- 
pofe,  but  the  following  paragraphs   more 
particularly  fo. — According  to  fome  authors,  there 
are  but  three  forts  of  governments,  viz.  monarchy 

or 


14.2  Mixed  Governments* 

or  principality,  ariftocracy,  and  democracy ;  and 
that  thofe  who  intend  to  erect  a  new  ftate,  mufthave 
recourfe  to  fome  one  of  thefe  which  he  likes  beft. 
Others,  and  with  more  judgment,  as  many  think,  fay 
there  are  fix  forts ;  three  of  which  are  very  bad,  and 
the  other  three  good  in  themfelves,  but  liable  to  be 
fo  corrupted  that  they  may  become  the  worft.  The 
three  good  forts  have  been  juft  now  mentioned :  the 
•other  three  proceed  from  thefe;  and  every  one  of 
them  bears  fuch  a  refemblance  to  that  on  which  it 
refpectively  depends,  that  the  tranfition  from  one  to 
the  other  is  fhort  and  eafy ;  for  monarchy  often  de- 
generates into  tyranny,  ariftocracy  into  oligarchy, 
and  democracy  into  licentious  anarchy  and  confu- 
iion :  fo  that  whoever  fets  up  any  one  of  the  former 
three  forts  of  government,  may  allure  himfelf  it  will 
not  be  of  any  lon§|durajion ;  for  no  precaution  will 
be  fufficient  to  prevent  its  falling  into  the  other  that 
is  analogous  to  it,  on  account  of  the  affinity  which 
there  feems  to  be  in  this  cafe  betwixt  virtue  and 
vice,  perfection  and  imperfection. 

This  variety  of  governments  among  mankind  ap- 
pears to  have  been  the  effect  of  chance  :  for  in  the 
beginning  of  the  world,  the  inhabitants  being  few, 
they  fometimes  livedfeparatefrom  each  other,  like 
beafts ;  but  afterwards,  as  they  multiplied,  they 
began  to  unite  for  their  mutual  defence,  and  put 
themielves  under  the  protection  of  fuch  as  were  moil 
eminent  amongft  them  for  courage  and  ftrength, 
whom  they  engaged  to  obey  and  acknowledge  as 
their  chiefs.  Hence  arofe  the  diftinction  betwixt 
honeft  and  dilhoneft,  juft  and  unjuft  :  for  when 
any  one  injured  his  benefactor,  his  ingratitude  ex- 
cited a  fort  of  fellow-feeling  and  indignation  in 
others,  as  well  as  kindnefs  and  refpect  for  thofe 
that  behaved  differently;  and,  as  they  confidered 
f:hat  they  might  fome  time  or  other,  perhaps,  be 

treated 


Mackiavel.  143 

treated  in  the  fame  manner  themfelves,  if  proper 
meafures  were  not  taken  to  prevent  it,  they  thought 
£t  to  make  laws  for  the  reward  of  good  men,  and 
the  punimment  of  offenders.  This  firft  gave  rife 
to  juftice  in  the  world;  and  from  this  confidera- 
tion  it  came  to  pafs,  in  procefs  of  time,  that,  in 
the  ele&ion  of  a  new  chief,  they  had  not  fo  much 
regard  to  courage  and  bodily  ftrength,  as  to  wif- 
dom  and  integrity  :  but  afterwards,  as  this  kind  of 
government  became  gradually  hereditary  inftead 
of  elective,  the  heirs  of  thefe  chieftains  foon  began 
to  degenerate  from  the  virtue  of  their  ancefters,  and 
.to  behave  themfelves  as  if  they  thought  the  main 
duty  of  a  prince  confifted  in  furpaffing  all  other 
men  in  luxury,  extravagance,  effeminacy,  and 
every  fort  of  voluptuoufnefs ;  by  which,  in  a  while, 
they  firft  grew  odious  to  their  fubjects,  and  then  fo 
jealous  for  themfelves,  that  they  were  forced  to  dif- 
trefs  and  cut  off  others  for  their  own  fecurity,and 
at  laft  to  become  downright  tyrants.  This  firft  oc- 
calioned  combinations  and  confpiracies  for  the 
deftrudion  of  princes;  not  amongft  the  weak  and 
punllanimous  part  of  their  fubjecls,  but  among 
fuch  as,  being  more  eminent  for  their  generofity, 
magnanimity,  riches,  and  birth,  could  not  endure 
any  longer  to  lubmit  to  thefe  pitiful  and  oppreffive 
governments. 

The  multitude,therefore,  fwayed  by  the  authority 
of  the  nobles,  rofe  in  arms  againft  their  prince ;  and 
being  freed  from  his  yoke,  transferred  their  alle- 
giance to  their  deliverers,  who,  being  thoroughly 
difgufted  at  monarchy,  changed  the  form  of  govern- 
ment, and  took  it  into  their  own  hands:  after 
which  they  conducted  both  themfelves  and  the 
ftate  acccording  to  the  plan  they  had  formed,  pre- 
ferring the  common  good  to  any  particular  advan- 
tage; and  behaving,  in  private  as  well  as  public 

affairs, 


144 


Mixed  Governments. 


affairs,  with  affiduity  and  moderation;    whilft  the 
remembrance  of  their  paft  fufferings  continued  frefti 
upon  their  minds.     But  this  authority  afterwards 
devolving  upon  their  fons,  who  had  not  feen  thefe 
changes,  nor  experienced  the  miferies  of  tyranny, 
they  began  to  grow  fo  dhTatisfied  with  that  fort  of 
civil  equality,   that  they  caft  off  all  reflraint,  and 
giving  themfelves  up  to  rapine,  ambition,  and  luft, 
foon  changed  the  government  again  from  arifto- 
cracy  into  an  oligarchy.  Their  adminiftration,  how- 
ever, becoming  as  infupportable,  in  a  while,  as  the 
tyranny  of  the  other  had  formerly  been,  the  people 
naturally  began  to  look  out  for  fome  deliverer; 
and,  having  fixed  upon  a  leader,  they  put  them- 
felves under  his  banners,  and  eftablifhed  oligarchy. 
But  when  they  had  done  this,  and  came  to  reflect 
upon  the  oppreffionsj;hey  fuftained  under  a  tyrant, 
they  refolved  never  to  be  again  governed  by  any 
one  man,  and  therefore  agreed  to  fet  up  a  popular 
government ;  which  was  conflituted  in  fuch  a  man- 
ner, that  the  chief  authority  was  not  veiled  either 
in  a  prince  or  in  a  junto  of  the  nobility. 

Now,  as  all  new  eftablimments  are  held  in  fome 
degree  of  reverence  and  veneration  at  firfl,  this 
form  fubfifted  for  fome  time ;  though  no  longer 
than  thole  people  lived,who  had  been  the  founders 
of  it :  for,  after  their  death,  their  defcendants  dege- 
nerated into  licentioufnels,  and  fuch  a  contempt  for 
all  authority  and  diftinclion,  that,  every  man  living 
after  his  own  caprice,  there  was  nothing  to  be  feen 
but  confufion  and  violence :  fo  that,  either  by  the 
advice  of  fome  good  and  refpeclable  man  or  com- 
pelled by  the  abfolute  neceflity  of  providing  a  re- 
medy for  thefe  diforders  and  enormities,  they  at 
lait  determined  once  more  to  fubmit  to  the  domi- 
nion of  one :  from  which  ftate  they  fell  again  in 
time,  through  the  fame  .gradations,  and  from  the 

above- 


MachiaveL 

abovementioned  caufes,  into  mifrule  and  licenti- 
oufnefs.  Such  is  the  rotation  to  which  all  ftates 
are  fubjecT:;  neverthelefs  they  cannot  often  revert 
to  the  fame  kind  of  government,  becaufe  it  is 
not  poffible  that  they  Ihould  fo  long  exift  as  to 
undergo  many  of  thefe  mutations :  for  it  frequent- 
ly happens,  that  when  a  ftate  is  labouring  under 
fuch  convulfions,  and  is  deftitute  both  of  ftrength 
and  counfel,  it  falls  a  prey  to  fome  other  neigh- 
bouring community  or  nation  that  is  better  go- 
verned ;  otherwife  it  might  pafs  through  the  feve- 
ral  abovementioned  revolutions  again  and  again 
to  infinity. 

All  thefe  forts  of  government  then,  in  my  opi- 
nion, are  infirm  and  infecure;  the  three  former 
from  the  ufual  fhortnefs  of  their  duration,  and 
the  three  latter  from  the  malignity  of  their  own 
principles.  Thewifeft  legifiators,  therefore,  being 
aware  of  thefe  defects,  never  eftablifhed  any  one 
of  them  in  particular,  but  contrived  another  that 
partakes  of  them  all,  confiding  of  a  prince, lords, 
and  commons,  which  they  looked  upon  as  more 
firm  and  liable,  becaufe  every  one  of  thefe  mem- 
bers would  be  a  check  upon  the  other;  and  of 
thofe  legiflators,  Lycurgus  certainly  merits  the 
higheft  praife,  who  constituted  an  eftablimment  of 
this  kind  at  Sparta,  which  lafted  above  eight  hun- 
dred years,  to  his  own  great  honour,  as  well  as 
the  tranquillity  of  the  citizens. 

Very  different  was  the  fate  of  the  government 
eftablilhed  by  Solon  at  Athens,  which,  being  a 
iimple  democracy  only,  was  of  fo  fhort  continu- 
ance, that  it  gave  way  to  the  tyranny  of  Pifif- 
tratus,  before  the  death  of  the  legiflator:  and 
though,  indeed,  the  heirs  of  that  tyrant  were  ex- 
pelled about  forty  years  after,  and  the  Athenians 
not  only  recovered  their  liberty,  but  re-eftablim- 

ed 


146  Mixed  Governments. 

ed  Solon's  laws  and  plan  of  government,  yet  they 
did  not  maintain  it  above  one  hundred  years,  not- 
withftanding  they  made  feveral  new  regulations 
to  reflrain  the  infolence  of  the  nobles,  and  the 
licentioufhefs  of  the  commons ;  the  neceflity  of 
which  Solon  had  not  forefeen  :  fo  that  for  want 
of  tempering  his  democracy  with  a  ihare  of 
ariftocracy,  and  princely  power,  it  was  of  moit 
duration  in  comparifon  of  the  conftitution  of 
Sparta. 

But  to  return  to  Rome. — Though  that  city  had 
not  a  Lycurgus  to  model  its  conftitution  at  firft, 
in  fuch  a  manner  as  might  preferve  -its  liberty 
for  a  long  courfe  of  time ;  yet  fo  many  were  the 
accidents  which  happened  in  the  contefls  betwixt 
the  patricians  and  plebeians,  that  chance  ef- 
fected, what  the  lawgiver  had  not  provided  for : 
fo  that  if  it  was  not  perfect  at  the  beginning,  it 
became  fo  after  a  while ;  for  though  the  firft  laws 
were  deficient,  yet  they  were  neither  incapable  of 
amendment,  nor  repugnant  to  its  future  perfec- 
tion ;  fince  not  only  Romulus,  but  all  the  reft  of 
the  kings  that  fucceeded  him,  made  feveral  good 
alterations  in  them,  and  fuch  as  were  well  calcu- 
lated for  the  fupport  of  liberty.  But,  as  it  was 
their  intention  to  found  a  monarchy,  and  not  a 
republic ;  when  that  city  had  fhaken  off  the  yoke 
of  a  tyrant,  there  feemed  to  be  many  provifions 
ftill  wanting  for  the  further  maintenance  of  its 
freedom.  And  notwithstanding  tyranny  was  at 
laft  eradicated,  by  the  ways  and  means  above- 
mentioned,  yet  thofe  who  had  chiefly  contributed 
to  it,  created  two  confuls  to  fupply  the  place  of 
royalty;  by  which  it  came  to  pafs,  that  the  name 
alone,  and  not  the  authority,  of  princes  was  ex- 
tinguifhed:  fo  that  the  fupreme  power  being- 
lodged  only  in  the  confuls  and  fenate,  the  govern- 
ment 


MachiavsL  147 

merit  confifted  of  no  more  than  two  of  the  three 
eftates,  which  we  have  fpoken  of  before,  that  is, 
of  royalty  and  ariftocracy :  it  remained,  therefore, 
ftill  necefTary  to  admit  the  people  inio  fome  mare 
of  the  government :  and  the  patricians  growing 
fo  infolent  in  time  (as  I  mall  mew  hereafter)  that 
the  plebeians  could  no  longer  endure  it,  the  lat- 
ter took  arms,  and  obliged  them  to  relinquifh 
part  of  their  authority,  left  they  mould  lofe  the 
whole :  on  the  other  hand,  the  confuls  and  fena- 
tors  ftill  retained  fo  much  power  in  the  common- 
wealth, as  enabled  them  to  fupport  their  rank  and 
dignity  with  honour.  This  ftruggle  gave  birth  to 
certain  officers,  called  tribunes  of  the  people ;  af- 
ter the  creation  of  whom,  that  ftate  became  more 
firm  and  compact,  every  one  of  the  three  degrees 
abovementioned  having  its  proper  fhare  in  the  go- 
vernment ;  and  fo  propitious  was  fortune  to  it, 
that  although  it  was  changed  from  a  monarchy  in- 
to an  ariftocracy,  and  afterwards  into  a  democracy, 
by  the  fteps  and  for  the  reafons  already  affigned, 
yet  the  royal  power  was  never  entirely  abolifhed 
and  gHBen  to  the  patricians,  nor  that  of  the  patri- 
cians wholly  to  the  plebeians  :  on  the  contrary, 
the  authority  of  the  three  eftates  bqing  duly  pro- 
portioned and  mixed  together,  gave  it  the  higheft 
degree  of  perfection  that  any  commonwealth  is  ca- 
pable of  attaining  to  ; — and  this  was  owing  in  a 
great  meafure,  if  not  altogether,  to  the  difTentions 
that  happened  betwixt  the  patricians  and  ple- 
beians, as  fhall  be  fhewn  more  at  large  in  the  fol- 
lowing chapters. 


VOL.  I.  T  LETTER 


148         Mixed  or  compofed  Governments. 
t 

LETTER     XXVII. 

V"       v  '*'•         *       ' 

MIXED  OR  COMPOSED   GOVERNMENTS. 

SIDNEY,    PAGE    22,    §    IO, 

Dear  Sir, 

SOME  fmall  numbers  of  men,  living  within 
the  precin&s  of  one  city,  have,  as  it  were, 
caft  into  a  common  flock,  the  right  which  they 
had  of  governing  themfelves  and  children,  and 
by  common  confent,  joining  in  one  body,  exercifed 
fuch  power  over  every  fingle  perfon  as  feemed 
beneficial  to  the  whole ;  and  this  men  call  perfect 
democracy.  Others  chofe  rather  to  be  governed 
by  a  felect  number  of  fuch  as  moft  excelled  in 
wifdom  and  virtue ;  and  this,  according  to  the 
lignification  of  the  word,  was  called  ariftocracy. 
When  one  man  excelled  all  others,  the 'govern- 
ment was  put  into  his  hands,  under  the  name  of 
monarchy.  But  the  wifelr,  belt,  and  by  far  the 
greateft  part  of  mankind,  rejecting  thele  fimple 
fpecies,  did  form  governments  mixed  or  compofed 
of  the  three,  as  mall  be  proved  hereafter,  which 
commonly  received  their  refpe&ive  denomination 
from  the  part  that  prevailed,  and  did  receive  praiie 
or  blame,  as  they  were  well  or  ill  proportioned. 

Sidney,  p.  138,  §  16.  The  belt  governments 
of  the  world  have  been  compofed  of  monarchy, 
ariftocracy,  and  democracy. 

As  for  democracy,  I  believe  it  can  fuit  only 
with  the  convenience  of  a  fmall  town,  accom- 
panied with  fuch  circumftances  as  are  feldom 

found. 


Sidney.  149 

found.  But  this  no  way  obliges  men  to  run  into 
the  other  extreme,  in  as  much  as  the  variety  of 
forms,  between  mere  democracy  and  abfolute  mo- 
narchy, is  almoft  infinite.  And  if  I  fhould  underv 
take  to  fay,  there  never  was  a  good  government 
in  the  world,  that  did  not  confift  of  the  thre$ 
fimple  fpecies  of  monarchy,  ariftocracy,  and  demo4 
cracy,  I  think  I  may  make  it  good.  This  at  the 
leaft  is  certain,  that  the  government  of  the  He-' 
brews,  inftituted  by  God,  had  a  judge,  the  great 
Sanhedrim,  and  general  afTemblies  of  the  people. 
Sparta  had  two  kings,  a  fen  ate  of  twenty-eight 
chofen  men,  and  the  like  afifemblies.  All  the 
Dorian  cities  had  a  chief  magiftrate,  a  fenate, 
and  occaiional  afTemblies.  The  cities  of  Ionia, 
Athens  and  others,  had  an  Archon,  the  Areo- 
pagitae,  &c.  and  all  judgments  concerning 
matters  of  the  greateft  importance,  as  well  as* 
the  ele&ion  of  magiftrates,  were  referred  to  the 
people.  Rome,  in  the  beginning,  toad  a  king  and  a 
fenate,  while  the  election  of  kings,' ii-nd  judgments 
upon  appeals,  remained  in  the  people;  afterwards, 
confuls  reprefenting  kings,  and  vetted  with  equal 
power,  a  more  numerous  fenate,  and  more  fre- 
quent meetings  of  the  people.  Venice  has  at  this 
day,  a  duke,  the  fenate  of  the  pregadi,  and  the 
great  aflembly  of  the  nobility,  which  is  the  whole 
city;  the  reft  of  the  inhabitants  being  only  incolae, 
not  cives  ;  arid  thofe  of  the  other  cities  or  coun- 
tries are  their  fubjects,  and  do  not  participate  in 
the  government. 

Genoa  is  governed  in  like  manner :  Lucca  not 
unlike  to  them.  Germany  is  at  this  day  governed 
by  an  emperor,  the  princes  or  great  lords  in  their 
feveral  precincts;  the  cities  by  their  own  magif- 
trates ;  and  by  general  diets,  in  which  the  whole 
power  of  the  nation  refides,  and  where  the  empe- 
ror, 


Mixed  or  competed  Governments. 

ror,  princes,  nobility,  and  cities  have  their  places 
in  perfon,  or  by  their  deputies.  All  the  northern 
nations  which,  upon  the  dhTolution  of  the  Roman 
empire,  pofTefled  thebeft  provinces  that  had  com- 
pofed  it,  were  under  that  form,  which  is  ufually 
called  the  Gothick  polity.  They  had  king,  lords, 
commons,  diets,*  affemblies  of  eftates,  cortes,  and 
parliaments,  in  which  the  fovereign  powers  of 
thofe  nations  did  refide,  and  by  which  they  were 
exercifed.  The  like  was  praftifed  in  Hungary, 
Bohemia,  Sweden,  Denmark,  Poland  :  and,  if 
things  are  changed  in  fome  of  thofe  places 
within  thefe  few  years,  they  mufl  give  better 
proofs  of  having  gained  by  the  change,  than  are 
yet  feen  in  the  world,  before  I  think  rnyfelf  obligr 
ed  to  change  my  opinion. 

Some  nations,  not  liking  the  name  of  king, 
•have  given  fuch  a  power  as  kings  enjoyed  in  other 
places  to  one  or  more  magiftrates,  either  limited 
to  a  certain  tirrie,  or  left  to  be  perpetual,  as  beft 
pleafed  themselves :  others,  approving  the  name, 
made  the  dignity  purely  elective.  Some  have  in 
their  elections  principally  regarded  one  family  as 
long  as  it  lafted :  others  confidered  nothing  but 
the  fitnefs  of  the  perfon,  and  referved  to  themielves 
a  liberty  of  taking  where  they  pleafed,  Some 
have  permitted  the  crown  to  be  hereditary  as  to 
its  ordinary  courfe;  but  reftrained  the  power,  and 
inftituted  officers  to  infpect  the  proceedings  of 
kings,  and  to  take  care  that  the  laws  were  not 
violated.  Of  this  fort  W7ere  the  Ephori  of  Sparta, 
theMaires  du  Palais,  and  afterwards  the  conftable 
of  France,  the  jufticiar  in  Arragon,  the  reichs- 
hofmeeter  in  Denmark,  the  high  fteward  in  Eng- 
land :  and  in  all  places,  fuch  affernblies  as  are  be- 
forementioned  under  feveral  names,  who  had  the 
power  of  the  whole  nation,  &e*>usri 

Sidney, 


Sidneys  -v>'  151 

Sidney,  p.  147.  §  18.  It  is  confeffed,  that  a 
pure  democracy  can  never  be  good,  utilefs  for  a 
fmall  town,  &c. 

Sidney,  p.  160.  §  19.  As  to  popular  govern- 
ment in  the  ftri&eft  fenfe,  that  is,  pure  democra- 
cy, where  the  people  in  themfelves,  and  by  them- 
felves,  perform  all  that  belongs  to  government,  I 
know  of  no  fuch  thing;  and,  if  it  be  in  the  world, 
have  nothing  to  fay  for  it. 

Sidney,  p.  161.  If  it  be  faid,  that  thofe  govern- 
ments, in  which  the  democratical  part  governs 
moil,  do  more  frequently  err  in  the  choice  of 
men,  or  the  means  of  preferving  that  purity  of 
manners  which  is  required  for  the  well-being  of 
a  people,  than  thofe  wherein  ariftocracy  prevails, 
I  confefs  itj  and  that  in  Rome  and  Athens,  the 
beft  and  wifeil  men  did  for  the  moil  part  incline 
to  ariftocracy.  Xenophon,  Plato,  Ariftotle,  Thu- 
cydides,  Livy,  Tacitus,  Cicero,  and  others,  were 
of  this  fort.  But  if  our  author  there  feek  pa- 
trons for  his  abfolute  monarchy,  he  will  find 
none  but  Phalaris,  Agathocles,  Dionylius,  Ca- 
tiline, Cethegus,  Lentulus,  with  the  corrupted 
crew  of  mercenary  rafcals  who  did,  or  endea- 
voured to  fet  them  up  :  thefe  are  they,  quibus  ex 
honefto  nulla  eft  fpes  :  they  abhor  the  dominion  of 
the  law,  becaufe  it  curbs  their  vices,  and  make 
themfelves  fubfervient  to  the  lufts  of  a  man  who 
may  nourifh  them. 

Sidney,  p.  165.  §  21.  Being  no  way  concern- 
ed in  the  defence  of  democracy,  &c.  I  may  leave 
our  knight,  like  Don  Quixote,  fighting  againft 
the  phantafms  of  his  own  brain,  and  faying  what 
he  pleafes  againft  fuch  governments  as  never  were, 
unlefs  in  fuch  a  place  as  St.  Marino,  near  Sini- 
glaglia  in  Italy,  where  a  hundred  clowns  govern 

a  bar- 


2  £2         Mixed  or  comfofed  Governments. 

a  barbarous  rock  that  no  man  invades,  and  relates 
nothing  to  our  queflion.  The  republic  of  St. 
Marino,  next  to  that  of  Millingen  in  Switzerland, 
is  the  fmalleft  republic  in  Europe.  The  limits  of 
it  extend  no  farther  than  the  bafe  of  the  moun- 
tain on  which  it  is  feated.  Its  inlignificance  is 
its  fecurity.  No  neighbouring  prince  ever  thought 
it  worth  his  while  to  deftroy  the  independency 
of  fuch  a  Beehive.  See  Blainville's  travels,  vol. 
ii.  p.  227.  Addifon's  Remarks  on  feveral  parts 
of  Italy. 

Sidney,  p.  2.158.  However,  more  ignorance 
cannot  be  exprefled,  than  by  giving  the  name  of 
democracy  to  thofe  governments  that  are  com- 
pofed  of  the  three  fimple  fpecies,  as  we  have 
proved  that  all  the  good  ones  have  ever  been : 
for,  in  a  ftricl:  fenfe/it  can  only  fuit  with  thofe 
where  the  people  retain  to  themfelves  the  admini- 
flration  of  the  fupreme  power ;  and  more  largely, 
when  the  popular  part,  as  in  Athens,  greatly  over- 
balances the  other  two,  and  the  denomination  is 
taken  from  the  prevailing  part* 


'£7,'  Oil  Ml 


LETTER 


Montefquicu*  153 

LETTER    XXVIII. 

MIXED   GOVERNMENTS. 

'  •  i;:>k  :i  t  v    '  :•••'.  7   i  M^v/iJI' ?  •' .  ?ylK^F'j. 

MONTESQJJIEU,    SPIRIT    OF    LAWS,    B.  II.    C.  VL 
OF    THE    CONSTITUTION    OF    ENGLAND. 


My  dear  Sir, 

IN  every  government  there  are  three  forts  of 
power;  the  legiflative,  the  executive  in  refpe& 
of  things  dependent  on  the  law  of  nations,  and 
the  executive  in  regard  to  things  that  depend  on 
the  civil  law. 

By  virtue  of  the  firft  (i.  e.  the  legiflative  power), 
the  prince  or  magiftrate  enads  temporary  or  per- 
petual laws,  and  amends  or  abrogates  thofe  that 
have  been  already  ena&ed.  By  the  fecond,  he 
makes  peace  or  war,  fends  or  receives  embaf- 
iies,  eftablifhes  the  public  fecurity,  and  provides 
againft  invaiions.  By  the  third,  he  punifhes  cri- 
minals, or  determines  the  difputes  that  arife  be- 
tween individuals.  The  latter  we  fhall  call  the 
judiciary  power,  and  the  other  limply  the  execu- 
tive power  of  the  ftate. 

The  political  liberty  of  the  citizen,  is  a  tran- 
quillity of  mind,  ariiing  from  the  opinion  each 
perfon  has  of  his  fafety.  In  order  to  have  thi& 
liberty,  it  is  requiiite  the  government  be  fo  con- 
ftituted,  as  that  one  citizen  need  not  be  afraid  of 
another  citizen. 

When  the  legiflative  and  executive  powers  are  j 
united  in  the  fame  perfon,  or  in  the  fame  body  of  / 
magiftrates,  there  can  be  no  liberty ;  becaufe  \ 
appreheniions  may  arife,  left  the  fame  monarch  or  \ 
lenate,  or  the  fame  fenate  fhould  ena&  tyran- 
nical 


154  Mixed  Governments. 

meal  laws,  to  execute  them  in  a  tyrannical  man* 
ner. 

Again,  there  is  no  liberty,  if  the  power  of 
judging  be  not  feparated  from  the  legiflative  and 
executive  powers :  were  it  joined  with  the  legifla- 
tive, the  life  and  liberty  of  the  citizens  would  be 
expofed  to  arbitrary  controul ;  for  the  judge 
would  then  be  legiflator :  were  it  joined  to  the 
executive  power,  the  judge  might  behave  with 
all  the  violence  of  an  oppreffor. 

There  would  be  an  end  of  everything  (tout 
feroit perdu)  were  the  fame  man,  or  the  fame  body, 
whether  of  princes,  of  the  nobles,  or  of  jhe  people, 
to  exercife  thofe  three  powers;  that  of  ena&ing 
laws,  that  of  executing  the  public  refoiutions> 
and  that  of  judging  the  crimes  or  differences  of 
individuals. 

Moft  kingdoms  in  Europe  enjoy  a  moderate 
government,  becaufe  the  prince,  who  is  inverted 
with  the  two  firft  powers,  leaves  the  third  to  his 
fubje&s.  In  Turkey,  where  thefe  three  powers 
are  united  in  the  fultan's  perfon,  the  fubjecls 
groan  under  the  weight  of  a  moft  frightful  oppref- 
lion.  In  the  republics  of  Italy,  where  thefe  three 
powers  are  united,  there  is  lefs  liberty  than  in  our 
monarchies.  Hence  their  government  is  obliged 
to  have  recourfe  to  as  violent  methods  for  its 
fupport,  as  even  that  of  the  Turks ;  witnefs  the 
ftate  inquiiitors  at  Venice,  and  the  lion's  mouth, 
into  which  every  informer  may  at  all  hours  throw 
his  written  accufations :  what  a  fituation  muft  the 
poor  citizen  be  in  under  thofe  poor  republics ! 
The  fame  body  of  magiftrates  are  poffeffed,  as 
executors  of  the  laws,  of  the  whole  power  they 
have  given  themfelves  in  quality  of  legiflators. 
They  might  plunder  the  ftate  by  their  general 
determinations;  and  "as  they  have  likewife  the 
judiciary  power  in  their  hands,  every  private 

citizen 


MonUfquieu.  155 

citizen  may  be  ruined  by  their  particular  deci- 
iions.  The  whole  power  is  here  united  in  one 
body;  and  though  there  is  no  external  pomp  that 
indicate^  a  defpotic  fway,  yet  the  people  feel  the 
effe&s  of  it  every  moment. 

Hence  it  is,  that  many  of  the  princes  of  Europe, 
whofe  aim  has  been  levelled  at  arbitrary  power, 
have  conftantly  fet  out  with  uniting  in  their  Own 
perfons  all  the  branches  of  magiftracy,  and  all 
the  great  offices  of  ftate. 

I  allow,  indeed,  that  the  mere  hereditary  arif- 
tocracy  of  the  Italian  republics,  does  not  anfwer 
exadly  to  the  defpotic  power  of  the  eaftern 
princes.  The  number  of  magiftr^tes  fometimes 
foftens  the  power  of  the  magiftracy ;  the  whole 
body  of  the  nobles  do  not  always  concur  in  the 
fame  defigns ;  and  different  tribunals  are  ere&ed 
that  temper  each  other.  Thus,  at  Venice,  the 
legiflative  power  is  in  the  council,  the  executive 
in  the  pregadi,  and  the  judiciary  in  the  quarantina. 
But  the  mifchief  is,  that  thefe  different  tribunals 
are  compofed  of  magiftrates  all  belonging  to  the 
fame  body ;  which  conftitutes  almoft  one  and  the 
fame  power. 

The  judiciary  power  ought  not  to  be  given  to 
a  {landing  fenate;  it  fhould  be  exercifed  by  per- 
fons taken  from  the  body  of  the  people,  as  at 
Athens,  at  certain  times  of  the  year,  and  pur- 
fuant  to  a  form  and  manner  prefcribed  by  law,  in 
order  to  ere6l  a  tribunal  that  fhould  laft  only  as 
long  as  neceffity  requires. 

By  this  means  the  power  of  judging,  a  power 
fo  terrible  to  mankind,  not  being  annexed  to  any 
particular  ftate  or  profeffion,  becomes,  as  it  were, 
invifible.  People  have  not  then  the  judges  con- 
tinually prefent  to  their  view :  they  fear  the  office, 
but  not  the  magiftrate. 

VOL.  I.  U  In 


156  Mixed  Governments* 

In  accufations  of  a  deep  or  criminal  nature,  it  is 
properthe  perfon  accufed  fhould  have  the  privilege 
of  choofmg,  in  fome  meafure,  his  judges,  in  con- 
currence with  the  law  ?  or,  at  leaft  he  fhould  have 
a  right  to  except  againft  fo  great  a  number,  that 
the  remaining  part  maybe  deemed  his  own  choice. 
The  other  two  powers  may  be  given  rather  to 
magiftrates  or  permanent  bodies,  becaufe  they  are 
not  exercifed  on  any  private  fubjedl ;  one  being  no 
more  than  the  general  will  of  the  ftate,  and  the 
other  the  execution  of  that  general  will. 

But  though  the  tribunals  ought  not  to  be  fixed, 
yet  the  judgments  ought,  and  to  fuch  a  degree  as 
to  be  always  f  conformable  to  the  exact  letter  of 
the  law.  Were  they  to  be  the  private  opinion  of 
the  judge,  people  would  then  live  in  fociety  with- 
out knowing  exactly  the  obligations  it  lays  them 
under* 

The  judges  ought  likewife  to  be  in  the  fame 
ftation  as  the  accufed,  or,  in  other  words,  his 
peers,  to  the  end  that  he  may  not  imagine  he  is 
fallen  into  the  hands  of  peribns  inclined  to  treat 
him  with  rigour. 

If  the  legiflative  leaves  the  executive  power  in 
pofleffion  of  a  right  to  imprifon  thofe  fubje&s  who 
can  give  fecurity  for  their  good  behaviour,  there 
is  an  end  of  liberty ;  unlefs  they  are  taken  up, 
in  order  to  anfwer,  without  delay,  to  a  capital 
crime;  in  this  cafe  they  are  really  free,  being  lub- 
jecl  only  to  the  power  of  the  law. 

But  fhould  the  legiflature  think  itfelf  in  danger, 
by  fome  fecret  conipiracy  againft  the  ftate,  or  by 
a  correfpondence  with  a  foreign  enemy,  it  might 
authorife  the  executive  power,  for  a  fhort  and 
limited  time,  to  imprifon  fufpected  perfons;  who, 
in  that  cafe,  would  loie  their  liberty  only  for  a 
while,  to  preferve  it  for  ever.  And  this  is  the 

only 


Montefquieu.  157 

only  reafonable  method  that  can  be  fubftituted 
to  the  tyrannical  magiftracy  of  the  Ephori,  and 
to  the  ftate  inquifhors  of  Venice,  who  are  alfo 
defpotical. 

As,  in  a  free  ftate,  every  man  who  is  fuppofed  a 
free  agent,  ought  to  be  his  own  governor ;  fo  the 
legiflative  power  fhould  refide  in  the  whole  body 
of  the  people.  But  iince  this  is  impoflible  in 
large  ftates,  and  in  fmall  ones  is  fubje&  to  many 
inconveniencies ;  it  is  fit  the  people  fhould  exe- 
cute by  their  reprefentatives,  what  they  cannot 
execute  by  themfelves. 

The  inhabitants  of  a  particular  town  are  much 
better  acquainted  with  its  wants  and  interefts, 
than  with  thofe  of  other  places ;  and  are  better 
judges  of  the  capacity  of  their  neighbours,  than 
of  that  of  the  reft  of  their  countrymen.  The 
members  therefore  of  the  legiflauire  mould  not 
be  chofen  from  the  general  body  of  the  nation ; 
but  it  is  proper,  that  in  every  confiderable  place, 
a  reprefentative  fhould  be  elected  by  the  inhabi- 
tants. 

The  great  advantage  of  reprefentatives,  is 
their  being  capable  of  difcuffing  affairs ;  for  this 
the  people  colle&ively  are  extremely  unfit,  which 
is  one  of  the  greateft  inconveniencies  of  a  demo- 
cracy. 

It  is  not  at  all  neceffary  that  the  reprefentatives, 
who  have  received  a  general  inftru&ion  from  their 
electors,  fhould  wait  to  be  particularly  inftrucled 
on  every  affair,  as  is  pradifed  in  the  diets  of 
Germany.  True  it  is,  that  by  this  way  of  pro- 
ceeding, the  fpeeches  of  the  deputies  might  with 
greater  propriety  be  called  the  voice  of  the  na- 
tion :  but,  on  the  other  hand,  this  wrould  throw 
them  into  infinite  delays ;  would  give  each  de- 
puty a  power  of  controuling  the  affembly;  and 

on 


158          Ancient  Republics,  and  Opinions 

on  the  moft  urgent  and  preffing  occafions,  the 
fprings  of  the  nation  might  be  flopped  by  a  fingle 
caprice. 


LETTER    XXIX. 

ANCIENT  REPUBLICS,   AND  OPINIONS 
OF  PHILOSOPHERS. 

My  dear  Sir, 

IN  fearching  for  the  principles  of  government, 
we  may  divide  them  into  two  kinds :  the  prin- 
ciples of  authority,  and  the  principles  of  power. 
The  firft  are  virtues  of  the  mind  and  heart,  fuch 
as  wifdom,  prudence,  courage,  patience,  tempe- 
rance, juftice,  &c.  :  the  fecond  are  the  goods  of 
fortune,  fuch  as  riches,  extradlion,  knowledge, 
and  reputation.  I  rank  knowledge  among  the 
goods  of  fortune,  becaufe  it  is  the  erTeft  of  edu- 
cation, fhidy,  and  travel,  which  are  either  acci- 
dents, or  ufual  efife&s  of  riches  or  birth,  and  is  by 
no  means  neceflfarily  connected  with  wifdom  or 
virtue :  but,  as  it  is  univerfally  admired  and  re- 
fpe&ed  by  the  people,  it  is  clearly  a  principle  of 
power.  The  fame  may  be  faid  of  reputation, 
which,  abftra&ed  from  all  coniideration  whether 
it  is  merited  or  not,  well  or  ill  founded,  is  ano- 
ther fource  of  power. 

Riches  will  hold  the  firft  place,  in  civilized 
focieties  at  leaft,  among  the  principles  of  power, 
and  will  often  prevail  not  only  over  all  the  prin- 
ciples of  authority,  but  over  all  the  advantages  of 
by;th,  knowledge,  and  fame.  Fox,  as  Harrington 

fays, 


of  Philofophers.  159 

fays,  "  Men  are  hung  upon  riches,  not  of  choice 
as  upon  the  other,  but  of  neceffity  and  by  the 
teeth :  for  as  much  as  he  who  wants  bread,  is  his 
fervant  that  will  feed  him ;  and  if  a  man  thus 
feeds  a  whole  people,  they  are  under  his  empire." 
It  already  appears,  that  there  muft  be  in  every 
fociety  of  men,  fuperiors  and  inferiors,  becaufe 
God  has  laid  in  the  conftitution  and  courfe  of  na- 
ture the  foundations  of  the  diftin&ion.  And  in- 
deed, as  Harrington  fays,  "  an  army  may  as  well 
connft  of  foldiers  without  officers,  or  of  officers 
without  foldiers,  as  a  commonwealth  confifl  of  a 
people  without  a  gentry,  or  of  a  gentry  without  a 
people." 

"  Let  ftates  take  heed,"  fays  Lord  Bacon,  "how 
their  nobility  and  gentlemen  multiply  too  faft,  for 
that  makes  the  common  fubject  grow  to  be  a  pea- 
fant  and  bafe  fwain  driven  out  of  heart,  and  in  ef- 
fect but  a  gentleman's  labourer.  How  ihall  the 
plow  then  be  kept  in  the  hands  of  the  owners,  and 
not  mere  hirelings  ?  how  ihall  the  country  attain  to 
the  character  which  Virgil  gives  of  ancient  Italy, 
Terra poUns armis,  atqtie  ubere  glebal  how,  but  by 
the  balance  of  dominion  or  property  ?" 

Notwithftanding  Mr.  Turgot's  averfion  to  ba- 
lances, Harrington  difcovered,  and  made  out,  as 
Toland  his  biographer  informs  us,  that  "  empire 
follows  the  balance  of  property,  whether  lodged 
in  one,  a  few,  or  many  hands."  A  noble  difco- 
very,  of  which  the  honour  folely  belongs  to  him, 
as  much  as  the  circulation  of  the  blood  to 
Harvey,  printing  to  Laurence  Cofter,  or  of  guns, 
compaffes,  or  optic  glafles  to  the  feveral  authors. 
Jf  this  balance  is  not  the  foundation  of  all  poli- 
tics, as  Toland  afferts,  it  is  of  fo  much  import- 
that  no  man  can  be  thought  a  mailer  of  the 

fubjed 


l6o         Ancient  Republics,  and  Opinions 

fubje&,   without  having  well  weighed  it.      Mr. 
Turgot,  it  is  plain,  had  not  the  leaft  idea  of  it. 

"  Tillage,"  fays  Harrington,  "  bringing  up  a 
good  foldiery,  brings  up  a  good  commonwealth  : 
for  where  the  owner  of  the  plow  comes  to  have  the 
fword  too,  he  will  ufe  it  in  defence  of  his  own. 
Whence  it  has  happened,  that  the  people  of  Eng- 
land, in  proportion  to  their  property,  have  been 
always  free,  and  the  genius  of  this  nation  has  ever 
had  fome  refemblance  with  that  of  ancient  Italy, 
which  was  wholly  addi&ed  to  commonwealths, 
and  where  Rome  came  to  make  the  greatefl  ac- 
count of  her  ruftic  tribes,  and  to  call  her  confuls 
from  the  plow :  for  in  the  way  of  parliaments, 
which  was  the  government  of  this  realm,  men  of 
country  lives  have  been  ftill  entrufted  with  the 
greateft  affairs,  and  the  people  have  conftantly 
had  an  averfion  to  the  ways  of  the  court.  Ambi- 
tion loving  to  be  gay  and  to  fawn,  has  been  a 
gallantry  looked  upon  as  having  fomething  in  it 
of  the  livery ;  and  hufbandry,  or  the  country  way 
of  life,  though  of  a  grofier  fpinning,  as  the  beft 
fluff  of  a  commonwealth,  according  to  Ariftotle  ; 
fuch  a  one,  being  the  moft  obftinate  afTertrefs  of 
her  liberty,  and  the  leaft  fubjedt  to  innovation  or 
turbulency.  Commonwealths,  upon  which  the 
city  life  has  had  the  greateft  influence,  as  Athens, 
have  feldom  or  never  been  quiet :  but  at  beft  are 
found  to  have  injured  their  own  buiinefs  by  over- 
doing it.  Whence  the  Urban  tribes  of  Rome,  con- 
fifting  of  the  turba  foreufis  and  Jibertinus,  that  had 
received  their  freedom  by  manumiffion,  were  of 
no  reputation  in  comparifon  of  the  nifties.  A 
commonwealth,  confifting  but  of  one  city,  would 
doubtlefs  be  ftormy,  in  regard  that  ambition  would 
be  every  man's  trade  :  but  where  it  confifts  of  a 
country,  the  plow  in  the  hands  of  the  owner  finds 

him 


of  Phitofofhers.  161 

him  a  better  calling,  and  produces  the  moft  inno- 
cent and  fteady  genius  of  a  commonwealth. 

Oceana,  p.  37. — Domeftic  empire  is  founded 
upon  dominion,  and  dominion  is  property,  real  or 
perfonal ;  that  is  to  fay,  in  lands,  or  in  money  and 
goods.  Lands,  or  the  parcels  of  a  territory,  are 
held  by  the  proprietor  or  proprietors  of  it,  in  fome 
proportion ;  and  fuch  (except  it  be  in  a  city  that 
has  little  or  no  land,  and  whofe  revenue  is  in  trade) 
as  is  the  proportion  or  balance  of  dominion  or 
property  in  land,  fuch  is  the  nature  of  the  empire. 
If  one  man  be  fole  landlord  of  a  territory,  or 
over-balance  the  people — for  example,  three  parts 
in  four — he  is  grand  feignior :  for  fo  the  Turk  is 
called  from  his  property ;  and  his  empire  is  abfo- 
lute  monarchy.  If  the  few,  as  a  nobility  and 
clergy,  be  landlords,  or  over-balance  the  people  to 
the  like  proportion,  it  makes  the  Gothic  balance, 
and  the  empire  is  mixed  monarchy,  as  that  of 
Spain,  Poland,  and  once  of  England :  and  if  the 
whole  people  be  landlords,  or  hold  the  lands  fo 
divided  among  them,  that  no  one  man,  or  number 
of  men,  within  the  compafs  of  the  few,  or  arif- 
tocracy,  over-balance  them,  the  empire  is  a  com- 
monwealth. 

If  force  be  interpofed  in  any  of  thefe  three 
cafes,  it  muft  either  frame  the  government  to  the 
foundation,  or  the  foundation  to  the  government; 
or,  holding  the  government  not  according  to  the 
balance,  it  is  not  natural,  but  violent:  and  there- 
fore if  it  be  at  the  devotion  of  a  prince,  it  is 
tyranny ;  if  at  the  devotion  of  the  few,  oligarchy; 
or  if  in  the  power  of  the  people,  anarchy.  Each 
of  which  confufions,  the  balance  Handing  other- 
wife,  is  but  of  fhort  continuance,  becaufe  againil 
the  nature  of  the  balance ;  which  not  defbroyed, 
deftroys  that  which  oppofes  it. 

Here 


162         Ancient  Republics,  and  Opinions 

Here  it  would  be  entertaining  to  apply  thefe 
obfervations  to  the  force  of  fleets  and  armies,  &c. 
applied  by  Great  Britain  in  the  late  conteft  with 
America.  The  balance  of  land,  efpecially  in 
New  England,  where  the  force  was  firft  applied, 
was  neither  in  the  king  nor  a  nobility,  but  im- 
menfely  in  favour  of  the  people.  The  intention 
of  the  Britim  politicians  was  to  alter  this  balance, 
"frame  the  foundation  to  the  government,  by 
bringing  the  landsjmore  and  more  into  the  hands 
of  the  governors,  judges,  counfellors,  &c.  &c. 
who  were  all  to  be  creatures  of  a  Britifh  miniftry. 
We  have  feen  the  effeds."— The  balance  deftroy- 
ed  that  which  oppofed  it. 

Harrington  proceeds. — But  there  are  certain 
other  confufions,  which  being  rooted  in  the  ba- 
lance, are  of  longer'continuance,  and  of  worfe 
confequence ;  as,  firft,  where  a  nobility  holds  half 
the  property,  or  about  that  proportion,  and  the 
people  the  other  half;  in  which  cafe,  without 
altering  the  balance,  there  is  no  remedy,  but  the 
one  muft  eat  out  the  other :  as  the  people  did  the 
nobility  in  Athens,  and  the  nobility  the  people  in 
Rome.  Secondly,  where  a  prince  holds  about 
half  the  dominion,  and  the  people  the  other  half, 
which  was  the  cafe  of  the  Roman  emperors, 
(planted  partly  upon  their  military  colonies,  and 
partly  upon  the  fenate  and  the  people)  the  govern- 
ment becomes  a  very  fhambles,both  of  the  princes 
and  the  people.  It  being  unlawful  in  Turky 
that  any  fhould  poflfefs  land  but  the  grand  feignior, 
the  balance  is  fixed  by  the  law,  and  that  empire 
firm.  Nor,  though  the  kings  often  fell,  was  the 
throne  of  England  known  to  fhake,  until  the 
ftatute  of  alienations  broke  the  pillars,  by  giving 
way  to  the  nobility  to  fell  their  eftates.  While 
Lacedemon  held  to  the  divifion  of  land  made  by 

Lycurgus, 


bf  PhilofopJiers*  163 

Lycurgus,  it  was  immoveable ;  but,  breaking 
that,  could  ftand  no  longer.  This  kind  of  law, 
fixing  the  balance  in  lands,  is  called  Agrarian, 
and  was  firft  introduced  by  God  himfelf,  who  di- 
vided the  land  of  Canaan  to  his  people  by  lot. 

The  public  fword,  without  a  hand  to  hold  it, 
is  but  cold  iron.  The  hand  which  holds  this 
fword  is  the  militia  of  a  nation  5  and  the  militia 
of  a  nation  is  either  an  army  in  the  field,  or 
ready  for  the  field  upon  occafion.  But  an  army 
is  a  beaft  that  has  a  great  belly,  and  muft  be 
fed  ;  wherefore  this  will  come  to  what  paftures 
you  have,  and  what  paftures  you  have  will 
come  to  the  balance  of  property,  without  which 
the  public  fword  is  but  a  name.  He  that  can 
graze  this  beaft  with  the  great  belly,  as  the  Turk 
does  his  timariots,  may  well  deride  him  that  ima- 
gines he  received  his  power  by  covenant.  But  if 
the  property  of  the  nobility,  ftocked  with  their 
tenants  a-nd  retainers,  be  the  pafture  of  that  beaft, 
the  ox  knows  his  mafter's  crib ;  and  it  is  impofii- 
ble  for  a  king,  in  fuch  a  conftitution,  to  reign 
otherwife  than  by  covenant;  or,  if  he  breaks  it, 
it  is  words  that  come  to  blows. 

Ariftotle  is  full  of  this  balance  in  divers 
places,  efpecially  where  he  fays,  that  immoderate 
wealth,  as  where  one  man,  or  the  few,  have 
greater  poiTeffions  than  the  equality  or  the  frame 
of  the  commonwealth  will  bear,  is  an  occafion  of 
fedition,  which  ends,  for  the  greater  part,  in  mo- 
narchy ;  and  that,  for  this  caufe,  the  oftracifm 
has  been  received  in  divers  places,  as  in  Argos 
and  Athens ;  but  that  it  were  better  to  prevent 
the  growth  in  the  beginning,  than,  when  it  has 
got  head,  to  feek  the  remedy  of  fuch  an  evil. 

Machiavel,  not  perceiving  that  if  a  common- 
wealth be  galled  by  the  gentry,  it    is   by  their 
VOL.  I.  X  ^  over- 


• 


1 64         Ancient  Republics*  and  Opinion* 

over-balance,  fpeaks  of  the  gentry  as  hoftile  to 
popular  governments,and  of  popular  governments 
as  hoftile  to  the  gentry ;  which  can  never  be 
proved  by  any  one  example,  unlefs  in  civil  war  ; 
feeing  that,  even  in  Switzerland,  the  gentry  are 
not  only  fafe,  but  in  honour.  But  the  balance, 
as  I  have  laid  it  down,  though  unfeen  by  Ma- 
chiavel,  is  that  which  interprets  him,  where  he 
concludes,  "  That  he  who  will  go  about  to  make 
a  commonwealth  where  there  be  many  gentlemen, 
unlefs  he  firft  deftroys  them,  undertakes  an  im- 
poffibility.  And  that  he  who  goes  about  to  in- 
troduce monarchy,  where  the  condition  of  the 
people  is  equal,  lhall  never  bring  it  to  pafs,  un- 
lefs he  cull  out  fuch  of  them  as  are  the  moft  tur- 
bulent and  ambitioys,  and  make  them  gentlemen 
or  noblemen,  not  in  name,  but  in  effe& ;  that  is, 
by  enriching  them  with  lands,  caftles,  and  trea- 
fures,  that  may  gain  them  power  among  the  reft, 
and  bring  in  the  reft  to  dependence  upon  them  ; 
to  the  end  that  they,  maintaining  their  ambition 
by  the  pjince,  the  prince  may  maintain  his  power 
by  them." 

Wherefore,  as  in  this  place  I  agree  with  Ma* 
chiavel,  that  a  nobility,  or  gentry,  over-balancing 
.  a  popular  government,  is  the  utter  bane  and  de- 
ftru<Sion  of  it,  fo  I  fhall  fhew  in  another,  that  a 
nobility  or  gentry*  in  a  popular  government, 
not  over-balancing  it,  is  the  very  life  and  foul 
of  it* 

The  public  fword,  or  right  of  the  militia,  be 
the  government  what  it  will,  or  let  it  change  how 
it  can,  is  infeparable  from  the  over-balance  in  do- 
minion- 

HARRINGTON'S 


of  Phtiofophers.  I  65 

HARRINGTON'S   PREROGATIVE    OF    POPULAR 

GOVERNMENT,    C.    Hi.    p.  2,26^rjf^  , 

The  balance  of  dominion  in  land  is  the  na- 
tural caufe  of  empire ;  and  this  is  the  principle 
which  makes  politics  a  fcience  undeniable  through- 
out, and  the  moft  demonftrable  of  any  whatever. 
— If  a  man,  having  one  hundred  pounds  a  year, 
may  keep  one  fervant,  or  have  one  man  at  his 
command,  then,  having  one  hundred  times  fo 
much,  he  may  keep  one  hundred  fervants ;  and 
this  multiplied  by  a  thoufand,  he  may  haye  one 
hundred  thoufand  men  at  his  command. — Now 
that  the  fingle  perfon,  or  nobility,  of  any  country 
in  Europe,  that  had  but  half  fo  many  men  at 
command,  would  be  king  or  prince,  is  that  which 
I  think  no  man  can  doubt.  But  "  No  money, 
"  no  Swifs." — The  reafon  why  a  fingle  perfon,  or 
the  nobility,  that  has  one  hundred  thoufand  men, 
or  half  fo  many,  at  command,  will  have  the  go*- 
vernment,  is,  that  the  eftate  in  land,  whereby 
they  are  able  to  maintain  fo  many,  in  any  Euro- 
pean territory,  mufl  over-balance  the  reft  that 
remains  to  the  people,  at  leaft  three  parts  in  four. 
Now,  for  the  fame  reafon,  if  the  people  hold  three 
parts  in  four  of  the  territory,  it  is  plain  there  can. 
neither  be  any  fingle  perfon  or  nobility  able  to 
difpute  the  government  with  them.  In  this  cafe, 
therefore,  except  force  be  interpofed,  they  govern 
themfelves.  So  that  by  this  computation  of  the 
balance  of  property  or  dominion  in  the  land,  you 
have,  according  to  the  three-fold  foundation  of 
property,  the  root  or  generation  of  the  three-fold 
kind  of  government  or  empire.  If  one  man  be 
fole  landlord  of  a  territory,  or  over-balance  the 
whole  people,  three  parts  in  four,  or  thereabouts, 
]pe  is  grand  feignior  ;  for  fo  the  Turk,  not  from 

his 


1 66         Ancient  Republics,  and  Opinions 

his  empire,  but  property,  is  called ;  and  the  em-, 
pire,  in  this  cafe,  is  abfolute  monarch}?-.      If  the 
few,  or  a  nobility,  or  a  nobility  with  a  clergy,  be 
landlords  to  fuch  a  proportion  as  over-balances 
the  people  in  the   like  manner,  they  may   make 
whom  they  pleafe  king;  or,  if  they  be  not  pleafed 
with  their  king,  down  with  him,  and  fet  up  whom, 
they  like  better ;  a  Henry  the  fourth,  or  feventh, 
a  Guife,  a  Montfort,  a  Nevil,  or  a  Porter,  fhould 
they  find  that  belt  for  their  own  ends  and  pur- 
pofes  :  for  as  not  the  balance  of  the  king,  but 
that  of  the  nobility,  in  this  cafe,  is  the  caufe  of 
the  government,  fo  not  the  eftate  of  the  prince  or 
captain,  but  his  virtue  or  ability,  or   fitnefs  for 
the  ends  of  the  nobility,  acquires  that  command 
or  office.     This   for   ariftocracy,  or  mixed  mo- 
narchy.    But  if  the  ''whole  people  be  landlords, 
or  hold  the   lands  fo  divided  among -them,  that 
no  one  man,  or  number  of  men,  within  the  com- 
pafs  of  the  few,  or  ariftocracy,  over-balance  them, 
it  is  a  commonwealth.     Such  is  the  branch  in  the 
root,  or  the  balance  of  property  naturally  pro- 
ducing empire. 

Then  follows  a  curious  account  of  the  laws  in 
Ifrael  againft  ufury,  and  in  Lacedemon  againfl 
trade,  &c.  which  are  well  worth  ftudying. 

Page  254.- — That  which,  introducing  two  ef- 
tates,  caufes  divifion,  or  makes  a  commonwealth 
unequal,  is  not  that  fhe  has  a  nobility,  without 
which  fhe  is  deprived  of  her  moft  fpecial  orna- 
ment, and  weakened  in  her  conduct,  but  when 
the  nobility  only  is  capable  of  fnagiftracy,  or 
of  the  fenate ;  and  where  this  is  fo  ordered,  fhe 
is  unequal,  as  Rome.  But  where  the  nobility 
is  no  otherwife  capable  of  magiftracy,  nor  of 
the  fenate,  than  by  election  of  the  people,  the 
Commonwealth  confifts  but  of  one  order,  and 

is 


of  Philosophers.  167 

is  equal,  as  Lacedemon  or  Venice.  Where  the 
nobility  holds  half  the  property,  or  about  that 
proportion,  and  the  people  the  other  half,  the 
fhares  of  the  land  may  be  equal;  but  in  regard 
the  nobility  have  much  among  few,  and  the 
people  little  among  many,  the  few  will  not  be 
contented  to  have  authority,  which  is  all  their 
proper  mare  in  a  commonwealth,  but  will  be 
bringing  the  people  under  power,  which  is  not 
their  proper  mare  in  a  commonwealth ;  where- 
fore this  commonwealth  muft  needs  be  unequal; 
and,  except  by  altering  the  balance,  as  the  Athe-; 
nians  did  by  the  reciiion  of  debts,  or  as  the  Ro- 
mans went  about  to  do,  by  an  agrarian,  it  be 
brought  to  fuch  an  equality, .  that  the  whole  power 
be  in  the  people,  and  there  remain  no  more  than 
authority  in  the  nobility,  there  is  no  remedy,  but 
the  one,  with  perpetual  feuds,  will  eat  out  the 
other,  as  the  people  did  the  nobility  in  Athens, 
and  the  nobility  the  people  in  Rome.  Where 
the  carcafs  is,  there  will  be  the  eagles  alfo ;  where 
the  riches  are,  there  will  be  the  power  :  fo  if  a 
few  be  as  rich  as  all  the  reft,  a  few  will  have  as 
much  power  as  all  the  reft;  in  which  cafe  the 
commonwealth  is  unequal,  and  there  can  be  no 
end  of  ftaving  and  tailing  till  it  be  brought  to 
equality.  & 

The  eftates,  be  they  one,  or  two,  or  three,  are 
fuch,  as  was  faid  by  virtue  of  the  balance  upon 
which  the  government  muft  naturally  depend  : 
exemplified  in  France,  &c. 

Page  256. — All  government  is  ,of  three  kinds  : 
a  government  of  fervants,  a  government  of  fub- 
jeds,  or  a  government  of  citizens.  The  firft  is 
abfolute  monarchy,  as  that  of  Turky ;  the  fecond 
ariftocratical  monarchy,  as  that  of  France;  the 

third 


1 68         Ancient  Republics,  and  Opinions 

third  a'  commonwealth,  as  Ifrael,  Rome,  Hol- 
land. Of  thefe,  the  government  of  fervants  is 
harder  to  be  conquered,  and  the  ealier  to  be  held. 
The  government  of  fubje&s  is  the  ealier  to  be 
conquered,  and  the  harder  to  be  held.  The  go- 
vernment of  citizens  is  both  the  hardeft  to  be 
conquered,  and  the  hardeft  to  be  held. 

The  reafon  why  a  government  of  fervants  is 
hard  to  be  conquered,  is,  that  they  are  under  a 
perpetual  difcipline  and  command.  Why  a  go- 
vernment of  fubje6ts  is  ealily  conquered,  is  on 
account  of  the  fa&ions  of  the  nobility. 

The  reafons  why  a  government  of  citizens, 
where  the  commonwealth  is  equal,  is  hardeft  to 
be  conquered,  are,  that  the  invader  of  fuch  a 
fociety  muft  not  only  jruft  to  his  own  ftrength, 
inafmuch  as,  the  commonwealth  being  equal,  he 
muft  needs  find  them  united ;  but  in  regard  that 
fuch  citizens,  being  all  foldiers,  or  trained  up  to 
their  arms,  which  they  ufe  not  for  the  defence  of 
flavery,  but  of  liberty,  a  condition  not  in  this 
world  to  be  bettered,  they  have,  more  efpecially 
upon  this  occalion,  the  higheft  foul  of  courage, 
and,  if  their  territory  be  of  any  extent,  the  vafteft 
body  of  a  well-difciplined  militia,  that  is  poffible 
in  nature :  wherefore  an  example  of  fuch  a  one, 
overcome  by  the  arms  of  a  monarch,  is  not  to  be 
found  in  the  world. 

In  the  Art  of  Law-giving,  chap.  i.  he  enlarges 
ftill  farther  upon  this  fubjedl;  and  inftances  Jo- 
feph's  purchafe  of  all  the  lands  of  the  Egyptians 
for  Pharaoh,  whereby  they  became  fervants  to 
Pharaoh ;  and  he  enlarges  on  the  Englifh  balance, 
&c. 

In  America,  the  balance  is  nine-tenths  on  the 

fide  of  the  people :  indeed  there  is  but  one  order; 

i 
and 


of  Philofophers.  169 

and  our  fenators  have  influence  chiefly  by  the 
principles  of  authority,  and  very  little  by  thofe 
of  power  j  but  this  muft  be  poftponed. 


LETTER    XXX. 

ANCIENT  REPUBLICS,  AND  OPINIONS 
OF  PHILOSOPHERS, 

My  dear  Sir* 

MY  defign  is  more  extenlive  than  barely  to 
fhew  the  imperfe&ion  of  Mr.  Turgot's 
idea.  This  might  be  done  in  a  few  words,  and 
a  very  ihort  procefs  of  reafoning :  but  I  wifh  to 
aflemble  together  the  opinions  and  reafonings  of 
philofophers,  politicians,  and  hiftorians,  who  have 
taken  the  moil  extenfive  views  of  men  and  fo- 
cieties,  whofe  characters  are  defervedly  revered, 
and  whofe  writings  were  in  the  contemplation  of 
thofe  who  framed  the  American  conftitutions.  It 
will  not  be  contefted,  that  all  thefe  chara&ers  are 
united  in  Polybius,  who,  in  a  fragment  of  his 
fixth  book,  tranflated  by  Edward  Spelman,  p« 
391,  at  the  end  of  his  tranflation  of  the  Roman 
Antiquities  of  Dionylius  HallicarnafTeniis,  fays  :»— 
*'  It  is  cuftomary  to  eftablifh  three  forts  of  go- 
vernments; kingly  government,  ariftocracy,  and 
democracy :  upon  which  one  may  very  properly 
afk  them,  whether  they  lay  thefe  down  as  the 
only  forms  of  government,  or  as  the  beft ;  for  in 
both  cafes  they  feera  to  be  in  an  error,  fince  it  is 

fnanifeft, 


170          Ancient  Republics,  and  Opinions 

manifeft,  that  the  beft  form  of  government  is  that 
which  is  compounded  of  all  three. — This  is  founded 
not  only  in  realon  but  in  experience,  Lycurgus 
having  fet  the  example  of  this  form  of  govern- 
ment in  the  inftitution  of  the  Lacedemonian  com- 
monwealth." 

Six  kinds  of  government  mufl  be  allowed: 
kingly  government  and  monarchy,  ariftocracy 
and  oligarchy,  democracy,  and  the  government 
of  the  multitude. 

Lycurgus  concluded,  that  every  form  of  go- 
vernment that  is  fimple,  by  foon  degenerating 
into  that  vice  that  is  allied  to  it,  mufl  be  unfta- 
ble.  The  vice  of  kingly  government  is  mo- 
narchy ;  that  of  ariftocracy,  oligarchy ;  that  of 
democracy,  rage  and  violence;  into  which,  in 
procefs  of  time,  all  ef  them  muft  degenerate. 
Lycurgus,  to  avoid  thefe  inconveniencies,  form- 
ed his  government  not  of  one  fort,  but  united  in 
one  all  the  advantages  and  properties  of  the  beft 
governments;  to  the  end  that  no  branch  of  it, 
by  fwelling  beyond  its  due  bounds,  might  dege- 
nerate into  the  vice  which  is  congenial  to  it ;  and 
that,  while  each  of  them  were  mutually  a&ed 
upon  by  oppofite  powers,  no  one  part  might  in- 
cline any  way,  or  out-weigh  the  reft ;  but  that  the 
commonwealth  being  equally  poifed  and  balanced, 
like  a  Jbip  or  a  waggon,  a£ed  upon  by  contrary 
powers,  might  long  remain  in  the  fame  fituation; 
while  the  king  was  reftrained  from  excefs  by  the 
fear  of  the  people,  who  had  a  proper  fhare  in 
the  commonwealth;  and,  on  the  other  fide,  the 
people  did  not  dare  to  difregard  the  king,  from 
their  fear  of  the  fenate,  who,  being  all  elected  for 
their  virtue,  would  always  incline  to  the  jufteft 
fide ;  by  which  means,  that  branch  which  hap- 
pened to  be  opprefTed  became  always  fuperior, 
and,  by  the  acceflional  weight  of  the  fenate,  out- 
balanced 


of  Philojophers.  171 

balanced  the  other. — This  fyftem  preferved  the 
Lacedemonians  in  liberty  longer  than  any  other 
people  we  have  heard  of  ever  enjoyed  it. 

All  the  three  principal  orders  of  government 
were  found  in  the  Roman  commonwealth ;  every 
thing  was  conftituted  and  adminiflered  with  that 
equality  and  propriety  by  thefe  three,  that  it  was 
not  poffible,  even  for  a  Roman  citizen,  to  af- 
fert  pofitively,  whether  the  government,  in  the 
whole,  was  ariflocratical,  democratical,  or  monar- 
chical. For  when  we  caft  our  eyes  on  the  power 
of  the  confuls,  the  government  appeared  entirely 
monarchical  and  kingly;  when  on  that  of  the  fe- 
nate, ariftocratical;  and  when  any  one  coniidered 
the  power  of  the  people,  it  appeared  plainly  de- 
mocratical. 

The  confuls,  when  they  are  at  Rome,  and  be- 
fore they  take  the  field,  have  the  adminiftration 
of  all  public  affairs;  for  all  other  magiftrates 
obey  them,  except  the  tribunes  of  the  people : 
they  introduce  ambafladors  into  the  fenate ;  they 
alfo  propofe  to  the  fenate  thofe  fubje<5ts  of  debate 
that  require  immediate  difpatch ;  and  are  folely  en- 
trufled  with  the  execution  of  the  decrees  :  to  them 
belongs  the  confideration  of  all  public  affairs  of 
which  the  people  have  cognizance,  whom  they 
are  to  affemble  upon  all  occafions,  and  lay  before 
them  the  decrees  of  the  fenate,  then  purfue  the 
refolutions  of  the  majority.  They  have  almoft  an 
abfolute  power  in  every  thing  that  relates  either  to 
the  preparations  of  war,  or  to  the  conduct  of  it 
in  the  field ;  for  they  may  give  what  orders  they 
pleafe  to  their  allies,  and  appoint  the  tribunes ; 
they  may  raife  forces,  and  enlift  thofe  who  are 
proper  for  the  fervice:  they  alfo  have  a  power 
when  in  the  field,  of  punifhing  any  who  ferve 
under  them ;  and  of  expending  as  much  as  they 

VOL.  I.  Y  pleafe 


172         Ancient  Republics^  and  Opinions 

pleafe  of  the  public  money,  being  always  attend* 
ed  by  a  qussftor  for  that  purpofe,  whofe  duty  it  is 
to  yield  a  ready  obedience  to  all  their  commands. 
So  that  whoever  cafts  his  eyes  on  this  branch, 
may  with  reafon  affirm  that  the  government  is 
merely  monarchical  and  kingly. 

The  fenate  have,  in  the  firft  place,  trie  com- 
mand of  the  public  money:  for  they  have  the 
conduct  of  all  receipts  and  difburfements ;  fince 
the  quseftors  cannot  iffue  money  for  any  particular 
fervice  without  a  decree  of  the  fenate,  except  thofe 
fums  they  pay  by  the  direction  of  the  conluls. 

It  has  the  power  over  all  difburfements  made 
by  the  cenfors,  every  fifth  year,  in  erecting  and  re- 
pairing public  buildings ; — takes  cognizance  of  all 
crimes  committed  in  Italy,  fuch  as  treafons,  con- 
fpiracies,  poifonings^  and  aflaflinations ; — fends 
embattles  out  of  Italy  to  reconcile  differences* 
ufe  exhortations,  fignify  commands,  admit  allian- 
ces, or  declare  war ; — determines,  when  ambaffa- 
dors  come  to  Rome,  in  what  manner  they  are  to 
be  treated,  and  the  anfwer  to  be  given  them.  For 
thefe  reafons,  when  a  foreigner  comes  to  Rome, 
in  the  abfence  of  the  confuls,  the  government  ap- 
pears to  him  purely  arrftocratical. 

There  is  ftill  a  mofi  confiderable  fhare  in  the 
government  left  for  the  people.  They  only  have 
the  power  of  diflribunng  honours  and  punim- 
ments,  to  which  alone  both  monarchies  and  com- 
monwealths, in  word,  all  human  inflitutions,  owe 
their  liability :  for  wherever  the  difference  be- 
tween rewards  and  punimments  is  not  underftood, 
or  injudicioufly  applied,  there  nothing  can  be  pro- 
perly adminiftered,  fince  the  worthy  and  unwor- 
thy are  equally  honoured! 

They  often  take  cognizance  of  thofe  caufes 
where  the  fine  is  confiderable,  if  the  criminals  are 

perfons 


of  Philofophers.  1 73 

perfons  who  have  exercifed  great  employments; 
and  in  capital  cafes  they  alone  have  jurifdi&ion; 
and  a  cuftom  prevails  with  them,  to  give  thofe 
who  are  tried  for  their  lives  a  power  of  departing 
openly  to  voluntary  banifhment. 

They  have  the  power  of  conferring  the  magif- 
tracy  upon  thofe  they  think  worthy  of  it,  which  is 
the  moft  honourable  reward  of  merit  any  govern- 
ment can  beftow. 

They  have  the  power  of  rejecting  and  confirm- 
ing laws,  and  determine  concerning  peace  and 
war,  alliances,  accommodations,  and  conventions. 

So  that,  from  hence  again,  one  may  with  reafon 
aflert,  that  the  people  have  the  greateft  fhare  in 
the  government,  and  that  the  commonwealth  is 
democraticaL 

Thefe  orders,  into  which  the  commonwealth  is 
divided,  have  the  power  to  oppofe,  aflift,  and  ba- 
lance each  other,  as  occafion  may  require. 

Though  the  conful  at  the  head  of  his  army  in 
the  field,  feems  to  have  an  abfolute  power  to  carry 
every  thing  he  propofes  into  execution,  yet  he  ftill 
Hands  in  need  of  the  people  and  fenate,  and  with- 
out their  afliftance  can  effe&  nothing  ;  for  neither 
corn,  clothes,  nor  pay,  can  be  furnifhed  to  the  army 
without  the  confent  of  the  fenate;  who  have  alfo 
the  power  of  fending  another  general  to  fucceed 
him,  as  foon  as  the  year  is  expired,  or  of  continu- 
ing him  in  the  command.  Again,  they  may  either 
magnify  and  extol,  or  obfcure  and  extenuate,  the 
victories  of  the  generals :  for  thefe  cannot  celebrate 
their  triumphs  unlefs  the  fenate  confents  to  it,  and 
furnifhes  the  neceflary  expence. 

As  the  power  of  putting  an  end  to  the  war  is 
in  the  people,  the  generals  are  under  a  neceflity 
of  having  their  approbation,  who  have  the  right 
of  ratifying  and  annulling  all  accommodations  and 

conventions. 


174          Ancient  Re-publics,  and  Opinions 

conventions.  It  is  to  the  people  that  the  generals, 
after  the  expiration  of  their  command,  give  an  ac- 
count of  their  conduct  :  fo  that  it  is  by  no  means 
fafe  for  them  to  difregard  the  favour  either  of  the 
fenate,  or  of  the  people. 

The  fenate  is  under  a  neceffity  of  fhewing  a  re- 
gard to  the  people,  and  of  aiming  at  their  appro- 
bation ;  as  not  having  the  power  to  puniih  crimes 
of  the  firft  magnitude  with  death,  unlefs  the  peo- 
ple confirm  the  previous  decree :  if  a  law  is  pro- 
pofed,  by  which  part  of  the  power  of  the  fenate 
is  to  be  taken  away,  their  dignities  aboliihed,  or 
even  their  fortunes  diminifhed,  the  people  have  it 
in  their  power  either  to  receive  or  reject  it.  If 
one  of  the  tribunes  of  the  people  oppofes  the 
paffing  of  a  decree,  the  fenate  are  fo  far  from 
being  able  to  ena6t  it,  that  it  is  not  even  in  their 
power  to  confult  or  afiemble  at  all.  For  all  thefe 
reafons,  the  fenate  Hands  in  awe  of  the  people. 

The  people-alfo  are  fubje6l  to  the  power  of  the 
fenate,  and  under  an  obligation  of  cultivating  the 
good-will  of  all  the  fenators,  who  have  many  op- 
portunities both  of  prejudicing  and  advantaging 
individuals.  Judges  are  appointed  out  of  the 
fenate  in-moft  caules  that  relate  to  contracts,  pub- 
lic or  private.  There  are  many  rivers,  ports, 
gardens,  mines,  and  lands,  and  many  works  relat- 
ing to  ereding  and  repairing  public  buildings,  let 
out  by  the  cenfors,  under  the  care  of  the  fenate ; 
all  thefe  are  undertaken  by  the  people;  fome  are 
purchafers,  others  partners,  fome  fureties  for  the 
contrads.  All  thefe  things  are  under  the  controul 
of  the  fenate,  which  has  power  to  give  time,  to 
mitigate;,  and,  if  any  thing  has  happened  to  render 
the  performance  of  the  contract  impracticable,  to 
cancel  it.  The  people,  thus  dependent  on  the 
fenate,  and  apprehending  the  uncertainty  of  the 

occafions 


of  Philofophers.  175 

occafions  in  which  they  may  ftand  in  need  of  their 
favour,  dare  not  refift  or  oppofe  their  will. 

In  like  manner,  they  are  not  ealily  brought  to 
obftruct  the  defigns  of  the  confuls,  becaufe  all  of 
them  in  general,  and  every  one  in  particular, 
become  fubjedl  to  their  authority,  when  in  the 
field. 

Such  being  the  power  of  each  order  to  hurt 
and  afTifteach  other,-their  union  is  adapted  to  all 
contingencies,  and  //  is  imfoffible  to  invent  a  more 
perfect  Jyjl  em.  When  the  common  fear  of  a  foreign 
enemy  compels  them  to  aft  in  concert,  fuch  is 
the  ftrength  of  the  government,  that  nothing  ne- 
ceflary  is  omitted,  or  comes  too  late,  fince  all  vie 
with  each  other  in  dire&ing  their  thoughts  to  the 
public  good,  and  their  endeavours  to  carry  their 
defigns  into  execution.  The  commonwealth,  from 
the  peculiar  frame  of  it,  becomes  irrefiftible,  and 
attains  whatever  it  propofes. 

When,  in  confequence  of  viclory,  they  live  in 
profperity  and  affluence,  enjoying  their  good  for- 
tune free  from  the  fear  of  a  foreign  enemy,  they 
grow,througheafe  and  flattery,  infolent  and  proud; 
their  commonwealth  is  then  chiefly  obferved  to 
relieve  itfelf :  for  when  any  branch  of  it  becomes 
ambitious,  and,  fwelling  beyond  its  bounds,  aims 
at  unwarrantable  power,  being  fubjec~l  to  the 
controul  of  the  other  two,  it  cannot  run  into 
any  excefs  of  power  or  arrogance;  but  all  three 
muft  remain  in  the  terms  prefcribed  by  the  con- 
ftitinion. 

Thus,  my  dear  Sir,  you  fee -that  Polybius's 
opinion  of  different  orders,  checks,  and  balances, 
in  a  commonwealth,  is  very  different  from  that  of 
Mr.  Turgot.  The  Roman  conftitution  formed 
the  nobleft  people,  and  the  greateft  power,  that 
has  ever  exifted.  But  if  all  the  powers  of  the 

confuls, 


1 76          Ancient  Republics,  and  Opinions 

confuls,  fenate  and  people,  had  been  centered  in 
a  iingle  affembly  of  the  people,  colle&ively  or 
reprefentatively,  will  any  man  pretend  to  believe 
that  they  would  have  been  long  free,  or  ever 
great  ? 

The  diftribution  of  power  was  however  never 
accurately  or  judicioufly  made  in  that  conftitu- 
tion:  the  executive  was  never  fufficiently  fepa- 
rated  from  the  legiflative,  nor  had  thefe  powers  a 
controul  upon  each  other  defined  with  fufficient 
accuracy:  the  executive  had  not  power  to  inter- 
pofe  and  decide  between  the  people  and  the 
fenate. 

As  we  advance  in  this  correfpondence,  we  may 
fee  caufe  to  differ  widely  from  the  judgment  of 
Polybius,  "  that  it  is  impojjible  to  invent  a  more 
perfeft  fyftem  of  government"  We  may  be  con- 
vinced that  the  conftitution  of  England,  if  its 
balance  is  feen  to  play,  in  pra&ice,  according  to 
the  principles  of  its  theory — that  is  to  fay,  if  the 
people  are  fairly  and  fully  reprefented,  fo  as  to 
have  the  power  of  dividing  or  choojing,  of  drawing 
up  hill  or  down,  initead  of  being  difpofed  of  by  a 
few  lords — is  a  fyftem  much  more  perfed.  The 
conftitutions  of  feveral  of  the  United  States,  it  is 
hoped,  will  prove  themfelves  improvements,  both 
upon  the  Roman,  the  Spartan,  and  the  Englifh 
commonwealths. 


LETTER 


of  Philofofhers.  177 


LETTER     XXXI. 

ANCIENT  REPUBLICS,  AND  OPINIONS 
OF  PHILOSOPHERS. 

My  dear  Sir, 

THE  generation  and  corruption  of  govern- 
ments, which  may  in  other  words  be  called 
the  progrefs  and  courfe  of  human  paflions  in  fociety, 
are  fubjeds  which  have  engaged  the  attention  of  the 
greateft  writers ;  and  whether  the  eflays  they  have 
left  us  were  copied  from  hiftory,  or  wrought  out 
of  their  own  conjectures  and  reafonings,  they  are 
very  much  to  our  purpofe,  to  fhew  the  utility 
and  necefiity  of  different  orders  of  men,  and  of  an 
equilibrium  of  powers  and  privileges.  They  de- 
monftrate  the  corruptibility  of  every  fpecies  of 
limple  government,  by  which  I  mean  a  power 
without  a  check,  whether  in  one,  a  few,  or  many. 
It  might  be  fufficient  to  Ihew  this  tendency  in 
fimple  democracy  alone,  for  fuch  is  the  govern- 
ment of  one  affembly,  whether  of  the  people  col- 
leftively  or  reprefentatively :  but  as  the  genera- 
tion and  corruption  of  all  kinds  of  government 
have  a  limilitude  with  one  another,  and  proceed 
from  the  fame  qualities  in  human  nature,  it  will 
throw  the  more  light  upon  our  fubjecl,  the  more 
particularly  we  examine  it.  I  mall  confine  my- 
lelf  chiefly  to  Plato,  Polybius,  and  your  name- 
fake  Sir  Thoriias  Smith. 

Polybius  thinks  it  manifeft,  both  from  reafon 
and  experience,  that  the  beft  form  of  government 
is  not  fimple,  but  compounded,  becaufe  of  the 

tea- 


178          Ancient  Republics,  and  Opinions 

tendency  of  each  of  the  iimple  forms  to  degene- 
rate ;  even  democracy,  in  which  it  is  an  eftablifhed 
cuftom  to  worfhip  the  gods,  honour  their  parents, 
refpec~l  the  elders,  and  obey  the  laws,  has  a  ftrong 
tendency  to  change  into  a  government  where  the 
multitude  have  a  power  of  doing  whatever  they 
defire,  and  where  infolence  and  contempt  of  pa- 
rents, elders,  gods,  and  laws,  foon  fucceed. 

From  whence  do  governments  originally  fpring  ? 
From  the  weaknefs  of  men,  and  the  confequent 
neceflity  to  affociate,  and  he  who  excels  in  ftrength 
and  courage,  gains  the  command  and  authority 
over  the  reft ;  as  among  inferior  animals,  who 
are  not  influenced  by  opinion,  the  ftrongeft  are, 
by  common  confent,  allowed  to  be  mafters.  This 
is  monarchy.  But  „  when  the  nation,  by  living 
together,  acquires  fome  tincture  of  honour  and 
juftice,  gratitude,  duty,  and  their  oppofites;  and 
the  monarch  countenances  thefe  moral  qualities, 
and  treats  every  one  according  to  his  merit,  they  are 
no  longer  afraid  of  violence,  but  fubmit  to  him, 
and  unite  in  fupporting  his  government,  although 
he  may  again  become  weak  and  advanced  in  years. 
By  this  means  a  monarch  infeniibly  becomes  a 
king,  that  is,  when  the  power  is  transferred  from 
courage  and  ftrength  to  reafon.  This  is  the  origin 
of  true  kingly  government,  for  the  people  preferve 
the  command,  not  only  to  them,  but  to  their 
defendants,  being  perfuaded,  that  thofe  who  have 
received  their  birth  and  education  from  fuch  men 
will  referable  them  in  their  principles.  But  if 
they  are  diiTatisfied  with  their  defcendants,  they 
then  choofe  magiftrates  and  kings,  with  regard 
only  to  fuperior  fenfe  and  reafon,  and  not  to 
ftrength  and  courage  :  having  by  experience  been 
convinced  of  the  difference  between  them.  Thofe 
who  were  once  chofen  and  inverted  with  the  royal 

dignity, 


of  Phitofophers.  179 

dignity,  grew  old  in  the  enjoyment  of  it,  poflefTed 
themfelves  of  a  territory,  furrounded  it  with  walls, 
and  fortified  advantageous  pofts  :  thus  confulting 
the  fecurity  of  their  lubje&s,  and  fupplying  them 
with  plenty  of  provifions,  differing  little  in  their 
clothes  or  tables  from  the  people  with  whom  they 
paffed  their  lives,  they  continued  blamelefs  and 
unenvied.  But  their  pofterity,  fucceeding  to  the 
government  by  right  of  inheritances  and  finding 
every  thing  provided  for  fecurity  and  fupport, 
they  were  led  by  fuperfluity  to  indulge  their  ap- 
petites, and  to  imagine  that  it  became  princes  to 
appear  in  a  different  drefs,  to  eat  in  a  more  luxu- 
rious manner,  and  enjoy,  without  contradiction, 
the  forbidden  pleafures  of  love.  The  firft  pro- 
duced envy,  the  other  refentment  and  hatred. 
By  which  means  kingly  government  degenerated 
into  tyranny. 

At  the  fame  time  a  foundation  was  laid,  and  a 
confpiracy  formed,  for  the  deftruclion  of  thofe 
who  exercifed  it ;  the  accomplices  of  which  were 
not  men  of  inferior  rank,  but  perfons  of  the  moil 
generous,  exalted,  and  enterprizing  fpirit;  for 
fuch  men  can  leaft  bear  the  iniolence  of  thofe  in 
power.  The  people,  having  thefe  to  lead  them, 
and  uniting  againfl  their  rulers,  kingly  govern- 
ment and  monarchy  were  extirpated,  and  ariflo- 
cracy  began  to  be  eftablifhed,  for  the  people,  as 
an  immediate  acknowledgment  to  thofe  who  had 
deftroyed  monarchy,  chofe  thefe  leaders  for  their 
governors,  and  left  all  their  concerns  to  them. 

Thefe,  at  firft,  preferred  the  advantage  of  the 
public  to  all  other  confiderations,  and  adminiftered 
all  affairs,  both  public  and  private,  with  care  and 
vigilance.  But  their  fons  having  fucceeded  them 
in  the  fame  power,  unacquainted  with  evils,  ftran- 
gers  to  civil  equality  and  liberty,  educated  from 

VOL.  J.  Z  their 


1 80         Ancient  Republics,  and  Opinions 

their  infancy  in  the  fplendor  of  the  power  and 
dignities  of  their  parents,  fome  giving  themfelves 
up  to  avarice,  others  to  intemperance,  and  others 
to  the  abufe  of  women,  by  this  behaviour  changed 
the  ariflocracy  into  an  oligarchy* 

Their  cataftrophe  became  the  fame  with  that  of 
\\\Qtyrants;  forif  anyperfon,  obferving  the  general 
envy  and  hatred  which  thefe  rulers  have  incurred, 
has  the  courage  to  fay  or  do  any  thing  againft  them, 
he  finds  the  whole  body  of  the  people  infpired 
with  the  fame  paflions  they  were  before  poffefled 
with  againft  the  tyrant,  and  ready  to  affift  him. 
Thereupon  they  put  fome  of  them  to  death,  and 
banifh  others ;  but  dare  not,  after  that,  appoint 
a  king  to  govern  them,  being  ftill  afraid  of  the 
injuftice  of  the  firftf  neither  dare  they  entruft  the 
government  with  any  number  of  men,  having  ftill 
before  their  eyes  the  errors  which  thofe  had  before 
committed :  fo  that  having  no  hope,  but  in  them- 
felves, they  convert  the  government  from  an  oli- 
garchy to  a  democracy,  and  take  upon  themfelves 
the  care  and  charge  of  .public  affairs. 

And  as  long  as  any  are  living  who  felt  the 
power  and  dominion  of  the  few,  they  acquiefce 
under  the  prefent  eftabliftiment,  and  look  upon 
equality  and  liberty  as  the  greateft  of  bleffings. 
But  when  a  new  race  of  men  grows  up,  thefe,  no 
longer  regarding  equality  and  liberty,  from  being 
accuftomed  to  them,  aim  at  a  greater  mare  of  power 
than  the  reft,  particularly  thofe  of  the  greateft 
fortunes,  who,  grown  now  ambitious,  and  being 
unable  to  obtain  the  power  they  aim  at  by  their 
own  merit,  diffipate  their  wealth,  by  alluring  and 
corrupting  the  people  by  every  method;  and 
when,  to  ferve  their  wild  ambition,  they  have 
once  taught  them  to  receive  bribes  and  entertain- 
ments, from  that  moment  the  democracy  is  at  an 

end> 


of  Phikfophers. 

end,  and  changes  to  force  and  violence.  For  the 
people,  accuftomed  to  live  at  the  expence  of  others, 
and  to  place  their  hopes  of  a  fupport  in  the  for- 
tunes of  their  neighbours,  if  headed  by  a  man  of 
a  great  and  enterprizing  fpirit,  will  then  have  re- 
courfe  to  violence,  and  getting  together,  will  mur- 
der, banim,  and  divide  among  themfelves  the 
lands  of  their  adverfaries,  till,  grown  wild  with 
rage,  they  again  find  a  mafter  and  a  monarch. 

This  is  the  rotation  of  governments,  and  this 
the  order  of  nature,  by  which  they  are  changed, 
transformed,  and  return  to  the  fame  point  of  the 
circle. 

Lycurgus  obferving  that  all  this  was  founded 
on  neceffity  and  the  laws  of  nature,  concluded, 
that  every  form  of  government  that  is  iimple,  by 
foon  degenerating  into  that  vice  that  is  allied  to  it, 
and  naturally  attends  it,  muft  be  unftable.  For 
as  ruft  is  the  natural  bane  of  iron,  and  worms  of 
wood,  by  which  they  are  fure  to  be  deftroyed, 
fo  there  is  a  certain  vice  implanted  by  the  hand 
of  nature  in  every  Iimple  form  of  government, 
and  by  her  ordained  to  accompany  it.  The  vice 
of  kingly  government  is  monarchy ;  that  of  arif- 
tocracy,  oligarchy ;  and  of  democracy,  rage  and 
violence ;  into  which  all  of  them,  in  procefs  of  time, 
muft  necefiarily  degenerate.  To  avoid  which 
Lycurgus  united  in  one  all  the  advantages  of  the 
beft  governments,  to  the  end  that  no  branch  of  it, 
by  fwelling  beyond  its  bounds,  might  degenerate 
into  the  vice  that  is  congenial  to  it,  and  that,  while 
each  was  mutually  adled  upon  by  oppojite  powers, 
no  one  part  might  outweigh  the  reft.  The 
Romans  arrived  at  the  fame  end  by  the  fame 
means. 

Polybius,  you  perceive,  my  dear  Sir,  is  more 
charitable  in  his  reprefentation  of  human  nature 

than 


Ancient  Republics,  and  Opinions 

than  Hobbes,  Mandeville,  Rochefoucault,  [Machia- 
vel,  Beccaria,  RoufTeau,  De  Lolme,  or  even  than 
our  friend  Dr.  Price.  He  candidly  fuppofes  that 
the  firft  kingly  government  will  be  wifely  and 
honeftly  adminiftered,  during  the  life  of  the  father 
of  his  people ;  that  the  firft  ariftocracy  will  be 
conducted  with  caution  and  moderation,  by  the 
band  of  patriots  to  whom  is  due  the  glory  of  the 
expulfion  of  the  tyrant ;  and  that  the  people,  for 
a  generation  at  leaft,  who  have  depofed  the  oli- 
garchy, will  behave  with  decorum. 

But  perhaps  it  might  be  more  exadly  true  and 
natural  to  fay,  that  the  king,  the  ariftocracy,  and 
the  people,  as  foon  as  ever  they  felt  themfelves 
fecure  in  the  pofleffion  of  their  power,  would 
begin  to  abufe  it. 

In  Mr.  Turgot's  fingle  aflembly,  thofe  who 
fhould  think  themfelves  moft  diftinguifhed  by 
blood  and  education,  as  well  as  fortune,  would 
be  moft  ambitious;  and  if  they  found  an  oppo- 
lition  among  their  conftituents  to  their  elections, 
would  immediately  have  recourfe  to  entertain- 
ments, fecret  intrigues,  and  every  popular  art, 
and  even  to  bribes,  to  increafe  their  parties.  This 
would  oblige  their  competitors,  though  they  might 
be  infinitely  better  men,  either  to  give  up  their 
preteniions,  or  to  imitate  thefe  dangerous  prac- 
tices. There  is  a  natural  and  unchangeable  in- 
convenience in  all  popular  elections.  There  are 
always  competitions,  and  the  candidates  have 
often  merits  nearly  equal.  The  virtuous  and 
independent  electors  are  often  divided :  this  na- 
turally caufes  too  much  attention  to  the  moft  pro- 
fligate and  unprincipled,  who  will  fell  or  give 
away  their  votes  for  other  considerations  than  wif- 
dom  and  virtue.  So  that  he  who  has  the  deepeft 
purfe,  or  the  feweft  fcruples  about  ufing  it,  will 
generally  prevail. 


of  Philofophers.  183 

It  is  from  the  natural  ariftocracy  in  a  lingle  af- 
fembly  that  the  firft  danger  is  to  be  apprehended 
in  the  prefent  ftate  of  manners  in  America ;  and 
with  a  balance  of  landed  property  in  the  hands  of 
the  people,  fo  decided  in  their  favour,  the  progrefs 
to  degeneracy,  corruption,  rage,  and  violence, 
might  not  be  very  rapid ;  neverthelefs  it  would 
begin  with  the  firft  elections,  and  grow  failer  or 
flower  every  year. 

Rage  and  violence  would  foon  appear  in  the 
aflembly,  and  from  thence  be  communicated 
among  the  people  at  large. 

The  only  remedy  is  to  throw  the  rich  and  the  ' 
proud  into  one  group,  in  a  feparate  aflembly,  and 
there  tie  their  hands;  if  you  give  them  fcope 
with  the  people  at  large,  or  their  reprefentatives, 
they  will  deftroy  all  equality  and  liberty,  with 
the  confent  and  acclamations  of  the  people  them- 
felves.  They  will  have  inuch  more  power,  mix- 
ed with  the  reprefentatives  than  feparated  from 
them.  In  the  firft  cafe,  if  they  unite,  they  will 
give  the  law,  and  govern  all ;  if  they  differ,  they , 
will  divide  the  ftate,  and  go  to  a  decifion  by 
force.  But  placing  them  alone  by  themfelves, 
the  fociety  avails  itfelf  of  all  their  abilities  and 
virtues ;  they  become  a  folid  check  to  the  repre- 
fentatives themfelves,  as  well  as  to  the  executive 
power,  and  you  difarm  them  entirely  of  the  power 
to  do  mifchief. 


LETTER 


184         Ancient  Republics,  and  Opinions 


LETTER    XXXII. 

ANCIENT  REPUBLICS,  AND  OPINIONS 
OF  PHILOSOPHERS. 

Dear  Sir> 

DIONYSIUS  Haliearnaflenfis,  in  his  feventh 
book,  has  given  us  an  excellent  fpeech  in 
the  fenate,  made  by  Manlius  Valerius,  a  man  ve- 
nerable for  his  age  and  wifdom,  and  remarkable 
for  his  conftant  friendfhip  for  the  people. 

<c  If  any  of  you,  fathers  1  alarmed  with  an  ap- 
prehenlion  that  you  will  introduce  a  pernicious 
cuftom  into  the  commonwealth,  if  you  grant  the 
people  a  power  of  giving  their  fuffrages  againft 
the  patricians,  and  entertain  an  opinion  that  the 
tribunitian  power,  if  confiderably  ftrengthened, 
xvill  prove  of  no  advantage,  let  them  learn,  that 
their  opinion  is  erroneous,  and  their  imagination 
contrary  to  found  reafoning :  for  if  any  meafure 
can  tend  to  preferve  this  commonwealth,  to  afliire 
both  her  liberty  and  power,  and  to  eftablifh  a  per- 
petual union  and  harmony  in  all  things,  the  moll 
effectual  will  be  to  give  the  people  a  fhare  in  the 
government:  and  the  moft  advantageous  thing 
to  us  will  be,  not  to  have  a  fimple  and  unmixed 
form  of  government ;  neither  a  monarchy,  an  oli- 
garchy, nor  a  democracy,  but  a  conftitution  tem- 
pered with  all  of  them :  for  each  of  thefe  forms, 
when  iimple,  very  eafily  deviates  into  abufe  and 
excefs ;  but  when  all  of  them  are  equally  mixed, 
that  part  which  happens  to  innovate,  and  to  exceed 
the  cuftomary  bounds,  is  always  reftrained  by  ano- 
ther that  is  fober,  and  adheres  to  the  eftablifhed 

order. — 


S^  185 

order.- — Thus  monarchy,  when  it  becomes  cruel 
and  infolent,  and  begins  to  purfue  tyrannical 
meafures,  is  fubverted  by  an  oligarchy,  confifting 
of  good  men ;  and  an  oligarchy,  compofed  of  the 
beft  men,  which  is  your  form  of  government,  when, 
elated  with  riches  and  dependents,  pays  no  re- 
gard to  juftice,  or  to  any  other  virtue,  and  is  de- 
ftroyed  by  a  wife  people :  and  in  a  democracy, 
when  the  people,  from  being  modeft  in  their  de- 
portment, and  obfervant  of  the  laws,  begin  to 
run  into  diforders  and  exceffes,  they  are  forced  to 
return  to  their  duty  by  the  power  with  which, 
upon  thofe  occaiions,  the  beft  man  of  the  com- 
monwealth is  inverted.  You,  fathers,  have  ufed 
all  poffible  precautions  to  prevent  monarchical 
power  from  degenerating  into  tyranny;  for,  in- 
ftead  of  a  fmgle  perfon,  you  have  inverted  two 
with  the  fupreme  power;  and  though  you  com- 
mitted this  magiftracy  to  them,  not  for  an  inde- 
finite time,  but  only  for  a  year,  you  neverthelefs 
appointed  three  hundred  patricians,  the  moft  re- 
fpedable,  both  for  their  virtue  and  their  age, 
of  whom  this  fenate  is  compofed,  to  Watch  over 
their  conduct ;  but  you  do  not  feem  hitherto  to 
have  appointed  any  to  watch  over  your  own,  and 
to  keep  you  within  proper  bounds.  As  for 
yourfelves,  I  am  as  yet  under  no  appreheniions, 
left  you  fhould  fuffer  your  minds  to  be  corrupted 
by  great  and  accumulated  profperity,  who  have 
lately  delivered  your  country  from  a  long  tyran- 
ny; and,  through  continual  and  lafting  wars,  have 
not  as  yet  had  leifure  to  grow  infolent  and  luxu- 
rious. But  with  regard  to  your  fucceffors,  when 
I  confider  how  great  alterations  length  of  time 
brings  with  it,  I  am  afraid,  left  the  men  of  power 
in  the  fenate  mould  innovate,  and  filently  tranf- 
form  our  conftitution  to  a  monarchical  tyranny  : 

whereas, 


1 86         Ancient  Republics,  and  Opinions 

whereas,  if  you  admit  the  people  to  afharein  the 
government,  no  mifchief  can  fpring  from  the  fe- 
nate;   but  the  man  who  aims  at  greater  power 
than  the  reft  of  his  fellow  citizens,  and  has  form- 
ed a  fa&ion  in  the  fenate,  of  all  who  are  willing  to 
partake    of   his    councils    and   his   crimes   (for 
thofe  who  deliberate  concerning   public  affairs 
ought  to   forefee  every  thing  that  is  probable) 
this  great,  this  awful  perfon,  1  fay,  when  called 
by  the  tribunes  to  appear  before  the  people,  muil 
give  an  account  both  of  his  actions  and  thoughts 
to  this  people,  inconliderable  as  they  are,  and  fo 
much  his  inferiors ;    and,  if  found  guilty,  fuffer 
the  punifhment  he  deferves :  and,  left  the  people 
themfelves,  when  vefted  with  fo  great  a  power, 
fhould  grow  wanton,' and,  feduced  by  the  worft 
of  demagogues,  become  dangerous  to  the  beft  of 
citizens   (for  the  multitude  generally  give  birth 
to   tyranny)   fome   perfon  of  confummate  pru- 
dence, created  dictator  by  yourfelves,  will  guard 
againft  this  evil,  and  not  allow  them  to  run  into 
excefs ;    and  being  invefted  with  abfolute  power, 
and  fubjedt  to  no  account,  will  cut  off  the  infl/5l- 
ed  part  of  the  commonwealth,  and  not  fuffer  that 
which  is  not  yet  infe&ed  to  be  vitiated,  reform 
the  laws,  excite  the  citizens  to  virtue,  and  ap- 
point fuch  magiftrates  as  he  thinks  will  govern 
"with  the  greateft  prudence:  and  having  effected 
thefe  things  within  the  fpace  of  fix  months,  he 
will  again  become  a  private  man,  without  receiv- 
ing any  other  reward  for  thefe  actions,  than  that 
of  being  honoured  for  having  performed  them. 
Induced,  therefore,  by  thefe  confiderations,  and 
convinced  that  this  is  the  moft  perfect  form  of 
government,  debar  the  people  from  nothing ;  but 
as  you  have  granted  them  a  power  of  choofing 
the  annual  magiftrates  who  are  to  prelide  over 

the 


of  Philofophers. 

the  commonwealth,  of  confirming  and  repealing 
laws,  of  declaring  war,  and  making  peace,  which 
are  the  greateft  and  moft  important  affairs  that 
come  under  the  coniideration  of  our  government, 
not  one  of  which  you  have  fubmitted  to  the  ab- 
folute  determination  of  the  fenate,  allow  them, 
in  like  manner,  the  power  of  trying  offend- 
ers, particularly  fuch  as  are  accufed  of  crimes 
againft  the  ftate,  of  railing  a  fedition,  of  aiming  at 
tyranny,  of  concerting  meafures  with  our  enemies 
to  betray  the  commonwealth,  or  of  any  other 
crimes  of  the  like  nature ;  for  the  more  formida- 
ble you  render  the  tranfgreffion  of  the  laws,  and 
the  alteration  of  difcipline,  by  appointing  many 
infpedlors,  and  many  guards  over  the  infolent  and 
the  ambitious,  the  more  will  your  conftitution  b£ 
improved." 

It  is  furprifing  that  Valerius  fhould  talk  of  an 
equal  mixture  of  monarchical,  ariflocratical,  and 
democratical  powers,  in  a  commomveaith  where 
they  were  fo  unequally  mixed  as  they  were  in 
Rome,  There  can  be  no  equal  mixture  without 
a  negative  in  each  branch  of  the  legiflature.  But 
one  example  of  an  equal  mixture  has  ever  exifted 
in  Europe,  and  that  is  in  England.  The  confuls 
in  Rome  had  no  negative;  the  people  had  a  ne- 
gative, but  a  very  unequal  one,  becaufe  they  had 
not  the  fame  time  and  opportunity  for  cool  deli- 
beration. The  appointment  of  tribunes  was  a 
very  inadequate  remedy.  What  match  for  a 
Roman  fenate  was  a  fingle  magiftrate  feated  among 
them  ?  his  abilities  could  not  be  equal ;  his  firm- 
nefs  could  not  always  be  depended  on :  but  what 
is  worle,  he  was  liable  to  be  intimidated,  flattered, 
and  bribed.  It  is  really  aftonifhing,  that  fuch 
people  as  Greeks  and  Romans  fhould  ever  have 
thought  four  or  five  ephori,  or  a  (ingle  tribune, 

VOL.  I.  A  a  or 


l88  Ancient  Republics,  &c. 

or  a  college  of  ten  tribunes,  an  adequate  repre- 
fentation  of  themfelves.  If  Valerius  had  pro- 
pofed,  that  the  conful  fhould  have  been  made  an 
integral  part  of  the  legiflature,  and  that  the  Ro- 
man people  mould  choofe  another  council  of  two 
or  three 'hundred,  equally  reprefenting  them,  to 
be  another  integral  part,  he  would  then  have  feen, 
that  the  appointment  of  a  didator  could  never  in 
any  cafe  become  necefiary. 


L  E  T  T  E  R    XXXIII. 

ANCIENT  REPUBLiCS,  AND  OPINIONS  OF 
PHILOSOPHERS. 

i\  %. '•       *  ••-       ,.    -.1    ».  .  ~  'f'.    *'•  ''     '<> 

PLATO. 

My  dear  Sir, 

PLATO  has  given  us  the  moil  accurate  detail 
of  the  natural  viciffitudes  of  manners  and 
principles,  the  ufual  progrefs  of  the  paffions  in 
fociety,  and  revolutions  of  governments  into  one 
another. 

In  the  fourth  book  of  his  Republic,  he  defcribes 
his  perfecl:  commonwealth,  where  kings  are  phi- 
lofophers,  and  philofophers  kings :  where  the 
whole  city  might  be  in  the  happieft  condition, 
and  not  any  one  tribe  remarkably  happy  beyond 
the  reft:  in  one  word,  where  the  laws  govern,  and 
juftice  is  eftabliihed :  where  the  guardians  of  the 
laws  are  fuch  in  reality,  and  preferve  the  confti- 
tution,  inftead  of  deftroying  it,  and  promote  the 
happinefs  of  the  whole  city,  not  their  own  parti- 
cularly :  where  the  ftate  is  one,  not  many  :  where 

there 


Plato.  189 

there  are  no  parties  of  the  poor  and  the  rich  at  war 
with  each  other :  where,  if  any  defcendant  of  the 
guardians  he  vicious,  he  is  difmiiTed  to  the  other 
clafles,  and  if  any  defcendant  of  the  others  be 
worthy,  he  is  raifed  to  the  rank  of  the  guardians : 
where  education,  the  grand  point  to  be  attended 
to,  produces  good  geniufes,  and  good  geniufes, 
partaking  of  fuch  education,  produce  ftill  better 
than  the  former :  where  the  children,  receiving 
from  their  infancy  an  education  agreeable  to  the 
laws  of  the  conflitution,  grow  up  to  be  worthy 
men,  and  obfervant  of  the  laws :  where  the 
fyftem,  both  of  laws  and  education,  are  contrived 
to  produce  the  virtues  of  fortitude,  temperance, 
wifdom,  and  juftice,  in  the  whole  city,  and  in  all 
the  individual  citizens  :  where,  if  among  the 
rulers,  or  guardians  of  the  laws,  there  be  one 
furpaffing  the  reft,  it  may  be  called  a  monarchy, 
or  kingly  •  government,  if  there  be  feveral,  an 
ariflocracy. 

Although  there  is  but  one  principle  of  virtue, 
thofe  of  vice  are  infinite ;  of  which  there  are  four 
which  deferve  to  be  mentioned.  There  are  as 
many  fpecies  of  foul  as  there  are  of  republics : 
five  of  each.  That  which  is  above  defcribed  is 
one. 

In  the  eighth  book  of  his  Republic  he  defcribes 
the  other,  four,  and  the  revolutions  from  one  to 
another.  The  firft  he  calls  the  Cretan,  or  Spar- 
tan, or  the  ambitous  republic;  the  fecond,  oli- 
garchy ;  the  third,  democracy ;  and  the  fourth, 
tyranny,  the  laft  difeafe  of  a  city. 

As  republics  are  generated  by  the  manners  of 
the  people,  to  which,  as  into  a  current,  all  other 
things  are  drawn,  of  neceffity  there  muft  be  as 
many  fpecies  of  men,  as  of  republics.  We  have 
already,  in  the  fourth  book,  gone  over  that  which 
we  have  pronounced  to  be  good  and  jufh  We 

are 


Ancient  Republics  >  &c. 

are  now;to  go  over  the  contentious  and  ambitious 
man,  who  is  formed  according  to  the  Spartan 
republic  ;  and  then,  him  refembling  an  oligarchy ; 
then  the  democratic ;  and  then  the  tyrannic  man, 
that  we  may  contemplate  the  mofl  unjufl  man, 
and  fet  him  in  oppoiition  to  the  mofl  juft,  that 
our  inquiry  may  be  completed !  The  ambitious 
republic  is  firft  to  be  confidered :  it  is  indeed  dif- 
ficult for  a  city  in  this  manner  conflituted,  i.  e. 
like  Sparta,  to  be  changed ;  but  as  every  thing 
which  is  generated  is  liable  to  corruption,  even  fuch 
a  conjlitution  as  this  will  not  remain  for  ever,  but  be 
diffbhed.  (I  ihall  pafs  over  all  the  aflrological 
and  rnyflical  whimfies  which  we  meet  with  fo 
often  in  Plato,  interfperfed  among  the  mofl  fub- 
lime  wifdom  and  profound  knowledge,  and  infert 
only  what  is  intelligible.)  The  amount  of  what 
he  fays  in  this  place  about  numbers  and  mufic, 
is,  that  miflakes  will  infenfibly  be  made  in  the 
choice  of  perfons  for  guardians  of  the  laws ;  and 
by  thefe  guardians,  in  the  rewards  and  promotion 
of  merit.  They  will  not  always  expertly  diflin- 
guifh  the  feveral  fpecies  of  geniufes,  the  golden, 
the  filver,  the  brazen,  and  the  iron.  Whilfl  iron 
ihall  be  mixed  with  filver,  and  brafs  with  gold, 
diffimilitude  and  difcord  arife,  and  generate  war, 
and  enmity,  and  fedition.  When  fedition  is  rifen, 
two  of  the  fpecies  of  geniufes,  the  iron  and  brazen, 
will  be  carried  away  after  gain,  and  the  acquifi- 
tion  'of  lands  and  houfes,  gold  and  filver.  But  the 
golden  and  filver  geniufes,  as  they  are  not  in 
want,  but  naturally  rich,  will  lead  the  foul 
towards  virtue  and  the  original  conflitution. 
Thus  divided,  drawing  contrary  ways,  and  living 
in  a  violent  manner,  will  not  this  republic  be 
in  the  middle,  between  ariflocracy  and  oligarchy, 
imitating,  in  fome  things,  the  former  republic, 
and  in  others  oligarchy  ?  They  will  honour 

their 


Plato.  191 

their  rulers,  their  military  will  abftain  from  agri- 
culture and  mechanic  arts ;  they  will  have  com- 
mon meals,  gymnaftic  exercifes,  and  contefls  of 
war,  as  in  the  former  republic  ;  but  they  will  be 
afraid  to  bring  wife  men  into  the  magiftracy,  be- 
caufe  they  have  no  longer  any  fuch  as  are  truly 
fimple  and  inflexible,  but  fuch  as  are  of  a  mixed 
kind,  more  forward  and  rough,  more  fitted  by 
their  natural  genius  for  war  than  peace,  efteeming 
tricks  and  flratagems ;  fuck  as  thefe  mall  deiire 
wealth,  and  hoard  up  gold  and  fil  ver,  as  thofe  who 
live  in  oligarchies.  While1  they  fpare  their  own, 
they  will  love  to  fquander  the  fubftance  of  others 
upon  their  pleafures :  They  will  fly  from  the 
law,  as  children  from  a  father,  who  have  been 
educated  not  by  perfuafion  but  by  force.  Such 
a  republic,  mixed  of  good  and  ill,  will  be  mofl 
remarkable  for  the  prevalence  of  the  contentious 
and  ambitious  fpirit. 

What  now  Ihall  the  wan  be,  correfpondent  t® 
this  republic?  He  will  be  arrogant  and  rough 
towards  inferiors ;  mild  towards  equals,  but  ex- 
tremely fubmiffive  to  governors ;  fond  of  dignity 
and  the  magiftracy,  but  thinking  that  political 
management,  and  military  performances,  not  elo- 
quence, nor  any  fuch  thing,  fliould  entitle  him  to 
them :  while  young  he  may  defpife  money,  but 
the  older  he  grows  the  more  he  will  value  'it, 
becaufe  he  is  of  the  covetous  temper,  and  not 
fmcerely  aifeded  to  virtue  and  reafon.  Such  an 
ambitious  youth  refembles  fuch  a  city,  and  is 
formed  fomehow  in  this  manner : — His  father,  a 
worthy  man,  in  an  ill-regulated  city,  fhuns  ho- 
nours, and  magiftracies,  and  law-fuits,  and  all  pub- 
lic bufmefs,  that,  as  he  can  do  no  good,  he  may 
have  no  trouble.  The  fon  hears  his  mother 
venting  her  indignation,  and  complaining  that 

ihe 


192  Ancient  Republics,  &c. 

Ihe  is  negle&ed  among  other  women,  becaufe  her 
huiband  is  not  in  the  magiftracy,  nor  attentive  to 
the  making  of  money;  that  he  is  unmanly  and 
remifs,  and  fuch  other  things  as  wives  are  apt  to 
cant  over  concerning  fuch  hulbands.  The  do- 
meftics  too  privately  fay  the  fame  things  to  the 
fons,  ftimulating  them  to  be  more  of  men  than 
their  father,  and  more  attentive  to  their  money. 
When  they  go  abroad  they  hear  the  fame  things, 
and  fee  that  thofe  who  mind  their  own  affairs  are 
called  Jimple,  and  fuch  as  mind  not  their  affairs 
are  commended.  The  young  man  comparing 
the  conduct,  fpeeches,  and  purfuits  of  his  father 
with  thofe  of  other  men,  the  one  watering  the 
rational  part  of  his  foul,  and  the  other  the  concu- 
pifcible  and  irafcible,  he  delivers  up  the  govern- 
ment within  himfelf  to  a  middle  power,  that  which 
is  irafcible  and  fond  of  contention,  and  fo  he  be- 
comes a  haughty  and  ambitious  man. — We  have 
now  the  fecond  republic,  and  the  fecond  man. 

This  fecond  republic  will  be  fucceeded  by 
oligarchy,  founded  on  men's  valuations,  in  which 
the  rich  bear  rule,  and  the  poor  have  no  fhare  in 
the  government.  The  change  from  the  ambi- 
tious republic  to  oligarchy  is  made  by  that  trea- 
fury  which  every  one  has  filled  with  gold :  for 
firft  of  all  they  and  their  wives  find  out  methods 
of  expence,  and  to  this  purpofe  ftrain  and  difobey 
the  laws,  one  obferving  and  rivalling -another,  the 
generality  become  of  this  kind;  and  proceeding 
to  greater  defires  of  making  money,  the  more  ho- 
nourable they  account  this  to  be,  the  more  will 
virtue  be  thought  difhonourable.  Virtue  is  fo 
different  from  wealth,  that  they  always  weigh 
againft  each  other.  Whilft  wealth  and  the  wealthy 
are  held  in  honour  in  the  city,  both  virtue  and  the 
good  muft  be  more  diihonoured,  and  what  is 

honoured 


Plato. 

honoured  is  purfued,  and  what  is  difhonoured  is 
negle&ed.  Inftead  then  of  ambitious  men,  they 
will  become  lovers  of  gain.  The  rich  they  praife 
and  admire,  and  bring  into  the  magiftracy,  but 
the  poor  man  they  defpife.  They  then  make 
laws,  marking  out  the  boundary  of  the  conftitu- 
tion, and  regulating  the  quantity  of  oligarchic 
power,  according  to  the  quantity  of  wealth ;  more 
to  the  more  wealthy,  and  lefs  to  the  lefs :  ib  that 
he  who  hath  not  the  valuation  fettled  by  law  is 
to  have  no  fhare  in  the  government.  What  think 
you  of  this  conftitution?  If  we  fhould  appoint 
pilots  according  to  their  valuation,  but  never 
entruft  a  fhip  with  a  poor  man,  though  better 
ikilled  in  his  art,  we  fhould  make  very  bad  navi- 
gation.— Again,  fuch  a  city  is  not  one,  but  of 
neceffity  two ;  one,  confifting  of  the  poor,  and 
the  other  of  the  rich,  dwelling  in  one  place, 
and  always  plotting  againft  one  another.  They 
are,  moreover,  incapable  to  wage  war,  becauie 
of  the  neceffity  they  are  under,  either  of  em- 
ploying the  armed  multitude,  and  of  dreading 
them  more  than  the  enemy,  or  to  appear  in  bat- 
tle, truly  oligarchic,  and  at  the  fame  time  be 
unwilling  to  advance  money  for  the  public  fervice, 
through  a  natural  difpofition  of  covetoufnefs. 

In  fuch  a  government  almoft  all  are  poor,  ex- 
cept the  governors;  and  where  there  are  poor, 
there  are  fome where  concealed  thieves,  and  purfe- 
cutters,  and  facrilegious  perfons,  and  workers  of 
all  other  evils  :  thefe  the  magiftracy  with  dili- 
gence and  force  reft  rains :  thefe  are  drones  in  a 
city  with  dangerous  ft  ings. 

This  is  oligarchy.  Now  let  us  confiderthe  man 
who  refembles  it.  The  change  from  the  ambi- 
tious to  the  oligarchic  man  is  chiefly  in  this  man- 
ner: 


1 94  Ancient*  Republics,  &c. 

ner: — The  ambitious  man,  has  a  fon,  who  emu- 
lates his  father,  and  follows  his  fteps;  afterwards 
he  dafhes  on  the  city,  as  on  a  rock,  wafting  his 
fubftance  in  the  office  of  a  general,  or  fome  other 
principal  magiftracy ;  then  falling  into  courts 
of  juftice,  deftroyed  by  fycophants,  ftripped  of 
his  dignities,  difgraced,  and  looting  all  his  fub- 
ftance. When  he  has  thus  fuifered,  and  loft  his 
fub fiance,  in  a  terror  he  pulhes  headlong  from 
the  throne  of  his  foul  that  ambitious  difpoiition ; 
and,  being  humbled  by  his  poverty,  turns  to  the 
making  of  money,  lives  fparingly  and  meanly, 
and  applying  to  work,  fcrapes  together  fubftance. 
He  then  feats  in  that  throne  the  avaricious  difpo- 
iition, and  makes  it  a  mighty  king  within  himfelf, 
decked  out  with  Perlian  crowns,  bracelets,  and 
fcepters.  Having  placed  the  virtuous  and  ambi- 
tious difpofition  low  on  the  ground,  he  reafons  on 
nothing  but  how  lefler  lubftance  ihall  be  made 
greater,  admires  and  honours  nothing  but  riches 
and  rich  people.  This  is  the  change  from  an 
. ambitious  youth  to  a  covetous  one,  and  this  is  the 
oligarchic  man. 

Democracy  is  next  to  be  confidered,  in  what 
manner  it  arifes,  and  what  kind  of  man  it  pro- 
duces when  arifen.  The  change  from  oligarchy  to 
democracy  is  produced  through  the  infatiable  deiire 
of  becoming  as  rich  as  poffible.  As  thofe  who  are 
governors  in  it  govern  on  account  of  their  pofieffing 
great  riches,  they  will  be  unwilling  to  reftrain  by 
law  fuch  of  the  youth  as  are  diilblute,  from 
having  the  liberty  of  fquandering  and  wafting 
their  lubftance;  that  fo,  by  purchasing  the  fub- 
ftance of  fuch  perfons,  and  lending  them  on 
ufury,  they  may  ftill  become  richer,  and  be  held 
in  greater  honour.  While  they  negleft  education, 
and  furler  the  youth  to  grow  licentious,  they 

fome- 


Plafa 

fometimes  lay  under  a  neceffity  of  becoming  poor* 
fuch  as  are  of  no  ungenerous  difpofition :  thefe 
fit  in  the  city,  fome  of  them  in  debt,  others  in 
contempt,    hating   and    confpiring   againft   thofe 
who  poflefs  their  fubftance,  and  with  others  very 
defirous  of  a  change.     But  the  money-catchers, 
ftill  brooding  over  it,  and  drawing  to  themfelves 
exorbitant  ufury,  fill  the  city  with  drones   and 
poor.     They  neglect  every  thing  but  making  of 
money,  and  make  no  more  account  of  virtue  than 
the  poor  do.     When   thefe  governors  and  their 
fubjects  meet   on  the  road,  at  public  fhows,  in 
military  marches,  as  fellow  foldiers  or  failors,  or 
in  common  dangers,  the  poor  are  by  no  means 
contemned  by  the  rich.    A  robuft  fellow,  poor  and 
funburnt,  betide  a  rich  man,  bred  up  in  the  {hade, 
fwoln  with  flefh,   and  panting  for  breath,  and  in 
agony  in  battle,  thinks  it  is  through  his  own  and 
his  fellows  fault  that  fuch  men  grow  rich,  and 
fays,  Our  rich  men  are  good  for  nothing.     The 
city  foon  grows  into  fedition  between  the  oligar- 
chic and  democratic  parties ;  and  the  poor  prevail- 
ing over  the  rich,  kill  fome  and  banilh  others,  and 
fhare  the  places  in  the  republic,  and  the  magiftra- 
cies,  equally  among  the  remainder,  and  for  the 
moft  part  the  magifiracies  are  difpofed  in  it  by 
lot.     In  what  manner  do  thefe  live,  and  what  fort 
of  republic  is  this?     A  democracy.     The  city  is 
full  of  all    freedom   of  adion  and   fpeech,  and 
liberty  to  do  in  it  what  any  one  inclines  :  every 
one  will  regulate  his  own  method  of  life  in  what- 
ever way  he  pleafes.      In  fuch  a  republic  will 
arifc  men  of  all  kinds.     This  is  the  flneft  of  all 
republics,  variegated  like  a  robe  with  all  kinds 
of  flowers,  and  diverfified  with  all  forts  of  man- 
ners.     The   multitude,  it   is    likely,  judge   this 
republic  the  bed,  like  children  and  women  gazing 
VOL.  I.  B  b  at 


196     jrjjgj        Ancient  Republics,  &c. 

at  variegated  things.  In  truth  it  contains  all 
of  republics,  and  it  appears  neceflary  for  any 
one,  who  wants  to  conftitute  a  city,  as  we  do  at 
prefent,  to  come  to  a  democratic  city,  as  to  a  ge- 
neral fair  of  republics,  and  choofe  the  form  that 
he  fancies :  he  will  not  be  in  want  of  models. 
Is  not  this  a  fweet  and  divine  manner  of  life  for 
the  prefent?  To  be  under  no  neceflity  to  govern, 
although  you  were '  able  to  govern ;  nor  to  be 
fubjed,  unlefs  you  incline  j  nor  to  be  engaged  in 
war  when  others  are ;  nor  to  live  in  peace  when 
others  do  fo,  unlefs  you  be  defirous  of  peace ;  and 
though  there  be  a  law  retraining  you  from  go- 
verning or  adminiftering  juftice,  to  govern  never- 
thelefs,  and  adminifter  juftice  if  you  incline  t 
Have  you  not  obferved,  in  fuch  a  republic,  men 
condemned  to  death  or  banifhment  continuing 
ftill,  or  returning  like  heroes,  and  walking  up  and 
down  openly,  as  if  no  one  obferved  them  ?  Is  not 
this  indulgence  of  the  city  very  generous,  in  mag- 
nificently defpiiing  all  care  of  education  and  dif- 
cipline,  and  in  not  regarding  from  what  fort  of 
purfuits  one  comes  to  adl  in  public  affairs,  but 
honouring  him,  if  he  only  fay  he  is  well  affected 
towards  the  multitude  ?  Thefe  things,  and  fuch  as 
'thefe,  are  to  be  found  in  a  democracy;  and  it 
would  be  a  pleafant  fort  of  republic,  anarchical 
and  variegated,  diftributing  a  certain  equality  to 
all  alike,  without  diflinclion. 

Let  us  coniider  now  the  chara6ler  of  a  democra- 
tical  man,  and  how  he  arifes  out  of  that  parfnno- 
nious  one  who,  under  the  oligarchy,  was  trained 
tip  by  his  father  in  his  manners.'  Such  a  one  by 
force  governs  his  own  pleafures,  which  are  expen- 
five,  and  tend  not  to  making  money,  and  are  called 
unneceflary.  Eating,  fo  far  as  conduces  to  pre- 
ierve  life,  health,  and  a  good  habit  of  body,  is  a 

plea- 


Plato.  197 

pleafure  of  the  neceffary  kind :  but  the  defire  of 
thefe  things  beyond  thefe  purpofes,  is  capable  of 
being  curbed  in  youth ;  and,  being  hurtful  to  the 
body  and  to  the  foul,  with  reference  to  her  attain- 
ing wifdom  and  temperance,  may  be  called  unne- 
ceflary :  in  the  fame  manner  we  ihall  fay  of  venere- 
al defires,  and  others.  We  juft  now  denominated  a 
drone  the  man  who  was  full  of  fuch  defires  and 
pleafures ;  but  the  oligarchic  man,  him  who  was 
under  the  neceffary  ones.  The  democratic  appears 
to  arife  from  the  oligarchic  man  in  this  manner : — 
When  a  young  man,  bred  up  without  proper  in- 
ilru6lion,and  in  a  parlimonious  manner,  comes  to 
tafte  the  honey  of  the  drones,  and  affociates  with 
thofe  vehement  and  terribk  creatures,  who  are  able 
to  procure  pleafures  every  way  diverfified,  from 
every  quarter;  thence  imagine  there  is  the  begin- 
ning of  a  change  in  him,  from  the  oligarchic  to  the 
democratic.  And  as  the  city  was  changed  by  the 
affiftance  of  an  alliance  from  without,  with  one 
party  of  it,  with  which  it  was  of  kin,  fhall  not  the 
youth  be  changed  in  the  fame  manner,  by  the 
afliftance  of  one  fpecies  of  defires  from  without, 
to  another  within  him,  which  refembles  it,  and  is 
akin  to  it  ?  By  all  means.  If  any  affiftance  be 
given  to  the  oligarchic  party  within  him,  by  his 
father,  or  the  others  of  his  family,  admonifhing 
and  upbraiding  him,  then  truly  arifes  fedition  and 
oppofition,  and  a  fight  within  him,  with  himfelf. 
Sometimes  the  democratic  party  yields  to  the 
oligarchic;  fome  of  the  defires  are  deftroyed, 
others  retire,  on  the  rife  of  a  certain  modefty  in 
the  foul  of  the  youth,  and  he  is  again  rendered 
fomewhat  decent.  Again,  when  fonie  defires  re- 
tire, there  are  others  akin  to  them,  which  grow 
up,  and  through  inattention  to  the  father's  in- 
ftiuftions,  become  both  many  and  powerful, 

draw 


198  Ancient  Republics, 

draw  towards  intimacies  among  themfelves,  and 
generate  a  multitude,  feize  the  citadel  of  the  foul 
of  the  youth,  finding  it  evacuated  of  noble  learning 
and  purfuits,  and  of  true  reafoning,  which  are  the 
beft  watchmen  and  guardians  in  the  underftand- 
ings  of  men  beloved  of  the  gods  ;  and  then  falfe 
and  boafting  reafonings  and  opinions,  rufhing  up 
in  their  ftead,  poffefs  the  fame  place  in  fuch  a 
one.  Thefe  falfe  and  boafting  reafonings,  deno- 
minating modefty  to  be  ftupidity ;  temperance,  un<- 
manlinefs;  moderation,  rufticity ;  decent  expence, 
illiberality ;  thruft  them  all  out  difgracefully,  and 
expel  them  their  territories,  and  lead  in  in  triumph 
infolence  and  anarchy,  and  luxury  and  impu- 
dence, with  encomiums  and  applaufes,  mining 
with  a  great  retinue,  and  crowned  with  crowns. 
Infolence  they  denominate  education ;  anarchy, 
liberty;  luxury,  magnificence;  and  impudence, 
manhood.  In  this  manner,  a  youth  bred  up  with 
the  neceflary  delires  changes  into  the  licentiouf- 
nefs  and  remiflhefs  of  the  unneceflary  and  unpro- 
fitable pleafures ;  his  life  is  not  regulated  by  any 
order,  but  deeming  it  pleafant,  free,  and  happy, 
he  puts  all  laws  whatever  on  a  level ;  like  the  ci- 
ty, he  is  fine  and  variegated,  and  many  men  and 
women  too  would  deiire  to  imitate  his  life,  as  he 
hath  in  him  a  great  many  patterns  of  republics 
and  of  manners. 

It  remains,  that  we  go  over  the  moft  excellent 
republic,  which  is  tyranny,  and  the  moft  excellent 
man,  who  is  the  tyrant.  The  change  is  from  de- 
mocracy to  tyranny,  as  from  oligarchy  to  demo- 
cracy. An  infatiable  deiire  of  riches,  and  a  ne- 
gleft  of  other  things,  through  attention  to  making 
money,  deftroys  oligarchy ;  and  an  infatiable 
third  of  liberty  deftroys  democracy.  When  a 
city  is  under  a  democracy,  and  is  thirfting  after  li- 

ip  berty, 


Plato.  199 

berty,  and  happens  to  have  bad  cup-bearers,  and 
grows  drunk  with  an  unmixed  draught  of  it,  be- 
yond what  is  necefTary,  it  punifhes  even  the  go- 
vernors, if  they  will  not  be  entirely  tame,  and  af- 
ford a  deal  of  liberty,  acculing  them  as  corrupted, 
and  leaning  towards  oligarchy.  Such  as  are  obe- 
dient to  magiftrates  are  abufed,  as  willing  flaves, 
and  good  for  nothing.  Magiftrates  who  referable 
fubjects,  and  fubjecls  who  referable  magiftrates, 
are  commended  and  honoured,  both  in  public  and 
private ;  in  fuch  a  city  they  of  neceffity  foon  go 
to  the  highefl  pitch  of  liberty,  and  this  inbred 
anarchy  defcends  into  private  families.  The  fa- 
ther refembles  the  child,  and  is  afraid  of  his  fons. 
The  fons  accuftom  themfelves  to  refemble  the 
father,  and  neither  revere  nor  ftand  in  awe  of  their 
parents.  Strangers  are  equalled  with  citizens. 
The  teacher  fears  and  flatters  the  fcholars,  and 
the  fcholars  defpife  their  teachers  and  tutors.  The 
youth  refemble  the  more  advanced  in  years,  and 
rival  them  in  words  and  deeds.  The  old  men, 
fitting  down  with  the  young,  are  full  of  merri- 
ment and  pleafantry,  mimicking  the  youth,  that 
they  may  not  appear  to  be  morofe  and  defpotic. 
The  flaves  are  no  lefs  free  than  thofe  who  purchafe 
them;  and  wives  have  a  perfect:  equality  and  li- 
berty with  their  hufbands,  and  huibands  with 
their  wives. — The  fum  of  all  thefe  things,  collected 
together,  make  the  fouls  of  the  citizens  fo  delicate, 
that  if  any  one  bring  near  to  them  any  thing  of 
flavery,  they  are  filled  with  indignation,  and  can- 
not endure  it ;  and  at  length  they  regard  not  the 
laws,  written  or  unwritten,  that  no  one  whatever, 
by  any  manner  of  means,  may  become  their  maf- 
ter.  This  is  that  government  fo  beautiful  and 
youthful,  whence  tyranny  fprings.  But  any 
thing  in  excefs,  in  animal  or  vegetable  bodies, 

in 


20O  Ancient  Republics,  £sfc. 

in  feafons  or  in  republics,  is  wont  to  occafion  a 
mighty  change  to  the  reverfe ;  and  exceflive  li- 
berty feems  to  change  into  nothing  but  exceflive 
ilavery,  both  with  a  private  perfon  and  a  city. 
Thus  licentioufnefs  deftroys  the  democracy.  Out 
of  no  other  republic  is  tyranny  conftituted  but 
out  of  democracy ;  and  out  of  the  moft  exceflive 
liberty,  the  greateft  and  moft  favage  Ilavery.  The 
race  of  idle  and  profufe  men,  one  part  of  which 
was  more  brave,  and  were  leaders,  the  other  more 
cowardly,  and  followers,  we  compared  to  drones, 
fome  with  flings,  others  with  none.  Thefe  two 
fpringing  up  in  a  republic,  raife  difturbance,  as 
phlegm  and  bile  in  a  natural  body.  Let  us  di- 
vide a  democratic  city  into  three,  as  it  really  is ; 
for  one  fuch  fpecies  .as  the  above  grows  through 
licentioufnefs  in  it,  no  lefs  than  in  the  oligarchic, 
but  is  much  more  fierce:  in  oligarchy,  becaufe  it 
is  not  in  places  of  honour,  but  is  debarred  from 
the  magiftracies,  it  is  unexercifed,  and  does  not  be- 
come ftrong;  but  in  a  democracy  this  is  the  pre- 
liding  party,  excepting  a  few ;  and  now  it  fays 
and  does  the  moft  outrageous  things.  Some  other 
party  is  now  always  feparated  from  the  multitude; 
and  while  the  whole  are  fomehow  in  purfuit  of 
gain,  fuch  as  are  the  moft  temperate  become  the 
wealthieft,  and  have  the  greateft  quantity  of  ho- 
ney ;  hence  the  greateft  quantity  of  honey,  and 
what  comes  with  the  greateft  eafe,  is  prefled 
out  of  thefe  by  the  drones.  Such  wealthy  peo- 
ple are  the  pafture  of  the  drones.  The  people 
who  mind  their  own  affairs,,  and  meddle  not  with 
any  others,  who  have  not  much  property,  but 
yet  are  the  moft  numerous,  and  the  moft  pre- 
valent in  democracy,  whenever  it  is  fully  assembled, 
would  be  a  third  fpecies :  but  it  will  not  often 
fully  aflemble,  if  it  does  not  get  fome  fhare  of  the 
honey.  It  does,  however,  always  get  a  fhare,  for 

their 


Plato. 

their  leaders  rob  thofe  who  have  fubftance,  and 
give  it  to  the  people,  that  they  may  have  the  mofl 
themfelves.  Thefe,  then,  who  are  thus  defpoiled, 
are  obliged  to  defend  themfelves,  faying  and  doing 
all  they  can  among  the  people.  Others,  then,  give 
them  occafion  to  form  defigns  againft  the  people, 
and  fo  they  become  oligarchic,  even  although  they 
fhould  have  no  inclination  to  introduce  a  change 
of  government :  thence  they  go  to  accufations, 
law-fuits,  and  contefts,  one  with  another,  the  lead- 
ers flandering,  and  the  drones  fringing. 

The  people  are  wont  always  to  fet  fome  one  in 
a  confpicuous  manner  over  themfelves,  to  cherifh 
him,  and  greatly  t$  increafe  his  power.  When- 
ever a  tyrant  riles,  it  is  from  this  root,  and  from 
nothing  elfe,  that  he  bloffoms.  What  then  is  the 
beginning  of  a  change,  from  a  prefident  into  a  ty- 
rant?— The  wolf  in  the  temple  of  Arcadia,  dedi- 
cated to  Lycaean  Jupiter,  had  this  infcription, 
"  That  whoever  tafted  human  entrails,  mixed  with 
other  facrifices,  neceffarily  became  a  wolf."  In 
the  fame  manner,  he  who,  being  prefident  of  the 
people,  and  receiving  an  extremely  fubmiflive 
multitude,  abftaineth  not  from  kindred  blood, 
but  unjuftly  accuiing  them,  and  bringing  them 
into  courts  of  juftice,  {tains  himfelf  with  blood- 
fhed,  and  banifhes  and  flays,  and  propofes  the  abo- 
lition of  debts,  and  divilion  of  lands;—  muft  not 
fuch  a  one  either  be  deflroyed  by  his  enemies,  or 
exercife  .tyranny,  and,  from  being  a  man,  become 
a  wolf?  He  now  becomes  feditious  towards  thofe 
who  have  fubftance,  and  when  he  fails  he  goes 
againft  his  enemies  with  open  force,  and  becomes 
an  accomplifhed  tyrant;  and  if  they  be  unable  to 
expel  him,  or  put  him  to  death  by  an  accufation 
before  the  city,  they  confpire  to  cut  him  off  pri- 
vately, by  a  violent  death.  On  this  account,  all 

thofe 


2.Q2,  Ancient  Republics,  &c. 

thofe  who  mount  up  to  tyranny  invent  the  cele- 
brated  tyrannical  demand  of  the  people,  certain 
guards  for  their  perfons,  that  the  affiftance  of  the 
people  may  be  fecured  to  them.  The  people, 
afraid  of  his  fafety,  but  fecure  as  to  their  own, 
grant  them.  Then  thofe  who  have  fubftance, 
and  the  crime  of  hating  the  people,  fly;  and  if 
any  one  of  them  is  caught,  he  is  put  to  death. 
This  preiident  of  a  city,  thus  not  behaving  like 
a  truly  great  man,  tumbles  down  many  others, 
and  fits  in  his  chair  a  confummate  tyrant,  inftead 
of  a  prefident  of  the  city.  Coniider  now  the  hap- 
pinefs  of  the  man  and  the  city  in  which  fuch  a 
mortal  arifes :  in  the  firft  days,  he  fmiles,  and  fa- 
lutes  every  one  he  meets,  fays  he  is  no  tyrant,  pro- 
mifes  many  things,  both  in  private  and  in  public, 
frees  from  debts,  diftributes  lands,  both  to  the  peo- 
ple in  general,  and  thofe  about  him,  affe&s  to  be 
mild  and  of  the  patriot  fpirit  towards  all.  But 
when  he  has  reconciled  to  himfelf  fome  of  his  fo- 
reign enemies,  and  tranquillity  is  reflored,  he  raifes 
wars , that  the  people  may  want  a  leader,and  that,  be- 
ing rendered  poor  by  the  payment  of  taxes,they  may 
be  under  a  neceffity  of  becoming  intent  on  a  daily 
fuftenance,  and  lefs  ready  to  confpire  againflhim. 
If  he  fufpe&s  any  of  them,  who  are  of  free  fpirits, 
will  not  allow  him  to  govern,  in  order  to  have 
fome  pretext  fordeftroying  them,  he  expofes  them 
to  the  enemy.  On  thefe  accounts,  a  tyrant  is  al- 
ways under  a  neceffity  of  railing  war.  While  he 
is  doing  thefe  things,  he  muft  become  more  hate- 
ful to  his  citizens :  fome  of  thofe  who  have  been 
promoted  along  with  him,  and  are  in  power,  fpeak 
out  freely,  both  to  him  and  among  themfelves, 
finding  fault  with  the  tranfadlions.  It  behoves  the 
tyrant  then  to  cut  off  all  thofe  who  are  of  a  more 
manly  fpirit,  if  he  means  to  govern,  till  he  leave 

no 


Plato.  203. 

no  one,  friend  or  foe,  worth  any  thing;  he  muft 
carefully  obferve  who  is  courageous,  magnani- 
mous, wife,  rich,  and  of  neceflity  he  muft  be  an 
enemy  to  all  thefe,  and  lay  fnares,  until  he  cleanfe 
the  city  of  them.  Thus  he  muft  live  with  wicked 
people,  and  be  hated  by  them  too,  or  not  live  at 
all ;  the  more  he  is  hated,  the  more  guards  he  will 
want.  But  the  worthy  men  being  deftroyed,  the 
worft  muft  be  his  guards.  What  a  bleffed  pof- 
feffion !  But  this  army  of  the  tyrant,  fo  beautiful, 
fo  numerous,  and  multiform,  muft  be  maintained. 
If  there  be  any  facred  things  in  the  city,  thefe  they 
will  fpend,  and  the  people  obliged  to  pay  the 
lighter  taxes.  When  thefe  fail,  he  and  his  drunken 
companions  and  affociates,  male  and  female,  (hall 
be  maintained  out  of  the  paternal  inheritance;  and 
the  people  who  have  made  the  tyrant  fhall  nourifh 
him.  If  the  people  be  enraged,  and  fay  that  they 
did  not  make  him  to  be  flaves  to  his  ilaves,  but 
that  they  might  be  fet  at  liberty  from  the  rich  in 
the  city,  who  are  now  called  good  and  worthy 
men,  and  order  him  and  his  companions  to  be 
gone  out  of  the  city,  as  a  father  drives  out  of  his 
houfe  his  fon,  with  his  tumultuary,  drunken  com- 
panions ;  then  indeed  the  people  fhall  know  what 
a  beaft  they  are  themfeives,  and  what  a  beaft  they 
have  generated,  hugged,  and  bred  up.  While  they 
are  the  weaker,  they  attempt  to  drive  out  the  ftrong- 
er.  The  tyrant  will  ftrip  them  of  their  armour. 
The  people,  defending  themfeives  againft  the 
fmoke  of  flavery,  have  fallen  into  the  fire  of  def- 
potifm  ;  inftead  of  that  exceffive  and  unfeafonable 
liberty,  embracing  the  moft  rigorous  and  wretch- 
ed flavery  of  bondmen. — Thus,  to  fpeak  modeftly, 
we  have  fufficiently  fliewn  how  tyranny  arifes  out 
of  democracy,  and  what  it  is  after  it  is  rifen. 

END    OF     THE    EIGHTH    BOOK. 

VOL.  I.  C  c  THE 


204  Ancient  Republics,  &fc. 

THE    NINTH    BOOK. 

THE  tyrannical  man  himfelf  remains  yet  to 
be  confidered,  in  what  manner  he  arifes  out 
of  the  democratic,  and  what  kind  of  man  he  is, 
and  whether  he  is  wretched  or  happy;  of  thofe 
pleafures  and  deiires  which  are  not  neceflary,  fame 
are  repugnant  to  law  ;  thefe  indeed  appear  to  fpring 
up  in  every  one,  but  being  ckajlifed  by  the  laws, 
and  the  better  defires,  along  with  reafon,  they 
either  forfake  fome  men  altogether,  or  are  lefs  in 
number,  and  feeble ;  in  others  they  are  in  greater 
number,  and  more  powerful.  Thefe  lawlefs 
deiires  are  fuch  as  are  excited  in  fleep,  when  the 
rational  part  of  the  foul  which  governs  it  is  afleep, 
and  the  part  which  is  brutal  and  favage,  being 
filled  with  meats  and  drunk  ennefs,  frifks  about, 
and  pufhing  away  fleep,  wants  to  go  and  accom- 
plifh  its  practices;  in  fuch  a  one  it  dares  to  do 
every  thing,  as  being  loofed  and  difengaged  from 
all  modefty  and  difcretion ;  for  it  fcruples  not  the 
embraces,  as  it  imagines,  of  gods,  men,  or  beafts ; 
nor  to  kill  any  one ;  in  one  word,  is  wanting  in 
no  folly  nor  impudence.  There  is  in  every  one 
a  certain  fpecies  of  deiires,  which  is  terrible,  fa- 
vage, and  irregular,  even  in  fome  who  feem  to 
us  to  be  entirely  moderate. 

Recollect  now  what  kind  of  man  we  faid  the 
democratic  one  was ;  educated  from  his  infancy 
under  a  parfimonious  father,  who  valued  the 
avaricious  defires  alone ;  but  being  afterwards 
converfant  with  thofe  who  are  more  refined,  run- 
ning into  their  manner,  and  all  fort  of  infolence, 
from  a  deteftation  of  his  father's  parfimony ;  how- 
ever, having  a  better 'natural  temper  than  thofe 
who  corrupt  him,  and  being  drawn  oppoiite  ways, 
he  fettles  into  a  manner  in  the  middle  of  both,  and 
participating  moderately,  as  he  imagines,  of  each 

of 


Plato.  205 

of  them,  he  leads  a  life  neither  illiberal  nor  licen- 
tious, becoming  a  democratic  man  from  an  arifto- 
cratic.  His  fon  is  educated  in  his  manners,  but 
the  fame  things  happening  to  him  as  to  his  father, 
he  is  drawn  into  all  kinds  of  licentioufnefs,  which 
is  termed,  however,  by  thofe  who  draw  him  off, 
the  moft  complete  liberty.  His  father,  the  do- 
meftics,  and  others,  are  aiding  to  thofe  delires 
which  are  in  the  middle :  but  when  the  tyrant- 
makers  have  no  hopes  of  retaining  the  youth  in 
their  power  any  other  way,  they  contrive  to  ex- 
cite in  him  a  certain  love,  which  preiides  over  the 
indolent  defires,  and  fuch  as  minifter  readily  to 
their  pleafures ;  and  when  other  deiires  make  a 
iioife  about  him,  full  of  their  odours  and  per- 
fumes, and  crowns  and  wines,  and  the  pleafures  of 
the  moft  dhTolute  kind,  then  truly  he  is  fur- 
rounded  \vith  madnefs  as  a  life  guard,  and  that 
preiident  of  the  foul  rages  with  phrenzy,  till  he 
kills  all  modefty,  is  cleanfed  of  temperance,  and 
filled  with  additional  madnefs.  This  is  the  for- 
mation of  a  tyrannical  man.  After  this  there  are 
feaftings  among  them,  and  revellings,  banquetting, 
and  miftrefTes,  and  all  fuch  things  as  may  be  ex- 
pected where  the  tyrants  love,  drunkennefs  and 
madnefs,  govern  all  in  the  foul.  After  this  there 
is  borrowing  and  pillaging  of  fubftance,  and 
fearching  for  every  thing  which  they  are  able,  by 
rage  and  phrenzy,  deceit  and  violence,  to  carry  off; 
pilfering  and  beguiling  parents.  When  the  fub- 
ftance of  father  and  mother  fails,  he  will  break 
into  houfes,  robin  theftreets,  rifle  temples.  Thofe 
defires  which  heretofore  were  only  looie  from  their 
flavery  in  fleep,  when  he  was  yet  under  the  laws 
and  his  father,when  under  democratic  government, 
now  when  he  is  tyrannized  over  by  his  paffions, 
ihall  be  equally  as  loofe  when  he  is  awake,  and 

from 


2o6          Ancient  Republics,  and  Opinions 

from  no  horrid  {laughter  or  deed  fhall  he  abftain ; 
but  the  tyrant  within  him  Jiving  without  any  rejlraint 
of  law  and  government,  fhall  lead  him  on  to  every 
mad  attempt.  Such  as  thefe  eftablifh  as  tyrant, 
the  man  who  among  them  hath  himfelf  moft  of 
the  tyrant,  and  in  greateft  ftrength  within  his  own 
foul.  If  the  city  relucls,  he  fhall  bring  in  other 
young  peoples  and  chaftife  his  formerly  beloved 
mother  and  father  country,  as  the  Cretans  fay.  But 
liberty  and  true  friendfhip  the  tyrannic  difpofition 
never  tafted.  Let  us  finifh  then  our  worft  man. 
He  will  be  awake  fuch  as  we  defcribed  him  afleep, 
and  he  who  appears  the  moft  wicked,  fhall  really 
be  the  moft  wretched;  as  many  men  as  many 
minds ;  as  city  is  to  city,  as  to  virtue  and  happi- 
nefs,  fo  will  man  be-to  man  ;  kingly  government 
is  the  beft,  and  tyranny  is  the  worft.  No  city  is 
more  wretched  than  that  which  is  under  tyranny, 
nor  any  more  happy  than  that  under  regal  power. 
Both  the  city  and  the  tyrant  fhall  be  flavifh,  poor, 
timorous;  and  you  will  find  more  lamentations 
and  groans,  weepings  and  torments,  than  in  any 
other  city.  We  Jhou/d  not  merely  conjecture  about 
matters  of  such  importance,  but  mofl  thoroughly  in* 
quire  into  them,  by  reasoning  of  this  kind,  for  the  in- 
quiry is  concerning  the  mofl  important  matter,  a  good 
life  and  a  bad. 

Such  private  men  as  are  rich,  and  pofTefs  many 
flaves,  have  this  refemblance  at  leaft  of  tyrants, 
that  they  rule  over  many :  if  they  live  fecurely, 
and  are  not  afraid  of  their  domeftics,  it  is  becaufe 
the  whole  city  gives  afiiftance  to  each  particular 
man  :  but  if  a  god  fhould  lift  a  man,  his  wife  and 
children,  with  fifty  flaves,  out  of  the  city,  and  let 
them  down  in  a  defart,  in  what  kind  of  fear  would 
he  be  about  himfelf,  his  wife  and  children,  left 
they  fhould  be  deftroyed  by  the  domeftics! 

Such, 


of  Phikfophers.  207 

Such,  and  much  worfe,  is  the  tyrant  in  his  ty^ 
rannical  city ; — envious,  faithlefs,cowardly,  unjuft, 
unfriendly,  unholy,  and  a  fink  and  breeder  of  all 
wickednefs. 

Now  tell  me  which  is  the  firft  and  which  the 
laft,  as  to  happinefs,  the  regal,  the  ambitious,  the 
oligarchic,  the  democratic,  and  the  tyrannic  man. 
and  city.  The  befl  and  jufteft  is  the  happieft. 

Thus,  Sir,  you  have  fome  of  Plato's  fentiments 
of  morals  and  politics,  how  much  they  are  to  Mr* 
Turgot's  purpofe,  we  may  mew  in  another  letter; 
mean  time  I  am,  &c. 


LETTER    XXXIV. 


My  dear  Sir, 

I  PROMISED  you  to  add  to  the  refearches  of 
Polybius  and  Plato,  concerning  the  mutability 
of  governments,  thofe  of  Sir  Thomas  Smith,  who, 
as  he  tells  us,  on  the  28th  of  March,  1565,  in 
the  7th  of  Eliz.  and  5ift  year  of  his  age,  was 
ambaflador  from  that  queen  to  the  court  of  France, 
and  then  publifhed  "The  Commonwealth  of  Eng-> 
land,"  not  as  Plato  made  his  Republic,  Xenophon 
his  Kingdom  of  Periia,  or  Sir  Thomas  Moore  his 
Utopia,  feigned  commonwealths,  fuch  as  never 
were  nor  fhall  be,  vain  imaginations,  phantafies  of 
philofophers,  but  as  England  flood,  and  was  go-^ 
verned  at  that  day. 

In  his  7th  chapter,  and  the  two  following,  he 
gives  us  his  opinion  of  the  origin  of  a  kingdom, 

an 


2o8         Ancient  Republics,  and  Opinions 

an  ariftocracy,  and  democracy.  The  third  he 
fuppofes  to  grow  naturally  out  of  the  fecond,  and 
the  fecond  out  of  the  firft,  which  originated  in 
patriarchal  authority.  But  as  there  is  nothing  re- 
markable, either  in  favour  of  our  fyftem  or  againft 
it,  I  ftiould  not  have  quoted  the  book  in  this  place, 
but  for  the  fake  of  its  title.  The  conftitution  of 
England  is  in  truth  a  republic,  and  has  been  ever 
fo  confidered  by  foreigners,  and  by  the  moft  learn- 
ed and  enlightened  Englishmen,  although  the  word 
commonwealth  has  become  unpopular  and  odious, 
iince  the  unfuccefsful  and  injudicious  attempts  to 
abolifh  monarchy  and  ariftocracy,  between  the 
years  1640  and  1660. 

Let  us  proceed  then  to  make  a  few  obfervations 
upon  the  Difcourfes  oT  Plato  and  Polybius,  and 
ihew  how  forcibly  they  prove  the  neceffity  of  per- 
manent laws,  to  reftrain  the  paflions  and  vices  of. 
men,  and  to  fecure  to  the  citizens  the  bleffings 
.  of  fociety,  in  the  peaceable  enjoyment  of  their 
lives,  liberties,  and  properties ;  and  the  neceflity 
of  different  orders  of  men,  with  various  and  op- 
pofite  powers,  prerogatives,  and  privileges,  to 
watch  over  one  another,  to  balance  each  other, 
and  to  compel  each  other  at  all  times  to  be  real 
guardians  of  the  laws. 

Every  citizen  muft  look  up  to  the  laws,  as  his 
mafter,  his  guardian,  and  his  friend;  and  when- 
ever any  of  his  fellow  citizens,  whether  magiftrates 
or  fubjects,  attempt  to  deprive  him  of  his  right, 
he  muft  appeal  to  the  laws;  if  the  ariftocracy 
encroach,  he  muft  appeal  to  the  democracy;  if 
they  are  divided,  he  muft  appeal  to  the  monarchical 
power  to  decide  between  them,  by  joining  with 
that  which  adheres  to  the  laws;  if  the  democracy 
is  on  the  fcramble  for  power,  he  muft  appeal  to 
the  ariftocracy,  and  the  monarchy,  which  by  unit- 
ing 


of  Philofophers.  209 

ing  may  reftrain  it.  If  the  regal  authority  pre- 
fumes  too  far,  he  muft  appeal  to  the  other  two*. 
Without  three  divifions  of  power,  ftationed  to 
watch  each  other,  and  compare  each  other's  con- 
dud  with  the  laws,  it  will  be  impoffible  that  the 
laws  fhould  at  all  times  preferve  their  authority, 
and  govern  all  men. 

Plato  has  fufficiently  aflerted  the  honour  of  the 
laws,  and  the  neceffity  of  proper  guardians  of 
them;  but  has  no  where  delineated  the  various 
orders  of  guardians,  and  the  neceflity  of  a  ba- 
lance between  them  :  he  has,  neverthelefs-,  given 
us  premifes  from  whence  the  abfolute  neceffity  of 
fuch  orders  and  equipoifes  may  be  inferred;  he 
has  fhewn  how  naturally  every  limple  fpecies  of 
government  degenerates.  The  ariftocracy,  or  am- 
bitious republic,  becomes  immediately  an  oligar- 
chy— What  fhall  be  do-ne  to  prevent  it  ?  Place 
two  guardians  of  the  laws  to  watch  the  arifto- 
cracy :  one,  in  the  lhape  of  a  king,*  on  one  fide 
of  it;  another,  in  the  fhape  of  a  democratical 
aflembly,  on  the  other  fide.  The  ariftocracy,  be- 
come an  oligarchy,  changes  into  a  democracy — 
How  fhall  it  be  prevented?  By  giving  the  natu- 
ral ariftocracy  in  Ibciety  its  rational  and  juft  weight, 
and  by  giving  it  a  regal  power  to  appeal  to,  againft 
the  madnefs  of  the  people.  Democracy  becomes 
a  tyranny— How  fhall  this  be  prevented  ?  By  giv- 
ing it  an  able  independent  ally  in  an  ariftocraticai 
aflembly,  with  whom  it  may  unite  againft  the  un- 
juft  and  illegal  defigns  of  any  one  man. 


LETTER 


Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

.fvi-T-*     l&tPif  '   •i'l*  li  '"  ^  '"'  'U  Vr 

\1 

LETTER    XXXV. 


ANCIENT   DEMOCRATICAL  REPUBLICS. 


CARTHAGE. 


My  dear  Sir, 

IN  order  to  Ihew  the  theory  of  Socrates,  as  re- 
ported by  Plato,  in,  a  clearer  light ;  and  to  be 
convinced  that  h€  has  not  exaggerated  in  his  de- 
fcription  of  the  mutability  in  the  characters  of 
men,  and  the  forms  of  government;  we  fhould 
look  into  the  hiftory  of  thofe  ancient  republics, 
from  whence  he  drew  his  obfervations  and  rea- 
fonings.  Although  it  is  probable  that  Greece  was 
his  principal  theatre,  yet  we  may  reafonably  fup- 
pofe  that  Carthage,  and  a  multitude  of  other  re- 
publics in  Italy,  befides  that  of  Rome,  were  not 
unknown  to  him. 

The  hiftory  of  Greece  fhould  be  to  our  coun- 
trymen, what  is  called  in  many  families  on  the 
continent  a  boudoir;  an  o&agonal  apartment  in  a 
houfe,  with  a  full-length  mirror  'on  every  fide, 
and  another  in  the  ceiling.  The  ufe  of  it  is, 
when  any  of  the  young  ladies,  or  young  gentle- 
men if  you  will,  are  at  any  time  a  little  out  of 
humour,  they  may  retire  to  a  place  where,  in 
whatever  direction  they  turn  their  eyes,  they  fee 
their  own  faces  and  figures  multiplied  without 
end.  By  thus  beholding  their  own  beautiful  per- 

fons, 


211 

«-/ 

*  .£ 

fons,  and  feeing  at  the  fame  time  the  deformity 
brought  upon  them  by  their  anger,  they  "may  re- 
cover their  tempers  and  their  charms  together* 
A  few  fhort  fketches  of  the  ancient  republics, 
will  ferve  to  fhew,  not  only  that  the  orders  we 
defend  were  common  to  all  of  them;  that  the 
profperity  and  duratidflfc  of  each  was  in  propor- 
tion to  the  care  taken  to  balance  them ;  and  that 
they  all  were .  indebted,  for  their  frequent  fedi- 
tions,  the  rife  and  progrefs  of  corruption,  and 
their  decline  and  fall,  to  the  imperfection  of  their 
orders,  and  their  defects  in  the  balance. 

As  there  are  extant  no  writings  of  any  Cartha- 
ginian philofopher,  ftatefmau,  or  hiftorian,  we 
have  no  exact  information  concerning  the  form  of 
their  commonwealth,  but  what  appears  in  a  few 
hints  of  Greek  and  Roman  authors.  Their  com- 
merce and  riches,  their  empire  of  the  fea,  and 
extenfive  dominion  of  two  thoufand  miles  on  the 
fea-coaft,  their  obftinate  military  contefts  with 
Rome,  and  the  long  duration  of  their  govern- 
ment, prove  both  that  their  population  and  power 
were  very  great,  and  their  conftitution  good ;  ef- 
pecially  as,  for  the  fpace  of  five  hundred  years, 
their  tranquillity  was  never  interrupted  by  fedi- 
tion,  nor  their  liberties  attempted  by  the  ambi* 
tion  of  any  of  their  citizens. 

The  national  character  was  military,  as  well  as 
commercial;  and,  although  they  were  avaricious, 
they  were  not  effeminate. 

The  monarchical  power  was  in  two  -fufFetes, 
the  ariftocratical  in  the  fenate,  and  the  democra- 
tical  was  held  by  the  people  in  a  body.  Thefe 
are  faid  to  have  been  nicely  balanced^  but  we 
know  not  in  what  manner.  The  chief  magiftrates 
were  annually  ele&ed  by  the  people.  The  fena- 

VOL.  I.  D  d  tors 


Ancient  Democr&tical  Republics. 

%  ' 

tors  were  elected  too,  and,  although  it  is  not  cer- 
tain, it  is  moft  probable,  by  the  people;  but  it 
appears  that  three  qualifications  were  indifpen- 
fable  in  every  fenator — birth,  merit,  and  wealth: 
this  lafl  requifite  rendered  commerce  honourable, 
even  in  the  firft  of  the  natricians  and  fenators 
themfelves,  and  animatedfihe  commercial  genius 
of  the  nation.     This  government  thus  far  refem- 
bles  thofe  of  the  United  States  of  America  more 
than  any  other  of  the  ancient  republics,  perhaps 
more  than  any  of  the  modern :  but  when  we  in- 
quire for  the  balance,  it  is  not  to  be  found.     The 
fuffetes  had  not  more  authority  than  Roman  con- 
fuls ;  they  had  but  a  part  of  the  executive  power, 
and  none  of  the  legislative :  much  of  the  execu- 
tive, and  all  the  legislative,  was  in  the  fenate-and 
people. — The  balance  then  could  only  be  between 
thefe  two.     Now  it  is  impoflible  to  balance  two* 
afTemblies,  without   introducing   a  third   power; 
one  or  other  will  be  moft  powerful,  and,  which- 
ever it  is,  it  will  continually  fcramble  till  it  gets 
the   whole  t    in   fa&,  the  people  here   had   the 
whole,  as  much  as  in  any  of  our  ftates;  fo  that 
while  the  citizens  were   uncorrupted   and   gave 
their  votes  honeftly  for  fufTetes  and  fenators,  all 
went  well :  and  it  is  extremely  remarkable,  that 
with  all  their  acknowledged  eagernefs  for  money, 
this  people  were  fomany  centuries  untainted  with 
luxury  and  venality ;  and  preferved  their  primr- 
tive  frugality  of  manners,  and  integrity  in  elec- 
tions.    As  to  the  Roman  accafations  of  inlince- 
rityi  there  is  no   more  realbn  to  believe  them, 
than  there  would  be  to  belkve  a  Carthaginian 
who  fhould  retort  the  reproach.     This,  as    well 
as  other  inftances,  may  lead  us  to  doubt  the  uni- 
of  the  do&rine,  that  commerce  corrupts 

manners- 


Carthage.  2,1$ 

tnann-ers.  There  was  another  remarkable  in- 
ftitution,  that  the  fenate  fhould  always  be  una- 
nimous; and  if  any  one  fenator  mfifted  upon 
his  own  opinion,  againft  all  the  reft,  there  could 
be  no  decifion,  but  by  an  appeal  to  the  people. 
— This  again  gave  a  ftrong  democratical  caft 
to  the  conftitution.  Such  a  tendency  could  only 
be  balanced  by  the  laws,  which,  requiring  a  large* 
fortune  for^every  fenator  and  public  officer,  in 
order  to  fupport  his  dignity,  and  fecure  him 
againfl  the  temptations  to  corruption,  confined 
the  choice  to  the  firft  families  and  abilities  united. 
— This  was  liable  to  great  objection;  becaufe 
great  abilities  might  often  be  poflefled  by  men  of 
obfcure  original,  and  fmaller  property,  who 
were  thereby  excluded. .  To  this  law,  neverthe- 
lefs,  may  be  afcribed  the  duration  of  the  re- 
public. 

Another  remarkable  check,  which  was  perhaps 
the  original  model  from  whence  the  Venetian  in- 
quifnion  was  copied,  was  a  committee  of  one 
hundred  and  four  members  of  the  fenate,  ap- 
pointed to  watch  the  ambition  of  the  great  fami- 
lies. To  this  body  all  their  admirals  and  gene- 
rals were  required  to  render  an  account  of  their 
conduct  at  the  end  of  every  year. 

Out  of  this  body  were  elecled  a  fub-committee 
of  five,  who  had  very  great  power :  their  office 
was  for  life ;  and  they  filled  up  their  own  vacan- 
cies out  of  the  one  hundred  and  four,  and  all 
the  vacancies,  even  in  the  one  hundred  and  four, 
out  of  the  fenate ;  they  had  the  fupreme  tribu- 
nal of  criminal  jurifdi&ion.  This  power  muft 
have  been  terrible  to  all ;  to  the  people,-  fenate, 
and  fuffetes  ;  yet  it  was  the  check  which  pre- 
ferved  the  ftate  from  fedition  and  convulfions. 

It 


Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

It  grew  unpopular;  and  the  law  which  at  laft 
made  it  annual  and  eledive,  probably  laid  the 
foundation  of  the  ruin  of  the  commonwealth,  by 
changing  the  balance,  and  introducing  the  domi- 
natio  plebis.  The  balances  in  this,  the  moft  demo- 
cratical  republic  of  antiquity,  contrived  by  the 
"people  themfelves  to  temper  their  own  power, 
•are  extremely  remarkable;  the  fuffetes  reprefent- 
ed,  like  the  confuls  at  Rome,  the  majefty  of  the 
commonwealth,  and  had  a  mare  of  executive  au- 
thority; the  council  of  five  had  criminal  jurifdic- 
tion,  and  inquifitorial  power;  the  one  hundred 
and  four,  were  a  body  chofen  out  of  the  fenate, 
by  the  five,  for  their  fupport;  then  comes  the 
lenate  at  large;  and,  laft  of  all,  the  people  at 
large.  Here  are  five  orders  completely  diftinft, 
befides  the  neceiTary  legal  qualification  of  great 
wealth  :  yet  all  thefe  checks,  although  they  pre- 
ferved  tl^e  ftate  five  hundred  years,  could  not 
prolong  its  period  above  feven  hundred ;  becaufe, 
after  all,  the  balance  was  not  natural,  nor  effec- 
tual. The  executive  power  was  not  feparated 
from  the  legiilative;  nor  the  different  parts  of  the 
legiflature  properly  divided  or  balanced  :  the  ex- 
ecutive power  and  judicial  were  both  chiefly  in  le- 
giflative  hands. 

The  noble  families,  thus  fecured  in  pofleflion 
both  of  legiilative  and  executive  power,  could 
not  be  retrained  by  all  the  ligaments  which  had 
been  contrived  to  preferve  the  equipoife  between 
them  and  the  people :  they  divided  into  two  fac- 
tions, with  the  family  of  Hanno  at  the  head  of 
One,  and -that  of  Barcas  of  the  other;  firft  at- 
tacked the  council  of  five,  whofe  power  was  un- 
popular, as  well  as  odious  to  the  nobles;  eafily 
procured  a  law  to  make  that  annually  ele&ive, 

or, 


Carthage.  '  215 

or,  in  other  words,  an  inftrumenl?  always  in  the 
hands  of  the  prevailing  fa&ion,  as  fuch  a  fmali 
body,  fo  changeable,  muft  ever  be;  and  over- 
turned the  conftitution.  The  Romans  had  all 
the  advantage  of  thefe  difTenfions  in  the  war,  by 
which  they  finally  deftroyed  their  rival  power  fo 
effe&ually,  that  fcarce  a  trace  of  it  remains  to  be 
feen,  even  in  ruins.  Their  virtues  were  not  ex- 
tinguifhed  to  the  laft,  and  fome  of  the  greatefl  ex- 
amples of  patriotifin  and  heroifm  were  exhibited 
even  in  their  expiring  agonies. 


LETTER    XXXVI. 

*   '4*>    '     f   «•  1. 
.  *     \.    "* 

ANCIENT  ARISTOCRATICAL  REPUBLICS. 


ROME. 

My  dear  Sir, 

DIONYSIUS  Halicarnaffenfis  has  not  only 
given  us  his  own  judgment,  that  the  moft 
perfect  form  of  government  is  that  which  con- 
fifts  of  an  equal  mixture  of  monarchy,  ariftocra- 
cy,  and  democracy,  in  the  fpeech  which  he  puts 
into  the  mouth  of  Valerius,  but  has  repeated  the 
fame  fentiment,  in  his  own  name,  in  other  parts 
of  his  work.  In  the  feventh  fedlion  of  his  fe- 
cond  book  of  the  Roman  Antiquities,  he  fays 

of 


2l6          Ancient  Ariftocratical  Republics. 

of  Romulus,  mat  he  was  extremely  capable  of 
inftituting  the  moft  perfect  form  of  govern- 
ment. And  again,  "  1  fhall  firft  fpeak  of  the 
form  of  government  he  inftituted,  which  I  look 
upon,  of  all  others,  to  be  the  moft  felf  fuffi- 
cient  to  anfwer  all  the  ends  both  of  peace  and 
war."  This  is  a  mixture  of  monarchy,  arifto- 
cracy, and  democracy,  extolled  by  Polybius;  and 
is  nearly  the  fame  with  that  of  Lycurgus,  infti- 
tuted at  Sparta  about  a  hundred  years  before. 
As  the  constitutions  of  Rome  and  Sparta  lafted 
fo  many  centuries  longer  than  others  of  Greece 
and  Italy,  and  produced  effedls  fo  amazing  upon 
the  Tauman  character,  we  may  rationally  afcribe 
that  duration,  and  thofe  effeds,  to  this  compoli- 
tion,  although  the  balance  was  very  imperfect  in 
both.  The  legal  power,  both  of  the  kings  and 
people,  in  both,  were  unequal  to  that  of  the  fe- 
nate,  and  therefore  the  predominant  chara&er  in 
both  was  ariftocracy.  In  Sparta,  the  influence 
of  the  monarchy  and  democracy  was  derived 
chiefly  from  the  oath  taken  by  the  kings  and 
ephori  to  fupport  each  other. — An  authority 
founded  thus  in  opinion,  in  religion,  or  rather 
fuperftition,  not  in  legal  power,  would  keep  the 
fenate  in  fome  awe,  but  not  in  any  certain  re* 
ftraint. 

Romulus  divided  all  the  people  into  three 
parts,  and  appointed  a  perfon  of  the  firft  rank  to 
be  the  chief  of  each  of  them.  Then  he  fubdi- 
vided  each  of  thefe  into  ten  others,  and  appoint- 
ed as  many  of  the  braveft  men  to  be  the  leaders 
of  thefe.  The  greater  diviiions  he  called  tribes, 
and  the  lefler  curias :  the  commanders  of  the 
tribes  were  called  tribuni;  and  thofe  of  the  cu- 
rise,  curiones,  He  then  divided  the  land  into 

thirty 


Rome..  217 

thirty  portions,  and  gave  one  of  them  to  each 
•  curia.  He  diftinguifhed  thofe  who  were  eminent 
for  their  birth,  virtues,  and  riches ;  and  to  thefe 
he  gave  the  name  of  fathers.  The  obfcure,  the 
mean,  and  the  poor,  he  called  plebeians,  in  imi- 
tation of  the  government  at  Athens,  where,  at 
that  time,  thofe  who  were  diftinguiftied  by  their 
birth  and  fortune  were  called  "  well-born,"  to 
whom  the  adminift ration  of  government  was  com- 
mitted ;  and  the  reft  of  the  people,  who  had  no 
fhare  in  it,  "  hufbandmen."  Romulus  appoint- 
ed-, the  patricians  to  be  priefts,  magiftrates,  and 
judges.  The  inftitution  by  which  every  plebeian 
Was  allowed  to  choofe  any  patrician  for  his  pa- 
tron, introduced  an  intercourfe  of  good  offices 
between  thefe  orders,  made  the  patricians  emulate 
each  other  in  a&s  of  civility  and  humanity  to 
their  clients,  and  contributed  to  preferve  the 
peace  and  harmony  of  Rome  in  fo  remarkable  a 
manner,'  that  in  all  the  contefts  which  happened 
for  fix  hundred  and  twenty  years,  they  never  pro- 
ceeded to  bloodlhed. 

The  king,  according  to  the  '  inftitution  *>f 
Romulus,  had  feveral  important  functions,  viz. 
I .  Supremacy  in  religion,  ceremonies,  facrifices, 
and  worfhip.  2.  The  guardianfhip  of  the  laws, 
and  adminiftration  of  jufticer  in  all  cafes,  whe- 
ther founded  on  the  law  of  nature,  or  .the  civil 
law :  he  was  to  take  cognizance  of  the  greateft 
crimes  in  perfon,  leaving  the  lefler  to  the  fenate; 
and  to  obferve,  that  no  errors  were  committed  in 
their  judgments :  he.  was  to  affemble  both  the  fe- 
nate and  the  people  ;  to  deliver  his  opinion  firft, 
and  purfue  the  refolutioi>s  of  the  majority. — -Ro- 
mulus, however,  wifely  avoided  that  remarkable 
Spartan  abfurdity,  of  two  kings. 

The 


2i8         Ancient  Ariftocratical  Republics. 

The  fenate  were  to  deliberate  and  determine, 
by  a  majority  of  votes,  all  queflions  which  the 
king  fhould  propofe  to  them.  This  inftitution 
alfo  Romulus  took  from  the  conftitution  of  the 
Lacedaemonians.  The  kings,  in  both  conftitu- 
tions,  were  fo  far  from  being  abfolute,  that  they 
had  not  the  whole  executive  power,  nor  any  ne- 
gative upon  the  legiflature ;  in  fhort,  the  whole 
power  of  the  government  was  veiled  in  the  fe- 
nate. 

The -people  had  three  privileges;  to  choofe 
magiflrates  (yet  all  the  great  employments  muft 
be  confined  to  the  patricians) ;  to  enacl:  laws ;  and 
to  determine  concerning  war,  when  propofed  by 
the  king :  but  the  concurrence  of  tHe  fenate  be- 
ing neceffary  to  give  a  fan&ion  to  their  deciiions, 
their  power  was  not  without  controul.* 

To  feparate  the  executive  from  the  legiflative 
power,  and  the  judicial  from  both,  and  to  give  the 
king,  the  fenate,  and  people,  each  a  negative  in 
the  legiflature,  is  fo  fimple,  and  to  us  appears  fo 
obvious  an  improvement  of  this  plan,  that  it  is 
furprifing  it  did  not  occur  to  Romulus,  as  well 
as  to  Lycurgus  :  but,  in  thofe  early  times,  per- 
haps neither  kings,  nor  nobles,  nor  people,  were 
willing  to  have  their  prerogatives  and  privileges 
fo  exactly  afcertained.  The  nobles,  in  both  na- 
tions, had  almoft  all  the  influence,  and  were  no 
doubt  as  jealous  of  royal  as  they  were  of  popu- 
lar power.  It  is  certain  that,  although  the  go- 
vernment was  called  monarchical,  it  was  in  real- 
ity ariftocratical  in  an  high  degree.  There  is  a 
remarkable  example  of  ariftocratical  art,  in  the 
manner  of  obtaining  the  determination  of  the 
people  :  they  were  not  permitted  to  vote  in  one 
common  aflembiy ;  they  were  called  in  their  cu- 

ris; 


Rome. 

rise ;  the  majority  of  votes  in  a  curia  decided  its 
voice;  and  a  majority  of  curise  was  the  refolve 
of  the  whole  people. 

Had  Romulus  died  in  peace,  and  left  a  fon,  his 
monarchy  would  probably  have  defcended  in  his 
family :  but  a  conteft  arofe  immediately  here  (as 
it  has  done  in  all  other  nations  where  the  people 
had  not  a  negative,  and  where  the  executive  pow- 
er has  been  partly  in  the  hands  of  a  king,  and 
partly  in  a  fenate)  between  the  king  and  the  no- 
bles ;  and  Romulus  was  put  to  death  by  the  pa- 
tricians, for  aiming,  as  they  pretended,  at  more 
power  than  his  mare.  This  enabled  the  patrici- 
ans to  carry  their  firft  point;  for  it  is  always  the 
firft  point  of  the  ariftocracy  to  make  the  firft  ma- 
giftrate  ele&ive;  in  this  they  are  always  at  firft 
joined  by  the  people;  but,  after  feeing  the  ufe 
which  the  nobles  make  of  thefe  elections  a  few 
times,  the  people  themfelves  have  aljvays  made  it 
hereditary. 

Numa  was  chofen,  a  man  of  peace,  piety,  and 
humanity,  who  had  addrefs  enough  to  make  the 
nobles  and  people  believe  that  he  was  married  to 
the  goddefs  Egeria,  and  received  from  his  celef- 
tial  confort  all  his  laws  and  meafures. 

Tullus  Hoftilius,  a  man  of  great  merit,  was 
chofen  in  his  ftead;  but  after  a  glorious,  at  leaft 
a  victorious,  reign  of  thirty-two  years,  was  mur- 
dered by  the  patricians,  headed  by  Ancus  Mar- 
cius,  grandfon  of  Numa  by  his  only  daughter, 
who  thought  his  family-right  prior  to  that  of 
Tullius. 

Ancus  was  ele&ed  king,  and  died  a  natural 
death. 

Lucius  Tarquinius,  after  a  reign  of  thirty- 
eight  years,  in  which  he  had  enlarged  the  terri- 
tory, beautified  the  city,  and  fhewn  himfelf  wor- 

VOL.  I.  E  e  thy 


Ancient  Ar iff ocr at ical  Republics. 

thy  of  the  crown,  was  affaflinated  in  his  palace 
by  the  two  fons  of  Ancus  Marcius,  who  had 
learned  the  family  policy:  but  their  projedl  was 
unfortunate ;  the  people  loved  Lucius,  executed 
the  inftruments  of  the  murder,  banifhed  the  twa 
fons  of  Ancus,  and  confifcated  their  eftates. 

Servius  TuHius,  who  had  married  the  daugh- 
ter of  Lucius,  was  now  elevated  to  the  throne 
by  the  people,  much  againft  the  will  of  the  fe- 
nate  and  patricians,  becaufe  Lucius  was  not  one 
of  them,  but  of  Greek  extraction.     Tullius  was 
chiefly  fupported  by  the  people,  always  difagree- 
able  to  the  patricians,  who  held  his  advancement 
to  the  throne  to  be  illegal.     The  adminiflration 
of  Tullius  is  an  artful  fyftem  of  duplicity,   to 
preferve  his  chara&er,  of  the  man  of  the  people, 
and,  at  the  fame  time,  appeafe  the  fury  of  the 
patricians,  by  really  undermining  the  authority 
of  the  people,   and  throwing  the  whole  power 
into   their   hands.      In   purfuance   of   his  prin- 
ciple  to   pleafe   both   fides,  he  made  excellent 
equitable  regulations  for  regiflering  the  people, 
eftabliming  a  militia,  and  proportioning  the  bur- 
dens of  war  according  to  the  property  and  abi- 
lities of   all  ranks ;    but  he  fubdivided  the  fix 
clafTes  into  one  hundred  and  ninety-three  cen- 
turies :    the  firfi  clafs  was  compofed  wholly  of 
the  rich,  and  contained  ninety-eight  of  the  cen- 
turies.     If  the  centuries  of  the  firft  clafs  were 
unanimous,  as  they  generally  were,  they  carried 
every  point  by  a  majority  of  three ;    if  they  dif- 
agreed,  the  centuries  of  the  fecond  clafs  were 
called;    if  they  difagreed,   the   third  came  for- 
ward;   and  ib  on,  till  ninety-feven  centuries  a- 
greed :    if  the  numbers  continued  equal,  ninety- 
fix  to  ninety-fix,  the  fixth  clafs  was  called,  which 
was  compoled  wholly  of  the  pooreft  people,  and 

contained 


Rome. 

contained  but  one  century ;  but  even  the  votes 
of  the  fourth  cla^s  were  rarely  called  for,  and  the 
votes  of  the  fifth  and  fixth  were  generally  ufelefs. 
"When  the  people  voted  by  curise,  the  vote  of 
every  citizen  was  given,  and,  as  the  poor  were 
moft  numerous,  they  were  always  fure  of  a  large 
majority;  but  when  thus  taken  by  centuries,  that 
numerous  body  of  the  poor,  which  compofed  the 
fixth  century,  were  wholly  iniignificant,  and  thofe 
of  the  fifth  and  fourth  very  nearly  fo.  By  chang- 
ing the  votes  from  curiae  to  centuries,  Tullius 
wholly  changed  the  fundamental  conftitution,  and 
threw  the  elections  of  magiftrates  civil. and  mili- 
tary, the  power  of  enading  and  repealing  laws, 
declaring  war,  and  making  peace,  all  into  the 
power  of  the  rich  patricians.  The  people  had 
not  fenfe  enough  to  fee  this  ;  nor  to  fee  another 
thing  of  more  importance,  viz.  that  the  king  had 
been  driven  to  the  neceflity  of  this  artful  flattery 
of  the  patricians,  by  his  not  being  independent 
of  them,  and  by  their  fharing  with  him  in  the 
executive  power.  Tullius  had  two  daughters,  mar- 
ried to  the  grandfons  of  his  predeceffor,  Aruns 
and  Tarcjuinius.  The  patricians  were  ftill  caball- 
ing againft  Tullius,  and  fet  up  Tarquin,  one  of  his 
fons-in-law,  againft  him ;  but  as  a  majority  were 
not  for  his  depofition,  Tarquin  and  his  impious 
and  inceftuous  wife  joined  the  cabal  in  the  mur- 
der of  her  firft  hufband  and  her  father.  Tarquin, 
in  time,  murdered  on  all  hands,  patricians  and 
plebeians. — He  was  expelled  by  Brutus, 

This  whole  hiftory,  from  Romulus  to  Tarquin, 
is  one  continued  ftruggle  of  the  noble  families 
for  the  firft  place ;  and  another  unanfwerable 
proof  of  the  neccffity  of  having  three  orders,  and 
each  order  independent,  in  order  to  form  an  ef- 
feftual  equilibrium.  The  people  were  very  little 

regarded 


Ancient  Ariflocratical  Republics. 

regarded  by  the  fenate  or  patricians ;  the  kings 
only  now  and  then  courted  the  people  for  fup- 
port  againft  their  rivals  amon^f  the  patrician  fa- 
milies. The  tyranny  of  Tarquin  made  the  name 
of  king  odious  and  unpopular  :  the  patricians, 
\vho  were  the  principal  conductors  of  the  revolu- 
tion, took  advantage  of  this  ;; — for  what  ?  To 
reftore  and  improve  Romulus's  plan  of  a  mixed 
government?  No;  but  to  eftablifh  their  favour- 
ite ariftocracy  upon  the  ruins  of  monarchy.  Two 
confuls,  in  imitation  of  the  two  Spartan  kings, 
were  to  be  elected  annually,  by  the  votes  of  the 
people,  which  carried  the  name  of  a  democratical 
power;  but  the  votes  were  taken  by  centuries, 
not  by  tribes,  which  made  the  patricians  mailers 
of  the  elections,  and  conftituted  an  ariftocracy  in 
reality.  From  this  moment  a  haughty  faction  of 
felfilh  patricians  appears,  who  affected  to  defpife 
the  people,  to  reduce  them  to  fervitude,  and  ef- 
tablifh a  defpotic  oligarchy.  The  people  had  fuf- 
fered  their  prejudices  to  blind  them  fo  far  as  to  be 
tricked  out  of  their  king,  who  was  at  leaft  a  bet- 
ter friend  to  them  than  the  patricians  were,  and 
now  the  contefts  were  wholly  between  patricians 
and  plebeians  :  the  former  had  now  got  the  con- 
fuls, and  confequently  the  executive  power,  as 
much  in  their  hands  as  ever  the  nobles  in  Venice 
had  their  doge,  or  as  the  nobles  in  Poland  have 
their  king. 

The  plebeians  were  now  in  a  moft  wretched 
fituation.  They  were  obliged  to  ferve  in  the  wars, 
to  keep  out  the  Tarquins  and  their  allies,  at  their 
own  expence,  which  frequently  obliged  them  to 
borrow  money  at  exorbitant  intereft  of  the  patri- 
cians, who  had  engrofTed  the  greater  part  of  the 
wealth ;  and,  as  the  country  was  often  ravaged 
by  the  enemy,  many  loft  all  their  effects.  Un- 
able 


Rome.  323 

able  to  pay  the  principal,  with  accumulated  loads 
of  intereft  upon  intereft,  they  were  frequently 
confined  by  their  creditors  in  chains,  and  fcourged 
with  whips ;  for  the  law,  to  which  they  had  fool- 
ilhly  confented,  had  made  the  debtor  a  Have  to 
the  creditor.  The  people  began  to  demand  an 
abolition  of  debts ;  the  fenate  appointed  a  didla- 
tor.  A  confuiion  of  foreign  wars  and  domeftic 
diffentions  enfues,  till  we  come  to  the  ftory  fo 
beautifully  told  by  Livy  and  Dionyfius,  of  the 
man  who  had  been  in  twenty-eight  battles,  who 
appeared  before  the  people,  and  ftiewed  on  his 
back  the  bleeding  fears  infli&ed  by  a  mercilefs 
creditor.  At  this  time  the  patricians  had  plunged 
into  their  ufual  difficulty,  a  violent  conteft  among 
themfelves,  between  a  furious  headlong  party 
which  always  appears  for  an  Oligarchy,  and  the 
moderate  men,  who  delire  to  continue  the  arifto- 
cracy;  the  young  patricians  generally  follow  the 
haughty  Claudius,  and  the  mild  Valerius  courts 
the  people.  The  oligarchy  prevails,  and  the  de- 
cemvirate  is  eftablifhed :  their  tyranny  drives  the 
people  to  the  facred  mountain;  and,  at  laft,  the 
tribunate  was  eftablifhed. — Here  is  the  firfl  fymp- 
tom  of  any  fyftem  purfued  by  the  people :  this 
was  a  balance — but  what  kind  of  balance  ?  No- 
body thought  of  another  council,  a  houfe  of  re- 
prefentatives,  who  fhould  have  a  negative ;  and, 
if  they  had,  it  would  not  have  availed  without  a 
king ;  for  fuch  a  new  affembly  would  foon  have 
been  either  wholly  fubjeded  to  the  fenate,  or 
would  have  voted  it  ufelefs.  In  truth,  the  mo- 
narchical power  being  fupprefled,  and  the  execu- 
tive authority,  as  well  as  legiflative,  being  now  on- 
ly in  the  fenate  and  people,  a  ftruggle  commenc- 
ed between  thefe  two. 

The 


224        Ancient  Ari floor atical  Republics. 

The  people  were  on  the  fcramble  for  more 
power;  and  firfl  obtained  a  law,  that  all  laws 
pafled  in  their  aflemblies  by  tribes,  mould  have 
equal  force  with  thofe  made  in  the  aflembly  by 
centuries ;  then,  that  all  pofts  and  dignities  mould 
be  enjoyed  by  the  plebeians  equally  with  the  pa- 
tricians ;  and  that  the  decrees  of  the  people  mould 
have  the  fame  force,  and  affect  the  patricians  in 
the  fame  manner,  as  thofe  pafled  by  the  fenate. 
All  this  was  very  juft,  and  only  brought  the  de- 
mocracy .to  an  equality  with  the  ariftocracy;  but 
whenever  thefe  two  are  equal  in  legal  power, 
numbers  will  foon  turn  the  balance  in  favour  of 
the  democracy,  unlefs  there  is  a  third  power  to 
intervene.  Accordingly  it  fo  happened,  and  the 
people  went  on  from  ftep  to  ftep,  increasing  their 
own  importance,  ancTdiminiftimg  that  of  the  fe- 
nate,  until  it  was  found  fhut  up  in  Utica;  but, 
before  this,  the  people  were  divided  into  parties, 
and  Cacfar,  at  the  head  of  one,  pafled  the  Rubi- 
con, that  is,  fet  the  moil  facred  law  of  his  coun- 
try at  open  defiance.  From  this  time  the  govern- 
ment became  a  government  of  men,  and  the  worfl 
of  men. 

From  this  example,  as  from  all  others,  it  ap- 
pears, that  there  can  be  no  government  of  laws 
without  a  balance,  and  that  there  can  be  no  ba- 
lance without  three  orders;  and  that  even  three 
orders  can  never  balance  each  other,  unlefs  each 
in  its  department  is  independent  and  abfolute. 
For  want  of  this,  the  ftruggle  was  firft  between 
the  king  and  fenate ;  in  which  cafe  the  king 
rauft  always  give  way,  unlefs  fupported  by  the 
people.  Before  the  creation  of  tribunes,  the  peo- 
ple were  in  no  fenfe  independent,  and  therefore 
could  not  fupport  the  kings.  After  the  aboli" 
tio.n  of  kings,  the  fenate  had  no  balance  either 

way, 


Tacitus.  2  25 

way,  and  accordingly  became  at  once  a  tyran- 
nical oligarchy.  When  the  people  demanded 
their  right,  and  obtained  a  check,  they  were  not 
fatisfied  ;  and  grafped  at  more  and  more  power, 
until  they  obtained  all,  there  being  no  monarchi- 
cal power  to  aid  the  fenate.  But  the  moment 
the  power  became  collected  into  this  one  centre, 
it  was  found  in  reality  fplit  into  three ;  and  as 
Caefar  had  the  largeft  of  the  three  mares,  he  in- 
ftantly  ufurped  the  whole. 


LETTER    XXXVIL 
ANCIENT  MONARCHICAL  REPUBLICS.  * 


TACITUS. 

Dear  Sir, 

BEFORE  we  proceed  to  the  Greeks,  we  may 
even  mention  the  favages.  Every  nation  in 
North  America  has  a  king,  a  fenate,  and  a  people. 
The  royal  office  is  elective,  but  it  is  for  life ; 
his  fachems  are  his  ordinary  council,  where  all 
the  national  affairs  are  deliberated  and  refolved 
in  the  firft  inftance :  but  in  the  greateft  of  all, 
which  is  declaring  war,  the  king  and  fachems 
call  a  national  affembly  round  a  great  council 
fire,  communicate  to  the  people  their  refolution, 
and  facrifice  an  animal.  Thofe  of  the  people  who 

approve 


2,z6  Ancient  Monarchical  Republics. 

approve  the  war,  partake  of  the  facrifice ;  throw 
the  hatchet  into  a  tree,  after  the  example  of  the 
king;  and  join  in  the  fubfequent  war  fongs  and 
dances.  Thole  who  difapprove  take  no  part  of 
the  facrifice,  but  retire. 


ANCIENT    GERMANS. 


THE  ancient  German  nations  mentioned  by  Ta- 
citus, had  among  them  at  leaft  two  forts  of  govern- 
ments. One  was  monarchy;  and  the  king  was  ab- 
folute,  as  appears  by  thefe  words :  "  Exceptis  iis 
"  gentibus  quse  regnantur;  ibi  enim  etfuper  irige- 
"  nuos,  etfuper nobiles,  afcendunt  liberti:  apud  ce- 
"  teros,  impares  libertini,  libertatis  argumentum."* 
The  other  fpecies  of  government  was  ariftocracy ; 
for  though  there  was  a  mixture  of  monarchy,  arif- 
tocracy, and  democracy,  yet  the  power  of  the  king 
and  people  was  fo  feeble,  and  that  of  the  nobles,  as 
comprehended  under  the  titles  of  princes,  dukes, 
and  counts,  was  fo  predominant,  that  the  govern- 
ment 


*  There  cannot  be  a  Wronger  proof  than  this,  that  the  monarchy 
was  of  the  moft  abfolute  kind,  that  it  was  indeed  a  fimple  defpotifm  ; 
and  Tacitus  hrmfelf  gives  the  explanation  of  it,  in  his  account  of 
the  origin  of  this  kind  of  flavery.  "  Aleam  fobrii  inter  feria  exer- 
**  cent,  tanta  lucrandi  perdendh  e  temeritate,  ut,  cum  omnia  defc- 
*'  cerunt,  extremo  ac  novifllmo  jaftu,  de  libertate  et  de  corpore 
**.  contendant.  Viclus  voluntariam  fervitutem adit ;  quanquam  junior, 
*<  quanquam  robuftior,  alligari  fe  ac  venire  patitur :  ea  eft  in  re 
*'  prava  pervicacia;  ipfi  fidem  vocant.  Servos  conditionis  hnjus  per 
u  commercia  tradunt,  ut  fe  quoque  pudore  vicloriae  exfolvant.  Li- 
*'  berti  non  multum  fupra  fervos  funt,  raro  aliquod  momentum  in 
u  domo,  nunquam  in  civitate,  exceptis  duntaxat  iis  gentibus  quac 
*'  regnantur,"  &c.  If  in  thefe  nations  thofe  freedmen,  who  were  no- 
thing in  the  others,  neither  in  the  family  or  the  flate,  were  held  in 
more  eftimation,  and  advanced  to  more  power,  than  the  citizens,  even 
than  the  nobles,  thefe  kings  muft  have  been  defpots,  in  the  {Iri&efi: 
fenfe  of  the  word;  otherwife  neither  nobles  nor  people  would  have 
fuifered  the  indignity. 


STacitus. 

ment  muft  .be  denominated  anftocratical.  "  De 
"  minoribus  rebus  principes  confultant,  de  majori- 
"  bus  omnes;  ita  tamen,  Ut  ea  quoque,  quorum 
"  penes  plebem  arbitrium  eft,  apud  principes  per- 
"  tra6tentur."  If  thofe  things  which  were  mofl 
clearly  in  the  power  of  the  people,  were  firft  dif- 
cufled  among  the  nobles,  the  reference  to  the  peo- 
ple afterwards  feems  to  have  been  rather  a  com- 
munication to  them  of  the  refult  of  the  fenate, 
than  a  fubmiffion  of  it  to  the  popular  judgmefc:. 

The  nature  and  extent  of  the  royal  dignity 
and  authority,  appears  from  thefe  words  :  cc  Reges 
"  ex  nobilitate  fumunt ;  nee  regibus  infinita  aut 
"  libera  poteftas."  Kings  were  taken  from  the 
nobility,  or  kings  were  chofen  for  their  noble  de- 
fcent;  fo  that  ordinarily  the  office  defcended  to 
the  next  of  kin :  but  it  is  here  exprefsly  afcer- 
tained  that  their  power  was  neither  unlimited  nor 
independent.  They  had  no  negative,  and  might 
in  all  things  be  over-ruled,  at  leaft  by  the  nobles 
and  people  conjointly. 

The  nature  and  extent  of  the  ariftocratical  dig- 
nities and  authorities,  may  be  colle6led  from  what 
follows :  "  Duces  ex  virtute  fumunt ;  et  duces  exem- 
<c  plo  potius  quamimperio,  li  prompti,  fi  confpicui : 
"  li  ante  aciem  agant,  admiratione  praefunt."  The 
feudal  hierarchy,  even  in  thefe  early  times,  was  fully 
eftablifhed,  although  it  was  afterwards  enlarged. 
The  titles  of  dukes  and  counts,  the  rank  and  power 
they  conferred,defcended  in  families,although  there 
was  the  bare  formality  of  an  election  in  the  grand 
council.  c<  Anna  fumere,  non  ante  cuiquam  moris, 
"  quam  civitas  fuffeclurum  probaverit :  xum,  in  ip- 
"  fo  confilio,  vel  principum  aliquis,  vel  pater,  vel 
"  propinquus,  fcuto  frameaque  juvenem  ornant. 
<c  Infignis  nobilitas,  aut  magna  patrum  merita, 
"  principis  dignationem  etiam  adolefcentulis  af- 

VOL.  I.  F  f  "  iignant." 


228          Ancient  Monarchical  Republics. 

"  fignant." — <c  When  the  young  men  were  fir  ft  ad-? 
"  mitted  into  public  fociety,  it  was  in  the  great 
"  eouncil ;  when  fome  one  of  the  dukes,  or  the 
"  father,  or  other  relation,  adorned  the  youth 
"  with  arms.  And  if*  he  is  of  very  noble  birth, 
"  or  his  •  father  has  great  merit,  the  dignity  of  a 
cc  duke  is  affigned  to  him,  young  as  he  is." — * 
From  this  it  is  pretty  clear  that  the  crown,  as  welt 
as  the  titles  of  dukes  and  counts,  defcended  in 
thedfamily  line ;  although  the  formality  of  an  ad- 
miflion  into  council  was  kept  up.  The  nobles, 
among  whom  the  king  was  little  more  than  the 
jfirft  among  equals — at  leaf!  he  was  not  more  fu- 
perior  to  the  dukes,  than  the  dukes  were  to  the 
counts — had  the  game-  in  their  own  hands,  and 
managed  a  rude  people  as  they  pleafed.  This, 
will  appear  probable  from  other  paffages :  "  Css~ 
"  teris  robuftioribus,  ac  jam  pridem  probatis,  ag- 
"  gregantur;  nee  rubor  inter  comites  afpici, 
"  gradus  quinetiam  et  ipfe  eomitatus  habet, 
<c  judicio  ejus  quern  feclantur.  Magnaque  el 
"  comitum  ssmulatio,  quibus  primus  apud  prin- 
**  cipem  fuum  locus ;  et  principum,  eui  plurimi 
<c  et  acerrimi  comites.  Ifec  dignitas,  hse  vires, 
cc  magno  femper  eledorum  juvenum  globo  cir- 
c<  cumdari,  in  pace  decus,  in  bello  prsefidium  ^ 
**  nee  folum  in  fua  gente  cuique,  fed  apud  fini- 
"  timas  quoque  civitates,  id  nomen,  ea  gloria 
"  eft,  fi  numero  ac  virtute  eomitatus  eiimieat ; 
ct  expetuntur  enim  legationibus,  et  mnneribus  or- 
*c  nantur,  et  ipfa  plerumque  fama  bel-la  profii- 
<c  gant.  Cum  ventum  in  aciem,  turpe1  principi 
"virtute  vinci,  turpe  comitatui  virtutem  princi- 
cc  pis  non  adequare.  Jam  VCEO  infarne  in  omnem 
"  vitam,  ac  probrofum,  fuperftitem  principi  fuo 
(e  ex  acie  receffiffe.  Ilium  defendere,  tueri,  fua 
**  quoque  fortia  fada  glorise  ejus  ailignare,  pra:- 

"  cipuum 


Tacitus.  229 

/*  cipuum  facramentum  eft.  Principes  pro  vic- 
"  toria  pugnant,  comites  pro  principe.  Si  civi- 
"  tas,  in  qua  orti  funt,  Jonga  pace  et  otio  torpeat, 
"  plerique  nobilium  adolefcentium  petunt  ultro 
"  eas  nationes  quas  turn  helium  aliquod  gerunt; 
"  quia  et  ingrata  genti  quies,  et  facilius  inter 
"  ancipitia  clarefcunt,  magnumque  comitatum 
"  non  nifi  vi  belioque  tueare ;  exigunt  enim 
<c  principis  fui  liberalitate  ilium  bellatorem 
fc  equum,  illam  cruentam  vidricemque  fra- 
"  meam;  nam  epulse,  et  quamquam  incompti, 
fc  largi,  tamen,  apparatus  pro  ftipendio  cedunt; 
"  materia  magnificentise  per  bella  et  raptus. 
"  Nee  arare  terram,  aut  expedare  annum,  tam 
"  facile  perfuaferis  quam  vocare  hoftes,  et 
cc  vulnera  mereri;  pigrum  quinimo  et  iners  vi- 
"  detur,  fudore  acquirere  quod  poffis  fanguine 
"  parare." 

When  the  foregoing  ties,  by  which  the  people 
or  the  common  foldiers  were  attached  to  the 
nobles,  and  the  young  and  inferior  nobles  to  the 
fuperior,  are  confidered,  a  better  judgment  may 
be  formed  of  the  authority  which  the  people 
really  had  in  the  grand  council  or  national  af- 
fembly. 

The  powers  and  privileges  of  the  people,  in 
aflembly,  appear  from  the  following  paffages : 
cc  Coeunt,  nifi  quid  fortiiitum  et  fubitum  incide- 
"  rit,  certis  diebus,  cum  aut  inchoatur  luna  aut 
£c  impletur ;  nam  agendis  rebus  hoc  aufpicatiffi- 
cc  mum  initium  credunt. — Illud  ex  libertate  vi- 
"  tiunij  quod  non  Jimul  nee  juffi  tonveniunt,  fed  et 
"  alter  et  tertius  dies  cundatione  coeuntium  ab- 
"  fumitur."  By  this  it  fhould  feem  that  the  peo- 
ple were  ib  far  from  efteeming  the  privilege  of 
meeting,  that  the  king  and  nobles  could  fcarcely 
get  them  together.  They  had  fuch  an  averfion  to 

thefe 


230          Ancient  Monarchical  Republics* 

thefe  civil  and  political  deliberations,  that  the 
chiefs  could  hardly  colle6l  them  to  receive  their 
orders. — "  Ut  turbas  placuit,  confidunt  armati. 
"  Silentium  per  facerdotes,  quibus  turn  et  coer- 
"  cendi  jus  eft,  imperatur.  Mox  rex,  vel  prin- 
"  ceps,  prout  setas  cuique,  prout  nobilitas,  prout 
"  decus  bellorum,  prout  facundia,  audiuntur, 
ce  aucloritate  fuadendi  magis  quam  jubendi  po- 
"  teftate.  Si  difplicuit  fententia,  -fremitu  afper- 
"  nantur ;  fin  placuit,  frameas  concutiunt.^ 
Here  is  fonie  appearance  of  popular  liberty :  but 
when  it  is  coniidered  that  the  nobles  were  pro^ 
bably  all  the  fpeakers ;  that  the  numbers  were  not 
counted,  nor  voices  diftin&ly  taken;  affent  ex- 
prefled  by  a  clafh  of  arms,  and  dififent  by  a  mur- 
mur or  a  groan ;  and  -efpecially  the  dependence  of 
the  people  on  their  leaders,  and  attachment  to 
them  by  oath;  we  may  confider  thefe  aflemblies 
rather  as  called  to  receive  the  proclamation  of  the 
laws  or  minds  of  the  nobles,  than  as  any  effedlual 
democratical  check.  There  was  one  thing  how^ 
ever,  of  great  importance,done  in  thefe  affemblies; 
judges,  the  pofle  comitatus,  and  juries,  were  here 
appointed  to  adminifter  juftice.  "  Eliguntur  in 
ff  iifdem  conciliis  et  principes,  qui  jura  per  pa- 
"  gos  vicofque  reddunt.  Centeni  lingulis  ex 
<c  plebe  comites,  confilium  fimul  et  aucloritas, 
<c  adfunt." — An  hundred  commoners  attended 
the  judge,  and  out  of  thefe  were  juries  appointed 
to  give  their  opinion,  ec  confilium  ;"  and  others, 
or  perhaps  the  fame,  to  afford  their  affiflancc, 
"  auctoritas,"  in  putting  the  fentences  and  judg- 
ment into  execution. 

From  other  particulars  related  by  Tacitus,  it 
is  very  probable  there  had  been  communications 
between  Germany  and  Greece;  from  the  wor- 
fliip  of  Hercules,  Mars,  Minerva,  &c. ;  if  not 

from 


Tacitus.  231 

from  the  altar  of  Ulyfles,  and  the  name  of  Laer- 
tes, and  the  other  monuments,  and  infcriptions 
in  Greek  letters,  of  which  he  fpeaks  more  doubt- 
fully.— However  this  may  have  been,  there  is  a 
remarkable  analogy  between  thefe  political  infti- 
tutions  of  the  Germans,  and  thofe  defcribed  by 
Homer  in  the  times  of  the  Trojan  war.  It  was, 
in  both,  the  prerogative  of  the  king  to  lead  in 
war,  and  to  rule  in  peace ;  but  it  is  probable  he 
was  not  fond  of  deliberating,  any  more  than  of 
fighting,  without  company;  and  though  he  may 
have  done  both  fometimes,  yet  numbers  of  his 
followers  were  ready  to  attend  him  in  either. 
The  nation  acknowledged  him  for  their  leader; 
but  they  were  accuftomed,  on  great  occaiions,  to 
affemble ;  and,  without  any  fludied  form  of  demo- 
cracy, took  the  fovereignty  upon  themfelves,  as 
often  as  their  paffions  were  ftrongly  enough  af- 
fected to  unite  them  in  a  body.  The  fuperipr 
clafles  among  themfelves  came  as  naturally  to  hold 
their  meetings  apart ;  and  aflembled  frequently, 
when  the  occafion  was  not  fufficient  to  engage  the 
attention  of  the  whole. — There  is  one  remarkable 
difference  between  the  Germans  and  the  Greeks. 
Among  the  former  the  priefts  were  a  diftincl  bo- 
dy, and  feem  to  have  had  more  decifive  authority 
than  the  kings,  nobles,  or  people  in  the  general 
affemblies — "  Silentium  per  facerdotes,  quibus 
"  turn  et  coercendi  jus  eft,  imperatur:"  whereas, 
among  the  latter,  the  kings  were  themfelves  at  the 
head  of  the  priefthood. 

In  this  fecond  kind  of  German  governments, 
we  fee  the  three  orders  of  king,  nobles,  and  com- 
mons diftinctly  marked;  but  no  balance  fixed, 
no  delineation  of  the  powers  of  each  :  which  left 
room  for  each  to  claim  the  fovereignty,  as  we 
know  they  afterwards  did;. at  leaft  the  king  and 

the 


Ancient  Monarchical  Republics. 

the  nobles  claimed  and  contended  for  it  for  many 
ages :  the  people  fometimes  claimed  it,  but  at  laft 
gave  it  up  to  the  king,  as  the  leaft  evil  of  the  two, 
in  every  country  except  England. 


L  E  T  T  E  R     XXXVIII. 

HOMER. 
P    H    JS,    A    C    I    A. 

Dear  Sir, 

IN  the  kingdom,  or  rather  ariftocracy,  of  Phse- 
acia,  as  reprefented  in  the  Odyffey,  we  have  a 
picture  at  full  length  of  thofe  forms   of  govern- 
ment which  at  that  time  prevailed  in  Greece. 

There  is  a  king  Alcinous;  there  is  a  council  of 
twelve  other  kings,  princes,  archons,  or  peers, 
for  they  are  called  by  all  thefe  names;  and  there 
is  a  multitude  :  but  the  laft  do  not  appear  to 
have  any  regular,  legal,  or  cuftomary  part  in  the 
government.  They  might  be  fummoned  together 
by  the  heralds,  or  called  by  the  found  of  trumpet, 
or  a  horn,  to  receive  information  of  the  refults  of 
their  chiefs  ;  to  affift  at  a  facrifice  or  proceflion  ; 
to  fee  a  ftranger,  or  a  ihow,  or  to  partake  of  a 
j~  feaft;  or  they  might  aflemble  of  themfelves  in  a 
rage  againft  an  oppreffor,from  enthufiafm  for.  the 
jroyal  iceptre,  or  other  caufes : — and  the  kings  had 
often  much  dependence  on  their  attachment  to 
their  hereditary  right,  their  defcent  from  the 
gods,  and  the  lacred  authority  of  the  poets,  who 
were  generally  royalifts. — The  archons  too  were 
often  afraid  of  the  fuperftition  of  their  people  for 
the  king,  and  his  regal  popularity.  But  the.  legal 

power 


Homer.  233 

power  of  the  people  was  very  far  from  being  a 
eonftitutional  check; — and  the  ftruggle  lay  be- 
tween the  kings  and  nobles.  The  laft  finally  pre- 
vailed, as  they  ever  will  againft  a  king  who  is  not 
fupported  by  an  adequate  popular  power.  The 
authority  in  Phssacia  was  collected  into  one  centre, 
and  that  centre  was  thirteen  kings  confederated  to- 
gether under  a  prefident  only.  Each  archon  was 
a  king  in  his  own  ifland,  ftate,  or  diftri6t,  in  which 
his  dignity  and  power  were  hereditary;  and  in 
cafe  of  a  foreign  war,  he  commanded  his  own  di- 
viiion  in  the  general  camp. 

UlyfTes  is  reprefented,  at  his  firft  entrance  into 
the  Phceacian  dominions,  as  obferving  and  admir- 
ing the  palaces  of  the  archons,  after  having  fur- 
veyed  the  gardens,  palace,  and  particular  territo- 
ry of  Alcinous: 

He  next  their  princes  lofty  domes  admires, 
In  feparate  iflands  crown'd  with  riiing  fpires. 

Od.  vii.  57. 

Alcinous  is  afterwards  reprefented  as  defcrib- 
ing  the  form  of  government  to  UlyfTes  : 

\      *    '}     »  '  •  T  flr  . . 

Twelve  princes  in  our  realm  dominion  fhare, 
O'er  whom  fupreme  imperial  pow'r  I  bear. 

Od.  viii.  425. 

Mr.  Pope  indeed,  in  this  tranflation,  has  given 
him  the  air  of  a  fovereign;  but  there  is  nothing 
like  it  in  the  original.  There  Alcinous,  with 
all  poffible  fimplicity  and  modefty,  only  fays, 
"  Twelve  illuftrious  kings,  or  archons,  rule  over 
"  the  people,  and  I  myfelf  am  the  thirteenth." 
Alcinous  and  his  twelve  archons  were  all  prefent 
at  this  interview  r 

Night 


234         Ancient  Monarchical  Republics* 

Night  now  approaching,  in  the  palace  ftand, 
With  goblets  crown'd,the  rulers  of  the  land,&c- 

Od.  viii.  182. 

The  nobles  gaze,  with  awful  fear  oppreft ; 
Silent  they  gaze,  and  eye  the  godlike  gueft,  &c. 

Od.  viii.  192- 

Pleas'd  with  his  people's  fame  the  monarch  hears, 
And  thus  benevolent  accofts  the  peers,  &c. 

Od.  viii.  421* 

Th'  afienting  peers,  obedient  to  the  king, 
In  hafte  their  heralds  fend  the  gifts  to  bring. 

Od.  viii.  433. 

x- 

The  precious  gifts  th'  illuftrious  heralds  bear, 
And  to  the  court  th'  embodied  peers  repair. 

Od.  viii.  453. 

Then  to  the  radiant  thrones  they  move  in  ftate, 
Aloft  the  king  in  pomp  imperial  fate. 

Od.  viii.  457. 

We  muft  not  forget  the  poet,  who  with  his  in- 
fpiration  from  the  Mufes  was  a  principal  fupport 
of  every  Grecian  king.  It  was  the  bard  who  fung 
the  praifes  of  the  king,  and  propagated  the  opinion 
that  he  was  fprung  from  Jupiter,  and  inflrudled  as 
well  as  dearly  beloved  by  him. 

The  bard  an  herald  guides;  ahe  gazing  throng 
Pay  low  obeifance  as  he  moves  along. 

Od.  viii.  515. 

Beneath  a  fculptur'd  arch  he  fits  enthron'd, 
The  peers  encircling  form  an  awful  round. 

Lives 


Homer*  233 

Lives  there  a  man  beneath  the  fpacious  flues, 
fi^ho  j acred  honours  to  the  bard  denies  ? 
The  Mufe  the  bard  infpires,  exalts  his  mind; 
The  Mufe  indulgent  loves  th'  harmonious  kind. 
O  more  than  man !  thy  foul  the  Mufe  infpires, 
Or  Phoebus  animates  with  all  his  fires. 

Qd.  viii.  532. 

Every  peer,  in  his  own  diftrift  or  ftate,  had 
another  fubordinate  council,  and  a  people  j  fo 
that  the  three  powers,  of  the  one,  the  few,  and  the 
many,  appeared  in  every  archonfhip ;  and  every 
archon,  in  his  own  diftricl:,  claimed  his  office  to 
be  hereditary  in  his  family :  and  all  the  archons 
agreed  together  to  fupport  each  other  in  this 
claim,  even  by  arms.  This,  therefore,  was  rather 
a  confederacy  of  thirteen  little  kingdoms,  than 
one  great  one.  The  firft  archon  of  the  confede- 
ration was  called  king  of  all  the  people,  and  claim- 
ed his  office  as  hereditary,  and  often  as  abfolute* 
The  other  archons  were  always  difpofed  to  dif- 
pute  the  hereditary  defcent,  and  to  make  it  elec- 
tive. The  fubordinate  councils  of  the  archons, 
in  their  feveral  diftricts,  were  probably  often  dif- 
pofed to  deny  their  offices  to  be  hereditary,  and 
to  infift  upon  elections.  Ulyfles,  who  was  him- 
felf  one  of  the  greateft  and  ableft  of  the  Grecian 
kings,  difcovers  his  perfect  knowledge  of  the 
hearts  of  Alcinous,  his  queen  and  nobles,  in  the 
compliment  he  makes  them.  Addrefling  himfelf 
to  the  queen,  the  daughter  of  great  Rhexenor : 

To  thee,  thy  confort,  and  this  royal  train, 

To  all  that  fhare  the  bleffings  of  thy  reign, 

***** 

So  may  the  gods  your  better  days  increafe, 
And  all  your  joys  defcend  on  all  your  race; 
VOL.  I.  G  g  So 


236          Ancient  Monarchical  Republics. 

So  reign  for  ever  on  your  country's  breaf!, 
Your  people  bleffing,  by  your  people  bleft. 

This  fupplication  was  addrefled  to  the  king 
and  queen,  the  princes,  archons,  dukes,  counts, 
barons,  peers,  call  them  by  what  name  you  pleafe, 
and  it  concludes  with  a  compliment  very  flattering 
to  all.  UlyfTes  knew  the  ruling  paffion  of  Grecian 
kings  and  nobles  to  be,  that  their  dignities,  even 
fuch  as  had  been  conferred  by  the  eledion  of  the 
people,  fhould  become  hereditary.  Mr.  Pope  has 
difguifed  this  fentinaent,  and  made  it  conformable 
to  the  notions  of  Englifhmen  and  Americans  r 
but  has  departed  from  the  fenfe  of  Homer  and 
from  the  fac~h 

"  May  you  tranfmit  to  your  children  your 
"  poffeffions  in  your  houfes,  and  whatever  gifts, 
"  rewards,  or  honours  the  people  hath  given 
"  you." 

It  is  plain  the  kings  claimed  an  hereditary  right; 
yet  the  fucceffion  was  fometimes  fet  afide  in  favour 
of  fome  other  noble,  or  branch  of  the  royal  blood  : 
and  perhaps  it  was  always  fet  afide  when  any  one 
of  the  nobles  had  more  power  than  the  heir  appa- 
rent- The  nobles  too  claimed  their  honours  to 
be  hereditary ;  and  they  generally  were  fo  :  but 
the  people  were  fometimes  bold  enough  to  fet  up 
competitors,  and  give  them  trouble.  But  perhaps 
there  were  never  any  very  formal  ele6tions;  pre- 
fenting  a  rucceflbr,  in  prefence  of  the  king  and 
the  other  nobles,  to  the  people  for  their  acclama- 
tions, was  probably  the  moft  that  was  done  :  for 
as  there  were  no  records,  nor  written  conftitution, 
or  laws,  the  right  of  kings,  archons,  and  people, 
muft  have  been  very  looie  and  undefined. 


LETTER 


Homer. 


LETTER    XXXIX. 


HOMER. 


I    T  HA  C    A. 


Dear  Sir, 

THE  court  of  Ithaca,  in  the  abfence  of  Ulyf- 
fes,  is  an  admirable  example  of  the  intrigues 
of  the  archons,  and  their  infatiable  ambition.  The 
throne  of  Ithaca,  and  the  fceptre  of  Laertes  and 
former  kings,  were  the  objects  which  had  fo  many 
charms  in  the  eyes  of  the  fuitors ;  and  Penelope's 
hand  was  chiefly  courted,  becaufe  that  would  re- 
concile the  archon  who  fhould  poflefs  her  to  the 
fuperftition  of  the  people,  and  enable  him  to  wield 
the  fceptre.  The  fuitors  deny  the  fceptre  to  be 
hereditary;  and  Telemachus  himfelf  is  doubt- 
ful :  he  threatens  indeed  to  call  a  council  or  af- 
fembly  of  the  people,  but  is  afraid  to  truft  them ; 
for  fear  they  fhould  fet  up  fome  other  Grecian 
prince,  whofe  blood  might  be  nearer  that  of  their 
ancient  kings. 

To  tempt   the  fpoufelefs  queen  with  amorous 

wiles, 

Refort  the  nobles  from  the  neighbouring  ifles ; 
From  Samos,  circled  with  th'  Ionian  main, 
Dulichium,  and  Zacynthns'  fylvan  reign: 

Ev'n, 


238          Ancient  Monarchical  Republics. 

Ev'n,  \vith  prefumptuous  hope  her  bed  t*  afcend, 
The  lords  of  Ithaca  their  right  pretend. 

Od.  i.  315. 

My  fentence  hear ;  with  ftern  diftafte  avow'd, 
To  their  own  diftri&s  drive  the  fuitor  crowd. 

Od.  i.  352. 

I  to  the  peers  aflembled  fhall  propofe 
The  firm  refolve  1  here  in  few  difclofe ; 
No  longer  live  the  cankers  of  my  court, 
All  to  your /everaj  ftates  with  fpeed  refort; 
Wafte  in  wild  riot  what^owr  land  allows, 
There  ply  the  early  feaft  and  late  caroufe. 

Od.  i.  475. 

/  , 

•    If  ruin  to  our  royal  race  ye  doom, 

Be  you  the  fpoilers,  and  our  wealth  confume ; 
Then  might  we  hope  redrefs  from  jufter  laws, 
And  raife  all  Ithaca  to  aid  our  caufe : 
But  while  your  fons   commit  the  unpunifh'd 

wrong, 
You  make  the  arm  of  violence  too  ftrong. 

Od.  ii.  83. 

* 

Ele&  by  Jove  his  delegate  of  fway, 
With  joyous  pride  the  fummons  I'd  obey. 

Should  fa&ious  power  difpute  my  lineal  right, 

******** 

Some  other  Greeks  a  fairer  claim  may  plead, 
To  your  pretence  their  title  would  precede, 
At  leaft,  the  fceptre  loft,  I  ftill  fhould  reign 
Sole  o'er  may  vaffals  and  domeftic  train. 

Od.  i.  501. 

To  heaven  alone 
Refer  the  choice  to  fill  the  vacant  throne; 

Your 


Homer*  239 

Your  patrimonial  ftates  in  peace  poflefs, 
Undoubted  all  your  filial  claim  confefs : 
Your  private  right  mould  impious  power  in- 
vade, 
The  peers  of  Ithaca  would  arm  in  aid. 

Od.  i.  509. 

It  is  thus  agreed  on  all  hands,  that,  as  one  of  the 
archons,  his  hereditary  title  of  his  eftates,  vaf- 
fals,  and  government  was  indifputable.  This 
was  the  common  caufe  of  all  the  archons,  and 
they  would  arm  in  fupport  of  the  claim  of  any 
one.  But  the  throne  and  fceptre  of  Ithaca  were  to 
be  difpofed  of  by  augury,  by  the  will  of  Jove, 
fignified  by  fome  omen.  To  this  Telemachus 
pays  fome  refpeft,  but  ftill  iniifts  on  his  right  of 
blood ;  and  fays,  that  if  the  omen  mould  be  un- 
favourable to  him,  it  would  not  promote  the 
hopes  of  any  of  the  archons  of  Ithaca;  but  fome 
other  Greeks,  nearer  of  kin  to  the  royal  blood, 
would  fet  up  their  claims.  The  archons,  not 
likely  to  fucceed  in  their  fcheme  of  getting  the 
fceptre  by  the  marriage  of  Penelope,  nor  by  per- 
fuading  Telemaehus  to  fubmit  the  queftion  to 
Jupiter  and  his  omens,  and  afraid  to  appeal  to 
the  people,  or  to  call  them  out  in  arms  to  dif- 
pute  the  fucceffion,  knowing  the  family  of  Laer- 
tes and  Ulyfles  to  be  more  popular  than  them- 
felves,  they  take  the  refolution  to  affaflinate  the 
young  prince, 

But  die  he  fhall ;  and,  thus  condemn'd  to  bleed, 
Be  now  the  fcene  of  inftant  death  decreed : 
Wait  ye  till  he  to  arms  in  council  draws 
The  Greeks,  averfe  too  juflly  to  our  caufe  ? 
Strike,  ere  the  ftates  conven'd  the  foe  betray, 
Our  murd'rous  ambufh  on  the  wat'ry  way. 

Or 


240          Ancient  Monarchical  Republics. 

Or  choofe  ye  vagrant  from  their  rage  to  fly, 
Outcafts  of  earth, to  breathe  an  unknown  Iky? 
But  if  fubmiflive  you  refign  the  fway, 
Slaves  to  a  boy5  go  flatter  and  obey ; 
Retire  we  inftant  to  our  native  reign, 
Nor  be  the  wealth  of  kings  confum'd  in  vain. 

Od.  xvi.  386. 

Telemachus  had  before  declared,  that  if  any 
archon  of  Ithaca,  or  any  other  Greek,  obtained 
the  fceptre,  he  would  no  longer  remain  in  the 
confederation,  but  would  reign  feparately  over 
his  paternal  domain.  Now  Antinous  declares, 
that  if  the  reft  of  the  archons  lubmit  to  the  boy, 
he  will  not;  but  will  retire  to  his  native  archon- 
ftiip. 

Amphinomus  afcends, 

Who  o'er Dulichium  ftretch'd  his  fpacious  reign, 
A  land  of  plenty,  bleis'd  with  every  grain. 
O  friends  forbear,  and  be  the  thought  with- 

ftood ! 

3Tis  horrible  to  fhed  imperial  blood ; 
Confult  we  firft  th'  all-feeing  power's  above, 
And  the  fure  oracles  of  righteous  Jove. 

Neither  in  Poland  nor  in  Venice  was  the  arif- 
tocratical  rage  to  render  weak,  unfteady,  and  un- 
certain the  royal  authority,  more  confpicuous 
than  it  was  here.  They  were  afraid  of  the  peo- 
ple and  the  auguries ;  but  neither  was  a  legal 
check;  and  we  fhall  fee  hereafter  that  thefe 
ftruggles  of  the  archons  very  foon  abolifhed  every 
monarchy  in  Greece,  even  that  of  Sparta,  until 
it  was  renewed  upon  another  plan  by  Lycurgus. 
And  the  fame  progrefs  of  paffions,  through  fedi- 
tions,  rebellions,  and  maffacres,  muft  for  ever 

take 


Homer.  24* 

take  place  in  a  body  of  nobles  againft  the  crown, 
where  they  are  not  effectually  reft  rained  by  an 
independent  people,  known  and  eftablifhed  in  the 
legiflature,  collectively  or  by  reprefentation. 

That  the  Grecian  kings,  claiming  from  Jupi- 
ter, and  fupported  by-  their  auguries  and  bards, 
thought  themfelves  abfolute,  and  often  punifhed 
the  crimes  of  the  archons  very  tyrannically,  is 
true. — Ulyffes  is  an  example  of  it.  Inftead  of 
bringing  the  fuitors  to  trial  before  the  nation, 
or  their  peers,  he  fhoots  them  all,  without  judge 
or  jury,  with  his  own  bow.— A  more  remarkable 
aflertion  of  a  claim  to  abfolute  monarchy  cannot 
be  imagined. 

Antinous  would  retire  to  his  native  diftricl,  and 
fpend  his  revenues  among  his  own  people,  not 
confume  his  royal  wealth  by  attendance  at  a  court 
of  a  confederation  which  would  be  no  longer  to  his 
tafte.  This  was  a  popular  fentiment  in  his  own 
dominions ;  his  people  wifhed  to  have  their  king 
refide  among  them,  and  were  very  willing  to  have 
the  confederacy  broken.  This  principle  it  was 
that  afterwards  crumbled  all  the  Greek  confede- 
rations to  duft. 


LETTER 


242  Ancient  Monarchical  Republics. 

LETTER    XXXIX. 
ANCIENT  MONARCHICAL  REPUBLICS- 

HOMER* 


My  dear  Sii* 

THE  fimilitude  between  the  ancient  Greek 
monarchies,  as  they  are  generally  called, 
though  the  predominance  of  ariftocracy  in  all  of 
them  is  very  manifeif,  and  the  feudal  ariftocracies 
defcribed  by  Tacitus,  is  very  obvious.  The  de- 
mocratical  power  is  neverthelefs  much  more  re- 
gular, though  not  independent,  in  the  latter; 
for,  in  addition  to  what  is  before  quoted,  it  ap- 
pears, that  the  judicial  authority  was  commonly 
exercifed  in  national  aflemblies — ''  Licet  apud 
"  concilium  accufare  quoque,  et  difcrimen  capi- 
cc  tis  intendere.  Diftinclio  posnarum  ex  deliclo, 
"  proditores  et  transfugas  arboribus  fufpendunt ; 
"  ignavos,  et  imbelles,  et  corpore  infames,  coeno 
<c  ac  palude,  inje&a  infuper  crate,  mergunt.  Di- 
cc  verfitas  fupplicii  illuc  refpicit,  tanquam  fce- 
€C  lera  oftendi  opporteat  dum  puniuntur,  flagitia 
"  abfcondi.  Sed  et  levioribus  delidis,  pro  modo 
"  poenarum,  equorum  pecorumque  numero  con- 
"  vidi  multantur;  pars  multse,  regi  vel  civitati, 
"  pars  ipfi  qui  vindicatur  vel  propinquis  ejus.ex- 
<c  folvitur." 

Although  the  mixture  of  monarchy,  ariftocra- 
cy, and  democracy,  is  vifible  in  the  republic  of 

Phseacia, 


*  ^''^  Oii  :rO<;-    ' 

Homer.  243 

Phseacia,  yet  the  king  appears  little  more  among 
the  archons  than  the  firft  among  equals,  and  the 
authority  of  the  people  is  ftill  more  faint  and  fee- 
ble. In  Ithaca,  there  appears  a  ftrong  claim  of 
fovereignty  in  the  king,  and  as  ftrong  a  preten- 
fion  to  it  in  the  archons  ;  and,  although  the  peo- 
ple are  dreaded  by  both,  and  their  claim  to  in- 
terfere in  the  difpofition  of  the-  crown  is  impli- 
citly acknowledged,  yet  it  feems  to  be  as  judges 
of  certain  religious  ceremonies,  by  which  the  will 
of  Jupiter  was  to  be^colleded,  than  as  any  re- 
gular civil  authority. 

Homer  was  a  royalift,  at  leaft  as  much  as  Plato 
and  Ariftotle. 

"  Jove  loves  our  chief,  from  Jove  his  honour 

fp  rings. 

"  Beware  !  for  dreadful  is  the  Wrath  of  kings. 
"  Be  filent,  wretch !  and  think  not  here  al- 

low'd 

"  That  worft  of  tyrants,  an  ufurping  crowd: 
"  To  one  fole  monarch  Jove  commits  the  fway ; 
"  His  are  the  laws,  and  him  let  all  obey. 

//.  ii.  233—241. 

The  name  of  a  republic  is  not  found  in  any  of 
his  writings  :  yet,  in  every  Grecian  government 
defcribed  by  him,  we  find  a  mixture,  not  only 
of  an  ariftocracy,  confifting  in  a  council  of 
princes  ;  but  of  a  democracy,  in  an  aflembly  of 
the  people. 

Agamemnon,  in  the  fecond  Iliad,  calls  toge- 
ther the  whole  body. 

Bid  him  in  arms  draw  forth  th'  embattled  train, 
Lead  all  his  Grecians  to  the  dufty  plain. 
VOL.  I.  H  h  The 


444         Ancient  Monarchical   Republics. 

The  king  difpatch'd  his  heralds  with  commands 
To  range  the  camp,  and  fummon  all  the  bands. 
The  gath'ring  hofts  the  monarch's  word  obey, 
While  to  the  fleet  Atrides  bends  his  way : 
In  his  black  fhip  the  Pylean  prince  he  found, 
There  calls  a  fenate  of  the  peers  around. 
Th'  affembly  plac'd,  the  king  of  men  expreil 
The  councils  labouring  in  his  artful  breaft  : 
Friends  and  confed'rates !  with  attentive  ear 
Receive  my  words,  and  credit  what  you  hear ; 
111  fits  a  chief  who  mighty  nations  guides, 
Directs  in  councils,  and  in  war  piefides, 
To  whom  its  fafety  a  whole  people  owes, 
To  wafte  long  nights  in  indolent  repofe. 
Now,  valiant  chiefs !  lince  Heav'nitfelf  alarms, 
Unite,  and  roufe  the  fons  of  Greece  to  arms ; 
But  firft  with  caution  try  what  yet  they  dare, 
Worn  with  nine  years  of  unfuccefsful  war. 
To  move  the  troops  to  meafure  back  the  main 
Be  mine,  and  yours  the  province  to  detain. 

The  kings  without  delay 

Diffolve  the  council,  and  their  chief  obey. 
The  fcepter'd  rulers  lead  ;  the  following  hoft, 
Pour'd  forth  by  thoufands,  darken  all  the  coaft. 
Nine  facred  heralds  now,  proclaiming  loud 
The  monarch's  will,  fufpendthe  lift'ning  crowd, 
The  king  of  kings  his  awful  figure  rais'd, 
High  in  his  hand  the  golden  fceptre  blaz'd — 
Ye  fons  of  Mars  !  partake  your  leader's  care, 
Heroes  of  Greece,  and  brothers  of  the  war, 
Fly,  Grecians,  fly  !  your  fails  and  oars  employ, 
And  dream  no  more  of  Heaven-defended  Troy. 
His  deep  defign  unknown,  the  hoils  approve 
Atrides'  fpecch  ; — the  mighty  numbers  move. 

It 


Homer.  245 

It  appears  from  the  whole  narration,  that  the 
great  body  of  the  people  were  difcontented,  and 
defirous  of  railing  the  liege.  The  king  alarmed, 
was  obliged  to  call  them  together,  with  an  artful 
deiign  to.  obtain  their  confent  to  perfevere.  He 
feigns  an  intention  to  return  home ;  the  people 
were  rejoiced  at  it.  Then  UlyiTes  and  the  other 
chiefs,  in  concert  with  Agamemnon,  receives  the 
fceptre  of  command,  and  endeavours  to  perfuade 
tjie  people  to  make  another  effort.  To  this  end 
Ulyfies  harangues  them. 

He  runs,  he  flies  through  all  the  Grecian  train, 
Each  prince  of  name,  or  chief  in  arms    ap- 

prov'd, 

He  fir'd  with  praife,  or  with  perfuafion  mov'd. 
But  if  a  clamorous  vile  plebeian  rofe, 
Him  with  reproof  he  check'd,  or  tam'd  with 

blows  : 

Be  ftill,  thou  Have,  and  to  thy  betters  yield, 
Unknown  alike  in  council  or  in  field ! 
Ye  gods  !  what  daftards  would  our  hoft  com- 
mand ! 

Swept  to  the  war,  the  lumber  of  the  land : 
Be  filent,  wretch  !  and  think  not  here  allow'd 
That  worft  of  tyrants,  an  ufurping  crowd. 
With  words  like  thefe  the  troops  UlyfTes  rul'd, 
The  loudeft  filenc'd,  and  the  fiercefl  cool'd. 
Back  to  th5  aiTernbly  roll  the  thronging  train, 
Defert  the  fhips,  and  pour  upon  the  plain. 
Therfites  only  clarnour'd  in  the  throng, 
Loquacious,  loud,  and  turbulent  of  tongue : 
Aw'd  by  no  fhame,  by  no  refpedl  controul'd, 
In  fcandal  bufy,  in  reproaches  bold, 
With  witty  malice  ftudious  to  defame, 
Scorn  all  his  joy,  and  laughter  all  his  aim': 

But 


246          Ancient  Monarchical  Republics. 

But  chief  he  gloried,  with  licentious  ftyle 
To  lafh  the  great,  and  monarchs  to  revile. 
Spleen  to  mankind  his  envious  heart  pofTeil> 
And  much  he  hated  all,  but  moft  the  beft; 
Ulyfles  or  Achilles  ftill  his  theme, 
But  royal  fcandal  his  delight  fupreme. 
Long  had  he  liv'd,  the  fcorn  of  ev'ry  Greek, 
Vext  when  he  fpoke,  yet  ftill  they  heard  him 
fpeak. 

If  from  this  only,  and  the  fubfequent  harangue 
of  Theriites,  we  were  to  form  a  judgment,  we 
fhould  conclude,  that  popular  affemblies  were 
very  frequent,  and  that  the  freedom  of  fpeech  in 
them  was  far  advanced  and  well  eftabjifhed ;  but 
the  furious  anfwer  of  ^Ulyfles,  and  the  unmerciful 
flogging  he  gives  him  for  his  boldnefs,  in  the  face 
of  the  whole  affembly,  wfiich  is  applauded  uni- 
verfally,  ihews,  that  the  demagogues  had  yet  but 
very  little  influence,  very  little  courage,  and  that 
popular  aflemblies  had  as  yet  very  little  conftitu- 
tional  power. 

The  principles  of  government  were  very  little 
underftood,  and  all  the  political  inftitutions  ex- 
tremely confufed,  in  the  times  of  the  Trojan  war, 
and  from  thence  to  Homer's  time.- — Nothing  was 
precifely  defined;  no  laws  were  written.  The 
moft  diftincl  rules,  which  are  now  to  be  traced, 
were  a  fupremacy  in  kings,  in  religion  and  war : 
fometimes  they  exercifed  judicial  power.  Monar- 
chies were  generally  hereditary;  yet  a  right  of 
the  nation  to  interfere,  and  alter  the  fucceffion,  is 
admitted.  The  right  of  the  fons  of  the  archons, 
to  fucceed  to  their  eftates  and  diftri&s,  was  an 
agreed  point  among  them ;  but  thefe  very  archons 
chofe  to  keep  open  to  competition  the  fuccefliori 

to 


Homer.  247 

to  the  throne,  fo  that  there  might  always  be  room 
for  the  pretenfions  of  the  moft  powerful,  who 
would  eafily  make  themfelves  thought  the  moft 
worthy.  The  moft  celebrated  kings,  when  ad- 
vanced in  years,  and  unable  to  fuftain  the  fatigues 
of  war,  and  cares  of  government,  were  obliged  to 
relign  their  power. — The  anxiety  of  Achilles,  ex- 
preffed  to  UlyfTes  in  the  ftiades,  is  a  proof  of 
this. 

Say  if  my  fire,  the  reverend  Peleus,  reigns 
Great  in  his  Pthia,  and  his  throne  maintains  ? 
Or,  weak  and  old,  my  youthful  arm  demands 
To  fix  the  fceptre  fteadfaft  in  his  hands ! 
O  might  the  lamp  of  life  re-kindled  burn, 
And  death  releafe  me  from  the  filent  urn ! 
This  arm,    that  thunder'd  o'er  the  Phrygian 

plain, 
And  fwell'd  the  ground  with  mountains  of  the 

flain, 

Should  vindicate  rfiy  injur'd  father's  fame, 
Crufh  the  proud  rebel,  and  aflert  his  claim. 

Od.  ii.  605. 

Kings  and  their  families,  claiming  their  defcent 
and  power  from  Jupiter,  contended  very  natu- 
rally and  confidently  that  the  one  was  heredi- 
tary, and  the  other  abfolute ;  and  accordingly, 
when  the  prince  who  fwayed  the  fceptre  was 
a6Uve,  brave,  and  able,  he  kept  the  archons  in 
awe,  and  governed  as  he  pleafed :  but  when  he 
was  feeble,  the  archons  grew  ambitious,  difputed 
the  fucceflion,  and  limited  the  royal  power.  To 
this  end  both  they  and  the  kings,  or  heirs  of 
kings,  fometimes  looked  to  the  people,  and 
feemed  to  admit  in  them  a  right  to  be  prefent 

at 


24$          Ancient  Monarchical  Republics. 

at  the  religious  ceremonies  by  which  the  will  of 
Jupiter  was  to  be  declared  ;  for  all  parties  agree, 
that  the  will  of  Jupiter  confers  the  fceptre,  not 
the  mere  election  of  the  people. 

The  right  of  primogeniture  was  favoured  by 
popular  opinion,  as  well  as  hereditary  defcent, 
becaufe  the  family  was  the  family  of  Jupiter,  re- 
lated to  him,  and  defcended  from  him  by  blood ; 
and  it  was  natural  to  fuppofe,  that  Jupiter's  incli- 
nations for  defcent  and  primo'geniture  refembled 
thofe  of  other  fathers  of  families. 

The  chiefs,  who  are  all  called  kings,  as  well 
as  the  head  of  them,  or  archons,  were  like  the 
Teutonic  counts  or  feudal  barons,  who  exercifed 
royal  rights  within  their  own  diftri&s,  ftates,*  or 
feparate  territories.  "This  principle  preferved  the 
real  and  legal  power  chiefly  in  their  hands,  and 
conftituted  the  whole  government  more  properly 
an  ariftocracy  than  a  royalty.  This  gave  an  un- 
controulable  pride  to  thefe  nobles,  which  could 
not  willingly  fubmit  to  the  pretenfions  of  the 
kings  (as  reprefentatives  of  Jupiter)  to  omnipo- 
tence, at  leaft  to  unlimited  power.  Hence  the 
continual  ftruggle  between  the  kings  and  archons, 
from  Homer's  time  to  that  great  and  memora- 
ble revolution  throughout  Greece,  from  monar- 
chy to  ariftocracy;  that  is,  from  kings  to  archons. 
The  people  not  yet  pofTeffing  nor  claiming  an 
authority  fufficiently  regular  and  independent  to 
be  a  check  to  monarchy  or  ariftocracy,  the  latter 
at  lafl  prevailed  over  the  former,  as  it  ever  did 
and  ever  will,  where  the  conteftis  merely  between 
thefe  two. 

The  people,- only  in  extraordinary  cafes,  in  the 
moft  effential  matters,  and  when  the  chiefs  were 
greatly  divided,  were  at  all  confulted ;  yet,  in  the 

courfc 


Homer* 


249 


courfe  of  the  ftruggle  between  the*  kings  and  ar- 
choas,  the  multitude  were  fo  often  called  upon, 
and  fo  much  courted,  that  they  came  by  degrees 
to  claim  the  whole  power,  and  prepared  the 
\vay,  in  many  of  the  Grecian  ftates,  for  another 
fubfequent  revolution,  from  ariftocracy  to  demo- 
cracy. 

Through  the  whole  of  Tacitus  and  Homer, 
the  three  orders  are  vifible  both  in  Germany  and 
Greece;  and  the  continual  fluctuations  of  law, 
the  uncertainty  of  life,  liberty,  and  property,  and 
the  contradictory  claims  and  continual  revoluti- 
ons, arofe  entirely  from  the  want  of  having  the 
prerogatives  and  privileges  of  thofe  orders  de- 
fined, from  the  want  .of  independence  in  each  of 
them,  and  a  balance  between  them.  « 


LETTER    XL. 
ANCIENT  ARISTOCRATICAL  REPUBLICS, 

tACED^MON. 


My  dear  Sir, 

FROM  the  days  of  Homer  to  thofe  of  Lycur- 
gus,-  the  governments  in  Greece  were  mo- 
narchical in  name  and  preteniion,  but  ariftocra- 
tical  in  reality.  The  archons  were  impatient  of 
regal  government,  conilantly  ftruggling  againft 
their  kings;  and  had  prevailed  in  every  other  city, 

except 


250         Ancient  Ariftocratical  Republics. 

• 

except  Sparta,  to  abolifh  the  royal  authority,  and 
fubftitute  an  ariftocracy  of  archons  in  its  place. 
In  Lacedsemon,  too,  where  there  were  eight-and- 
twenty  archons  contending  againft  two  kings,  they 
had  brought  the  whole  country  into  the  utmoft 
confufion.  The  circumftance  of  two  kings, 
which  perhaps  prolonged  the  regal  power  longer 
in  Sparta  than  in  any  other  city,  originated  in  the 
fondnefs  of  a  mother.  Ariftodemus,  one  of  the 
defcendants  of  Hercules,  to  whofe  fhare  Laconia 
fell,  upon  the  divifion  of  the  Peloponnefus,  after 
the  return  of  that  family  from  banimment,  leaving 
twin  fons,  Eurifthenes  and  Procles ;  their  mother 
refufing  to  determine  which  had  the  right  of  pri- 
mogeniture, it  was  agreed  that  both  ftiould  fuo 
ceed  to  the  -crown  with  equal  authority,  and  that 
the  pofterity  of  each  mould  inherit.  The  nobles 
took  advantage  of  all  the  jealoufies  which  arofe 
between  the  two  families,  obliged  each  to  court 
them,  and  from  time  to  time  to  make  them  con- 
ceffions,  until  the  royal  authority  was  loft ;  and 
as  the  archons  could  not  agree,  each  party  now 
began  to  court  the  people,  and  univerfal  anarchy 
prevailed. 

Lycurgus,  of  the  family  of  Procles,  and  only 
in  the  tenth  defcent  from  Hercules,  fucceeded  his 
brother  Polidedes ;  but  being  told  his  brother's 
widow  was  with  child,  he  declared  himfelf  pro- 
tector only,  and  religned  the  crown.  Such  a  dif- 
interefted  indifference  to  a  crown  in  any  one  of 
royal  or  noble  blood,  was  fo  unexampled  in  that 
age,  that  no  wonder  it  was  much  admired  and 
very  popular.  The  ambitious  princefs,  his  Mer, 
offered  to  marry  him,  and  remove  out  of  his  way 
the  only  competitor,  by  procuring  an  abortion. 
He  deceived  her  by  counterfeited  tendernefs ;  and 
diverted  her  from  the  thoughts  of  an  abortion,  by 

prom  i  fin  g 


Lacedcemon*  25 1 

promifing  to  take  the  difpofition  of  the  child  up- 
on himfelf  when  it  fhould  be  born.  The  infant 
was  fent  to  him,  when  at  fupper  with  the  principal 
magiftrates :  he  took  it  in  his  arms,  and  cried,  "A 
"  king,  Spartans,  is  born  to  you,"  and  placed  it 
in  his  own  feat.  The  company  were  touched  at  the 
tendernefs  of  the  fcene,  and  fell  into  a  tranfport 
of  enthufiafm,  both  of  piety  to  the  blood  of  Her- 
cules, and  admiration  of  thedifinterefted  integrity 
of  Lycurgus,  who,  like  an  able  ftatefman,  per- 
petuates the  memory  of  the  event,  and  the  joy  at 
it,  by  the  name  with  which,  upon  the  fpot,  he 
chriftens  the  boy,  Charilaus,  the  peoples  joy.  But 
all  this  exalted  merit,  added  to  his  acknowledged 
divine  defcent,  and  the  undoubted  poffeffion  of 
royal  power,  were  not  fufficient  to  over-awe  the 
jealouly  of  the  nobles,  a  ftrong  party  of  whom 
joined  the  irritated  queen  and  her  brother,  and 
raifed  continual  factions  againft  him.  "Weary  of 
cabals,  and  ftimulated  with  a  thirft  for  knowledge, 
he  determined  to  travel;  viiited  Crete  and  Egypt, 
the  two  fources  of  the  theology  and  policy  of 
Greece;  and  brought  home  with  him,  on  his  re- 
turn to  his  own  country,  Thales  the  poet,  and 
the  writings  of  Homer,  with  the  refolution  of 
adopting  the  martial  difcipline  and  political  liber- 
ty which  he  read  in  the  poet,  and  had  feen  exem- 
plified in  Crete.  Nothing  could  be  better  cal- 
culated than  his  two  poets,  to  infpire  the  nation 
with  that  enthufiafm  which  he  wanted,  and  con- 
firm the  belief,  that  kings  were  from  Jupiter,  and 
beloved  by  him,  excepting  the  refponfe*  of  the 
oracle,  which  he  took  care  to  procure :  "  Wel- 
"  come  Lycurgus,  to  this  happy  place;  thou 
"  favourite  of  heaven !  I  ftand  in  doubt  whether 
"  I  fhall  pronounce  thee  god  or  man :  inclining 
"  ftill  to  think  thou  art  a  god !" — Herodotus. 
VOL.  I,  •  li  The 


252          Ancient  Ariftocratical  Republics. 

The  diforders  in  Sparta  were  now  become  infup* 
portable ;  the  kings  had  as  little  authority  as  the 
laws.  All  parties,  except  the  two  kings,  in  de- 
%air  of  their  private  fchemes,  applied  to  the  great 
legiflator,  pointed  out  to  all,  by  his  divine  origi- 
nal, the  infpiration  of  Homer  and  Thales,  his 
own  integrity,  wifdom,  knowledge,  and  com- 
manding authority  over  the  minds  of  men,  as 
well  as  his  fpecial  divine  miflion  pronounced  by 
the  oracle,  to  be  the  only  man  capable  of  new- 
modelling  the  conftitution. 

In  Crete  he  had  acquired  a  deep  infight  into 
human  nature,  at  leaft  he  had  informed  himfelf 
fully  of  the  length  and  breadth,  the  heighth  and 
depth,  of  the  paffion  of  ambition  in  the  human 
heart;  that  complication  of  affections,  which  is 
called  by  fo  many  names;  the  love  of  efteem,  of 
praife,  of  fame,  of  glory ;  that  fenfe  of  honour  in 
which  Montefquieu  tells  us  monarchies  are  found- 
ed; which  Tacitus  tells  us  made  the  ancient  Teu- 
tons fubmit  quietly  to  be  fold  by  their  inferiors, 
when  they  had  gambled  away  their  liberty;  which 
at  this  day  enforces  fo  punctual  a  payment  of 
debts  of  honour  contracted  at  play;  which  fup- 
ports  againft  all  laws  throughout  Europe  the 
cuftom  of  duelling,  and  produces  more  filicides 
than  any  other  caufe  ;  which  is  commonly  known 
by  the  denomination  of  the  point  of  honour,  and 
may  with  as  much  propriety  be  called  ambition ; — r 
Lycurgus  appears  to  have  underitood  better  than 
any  o{her  legiflator,  and  to  have  made  the  founda- 
tion of  his  iuftitution  :  for  this  reafon,  Plato  with 
great  propriety  calls  it  "  The  ambitious  Re- 
public." 

Lycurgus  in  fecret  confulted  the  nobles,  but 
not  the  kings ;  formed  a  powerful  party,  called 
an  aflembly  of  the  people,  before  whom  his  friends 

appeared 


Lacedtemon.  253 

appeared  in  arms.  Charilaus  and  Archilaus  were 
not  in  the  fecret,  but  found  themfelves  obliged  to 
fubmit.  What  is  all  this  but  a  body  of  nobles 
completing,  by  the  aid  of  Lycurgus,  that  aboli- 
tion of  monarchy  which  they  had  been  purfuing 
for  ages?  unreftrained  by  any  legal  check  in  the 
people,  and  unrefifted  by  any  adequate  power  in 
the  crown  ?  But  what  was  his  new  inftitution  ? 

In  compliance  with  old  prejudices,  and  from 
attachment  to  his  family,  he  confirmed  the  two 
families  on  the  throne,  eftablifhed  the  hereditary 
defcent  of  the  crown,  but  limited  its  authority. 
The  kings  were  to  continue  high  priefts,  to  be 
commanders  in  chief  of  the  .armies,  and  prefidents 
ofthefenate.  Chariiaus  and  Archilaus,  terrified 
by  the  fate  of  all  the  other  kings  of  Greece, 
agreed  to  accept  of  a  certain,  though  limited  au- 
thority, in  lieu  of  preteniions  more  abfolute,  a^nd 
more  precarious. 

The  ancient  dignities  of  the  nobles  were  con- 
firmed and  enlarged :  a  fenate  of  eight-and-twenty 
of  their  chiefs  was  formed,  at  the  head  of  whom 
the  two  kings  were  placed.  To  the  people  he 
committed  the  eledion  of  future  fenators :  but  as 
the  prefent  twenty-eight  were  for  life,  and  the 
influence  of  kings  and  fenators  would  be  com- 
monly ufed  with  great  unanimity,  in  favour  of 
the  eldeft  fon,  to  fill  up  a  vacancy  made  by  the 
death  of  his  father ;  and  as  the  people  were  not 
permitted  to  debate,  their  choice  was  perhaps 
little  more  than  a  confent  by  acclamations  to  a 
nomination  made  by  the  king,  and  amounted  to 
the  fame  thing  with  an  hereditary  houfe  of  peers. 
To  this  fenate  the  whole  executive  power  was 
committed,  and  the  moft  important  part  .of  the 
legiflative;  for  as  all  laws  were  to  originate  there 
only,  they  had  a  negative  before  debate.  Here 

is 


254          Ancient  Ariftbcratical  Republics. 

is  indeed  all  authority  nearly  collected  into  one 
centre,  and  that  centre  the  nobility;  for  the  king 
was  but  the  firft  among  equals,  having  no  nega- 
tive upon  the  fenate.  Ifthelegiflator  had  refted 
here,  his  infKtution  would  have  been  in  effe6t 
a  fimple  hereditary  oligarchy,  poffefled  of  the 
whole  legiflative,  executive,  and  judicial  power, 
and  probably  as  reftlefs  as  ever,  to  reduce  the 
kings  to  elections  for  life,  or  years,  and  then 
to  take  from  them  the  power  of  religion,  the 
command  of  Armies,  and  then  to  change  the 
title  from  king  to  archon,  or  from  the  family  of 
Hercules  to  other  houfes.  With  a  view  to  counter- 
balance this  dangerous  authority,  he  inftituted 
aflembiies  of  the  people,  but  intruded  them  only 
with  the  power  of  confirming  or  rejecting  what  the 
fenate  propofed,  and  exprefsly  forbade  them  all 
debate.  The  citizens  were  to  give  their  fimple 
ayes  or  noes,  without  being  allowed  to  fpeak,  even 
fo  far  as  to  give  a  reafon  for  their  vote.  He  in- 
ftituted moreover,  as  a  farther  check  upon  the 
fenate,  five  magiftrates  to  infpe&  the  adminiftra- 
tion,  and  maintain  the  conftitution ;  to  convoke, 
prorogue,  and  diffolve  both  the  greater  aflembly 
of  the  people,  compofed  of  nine  thoufand  inhabi- 
tants of  the  city,  and  the  lefTer,  con  lifting  of 
thirty  thoufand  inhabitants  of  the  country  or  infe- 
rior villages.  Thefe  magiftrates  were  called  the 
ephori,  and  were  to  be  annually  appointed.  But 
the  lawgiver  faw  that  the  king  and  people  were 
both  too  weak,  and  the  fenate  would  ftill  have 
power  to  fcramble  after  both  ;  he  therefore  con- 
trived a  kind  of  folemn  alliance  to  be  perpetually 
renewed  between  the  monarchical  and  democrati- 
cal  branches,  by  which  the  fenate  might  be  awed 
into  moderation.  He  'ordered  an  oath  to  be  taken 
everytnonth,  by  the  kings  and  the  ephori:  the 

former 


Lacedamon.  255 

former  fwore  to  obferve  the  laws,  and  the  latter 
fwore,  for  themfelves  and  the  people  whom  they 
reprefented,  to  maintain  the  hereditary  honours 
of  the  race  of  Hercules,  to  revere  them  as  mini-* 
fters  of  religion,  to  obey  them  as  judges,  and  fol- 
low them  as  leaders.  This  was  indeed  a  balance 
founded  in  opinion  and  in  religion,  though  not  a 
legal  and  independent  check ;  as  it  was  not  a  ne- 
gative in  either.  In  this  conftitution  then  were 
three  orders,  and  a  balance,  not  indeed  equal  to 
that  of  England,  for  want  of  a  negative  in  each 
branch  ;  but  the  nearefl  refembling  it  of  any  we 
have  yet  feen.  The  kings,  the  nobles,  the  fenate, 
and  the  people  in  two  aflemblies,  are  furely  more 
orders  than  a  governor,  fenate,  and  houfe.  The 
balance  here  attempted  was  as  ftrong  as  religion 
operating  on  human  nature  could  make  it,  though 
not  equivalent  to  a  negative  in  each  of  three 
branches.  Another  balance  was  attempted,  in  the 
rigorous  reparation  of  the  city  from  the  country, 
in  two  affemblies :  it  avoided  the  danger  of  jea- 
louiies  between  town  and  country  in  the  delibera- 
tions of  the  people,  and  doubled  the  chances  both 
of  the  monarchy  and  democracy,  for  preferving 
their  importance  in  cafe  of  incroachments  by  the 
fenate.  If  the  fenate  and  nobles  Ihould  prevail  in 
one  affembly  of  the  people  fo  far  as  to  carry  any 
unconftitutional  point,  the  kings  and  ephori 
would  find  a  refource  in  the  other,  to  lead  them 
back.  The  Lacedsmonian  republic  may  then, 
with  propriety,  be  called  monarchical,  and  had 
the  three  effential  parts  of  the  bed  poffible  go- 
vernment; it  was  a  mixture  of  monarchy,  arifto- 
cracy,  and  democracy.  It  failed,  however,  in 
that  effential  particular,  the  balance.  The  arifto*. 
cracy  had  a  legal  power,  fo  eminent  above  that 
of  king  or  people,  that  it  would  foon  have  annihi- 
lated 


256         Ancient  ^rijlocratical  Republics. 

lated  both,  if  other  precautions  had  not  been 
taken,  which  deftroyed  all  the  real  merit  of  this 
celebrated  inftitution.  That  the  glory  of  the 
defcendants  of  Hercules,  and  of  their  republic, 
might  be  the  pride  of  every  citizen,  and  that  a 
fuperftitious  attachment  to  both  might  be  perpe- 
tuated, it  was  neceffary  to  extinguifh  every  other 
appetite,  paflion,  and  afTe&ion,  in  human  nature. 
The  equal  diviiion  of  property ;  the  banimment 
of  gold  and  iilver ;  the  prohibition  of  travel,  and 
intercourfe  with  Grangers ;  the  prohibition  of  arts, 
trades,  and  agriculture;  the  difcouragement  of 
literature ;  the  public  meals ;  the  inceflant  war- 
like exercifes ;  the  do&rine,  that  every  citizen  was 
the  property  of  the  ftate,  and  that  parents  ihould 
not  educate  their  own  children ; — although  they 
ferved  to  keep  up  the  conftant  belief  of  the  divine 
million  of  Lycurgus,  and  an  enthufiaftic  paffion 
for  the  glory  of  the  republic,  and  the  race  of  Her- 
cules; and  although  they  are  celebrated  by  the 
ariftocratical  philofophers,  hiftorians,  and  ftatef- 
men  of  antiquity;  muft  be  confidered  as  calcu- 
lated to  gratify  his  own  family  pride  rather  than 
promote  the  happinefs  of  his  people.  Four  hun- 
dred thoufand  flaves  mud  be  devoted  to  forty 
thoufand  citizens ;  weak  and  deformed  children 
muft  be  expofed;  morality  and  humanity,  as  well 
as  all  the  comforts,  elegancies,  and  pleafures  of 
'life,  muft  be  facrificed  to  this  glaring  phantom  of 
vanity,  fuperftition,  and  ambition.  Separated 
from  the  reft  of  mankind,  they  lived  together, 
deftitute  of  all  bufmefs,  pleafure,  and  amufement, 
but  war  and  politics,  pride  and  ambition ;  and 
thefe  occupations  and  paflions  they  tranfmitted 
from  generation  to  generation,  for  ieven  hundred 
years;  as  if  fighting  and  intriguing,  and  not  life 
and  happinefs,  were  the  end  of  man,  and  fociety ; 

as 


Lacedtemon*  257 

as  if  the  love  of  one's  country,  and  of  glory,  were 
amiable  paflions,  when  not  limited  byjuftice  and 
general  benevolence;  and  as  if  nations  were  to 
be  chained  together  for  ever,  merely  that  one 
family  might  reign  among  them.  Whether  Ly- 
curgus  believed  the  defcent  of  his  anceftor  from 
Jupiter,  the  divine  infpiration  of  Homer  and 
Thales,  or  the  divinity  of  the  Oracle,  any  more 
than  Mahomet  believed  his  divine  miflion,  may 
well  be  doubted.  Whether  he  did  or  not,  he 
ihackled  the  Spartans  to  the  ambitious  views 
of  his  family  for  fourteen  fucceffions  of  Herculean 
kings,  at  the  expence  of  the  continual  difturbance 
of  all  Greece,  and  the  conftant  mifery  of  his  own 
people.  Amidft  the  contradictions  of  ancient  and 
modern  writers,  that  account  has  been  followed 
concerning  the  inftitution  of  the  ephori,  which 
appears  mod  favourable  to  Lycurgus.  The  Ro- 
"  man  tribunes,  and  perhaps  the  Venetian  inquifi- 
tors,  were  borrowed  from  this  inftitution. 

Human  nature  perifhed  under  this  frigid  fyf- 
tem  of  national  and  family  pride.  Population, 
the  ib reft  indication  of  national  happinefs,  de- 
creafed  fo  faft,  that  not  more  than  one  thoufand 
old  Spartan  families  remained,  while  nine  thoufand 
ftrangers  had  intruded  in  fpite  of  all  their  prohi- 
bitory laws.  The  conqueft  of  Athens  gave  them 
a  tafife  of  wealth,  and  even  the  fear  of  the  penalty 
of  death  could  not  reftrain  them  from  travelling. 
Intercourfe  with  ftrangers  brought  in  foreign 
manners.  The  ephori  were  fometimes  bribed* 
Divifions  arofe  between  the  two  kings,  Agis  and 
Leonidas  :  one  joined  with  the  people,  the  other 
with  the  nobles,  and  •  the  fedition  proceeded  to 
blood.  Kings  became  fo  fond  of  fubiidies  from 
foreign  powers,  that  Agefilaus  received  them  from 
a  king  of  Egypt,  and  his  enemy  at  the  fame 

time. 


Ancient  Ariflocratical  Republics* 

time*  Agis  was  murdered  by  the  order  of  the 
ephori,  who,  inftead  of  honouring  the  blood  of 
Hercules  according  to  their  oath,  took  the  fove- 
reign  power  into  their  own  hands.- — Here  the  ba- 
lance broke;  Cleomenes,  who  endeavoured  like 
Agis  to  reftore  the  old  laws  and  maxims,  fell  a 
facrifice,  and  nothing  appears  afterwards  in  the 
hiftory  of  Sparta  but  profligacy,  tyranny,  and 
cruelty,  like  that  in  Rome  under  the  worft  of  the 
Csefars. 

The  infritution  of  Lycurgus  was  well  calcu- 
lated to  preferve  the  independence  of  his  country, 
but  had  no  regard  to  its  happinefs,  and  very  lit- 
tle to  its  liberty.  As  the  people's  confent  was  ne- 
ceflary  to  every  law,  it  had  fo  far  the  appearance 
of  political  liberty  :  but  the  civil  liberty  of  it  was 
little  better  than  that  of  a  man  chained  in  a  dun- 
geon ;  a  liberty  to  reft  as  he  is.  The  influence  of 
this  boafted  legiflation  on  the  human  character 
was  to  produce  warriors  and  politicians,  and  no- 
thing elfe.  To  fay  that  this  people  were  happy,  is 
to  contradict  every  quality  in  human  nature,  ex- 
cept ambition.  They  had  no  other  gratification : 
fcience  and  letters  were  facrificed,  as  well  as  com- 
merce, to  the  ruling  paffion ;  and  Milton  had  no 
reafon  to  "  wonder  how  mufelefs  and  unbookifh 
"  they  were,  minding  nought  but  the  feats  of 
"  war/'  fince  it  was  not  fo  much  becaufe*  Ly- 
curgus was  "  addi&ed  to  elegant  learning,  or 
"  to  mollify  the  Spartan  furlinefs  with  fmooth 
"  longs  and  odes,  the  better  to  plant  among 
"  them  law  and  civility,"  that  he  brought  the 
fcattered  works  of  Homer  from  Ionia,  and  Thales 
from  Crete,  but  merely  to  propagate  his  own  and 
his  family  impofture.  The  plan  was  profound, 
a*id  means  were  with  great  ability  fitted  to  the 
end :  but  as  a  fyftem  of  legiflation,  which  fhould 

neve* 


Lacedamon.  259 

jtievcr  have  any  other  end  than  the  greateft  happi- 
nefs  of  the  greateft  number,  facing  to  all  their 
rights,  it  was  not  only  the  leaft  refpedlable,  but 
the  moft  deteftable  in  all  Greece.  To  do  it  juf- 
tice,  however,  it  is  much  to  be  defired,  that  ex- 
ercifes  like  thofe  eftablifhed  by  Lycurgus,  run- 
ning, wreftling,  riding,  fwimming,  fcating,  fenc- 
ing, dancing,  ihould  be  introduced  into  pub- 
lic and  private  education  in  .  America,  which 
would  fortify  the  bodies  and  invigorate  the  minds 
of  youth ;  inftead  of  thofe  fedentary  amufements 
which  debilitate,  and  are  taking  entire  poffeffion, 
of  fociety  all  over  the  world.  The  ladies  too 
might  honour  fome  of  thefe  entertainments,  though 
not  all,  with  their  prefence  and  participation,  to 
the  great  advantage  of  their  own  health,  and  that 
of  pofterity,  without  injury  to  their  charms,  or 
their  reputations.  But,  above  all,  the  exiftence 
of  an  all-perfe6l  Intelligence,  the  parent  of  nature, 
the  wife  and  moral  ruler  of  it;  the  refponiibility 
of  every  fubordinate  intelle&ual  and  moral  agent ; 
a  future  ftate  of  rewards  and  punifhments ;  and 
the  facred  obligations  of  oaths,  as  well  as  of  the 
relative  duties  of  focial  life,  cannot  be  too  clear- 
ly fixed  by  rational  arguments  in  the  minds  of 
all  the  citizens.  In  this  refpect  Lycurgus  merits 
praife. 

But  as  a  civil  and  political  conftitution,  taken  all 
together,  it  is  infinitely  inferior  to.  another,  whicn 
Americans  have  taken  for  their  model.  The 
Englifh  conftitution  is  the  refult  of  the  moft  ma- 
ture deliberation  on  univerfal  hiftory  and  philo- 
fophy.  If  Harrington's  council  of  legiilators  had 
read  over  the  hiftory,  and  ftudied  the  conftitution 
of  every  nation  ancient  and  modern,  remarked 
the  inconveniencies  and  defe&s  of  each,  and  bent 
the  whole  force  of  their  invention  to  difcover  a 

VOL.  I.  K  k  remedy 


./  260        Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

i          •>  t"\ 

remedy  for  it,  they  would  have  produced  no 
other  regulations/  than  thofe  of  the  Englifh 
conftitution  in  its  theory,  unlefs  they  had  found  a 
people  fo  circumftanced  as  to  be  able  to  bear  an- 
nual ele&ions  of  the  king  and  fenate.  This  im- 
provement the  Americans,  in  the  prefent  ftage  of 
fociety  among  them,  have  ventured  on ;  fenfible, 
however,  of  the  danger,  and  knowing  perfectly 
well  a  remedy,  in  cafe  their  elections  fhould  be- 
come turbulent.  Of  this,  at  prefent,  there  is  no 
appearance. 


LETTER    XLI. 

ANCIENT    DEMOCRATICAL 
REPUBLICS. 

ATHENS. 

My  dear  Sir, 

CROPS,  an  Egyptian,  condu&ed  a  colony 
that  fettled  in  Athens,  and  firft  engaged  the 
wandering  fhepherds  and  Hunters  of  Attica  to 
unite  in  villages  of  hufbandmen.  Although  the 
government  of  Egypt  was  an  abfolute  monarchy, 
he  found  it  neceffary  to  eftablifh  his  own  upon  a 
more  limited  plan. 

The  two  rival*  families  of  Perfeus  and  Pelops, 
anciently  contended  for  the  dominion  of  the  Gre- 
cian peninfula.  The  fortune  of  the  defcendants  of 
the  latter  prevailed,  and  their  fuperior  profperity 
led  them  to  perfecute  their  enemies.  The  de- 
fcendants of  Hercules,  who  was  a  fon  of  Jupiter 
by  Alcmena,  of  the  line- of  Perfeus,  were  ftripped 
of  all  their  poifeflions,  and  driven  into  exile.  Af- 
ter a  feries  of  misfortunes,  Temenus,  Crefphon- 

tes, 


Athens.  2,61 

t'es,  and  Ariftodemus,  defcendants  in  the  fifth  de- 
gree from  Hercules,  conducted  an  expedition  in- 
to Greece,  and  conquered  the  whole  country. 

The  governments  of  the  little  ftates  of  Greece 
in  the  firft  ages,  though  of  no  very  regular  and 
certain  conftitution,  were  all  limited  monarchies. 
When,  therefore,  the  Heraclides  poffefled  them- 
felves  of  Peloponnefus,  they  eftablifhed  every 
where  that  hereditary  limited  monarchy,  which 
was  the  only  government  affimilated  to  the  ideas 
and  temper  of  the  age,  and  an  equality  among 
themfelves.  Thofe  vigorous  principles  of  arifto- 
cracy,  and  fome  traces  of  the  fpirit  of  democracy, 
which  had  always  exifted  in  the  Grecian  govern- 
ments, began  to  ferment;  and  in  the  courfe  of  a 
few  ages  monarchy  was  every  where  abolifhed : 
the  very  name  of  king  was  profcribed ;  a  repub- 
lic was  thought  the  only  government  to  which  it 
became  men  to  fubmit;  and  the  term  Tyrant  was 
introduced  to  denote  thofe  who,  in  oppoiition  to 
thefe  new  political  principles,  acquired  monarchi- 
cal authority.  Abfolute  monarchy  was  unknown 
as  a  legal  conftitution.  The  title  of  king  implied 
a  fuperiority  of  lawful  dignity  and  authority  in 
one  perfon,  above  all  others,  for  their  benefit,  not 
a  right  of  abfolute  power.  Legiflation  was  never 
within  their  prerogative.  A  diftinclion  of  fami- 
lies into  thofe  of  higher  and  lower  rank  obtained 
very  early  throughout  Greece,  and  no'  where 
more  than  at  Athens,  where,  by  the  conftitution 
of  Thefeus,  the.Eupatrides,  or  nobly  born,  formed 
a  diftmcl  order  of  the  ftate  with  great  privileges. 
Afterwards  wealth  became  the  principal  crite- 
rion of  rank,  which  amounted  probably  to  the 
fame  thing,  as  the  nobly  born  were  generally  moft 
wealthy.  Every  citizen  in  every  Grecian  ftate 
was  bound  to  military  fervice,  as  in  modern  times 

among 


2,6%  Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

among  the  feudal  kingdoms.  It  was  natural  that 
the  rich  fhould  ierve  on  horfeback ;  and  this  was 
the  origm  of  knighthood  both  in  ancient  and 
modern  nations.  Where  the  noble  or  the  rich 
held  all  the  power,  they  called  their  own  govern- 
ment ariftocracy,  or  government  of  the  better 
fort,  or  optimacy,  government  of  the  beft  fort. 
The  people  allowed  the  appellation  of  ariftocracy 
only  to  thofe  governments  where  perfons,  ele&ed 
by  themfelves  for  their  merit,  held  the  principal 
power.  Democracy  lignified  a  government  by 
all  the  freemen  of  the  ftate,  or  the  people  at 
large,  forming  in  affembly  the  legal,  abfolute 
fovereign :  but  as  this,  above  all  others,  was  fub- 
je&  to  irregularity,  confufion,  and  abfurdity, 
when  unchecked  by  fome  balancing  power  lodged 
in  fewer  hands,  it  was  called  ochlocracy,  or  mob 
rule.  Moft  of  the  Grecian  ftates  had  fome  mix- 
ture of  two  or  more  of  thefe  forms.  The  mixture 
of  oligarchy  and  democracy,  in  which  the  former 
was  fuperior,  yet  the  latter  fufficed  to  fecure  liber- 
ty and  equal  right  to  the  people,  might,  according 
to  Ariftotle,  be  called  ariftocracy.  That  mixture 
where  the  democratic  power  prevailed,  yet  was  in 
fome  degree  balanced  by  authority  lodged  in 
Headier  hands,  is  difiinguifhed  by  that  great  au- 
thor by  the  name  of  polity.  An  equal  mixture  of 
all  three  was  never  known  in  Greece,  and  there- 
fore never  obtained  a  diftincl:  name  in  that  lan- 
guage. 

A  war  happened  between  the  Athenians  and 
Peloponnefians ;  the  armies  were  encamped  near 
each  other,  and  the  Delphian  oracle  was  confult- 
ed.  <  The  anfvver  of  the  Pythonefs  implied,  that 
the  Peloponnefians  would  be  victorious,  provided 
they  did. not  kill  the  Athenian  king.  Codrus  dif- 
guiiing  himfelf  like  a  clown,  with  a  faggot  on  his 

fhoulder, 


Athens.  263 

fhoulder,  and  a  fork  in  his  hand,  determined  to 
devote  his  life,  entered  the  enemy's  camp,  and 
was  killed.  The  Peloponnefian  chiefs  finding  the 
body  to  be  Codrus,  and  fearing  the  prophecy, 
withdrew  their  forces,  and  a  peace  enfued.  Me- 
don,  the  eldeft  fon  of  Codrus,  was  lame ;  and  bo- 
dily ability  was  held  in  fo  high  rank  in  popular 
efteem,  that  his  younger  brother  difputed  the  fuc- 
ceffion.  Each  had  a  powerful  party;  but  the  dif- 
pute  brought  forward  a  third,  which  was  for  abo- 
lifhing  the  royalty,  and  having  no  king  but  Ju- 
piter. Fatal  diflenfions  were  apprehended,  when 
a  declaration  of  the  oracle  was  procured  in  favour 
of  Medon;  and  it  was  amicably  accommodated 
that  Medon  fhould  be  firft  magiftrate,  with  title 
of  archon,  but  not  king.  Although  the  honour 
was  to  be  hereditary,  and  that  the  archon  fhould 
be  accountable  to  the  affembly  of  the  people  for 
his  adminiftration,  it  was  agreed  that  a  colony 
fhould  be  fent  to  Afia  Minor,  under  Nelius  and 
Androclus,  younger  fons  of  Codrus.  The  moil 
reftlefs  fpirits  joined  in  the  migration,  and  no  fur- 
ther materials  for  hiftory  remain  for  feveral  gene- 
rations. 

From  the  period  where  Homer's  hiftory  ceafes, 
to  that  in  which  the  firft  profe  hiftorians  lived,  a 
fpace  of  250  years,  there  is  little  light  to  be  ob- 
tained. Twelve  archons  are  named,  who  followed 
Medon  by  hereditary  fucceffion,  and  filled  up  300 
years.  On  the  death  of  Alcmon,  Charops  was 
raifed  to  the  archooihip,  upon  condition  of  holding 
it  for.  ten  years  only.  Six  archons  followed  Cha- 
rops, by  appointment,  for  ten  years ;  but  on  the 
expiration  of  the  archonfhip  of  Eryxias,  it  was  re- 
folved  that  the  office  fhould  be  annual,  and  that 
there  mould  be  nine  perfons  to  execute  it.  They 
had  not  all  equal  dignity,nor  the  fame  functions: 

one 


264          Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

one  reprefented  the  majefty  of  the  irate,  and  was 
ufually  called  the  archon ;  the  fecond  had  the  ti- 
tle of  king,  and  was  head  of  the  church  ;  the  pole- 
march  was  third,  and  chief  of  military  affairs.  The 
other  fix  had  the  title  of  thefmothetes;  they  pre- 
lided  as  judges  in  ordinary  courts  of  juftice.  The 
nine  together  formed  the  council  of  Hate :  here 
methinks  I  fee  the  Polilh  nobles  running  down 
the  king,  or  thofe  of  Venice  the  doge,  and  di- 
viding the  fpoils*  of  his  prerogatives  among 
themfelves.  Legiilation  was  in  the  afTembly 
-of  the  people ;  but  the  whole  adminiftration, 
civil,  military,  religious,  and  judiciary,  was  with 
the  archons,  who  were  commonly  appointed  by 
lot ;  but  fometimes  the  aflembly  of  the  people 
interfered,  and  exercifed  the  power  of  naming 
them.  From  the  appointment  of  annual  archons 
there  was  nothing  but  inteftine  troubles.  That 
weight  which,  from  earlieft  times,  a  few  principal 
families  poflefled  among  the  Attic  people,  and 
which  was  in  a  great  degree  'confirmed  to  them 
by  the  conftitution  of  Thefeus,  remained,  amid 
all  the  turbulence  of  democracy,  to  a  late  period. 
Among  thofe  families  the  Alcmseonides,  claiming 
fome  connection  by  blood  with  the  perpetual  ar- 
chons a^nd  kings  of  the  ancient  Neleid  line,  were 
of  great  fame.  Megacles,  head  of  this  family, 
was  archon  when  Cylon,  a  man  of  a  very  ancient 
and  powerful  family,  attempted  to  acquire  the 
fovereignty  of  his  country.  He  feized  the  citadel 
of  Athens  with  fome  troops  he  received  from 
Theagerus,  tyrant  of  Megara,  whofe  daughter  he 
had  married.  His  vanity  was  excited  not  only 
by  his  birth  and  marriage,  but  his  perfonal  merit, 
having  been  vitior  in  a  chariot  race  at  the  Olympic 
games.  The  people  ran  to  arms  under  their  ar- 
chons, and  laid  fiege  to  the  citadel.  Cylon  fled, 

and 


• 


Athens.  &6$ 

and  his  party  fled  to  the  altars :  they  were  pro- 
mifed  pardon,  but  condemned  and  executed.  This 
was  an  atrocious  infidelity,  and  made  the  aclors 
in  it  as  odious,  as  it  rendered  Cylon  and  his  party 
again  popular  and  powerful. 

The  miferies  of.  a  fluctuating  jurifprudence  be- 
came infufferable,  and  all  parties  united  at  laft  in 
.  the  refolution  to  appoint  a  lawgiver.  Draco  was 
raifed  to  this  important  office ;  a  man  whofe  mo- 
rals and  integrity  recommended  him  to  the  peo- 
ple, but  whofe  capacity  was  equal  to  no  im- 
provement in  the  political  conftitution,  and  to  no 
greater  invention  for  reforming  the  judicatures, 
than  that  of  infli&ing  capital  punifhments  in  all 
offences  :  and  the  knowing  ones  had  no  other 
remedy  than  to  get  the  oracle  to  pronounce  that 
the  laws  of  Draco  were  written  in  blood ;  an  ex- 
preffion  which  ftruck  the  imagination  and  touch- 
ed the  heart, 'and  therefore  foon  rendered  this  fyf- 
tem  unpopular. 

Salamis,  perceiving  the  divifions  at  Athens,  re- 
volted, and  allied  itfelf  to  Megara.  Several  at- 
tempts to  recover  it  having  failed,  the  lower  peo- 
ple, in  oppofition  to  their  chiefs,  carried  a  law, 
making  it  capital  to  propofe  a  renewal  of  the  en- 
terprize.  Solon,  of  an  ancient  royal  family,  who 
had  hitherto  purfued  nothing  but  literature  and 
poetry,  perceiving  that  this  rafh  aft  of  the  popu- 
lace began  to  give  general  difguft  and  repentance, 
efpecially  to  the  young  Athenians,  ventured  to 
lead  the  people  to  repeal  it.  He  caufed  it  to  be 
reported  that  he  was  mad,  and  for  fonie  time  kept 
his  houfe  :  in  this  retirement  he  compofed  a  poem, 
fuch  as  he  thought  would  excite  the  multitude; 
then  watching  his  opportunity,  during  an  affem- 
bly  of  the  people,  he  ran  into  the  Agora  like  one 

frantic* 


266          Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

frantic,  mounted  on  a  rock,  and  read  his  poem 
to  the  people.  Some  of  his  fitends,  who  were 
in  the  lecret,  were  prefent,  and  ready  to  wonder 
and  applaud.  The  enthufiafm  fpread,-  the  law 
was  repealed,  and  an  expedition  fent  under  So- 
lon's friends,  which,  being  fkilfully  conducted, 
recovered  the  ifland.  But  the  party  of  Cylon 
were  ftill  clamorous  againft  the  partifans  of  Me- 
gacles,  for  their  breach  of  faith.  Solon  perfuad- 
ed  the  accufed  to  fubmit  to  a  trial :  they  were 
condemned  to  baniihment ;  but  this  punimment 
not  being  fufficient  to  appeafe  the  deity,  the  bones 
of  thofe  who  had  been  executed  were  removed  be- 
yond the  mountains.  During  thefe  troubles  Sa- 
lamis  was  retaken.  Superftition  now  gained  the  af- 
cendant;  phantoms  an$J  omens  were  feen,and  expia- 
tions and  purifications  were  neccflary.  Epimenides, 
a  Cretan  philofopher,  of  great  reputation  for  reli- 
gious knowledge,  and  an  intimate  friend  of  Solon, 
was  invited  to  iuperintend  the  religion  of  Athens. 
Epimenides  was  the  oftenfible  director,  but  So- 
lon concerted  with  him  the  various  improvements 
in  jurifprudence.  By  means  of  religious  pomp, 
ceremony,  facrifioes,  and  proceffions,  he  amufed 
the  people  into  Tome  degree  of  order  and  fufpen* 
fion  of  their  factions :  but  the  tranquillity  was 
not  likely  to  be  lafting.  Three  political  parties 
exifled :  one  for  democracy,  compofed  of  the  land- 
holders of  the  mountains;  another  for  an  arifto- 
cracy,  of  the  rich,  confifting  of  the  pofTelTors  of 
the  plain ;  a  third  preferred  a  mixture  of  oligar- 
chy and  democracy,  confirming  of  the  inhabitants 
of  the  coaft,  and  the  moil  difinterefted  men. 
There  was  another  divifion  of  the  people,  into  the 
parties  of  the  rich  and  tfie  poor.  Dangerous  con- 

vulfions 


Athens.  267 

Vulfions  were  fo  apprehended,  that  many  fober 
men  thought  the  eftablifhment  of  a  tyranny,  in 
one,  neceflary  to  prevent  greater  evils.  Solon's 
reputation  for  wifdom  and  integrity  was  univer- 
lal;  and,  as  he  had  friends  in  all  parties,  they 
procured  the  place  of  archon,  with  power  to  re- 
form the  conftitution.  -  His  firft  object  was  to 
reconcile  the  rich  with  the  poor:  this  he  accom- 
plifhed  by  lowering  the  intereft  without  annulling 
the  debt,  and  by  taking  from  the  creditor  the  ex- 
orbitant powers  over  the  perfon  and  family  of  the 
debtor.  He  found  fuch  a  predilection  for  de- 
mocracy ia  the  minds  of  the  citizens,  that  he 
preferred  to  every  free  Athenian  his  equal  vote 
in  the  aflembly  of  the  people,  which  he  made  fu- 
preme  in  all  cafes,  legiflative,  executive,  and  ju- 
dicial. He  had  not,  probably,  tried  the  experi- 
ment of  a  democracy  in  his  own  family,  before 
he  attempted  it  in  the  city,  according  to  the  ad- 
vice of  Lycurgus ;  but  was  obliged  to  eftablifh. 
fuch  a  government  as  the  people  would  bear,  not 
that  which  he  thought  the  belt,  as  he  faid  him- 
felf. 

As  the  laws  of  Solon  were  derived  from  Crete 
and  Egypt,  were  afterwards  adopted  by  the  Ro- 
mans as  their  model,  and  have  by  them  been 
tranfmitted  to  all  Europe,  they  are  a  moft  inte- 
refting  fubjecl:  of  inquiry ;  but  it  is  not  poffible 
to  afcertain  exadly  which  were  his,  which  were 
thofe  of  Epimenides  or  Thefeus,  or  what  was,  in 
fa6l,  the  conftitution  of  Athens.  The  firft  in- 
quiry is,  Who  were  citizens?  By  a  poll  that 
was  taken  in  the  time  of  Pericles,  they  were  found 
to  be  fourteen  thoufand  perfons.  By  another,  in 
the  time  of  Demetrias  Phalerius,  they  were  twen- 
ty-one thoufand :  at  the  fame  time  there  were 

VOL.  I.  LI  .tea 


268          Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

ten  thoufand  freemen,  confifting  of  foreigners  and 
freed  flaves,   and  four  hundred  thoufand  fouls  in 
a6lual  bondage,  who  had  no  vote  in  the  afTembly 
of  the  people.     The  perfons  therefore  who  fhared 
the  power,  being  not  a  tenth  part  of  the  nation, 
were  excufed  from  labour,  in  agriculture  as  well 
as  manufactures,    and  had  time  for  education  ; 
they  were  paid  too  for  attendance  on  public  af- 
fairs, which  enabled  the  poorer  citizens  to  attend 
their  duty.     This  is  one  circumftance  which  ren- 
dered a  government  fo  popular  practicable  for.  a 
time  :    another  was,  the  divifion  of  Attica  into 
tribes  and  boroughs,  or  diftricts,  like  the  Ame- 
rican counties,  towns,  and  parifhes,  or  the  fhires, 
hundreds,  and  tythings  of  England.     The  tribes 
at  firft  were  four,  afterwards  ten.      Each   tribe 
had  its  prefiding  magiftrate,   called  phylarchus, 
analogous  to  the  Englifh  IherifT;    and  each  bo- 
rough, of  which  there  were  one  hundred  and  fe- 
venty-four,   its   demarchus,   like  a  conftable  or 
headborough.     As  the  title  of  king  was  preferved 
to  the  high-prieft,  fo  the  perfon  prefiding  over 
the  religion  of  each  tribe  was  called  philobafileus, 
king's   friend,   and  was  always  appointed  from 
among  the  nobly  born,  eupatrides.     Thus  reli- 
gion was  always  in  the  hands  of  the  ariftocratical 
part  of  the    community.      As  the  oracles   and 
priefts  were  held  by  the  people  in  fo   much  fa- 
cred    veneration,    placing  them,    with   all .  their 
fplendid  fhews  and  rites,  always  in  the  power  of 
the  ariftocratical  families,  or  perfons  of  beft  edu- 
cation, was  as  great  a  check  to  the  democracy  as 
can  well  be  imagined.     It  fhould  be  here  recol- 
le<5led  too,  that  almoft  all  thefe  eupatrides  or  no- 
bles, among  the  Greeks,  were  believed  to  be  de- 
fcended  from  the  gods,  nearly  or  remotely.     No- 
bility? 


Athens.  269 

bility,  as  well  as  royalty,  were  believed  of  divine 
right,  becaufe  the  gods  and  goddefles  had  con- 
defcended  to  familiar  intercourfes  with  women 
and  men,  on  purpofe  to  beget  perfons  of  a  fupe- 
rior  order  to  rule  among  nations.  The  fuperi- 
ority  of  priefts  and  nobles  were  affumed  and  con- 
ceded with  more  confiftency  than  they  are  in  Po- 
land, Switzerland,  and  Venice,  and  they  muft 
have  had  a  proportional  influence  with  the  peo- 
ple. < 

Another  check  to  this  authority  in  one  centre, 
the  nation,  eftablifhed  by  Solon,  was  countenan- 
ced by  precedent  introduced  by  Thefeus,  who 
divided  the  Attic  people  into  three  ranks:  all 
magiftrates  were  taken  excluiively  out  of  the 
firft.  Solon,  by  a  new  divifion,  made  four  ranks, 
determined  by  property,  and  confined  all  magif- 
tracies  to  the  firft  three.  By  this  regulation,  he 
excluded  all  thofe  who  had  no  will  of  their  own, 
and  were  dependent  on  others;  but  by  ftill  al- 
lowing to  the  fourth,  who  were  more  numerous 
1  than  all  the  others,  their  equal  votes  in  the  af- 
fembly  of  the  people,  he  put  all  power  into 
hands  the  leaft  capable  of  properly  ufing  it;  and 
accordingly  thefe,  by  uniting,  altered  the  confti- 
tution  at  their  pleafure,  and  brought  on  the  ruin 
of  the  nation.  By  thefe  precautions,  however, 
we  fee  the  anxiety  of  Solon  to  avail  himfelf  of 
every  advantage  of  birth,  property,  and  religion, 
which  the  people  would  refped:,  to  balance  the  fo- 
vereign  democracy.  With  the  fame  view  he  infti- 
tuted  a  fenate,  of  one  hundred  perfons  out  of  each 
of  the  four  tribes ;  and  this  great  council  to  which 
he  committed  many  of  the  powers  of  the  archons, 
he  hoped  would  have  a  weight  which  all  the  ar- 
chons together  had  not  been  able  to  preferve.  It 
was  afterwards  increafed  to  five  hundred,  when 

the 


270  Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

the  tribes  were  increafed  to  ten,  fifty  out  of  each, 
and  was  then  called  the  council  of  five  hundred. 
They  were  appointed  annually  by  lot;  but  cer- 
tain legal  qualifications  were  required,  as  well  as 
a  blamelefs  life.  The  members  of  each  tribe  in 
turn,  for  thirty-five  days,  had  fuperior  dignity, 
and  additional  powers,  with  the  title  of  prytanes, 
from  whence  the  hall  was  called  Prytaneium.  The 
prytanes  were  by  turns  preiidents,  had- the  cufto- 
dv  of  the  feal,  and  the  keys  of  the  trealury  and 
citadel,  for  one  day.  The  whole  afifembly  formed 
the  council  of  ftate  of  the  commonwealth,  and 
had  the  conftant  charge  of  its  political  affairs ;  the 
moft  important  of  which  was  the  preparation  of 
buiinefs  for  the  aflembly  of  the  people,  in  which 
nothing  was  to  be  propofed  which  had  not  firfl 
been  approved  here.  This  was  Solon's  law; 
and,  if  it  had  been  obferved,  would  have  formed 
a  balance  of  fuch  importance,  that  the  common- 
wealth would  have  lafted  longer,  and  been  more 
fteady.  But  fadious  demagogues  were  often  found 
to  remind  the  people,  that  all  authority  was  col- 
ledled  into  one  centre,  and  that  the  fovereign  af- 
fembly  was  that  centre ;  and  a  popular  afTembly 
being,  in  all  ages,  as  much  difpofed,  when  un- 
checked by  an  abfolute  negative,  to  overleap  the 
bounds  of  law  and  conftitution  as  the  nobles  or 
a  king,  the  laws  of  Solon  were  often  fpurned, 
and  the  people  demanded  and  took  all  power, 
whenever  they  thought  proper. 

Senfible  that  the  buiinefs  of  approving  and  re- 
je&ing  magiftrates,  receiving  accufations,  cata- 
logues of  fines,  enading  laws,  giving  audience 
to  ambafladors,  and  difcuffions  of  religion,  would 
very  often  be  uninterefting  to  many  even  of  the 
moft  judicious  and  virtuous  citizens ;  that  every 
man's  bufinefs  is  no  man's;  Solon  ordained  it^cri- 

minal 


Athens.  271 

minal  in  any  not  to  take  a  fide  in  civil  diftur- 
bances.  Certain  times  were  ftated  for  the  meet- 
ing of  the  general  affembly  ;  all  gates  were  fhut, 
but  that  which  led  to  it ;  fines  were  impofed  for 
non-attendance;  and  a  final!  pay  allowed  by  the 
public  to  thofe  who  attended  pun&ually  at  the 
hour.  Nine  proedri  were  appointed  from  the 
council ;  from  whom  the  moderators,  epiftates, 
were  appointed  too  by  lot,  with  whom  fat  eleven 
nomophylaces,  whofe  duty  it  was  to  explain  the 
tendency  of  any  motions  contrary  to  the  fpirit  of 
the  constitution.  The  prytanes  too  had  diftinc~l 
and  considerable  powers  in  the  affembly.  When 
any  change  in  the  law  was  judged  neceflary  by 
the  people,  another  court,  confiding  of  a  thou- 
fand  perfons,  called  nomothetes,  were  directed  to 
confider  of  the  befl  mode  of  alteration,  and  pre- 
pare a  bill ;  after  all,  five  fyndics  were  appointed 
to  defend  the  old  law  before  the  affembly,  be- 
fore the  new  one  could  be  euaded.  A  law,  paffed 
without  having  been  previoufly  publifhed,  con- 
ceived in  ambiguous  terms,  or  contrary  to  any 
former  law,  fubje6led  the  propofer  to  penalties. 
It  was  ufual  to  repeal  the  old  law  before  JL  new 
one  was  propofed,  and  this  delay  was  an  addi- 
tional fecurity  to  the  conftitution.  The  regular 
manner  of  enabling  a  law  was  this : — A  bill  was 
prepared  by  the  council;  any  citizen  might,  by 
petition  or  memorial,  make  a  propofition  to  the 
prytanes,  whofe  duty  it  was  to  prefent  it  to  the 
council — if  approved  by  them,  it  became  a  pro- 
boulema;  and,  being  written  on  a  tablet,  was 
expofed,  for  feveral  days,  for  public  confidera- 
tion,  and,  at  the  next  affembly,  read  to  the  peo- 
ple— then  proclamation  was  made  by  a  crier, 
"  Who  of  thofe  above  fifty  years  of  age  chooies 
"  to  fpeak?"  When  thefe  had  made  their  ora- 
tions, 


272          Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

tions,  any  other  citizen,  not  difqualified  by  law 
for  having  fled  from  his  colours  in  battle,  being 
deeply  indebted  to  the  public,  or  convicted  of 
any  crime,  had  an  opportunity  to  fpeak;  but 
the  prytanes  had  a  general  power  to  enjoin  fi- 
lence  on  any  man,  fubject  no  doubt  to  the  judg- 
ment of  the  aflembly :  without  this,  debates  might 
be  endlefs.  When  the  debate  was  finifhed,  the 
crier,  at  the  command  of  the  proedri,  proclaimed 
that  the  queftion  waited  the  determination  of  the 
people,  which  was  given  by  holding  up  the  hand : 
in  fome  uncommon  cafes,  particularly  of  impeach- 
ments, the  votes  were  given  privately,  by  cafting 
pebbles  into  urns.  The  proedri  examined  the 
votes,  and  declared  the  majority;  the  prytanes 
difmifled  the  aflembly.  Every  one  of  thefe  pre- 
cautions demonftratecl  Solon's  convidtion  of  the 
neceflity  of  balances  to  fuch  an  aflembly,  though 
they  were  found  by  experience  to  be  all  ineffec- 
tual. From  the  fame  folicitude  for  balances 
againft  the  turbulence  of  democracy,  he  reftored 
the  court  of  Areopagus,  improved  its  conftitu- 
tion,  and  increafed  its  power:  he  compofed  it  of 
thofe  who  had  held  with  reputation  the  office  of 
archon,  and  admitted  them  into  this  dignity  and 
authority  for  life.  The  experience,  the  reputa- 
tion, and  permanency  of  thefe  Areopagites  muft 
have  been  a  very  powerful  check.  From  the 
Areopagus  alone  no  appeal  lay  to  the  people ; 
yet  if  they  chofe  to  interfere,  no  balancing  power 
exifted  to  refift  their  defpotic  will.  The  confti- 
tution  authorifed  the  Areopagus  to  flop  the  judi- 
cial decrees  of  the  aflembly  of  the  people ;  annul 
an  acquittal,  or  grant  a  pardon — to  diredl  all 
draughts  on  the  public  treafury — to  punifh  im- 
piety, immorality,  and  diforderly  conduft — to 
fuperintend  the  education  of  youth;  punifh  idle- 

nefs — 


Athens. 

nefs — to  inquire  by  wlm  means  men  of  no  pro- 
perty or  employment  maintained  themfelves.  The 
court  fat  in  the  night,  without  light,  that  the 
members  might  be  lefs  liable  to  prejudice.  Plead- 
ers were  confined  to  fimple  narration  of  facts,  and 
application  of  laws,  without  ornaments  of  fpeech, 
or  addrefs  to  the  paffions.  Its  reputation  for  wif- 
dom  and  juftice  was  fo  high,  that  Cicero  faid,  the 
commonwealth  of  Athens  could  no  more  be  go- 
verned without  the  court  of  Areopagus,  than  the 
world  without  the  providence  of  God. 

The  urgent  neceffity  for  balances  to  a  fovereign 
aflembly,  in  which  all  authority,  legiflative  ex- 
ecutive, and  judicial,  was  collected  into  one  cen- 
tre, induced  Solon,  though  in  fo  fmall  a  ftate,  to 
make  his  conftitution  extremely  complicated  :  no 
lefs  than  ten  courts  of  judicature,  four  for  crimi- 
nal caufes,  and  fix  for  civil,  befides  the  Areopa- 
gus and  general  aflembly,  were  eftablifhed  at 
Athens.  In  conformity  to  his  own  faying,  cele- 
brated among  thofe  of  the  feven  wife  men,  that 
"  the  moft  perfect  government  is  that  where  an 
"  injury  to  any  one  is  the  concern  of  all,"  he  di- 
rected that,  in  all  the  ten  courts,  caufes  mould 
be  decided  by  a  body  of  men,  like  our  juries,  ta- 
ken from  among  the  people ;  the  archons  only 
preiiding  like  our  judges.  As  the  archons  were 
appointed  by  lot,  they  were  often  but  indifferent 
lawyers,  and  chofe  two  perfons  of  experience  to 
aflift  them ;  thefe,  in  time,  became  regular  con- 
ftitutional  officers,  by  the  name  of  Paredri,  af~ 
feflbrs.  The  jurors  Were  paid  for  their  fervice, 
and  appointed  by  lot. — This  is  the  glory  of  So- 
lon's laws :  it  is  that  department  which  ought  to 
belong  to  the  people  at  large ;  they  are  moft  com- 
petent for  this :  and  the  property,  liberty,  equa- 
lity, 


274         Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

lity,  and  fecurity  of  the  citizens,  all  require  that 
they  alone  fhould  poflefs  it.  Itinerant  judges, 
called  the  Forty,  were  appointed  to  go  through 
the  counties,  to  determine  afiaults,  and  civil  ac- 
tions under  a  certain  fum. 

Every  freeman  was  bound  to  military  fervice. 
The  multitude  of  flaves  made  this  necefTary,  as 
well  as  practicable.  Rank  and  property  gave  no 
other  diftindion  than  that  of  ferving  on  horfeback. 

The  fundamental  principle  of  Solon's  govern- 
.  ment  was  the  moft  like  Mr.  Turgot's  idea  of  any 
we  have  feen.  Did  this  prevent  him  from  efta- 
blifhing  different  orders  and  balances?  did  it  not 
render  neceflary  a  greater  variety  of  orders,  and 
more  complicated  checks,  than  any  in  America? 
Yet  all  were  infuffieient,  for  want  of  the  three 
checks,  abfolute  and  independent.  Unlefs  three 
powers  have  an  abfolute  veto,  or  negative,  to  eve- 
ry law,  the  constitution  can  never  be  long  pre- 
ferved;  and  this  principle  we  find  verified  in  the 
fubfequent  hiftory  of  Athens,  notwithstanding  the 
oath  he  had  the  addrefs  and  influence  to  per- 
fuade  all  the  people  to  take,  that  they  would 
change  none  of  his  institutions  for  ten  years. 
Soon  after  his  departure,  the  three  parties  of  the 
highlands,  lowlands,  and  coaits,  began  to  fhew 
themfelves  afrefh.  Thele  were,  in  fact,  the  party 
of  the  rich,  who  wanted  all  power  in  their  own 
hands,  and  to  keep  the  people  in  abfolute  fub- 
jection,  like  the  nobles  in  Poland,  Venice,  Ge- 
noa, Berne,  Soleure,  &c. ;  the  democratical  par- 
ty, who  wanted  to  abolifh  the  council  of  five 
hundred,  the  Areopagus,  the  ten  courts  of  judi- 
cature, and  every  other  check,  and  who,  with 
furious  zeal  for  equality,  \vere  the  readiest  initru- 
ments  of  defpotifm ;  and  the  party  of  judicious 

and 


Athens.  275 

and  moderate  men,  who,  though  weaker  than 
cither  of  the  others,  were  the  only  balance  be- 
tween them.  This  laft  party,  at  this  time,  was 
fupported  by  the  powerful  family  of  the  Alo 
maeonides,  of  whom  Megacles,  the  chief,  had 
greatly  increafed  the  wealth  and  fplendour  of  his 
houfe,  by  marrying  the  daughter  of  the  tyrant  of 
Sicion,  and  had  acquired  fame  by  victories  in  the 
Olympian,  Pythian,  and  Ifthmian  games:  the 
head  of  the  oligarchic  party  was  Lycurgus,  not 
the  Spartan  lawgiver :  the  democratical  party  was 
led  by  Pififtratus,  claiming  defcent  from  Codrus 
and  Neftor,  with  great  abilities,  courage,  addrefs, 
and  reputation  for  military  conduct  in  feveral  en- 
terprizes.  Upon  Solon's  return,  after  an  ab- 
fence  of  ten  years,  he  found  prejudices  deeply 
rooted ;  attachment  to  their  three  leaders  dividing 
the  whole  people*  He  was  too  old  to  direct  the 
florin:  the  factions  continued  their  manoeuvres; 
and  at  length  Piiiftratus,  by  an  artifice,  became 
mafter  of  the  commonwealth.  Wounding  him- 
felf  and  his  horfes,  he  drove  his  chariot  violently 
into  the  Agora,  where  the  aflembly  of  the  people 
Was  held ;  and,  in  a  pathetic  fpeech,  declared 
"  that  he  had  been  waylaid  as  he  was  going  into 
cc  the  country — that  it  was  for  being  the  man 
<e  of  the  people  that  he  had  thus  fufTered — that 
cc  it  was  no  longer  fafe  for  any  man  to  be  a 
"  friend  of  the  poor — it  was  not  fafe  for  him  to 
<c  live  in  Attica,  unlefs  they  would  take  him 
"  under  their  protection."  Arifton,  one  of  his 
partifans,  moved  for  a  guard  of  fifty  men,  to  de- 
fend the  perfon  of  the  friend  of  the  people,  the 
martyr  for  their  caufe.  In  fpite  of  the  utmoft 
oppofition  of  Solon,  though  Piiiftratus  was  his 
friend,  this  point  was  carried:  Pififtratus,  with 
his  guards,  ieized  the  citadel;  and,  his  oppo- 
VOL.  I.  Mm  nents 


276          Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

nents  forced  into  fubmiffion  or  exile,  he  became 
the  firft  man,  and  from  this  time  is  called  the 
Tyrant  of  Athens ;  a  term  which  meant  a  citizen 
of  a  republic,  who  by  any  means  obtained  a  fo- 
vereignty  over  his  fellow-citizens.  Many  of  them 
were  men  of  virtue,  and  governed  by  law,  after 
being  raifed  to  the  dignity  by  the  confent  of  the 
people ;  fo  that  the  term  Tyrant  was  arbitrarily 
ufed  by  the  ancients,  fometimes  to  fignify  a  law- 
ful ruler,  and  fometimes  an  ufurper.  Pififtratus, 
of  whom  Solon  faid,  "  Take  away  his  ambition, 
<c  cure  him  of  his  luft  of  reigning,  and  there  is  not 
"  a  man  of  more  virtue,  or  a  better  citizen,"  chang- 
ed nothing  in  the  conftitution.  The  laws,  afTem- 
bly,  council,  courts  of  juftice,  and  magiftrates,  all 
remained ;  he  himfelf  obeyed  the  fummons  of  the 
Areopagus,  upon  the  charge  of  murder.  Solon 
trufted  to  his  old  age  againft  the  vengeance  of 
the  tyrant,  and  treated  him  in  all  companies  with 
very  imprudent  freedoms  of  fpeech.  But  Piiif- 
tratus carried  all  his  points  with  the  people  ;  and 
had  too  much  fenfe  to  regard  the  venerable  legif- 
lator,  or  to  alter  his  fyftem.  He'  returned  his 
reproaches  with  the  higheft  refped;  and  gained 
upon  him,  according  to  fome  authors,  to  conde- 
fcend  to  live  with  him  in  great  familiarity,  and 
affift  him  in  his  adminiftration.  Others  fay  that 
Solon,  after  having  long  braved  the  tyrant's  re- 
fentment,  and  finding  the  people  loft  to  all  fenfe 
of  their  danger,  left  Athens  and  never  returned. 

Solon  died  at  the  age  of  eighty,  two  years  after 
the  ufurpation.  The  ufurper  foon  fell.  The  de- 
preffed  rival  chiefs,  Megacles  and  Lycurgus, 
uniting  their  parties,  expelled  him;  but  the  con- 
federated rivals  could  not  agree.  Megacles  pro- 
pofed  a  coalition  with  Pififtratus,  and  offered  him 
his  daughter  in  marriage.  The  condition  was  ac- 
cepted ; 


Athens.  277 

cepted ;  but  the  people  in  aflembly  muft  be  gain- 
ed. To  this  end  they  dreffed  a  fine  girl  with  all 
the  ornaments  and  armour  of  Minerva,  and  drove 
into  the  citv,  heralds  proclaiming  before  them, 
"  O  Athenians,  receive  Pififtratus,  whom  Mi- 
nerva honouring  above  all  men,  herfelf  conducls 
into  your  citadel."  The  people  believed  the  maid 
to  be  a  goddefs,  worfhipped  her,  and  received  Pi- 
fiftratus again  into  the  tyranny.  Is  this  govern- 
ment, or  the  waves  of  the  fea  ?  But  Pififlratus 
was  foon  obliged  to  retire  to  Eretria,  and  leave 
the  party  of  Megacles  matters  of  Athens.  He 
ftrengthened  his  conne&ions ;  and  in  the  eleventh 
year  of  this  his  fecond  banifhment,  he  returned  to 
Attica  with  an  army,  and  was  joined  by  his  friends. 
The  party  of  Megacles  met  him  with  another 
army,  ill  difciplined  and  commanded,  from  the 
city;  were  atttacked  by  -furprife,  and  defeated. 
Pififtratus  proclaimed  that  none  need  fear,  who 
would  return  peaceably  home.  The  known  honour, 
humanity,  and  clemency  of  his  chara&er,  procured 
him  confidence;  his  enemies  fled,  and  he  entered 
the  city  without  oppofition.  He  made  no  funda- 
mental change  in  the  conftitution,  though,  as  head 
of  a  party,  he  had  the  principal  influence.  He  de- 
pended upon  a  large  fortune  of  his  own,  and  a  good 
understanding  with  Thebes  and  Argos,  to  fupport 
him  in  it.  He  diea  in  peace,  and  left  his  fon 
fucceffor  to  his  influence.  Both  his  fons,  Hip- 
pias  and  Hipparchus,  were  excellent  characters; 
and  arts,  agriculture,  gardening,  and  literature,  as 
well  as  wifdom  and  virtue,  were  fingularly  culti- 
vated by  the  whole  race  of  thefe  tyrants.  Har- 
modius  and  Ariftogeton,  however,  confpired  the 
death  both  of  Hippias  and  Hipparchus;  the  lat- 
ter was  killed,  and  Hippias  was  led  to  feverities : 
many  Athenians  were  put  to  death.  Hippias,  to 

ftrengthen 


278         Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

ftrengthen  his  intereft  with  foreign  powers,  mar- 
ried his  only  daughter  to  the  fon  of  the  tyrant  of 
Lampfacus.  Her  epitaph  iliews  that  the  title  of 
Tyrant  was  not  then  a  term  of  reproach  :  "  This 
"  duft  covers  Archedice,  daughter  of  Hippias,  in 
"  his  time  the  firft  of  the  Greeks.  Daughter, 
"  lifter,  wife,  and  mother  of  tyrants,  her  mind 
"  was  never  elated  to  arrogance." 

The  oppofite  party  were  watchful  to  recover 
Athens,  and  to  increafe  their  intereft  with  the 
other  Grecian  ftates  for  that  end.  The  temple  of 
Delphi  was  burnt.  The  Alcmaeonides,  to  ingra- 
tiate themfelves  with  the  oracle,  the  Amphi6lyons, 
and  all  Greece,  rebuilt  it  with  Parian  marble,  in- 
ftead  of  Porine  ftone,  as  they  had  contracted  to 
do,  without  alking  any  additional  price.  The 
confequence  was,  that  whenever  the  Lacedsemo- 
nians  confulted  the  oracle,  the  anfwer  always  can- 
eluded  with  an  admonition  to  give  liberty  to 
Athens.  At  length  the  oracle  was  obeyed;  and, 
after  fome  variety  of  fortune,  the  Alcmseonides, 
aided  by  Cleomenes  the  Spartan,  prevailed,  and 
Hippias  retired  to  Sigeium.  It  was  one  maxim 
of  the  Spartans,  conftantly  to  favour  ariftocratical 
power;  or  rather,  wherever  they  could,  to  eftablifh 
an  oligarchy :  for  in  every  Grecian  city  there  was 
always  an  ariftocratical,  oligarchical,  and  demo- 
cratical  faction.  Whenever  the  Grecian  ftates  had 
a  war  with  one  another,  or  a  iedition  within  them- 
felves, the  Lacedaemonians  were  ready  to  inter- 
fere as  mediators.  They  conducted  the  bufinefs 
generally  with  great  caution,  moderation,  and  fa- 
gacity ;  but  never  loft  light  of  their  view  to  ex- 
tend the  influence  of  their  ftate ;  nor  of  their  fa- 
vourite meafure  for  that  end,  the  encouragement 
of  ariftocratical  power,  or  rather  oligarchical : 
for  a  few  principal  families,  indebted  to  Lacedss- 

mon 


Athens.  279 

mon  for  their  pre-eminence,  and  unable  to  retain 
it  without  her  afiiftance,  were  the  beft  inftruments 
for  holding  the  ftate  in  alliance.  This  policy  they 
now  propofed  to  follow  at  Athens.  Cleifthenes, 
fon  of  Megacles,  head  of  the  Alcmseonides,  was 
the  firft  perfon  of  the  commonwealth.  Having  no 
great  abilities,  a  party  was  formed  againft  him 
under  Ifagoras,  with  whom  moft  of  the  principal 
people  joined.  The  party  of  Cleifthenes  was 
among  the  lower  fort,  who.  being  all  powerful  in 
the  general  afTembly,  he  made  by  their  means 
fome  alterations  in  the  confutation  favouring  his 
own  influence.  Cleifthenes  was  now  tyrant  of 
Athens,  as  much  as  Pififtratus  had  been.  In  the 
contefts  of  Grecian  factions,  the  alternative  was 
generally  victory,  exile,  or  death;  the  inferior 
party  therefore  reforted  fometimes  to  harm  expe- 
dients. Ifagoras  and  his  adherents  applied  to  La- 
cedssmon.  Cleomenes,  violent  in  his  temper,  en- 
tered with  zeal  into  the  caufe  of  Ifagoras,  and  fent 
a  herald  to  Athens,  by  whom  he  imperioufly  de- 
nounced banifhment  againft  Cleifthenes  and  his 
party,  on  the  old  pretence  of  criminality  for  the 
execution  of  the  partifans  of  Cylon.  Cleifthenes 
obeyed.  Exalted  by  this  proof  of  a  dread  of 
Spartan  power,  he  went  to  Athens  with  a  fmall 
military  force,  and  banifhed  feven  hundred  fami- 
lies at  once :  fuch  was  Athenian  liberty.  He 
was  then  proceeding  to  change  the  conftitution, 
to  fuit  the  views  of  Spartan  ambition,  by  difiblv- 
ing  the  council  of  five  hundred,  and  committing 
the  whole  power  to  a  new  council  of  three  hundred, 
all  partiians  of  Ifagoras.  Athens  was  not  fo  far 
humbled.  The  five  hundred  refifted,  and  excited 
the  people,  who  flew  to  arms,  and  beiieged  Cleo- 
menes and  Ifagoras  in  the  citadel;  who  the  third 
day  fur-rendered,  upon  condition  that  the  Lacedae- 
monians 


280          Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

monians  might  depart  in  fafety.  Ifagoras  went 
with  them.  Many  of  his  party  were  executed, 
and  Cleifthenes,  and  the  exiled  families,  returned; 
but  confcious  of  their  danger  from  their  hoftile 
fellow-citizens  in  concert  with  Lacedasmon,  they 
fent  to  folicit  an  alliance  with  Artaphernes,  the 
fatrap  of  Perfia.  The  anlwer  was,  If  they  would 
give  earth  and  water  to  Darius  they  might  be  re- 
ceived, otherwife  they  muft  depart.  The  ambaf- 
fadors,  coniidering  the  imminent  danger  of  their 
country  and  party,  confented  to  thefe  humiliating 
terms.  Although  Athens  was  diftracled  with  do- 
me ftic  factions,  and  preffed  with  the  fear  of  an 
attack  from  Cleomenes,  the  conduct  of  her  am- 
baffadors,  in  acknowledging  fubjeclion  to  the  Per- 
fian  king,  in  hopes  of  his  protection,  was  highly 
reprobated  upon  their  return;  and  it  does  not 
appear  that  Perlian  affiftance  was  further  defired : 
yet  the  danger  which  hung  over  Athens  was  very 
great.  Cleomenes,  bent  on  revenge,  formed  a 
confederacy  againft  them,  of  the  Thebans,  Corin- 
thians, and  Chalcidians.  Thefe  could  not  agree, 
and  the  Athenians  gained  fome  advantages  of  two 
of  them.  Cleomenes  then  pretended  that  Sparta 
had  acted  irreligioufly  in  expelling  Hippias,  who 
ought  to  be  reftored ;  becaufe,  when  he  was  be- 
fieged  in  the  citadel  at  Athens,  he  had  difcovered 
a  collulion  between  the  Delphic  priefts  and  the 
Alcmaeonides.  Sparta  was  willing  to  reftore  Hip- 
pias ;  but  Corinth,  their  ally,  was  not.  Hippias, 
clefpairing  of  other  means,  now  in  his  turn  applied 
to  Perfia,  and  brought  upon  his  country  the  Per- 
fian  war;  from  which  it  was  delivered  by  Miltia- 
des,  at  the  battle  of  Marathon.  Miltiades  became 
the  envy  of  the  Alcmasonide  family.  Xanthippus, 
one  of  the  principal  men  of  Athens,  who  had  mar- 
ried a  daughter  of  Megacies,  the  great  opponent 

of 


Athens.  281 

of  Pififtratus,  conducted  a  capital  accufation 
againft  him  :  he  was  condemned  in  a  fine  of 
fifty  talents,  more  than  he  was  worth.  His  wound, 
which  prevented  him  from  attending  the  trial, 
mortified,  and  he  died  in  prifon.  In  order  to 
brand  the  family  of  Pififtratus,  the  fame  of  Har- 
modius  and  Ariftogeton  was  now  cried  up.  They 
had  afTaffinated  Hipparchus  from  mere  private  re- 
venge ;  but  they  were  now  called  afTerters  of  pub- 
lic liberty.  The  tyrannicide,  as  it  was  called,  was 
celebrated  by  fongs,  ftatues,  ceremonies,  and  re- 
ligious feftivals. 

It  muft  be  acknowledged  that  every  example 
of  a  government,  which  has  a  large  mixture  of 
democratical  power,  exhibits  fomething  to  our 
view  which  is  amiable,  noble,  and  I  had  almoft 
faid,  divine.  In  every'  ftate  hitherto  mentioned, 
this  obfervation  is  verified.  What  is  contended 
for,  is,  that  the  people  in  a  body  cannot  manage 
the  executive  power,  and  therefore  that  a  fimple 
democracy  is  impracticable;  and  that  their  fhare 
of  the  legiflative  power  muft  be  always  tempered 
with  two  others,  in  order  to  enable  them  to  pre- 
ferve  their  fhare,  as  well  as  to  correct  its  rapid 
tendency  to  abufe.  Without  this,  they  are  but  a 
tranfient  glare  of  glory,  which  pafles  away  like  a 
flafh  of  lightning,  or  like  a  momentary  appear- 
ance of  a  goddefs  to  an  ancient  hero,  which,  by 
revealing  but  a  glimpfe  of  celeftial  beauties,  only 
excited  regret  that  he  had  ever  feen  them. 

The  republic  of  Athens,  the  fchool-miftrefs  of 
the  whole  civilized  world,  for  more  than  three 
thoufand  years,  in  arts,  eloquence,  and  philofo- 
phy,  as  well  as  in  polite n els  and  wit,  was,  for  a 
fhort  period  of  her  duration,  the  moft  democratical 
commonwealth  of  Greece.  Unfortunately  their 
hiftory,  between  the  abolition  of  their  kings  and 

the 


282          Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

* 

the  time  of  Solon,  has  not  been  circumftantially 
pieferved.  During  this  period,  they  feem  to  have 
endeavoured  to  collect  all  authority  into  one  cen- 
tre, and  to  have  avoided  a  composition  of  orders 
and  balances  as  carefully  as  Mr.  Turgot:  but 
that  centre  was  a  group  of  nobles,  not  the  nation. 
Their  government  confifted  in  a  fingle  affembly 
of  nine  archons,  choien  annually  by  the  people. 
But  even  here  was  a  check ;  for  by  law  the  archons 
mufl  all  be  chofen  out  of  the  nobility.  But  this 
form  of  government  had  its  ufual  effects,  by  intro- 
ducing anarchy,  and  fuch  a  general  profligacy  of 
manners,  that  the  people  could  at  length  be  re- 
ftrained  by  nothing  fhort  of  the  ultimate  punifh- 
ment  from  even  the  moft  ordinary  crimes.  Draco 
accordingly  propofed  a  law;  by  which  death  fhould 
be  inflicted  on  every  violation  of  the  law.  Hu- 
manity fhuddered  at  fo  (hocking  a  feverity !  and 
the  people  chofe  rather  that  all  offences  fhould  go 
unpunifhed,  than  that  a  law  thus  written  in  blood, 
as  they  termed  it  both  in  horror  and  contempt, 
fhould  be  executed.  Confufions  increafed,  and 
divided  the  nation  into  three  factions;  and  their 
miferies  became  fo  extreme,  that  they  offered  So- 
lon an  abfolute  monarchy.  He  had  too  much 
ienfe,  as  well  as  virtue,  to  accept  it ;  but  employed 
his  talents  in  new-modelling  the  government. 
Senfible,  from  experience,  of  the  fatal  effects  of  a 
government  too  popular,  he  wifhed  to  introduce 
an  ariftocracy,  moderated  like  that  of  Sparta  y 
but  thought  the  habits  and  prejudices  of  the  peo- 
ple too  ftrong  to  bear  it.  The  archons  he  con- 
tinued ;  but,  to  balance  their  authority,  he  erected 
a  lenate  of  four  hundred,  to  be  chofen  by  ballot 
of  the  people.  He  alib  revived  the  court  of  Are- 
opagus, which  had  jurifdiction  in  criminal  cafes, 
and  the  care  of  religion.  He  excluded  from  the 

executive, 


Athens*  283 

executive,  or  the  magiftracy,  all  the  citizens  who 
were  not  pofTeffed  of  a  certain  fortune ;  but  vefted 
the  fovereignty  in  a  legiflative  aflembly  of  the 
people,  in  which  all  had  a  right  to  vote.     In  this 
manner  Solon  attempted  a  double  balance.    The 
Areopagus   was  to  check  the  executive   in   the 
hands  of  the  archons ;   and  the  fenate  of  four 
hundred,   the  ficklenefs  and  fire  of  the  people. 
Every  one  muft  fee  that  thefe  devices  would  have 
been  no  effectual  controul  in  either  cafe;  yet  they 
were  better  than  none.     It  was  very  right  that  the 
people  mould  have  all  elections;    but  democra- 
tic al  prejudices  were  fo  inveterate,  that  he  was 
obliged  not  only  to  make  them,  afTembled  in  a 
body,  an  effential  branch  of  the  legiflature,  but  to 
give  them  cognizance  of  appeals  from  all  the  fu- 
perior  courts.     Solon  himfelf,  in  his  heart,  muft 
have  agreed  with  Anacharlis,  that  this  conftitu- 
tion  was  but  a  cobweb  to  bind  the  poor,  while  the 
rich  would  eafily  break  through  it.     Pififtratus 
foon  proved  it,  by  bribing  a    party,  procuring 
himfelf  a  guard,  and  demoliming  Solon's  whole 
fyftem  before  his  eyes,  and  eftablifhing  a  fingle 
tyranny.     The  tyrant  was  expelled  feveral  times 
by  the  oppofition,  but  as  often  brought  back,  and 
finally  tranfmitted  his  monarchy  to  his  fons.    One 
of  thefe  was  afTaffi  nated  by  Harmodius  and  Arifto- 
geton  ;  and  the  other  driven  into  banifhment  by  the 
oppofition,  aided  by  the  neighbouring  ftate,  Spar- 
ta.   He  fled  to  the  Perfians,  excited  Darius  againft 
his  country,  and  was  killed  at  Marathon.     Thefe 
calamities  infpired  the  people  with  fuch  terrors  of 
a  fingle  tyrant,  that,  inftead  of  thinking  to  balance 
effectually  their  "orders,"  they  eftablifhed  the  of- 
tracifm,  to  prevent  any  man  from  becoming  too 
popular  :  a  check  indeed,  but  a  very  injudicious 
one;  for  it  only  banifhed  their  belt  men.  Hiftory 
VOL.  I.  N  n  no 


..      %  * 

284         Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

no  where  furnifhes  fo  frank  a  confeffion  of  the 
people  themfelves,  of  their  own  infirmities  and  un- 
fitnefs  for  managing  the  executive  branch  of  go- 
vernment, or  an  unbalanced  fhare  of  the  legifla- 
ture,  as  this  inftitution.  The  language  of  it  is, 
"  We  know  ourfelves  fo  well,  that  we  dare  not 
"  truft  our  own  confidence  and  affe&ions,  our 
f:  own  admiration  and  gratitude  for  the  greateft 
"  talents  and  fublimeft  virtues.  We  know  our 
(C  heads  will  be  turned,  if  we  fuffer  fuch  charac- 
"  ters  to  live  among  us,  and  we  fhall  always  make 
"  them  kings."  What  more  melancholy  fpeclacle 
can  be  conceived  even  in  imagination,  than  that 
inconftancy  which  erects  ftatues  to  a  patriot  or  a 
hero  one  year,  banifhes  him  the  next,  and  the 
third  erects  frefh  flatues  to  his  memory  ? 

Such  a  conftitution  of  government,  and  the 
education  of  youth  which  follows  neceflarily  from 
it,  always  produces  fuch  characters  as  Cleon  and 
Alcibiades ;  mixtures  of  good  qualities  enough  to 
acquire  the  confidence  of  a  party,  and  bad  ones 
enough  to  lead  them  to  deftru&ion ;  whofe  lives 
ftiew  the  miferies  and  final  cataftrophe  of  fuch  im- 
perfect polity. 

From  the  example  of  Athens  it  is  clear,  that 
the  government  of  a  fingle  aflembly  of  archons 
chofen  by  the  people,  was  found  intolerable;  that, 
to  remedy  the  evils  of  it,  Solon  eftablifhed  four  feve- 
ral  orders,  an  aflembly  of  the  people,  an  aflembly 
of  four  hundred*  an  aflembly  of  archons,  and  the 
Areopagus ;  that  he  endeavoured  to  balance  one 
fingly  by  another,  inftead  of  forming  his  balance 
out  of  three  branches.  Thus  thefe  attempts  at  an 
equilibrium  were  ineffectual ;  produced  a  never- 
ending  flu&uation  in  the  national  councils,'  con- 
tinual fadlions,  maflacres,  profcriptions,  banifh- 
Hieiit,  and  death  of  the  beft  citizens :  and  the  hif- 

tory 


Athens.  285 

tory1  of  the  Peloponnefian  War  by  Thucidydes, 
will  inform  us  how  the  raging  flames  at  laft 
burnt  out. 

The  people  in  each  of  the  United  States  have, 
after  all,  more  real  authority  than  they  had  in 
Athens.  Planted  as  they  are  over  large  domini- 
ons, they  cannot  meet  in  one  aflembly,  and  there- 
fore are  not  expofed  to  thofe  tumultuous  commo- 
tions, like  the  raging  waves  of  the  fea,  which  al- 
ways agitated  the  ecclefia  at  Athens.  They  have 
all  elections  of  governor  and  fenators,  as  well  as 
reprefentatives,  fo  prudently  guarded,  that  there 
is  fcarce  a  poflibility  of  intrigue.  The  property 
required  in  a  representative,  fenator,  or  ever  go- 
vernor, is  fo  fmall,that  multitudes  have  equal  pre- 
tenfions  to  be  chofen.  No  eledlion  is  confined  to 
any  order  of  nobility,  or  to  any  great  wealth;  yet 
the  legiflature  is  fo  divided  into  three  branches,  that 
no  law  can  be  pafled  in  a  paffion,  nor  inconliftent 
with  the  conftitution.  The  executive  is  excluded 
from  the  two  legiflative  aflemblies;  and  the  judi- 
ciary power  is  independent,  as  well  as  feparate 
from  all.  This  will  be  a  fair  trial,  whether  a  go- 
venment  fo  popular  can  preferve  itfelf.  If  it  can, 
there  is  reafon  to  hope  for  all  the  equality,  all  the 
liberty,  and  every  other  good  fruit  of  an  Atheni- 
an democracy,  without  any  of  its  ingratitude,  le- 
vity, convulfions,  or  factions. 


LETTER 


286         Ancient  Dctoocratical  Republics. 


LETTER    XLII. 


ANTALCIDAS. 


Dear  Sir, 

IN  the  year  1774,  a  certain  Britifh officer,  then 
at  Bofton,  was  often  heard  to  fay,  "  I  wiih 
*e  I  were  Parliament :  I  would  not  fend  a  fhip 
"  or  troop  to  this  country  ;  but  would  forthwith 
ce  pafs  a  ftatute,  declaring  every  town  in  North 
"  America  a  free,  fovereign,  and  independent 
<c  commonwealth.  This  is  what  they  all  defire, 
"  and  I  would  indulge  them  ;  I  fhould  foon 
"  have  the  pleafure  to  fee  them  all  at  war  with 
"  one  another,  from  one  end  of  the  continent  to 
"  the  other." — This  was  a  gentleman  of  letters, 
and  perhaps  had  learned  his  politics  from  Antal- 
cidas,  whofe  opinion  concerning  the  government 
of  a  iingle  affembly,  is  very  remarkable ;  but  the 
Greek  and  the  Briton  would  both  have  found 
their  artifices  in  America  ineffectual.  The  Ame- 
ricans are  very  far  from  being  defirous  of  fuch 
multiplications  and  divifions  of  ftates,  and  know 
too  well  the  mifchiefs  that  would  follow  from 
them  :  }^et  the  natural  and  inevitable  effect  of 
Mr.  Turgot's  fyftem  of  government,  would,  in  a 
courfe  of  time,  be  fuch  a  fpirit  among  the  peo- 
ple. 

It  is  not  very  certain  whether  Antalcidas  was  a 
Spartan  or  not.  If  he  was,  he  had  violated  the 
law  of  Lycurgus  by  travel,  and  had  refided  long 

in 


Antakldas.  287 

in  Perfia,  and  maintained  an  intercourfe  and  cor- 
refpondence  with  feveral  noble  families.  He  was 
bold,  fubtle,  infinuating,  eloquent ;  but  his  vices 
and  corruption  were  equal  to  his  addrefs.  The 
ftern  Spartan  fenate  thought  him  a  proper  inftru- 
ment  to  execute  an  iniidious  commiflion  at  a  pro- 
fligate court.  The  inftitutions  of  his  own  coun- 
try Sparta,  were  the  obje&s  of  his  ridicule;  but 
thofe  of  the  democratical  ftates  of  Greece,  of  his 
fovereign  contempt.  The  ancient  maxim  of  fome 
of  the  Greeks,  "  7 hat  every  thing  is  lawful  to  a 
"  man  in  the  fervice  of  his  country"  was  now  ob- 
folete,  and  had  given  way  to  a  purer  morality; 
but  Antalcidas  was  probably  one  of  thofe  philo- 
ibphers,  who  thought  every  thing  lawful  to  a  man 
which  could  ferve  his  private  intereft. — The  Spar- 
tan fenate  never  adled  upon  a  principle  much 
better;  and  therefore  might,  upon  this  occafion, 
have  given  their  ambaflador  the  inftru&ion  which 
he  pretended,  viz.  to  offer  ec  to  refign  all  preten- 
"  fions  to  the  Greek  cities  in  Alia,  which  they 
"  would  acknowledge  to  be  dependencies  of  the 
"  Perfian  empire ;  and  to  declare  all  the  cities 
"  and  iflands,  fmall  and  great,  totally  indepen- 
"  dent  of  each  other."  Thefe  articles,  in  confe- 
quence  of  which  there  would  not  be  any  republic 
powerful  enough  to  difturb  the  tranquillity  of 
Perfia,  were  more  advantageous  to  them  than  the 
moft  infolent  courtier  would  have  ventured  to 
propofe.  The  ambaflador  was  rewarded  by  a 
magnificent  prefent;  and  the  terms  of  peace  tranf- 
mitted  to  court,  to  be  ratified  by  Artaxerxes. 
The  negociation  however  languifhed,  and  the  war 
was  carried  on  with  violence  for  feveral  years ;  and 
all  the  art,  activity,  and  addrefs  of  Antalcidas 
were  put  to  the  trial,  before  he  obtained  the  rati- 
fication. The  treaty  was  at  lad  completed — 

"  That 


288          Ancient  Democratkal  Republics. 

"  That  all  the  republics,  fmall  and  great,  fhoulcl 
"  enjoy  the  independent  government  of  their  own 
"  hereditary  laws  ;  and  whatever  people  reje&ed 
"  thefe  conditions,  fo  evidently  calculated  for 
"  preferving  the  public  tranquillity,  mull  ex- 
"  pect  the  utmoft  indignation  of  the  Great  King, 
"  who,  in  conjunction  with  the  republic  of  Sparta, 
"  would  make  war  on  their  perverfe  and  danger- 
"  ous  obftinacy,  by  fea  and  land,  with  fhips 
"  and  money." 

Antalcidas,  and  Teribazus  the  Perfian  fatrap, 
with  whom  he  had  concerted  the  treaty,  had  fore- 
feen,  that,  as  Thebes  muft  refign  her  authority 
over  the  inferior  cities  of  Bceotia — As  Argos  muft 
withdraw  her  garrifon  from  Corinth,  and  leave 
that  capital  in  the  power  of  the  ariftocratic  or 
Lacedaemonian  faction — and  as  Athens  muft 
abandon  the  fruits  of  her  recent  victories — there 
might  be  an  oppofition  to  the  treaty  made  by 
thefe  three  ftates:  to  guard  again  ft  which,  they 
had  provided  powerful  armaments  by  fea  and 
land,  which,  with  Spartan  and  Perfian  threats,  fo 
intimidated  all,  that  all  at  laft  fubmitted. 

This  peace  of  Antalcidas  forms  a  difgraceful 
sera  in  the  hiftory  of  Greece.  Their  ancient  con- 
federacies were  diffolved ;  the  fmaller  towns  were 
loofened  from  all  connection  with  the  large  cities; 
all  were  weakened,  by  being  dilunited. — What 
infamy  to  the  magiflrates  of  Sparta,  and  their  in- 
triguing, unprincipled  ambaflador  !  But  Athens, 
Thebes,  and  Argos,  by  the  friendihip  of  the  de- 
mocratical  cities  and  confederacies,  had  become 
powerful,  and  excited  their  haughty  jealoufy. 
The  article  which  declared  the  fmaller  cities  inde- 
pendent, was  peculiarly  ufeful  to  the  views  of 
Sparta ;  it  reprefented  them  as  the  patrons  of  li- 
berty, among  the  free.  The  ftera  policy  of 

Sparta 


^ntalcidas.  289 

Sparta  had  crufhed,  in  all  her  fecondary  towns, 
the  hope  of  independence.  The  authority  of 
Athens,  Thebes,  Argos,  and  all  the  democrati- 
cal  confederacies,  were  lefs  imperious;  the  fo- 
vereign  and  fubjedl:  were  more  nearly  on  a  foot- 
ing of  equality;  and  the  Spartans  knew,  that 
cc  men  are  difpofed  to  reject  the  juft  rights  of 
"  their  equals.,  rather  than  revolt  againfl  the  ty- 
"  ranny  of  their  matters;"  their  own  flaves  and 
citizens  had  furnilhed  them  with  conftant  proof 
of  this. 

But  Sparta,  by  this  mafter-piece  of  roguery, 
meant  not  only  to  hold  ftill  all  her  own  fubordi- 
nate  cities  in  fbbje&ion,  not  only  to  detach  the 
inferior  communities  from  her  rivals,  but  to  add 
them  to  her  own  confederacy.  To  this  end  fhe, 
by  her  emiffaries,  intrigued  in  all  the  fubordinate 
cities.  How  ?  by  promoting  liberty,  popular  go- 
vernment, or  proper  mixtures  of  a  well-ordered 
commonwealth?  By  no  means;  but  by  fupport- 
ing  the  ariftocratical  factions  in  all  of  them,  fo- 
menting animofities  among  the  people  againil 
each  other,  and  efpecially  againfl  their  capitals. 
Complaints,  occaiioned  by  thefe  cabals,  were  re- 
ferred to  the  Spartan  fenate,  which  had  acquired 
the  reputation  of  the  patron  of  the  free,  the  weak, 
and  the  injured,  and  always  decided  in  their  own 
favour.  But  the  ambition  of  Spartans,  cool  and 
cunning  as  it  was,  had  not  patience  to  remain 
long  fatisfied  with  fuch  legal  ufurpations;  they 
determined  to  mix  the  terror  of  their  arms  with 
the  fedudlion  of  policy.  Before  we  proceed  to 
an  account  of  their  operations,  we  muft  develop 
a  little  more  fully  the  policy  of  Antalcidas. — 
Befides  the  free  republics  of  Attica,  Thebes,  and 
Argos,  which  confifted  of  feveral  cities,  govern- 
ed by  their  firit  magiftrate,  fenate,  and  people, 

iu 


290          Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

in  which  the  fubordinate  cities  always  complain* 
ed  of  the  inordinate  influence  of  the  capital ; 
there  were  feveral  republics  reputed  ftill  more 
popular,  becaufe  they  were  governed  by  fingle 
aflemblies,  like  Bifcay,  the  Grifons,  Appenzel, 
Underwald,  Claris,  &c.  Thefe  republics  con- 
iifted  of  feveral  towns,  each  governed  by  its  own 
firft  magiftrate,  council,  and  people  ;  but  con- 
federated together,  under  the  fuperintendance  of 
a  fingle  diplomatical  aflembly,  in  which  certain 
common  laws  were  agreed  on,  and  certain  com- 
mon magiftrates  appointed,  by  deputies  from 
each  town.  Thefe  confederacies  are  the  only  ex- 
amples of  governments  by  a  fingle  aflembly 
which  were  known  in  Greece.  Antalcidas  knew 
that  each  of  thefe  towns  was  difcontented  with  the 
adminiftration  of  their  common  aflembly,  and  in 
their  hearts  wifhed  for  independence.  Jt  was  to 
this  foible  of  the  people  that  he  addrefled  that 
policy,  in  his  Perlian  treaty,  by  which  he  twifted 
to  atoms,  as  if  it  had  been  a  rope  of  fand,  every 
democratical  city  and  confederacy,  and  every  one 
in  which  democracy  and  ariftocracy  were  mixed, 
throughout  all  Greece.  The  firft  vi&im  of  this 
ambitious  policy  was  Arcadia,  in  the  centre  of 
Peloponnefus,  whofe  principal  town  was  Manti- 
nssa.  Arcadia  was  a  fertile  and  beautiful  valley, 
furrounded  by  lofty  mountains :  the  fcattered  vil- 
lages of  fhepherds,  inhabiting  thefe  hills  and 
vales,  had  grown  into  cities,  by  the  names  of 
Tegea,  Stymphalis,  Herasa,  Orchomonus,  and 
Mantinasa.  The  inhabitants  were  diftinguifhed  by 
their  innocence,  and  the  fimplicity  of  their  man- 
ners ;  but,  whenever  they  had  been  obliged,  from 
necefilty,  to  engage  in  war,  they  had  difplayed 
fuch  vigour,  energy,  and  intrepidity,  as  made 
their  alliance  very  defirable.  The  dangerous 

neigh- 


-dntatcidas*  291 

neighbourhood  of  Sparta  had  obliged  them  to 
fortify  their  towns,  and  maintain  garrifons;  but 
jealoufies  arofe  between  Tegea  and  Mantinaea, 
and  emulations  to  be  the  capital.  The  year 
after  the  treaty  of  Antalcidas,  ambaffadors  were! 
fent  by  the  Spartan  fenate  to  the  affembly  at 
Mantinaea,  to  command  them  to  demolifh  the 
walls  of  their  proud  city,  and  return  to  their 
peaceful  villages.  The  reafons  affigned  were, 
that  the  Mantinaeans  had  difcovered  their  hatred 
to  Sparta,  envied  her  profperity,  rejoiced  in  her 
misfortunes,  and,  in  the  late  war,  had  furnifhed 
fome  corn  to  the  Argives.  The  Mantinaeans  re- 
ceived the  propofal  with  indignation ;  the  ambaf- 
fadors retired  in  difguft :  the  Spartans  proclaimed 
war,  demanded  the  aid  of  their  allies,  and  march- 
ed a  powerful  army  under  their  king  Agelipolis, 
and  invaded  the  territory.  After  the  moft  de- 
ftrudlive  ravages  of  the  country,  and  a  long  liege 
of  Mantinsea,  they  were  not  able  to  fubdue  the 
fpirit  of  this  people,  until  they  turned  the  courfe 
of  the  river  Ophis,  and  laid  the  walls  of  the  city 
under  water  ;  thefe,  being  of  raw  bricks,  diP 
folved,  and  fell*  The  inhabitants,  intimidated, 
offered  to  demolim  the  walls,  and  follow  Sparta 
in  peace  and  war,  upon  condition  they  might  be 
allowed  to  continue  and  live  in  the  city. — Ageii- 
polis  replied,  that  while  they  lived  together  in 
one  city,  their  numbers  expofed  them  to  the  de- 
lufions  of  feditious  demagogues,  whofe  addrefs 
and  eloquence  feduced  the  multitude  from  their 
true  intereft,  and  deftroyed  the  influence  of  their 
fuperiors  in  rank,  wealth,  and  wifdom,  on  whofe 
attachment  alone  the  Lacedaemonians  could  de- 
pend ;  and  therefore,  that  they  muft  deftroy  their 
houfes  in  the  city,  feparate  into  four  communi- 
ties, and  return  to  thofe  villages  which  their  an- 
VOL.  I.  Go  ceftors 


292          Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

ceftors  had  inhabited.  The  terror  of  an  immedi- 
ate affault  made  it  neceflary  to  comply ;  and  the 
Spartans  made  a  mighty  merit  of  fuffering  fixty 
of  the  moft  zealous  partizans  of  democracy  to  fly, 
unmurdered,  from  their  country. 

The  little  republic  of  Phlius,  too,  like  every 
other  where  a  balance  is  not  known  and  preferv- 
ed,  was  diftracled  by  parties.  The  popular  par- 
ty prevailed,  and  banifhed  their  opponents,  the 
friends  of  ariftocracy.  The  Spartans  threatened, 
and  the  ruling  party  permitted  the  exiles  to  re- 
turn; but  not  meeting  with  refpe&ful  treatment 
enough,  they  complained,  and  the  Spartans,  un- 
der Agelilaus,  appointed  commiflioners  to  try  and 
condemn  to  death  the  obnoxious  leaders  of  the 
people  in  Phlius.  This  odious  office  was  exe- 
cuted with  fuch  unexampled  feverity,  as  terrified 
thofe  who  furvived  into  an  invariable  attachment 
to  Sparta. 

The  confederacy  of  Olynthus  was  next  attempt- 
ed. A  number  of  towns,  of  which  Olynthus  was 
the  principal,  between  two  rivers,  had  been  incor- 
porated or  affociated  together,  and  grown  into 
ibme  power,  and  greater  hopes.  This  was  enough 
to  aroufe  the  jealoufy  of  Sparta.  They  fent  four 
or  five  fucceflive  armies,  under  their  ableft  kings, 
to  take  the  part  of  the  ariftocratical  fadion,  and 
conquer  this  league.  Such  was  the  fpirit  and  re- 
fources  of  this  little  fpot,  that  they  defended 
themfelves  for  four  or  five  campaigns,  and  then 
were  forced  to  fubmitr 

Thebes  had  been  torn  with  ariftocratic  and 
democratic  factions,  in  confequence  of  the  peace 
of  Antalcidas,  and  Sparta  joined  the  latter,  which 
ultimately  produced  long  and  obftinate  wars,  and 
the  exalted  characters  of  Pelopidas  and  Epami* 
nondas,  who,  however,  with  all  their  virtues,  were 

not 


Antakidas.  293 

not  able  finally  to  eftablifh  the  independency  of 
their  country,  though  both  perifhed  in  the  attempt ; 
Epaminondas,  to  the  laft,  refufing  to  the  feveral 
communities  of  Boeotia  their  hereditary  laws  and 
government,  although  he  was  one  of  the  democra- 
tical  party. 

Sparta,  in  the  next  place,  fent  a  detachment  to 
fupport  the  partifans  of  ariftocracy  in  Argolis, 
Achaia,  and  Arcadia,  but  were  obliged  to  eva- 
cuate that  country  by  Pelopidas  and  Epaminon- 
das ;  but  the  latter  fupported  ariftocratic  govern- 
ment. As  foon  as  he  retired,  the  Arcadians  com- 
plained againft  him,  tfiat  a  people,  who  knew  by 
their  own  experience  the  nature  of  ariftocracy, 
fhould  have  confirmed  that  fevere  form  of  go- 
vernment in  an  allied  or  dependent  province. 
The  multitude  in  Thebes  condemned  the  pro- 
ceedings of  Epaminondas,  and  fent  commiffion- 
ers  into  Achaia,  who  affifted  the  populace,  and  a 
body  of  mercenaries,  to  dhTolve  the  ariftocracy, 
and  banifh  or  put  to  death  the  nobles,  and  infti- 
tute  a  democracy.  The  foreign  troops  were 
fcarcely  departed,  when  the  exiles,  who  were 
very  numerous  and  powerful,  returned,  and,  after 
a  defperate  and  bloody  ftruggle,  recovered  their 
ancient  influence:  the  leaders  of  the  populace 
were  now,  in  their  turn,  put  to  death  or  expelled ; 
the  ariftocracy  re-eftablimed ;  and  the  magiftrates 
craved  the  protection  of  Sparta,  which  was  readi-> 
ly  granted. 

It  would  be  endlefs  to  purfue  the  confequences 
of  the  peace  of  Antakidas :  uninterrupted  con- 
tefts  and  wars  in  every  democratical  ftate  in 
Greece  were  the  confequenceof  it;  ariftocratical 
and  democratical  factions  eternally  difputing  for 
fuperiority,  rnutually  baniihing  and  butchering 

each 


294         Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

each  other;  profcriptions,  aflaffinations  (of  which 
even  Pelopidas  was  not  innocent)  treacheries, 
cruelties  without  number  and  without  end. — But 
no  man,  no  party,  ever  thought  of  introducing  an 
effectual  balance,  by  creating  a  king  with  an  equal 
power,  to  balance  the  other  two.  The  Romans 
began  to  think  of  this  expedient,  but  it  was  re- 
ferved  for  England  to  be  the  firft  to  reduce  it  to 
pradtice. 

Would  Mr.  Turgot  have  faid,  that  if  Thebes, 
Athens,  Argos,  and  the  Achaean,  Arcadian,  and 
Olynthian  leagues,  had  been  each  of  them  gOr 
verned  by  a  legiflature  cornpofed  of  a  king,  fe- 
nate,  and  aflembly,  with  equal  authority,  and  each 
a  decifive  negative,  that  the  caufe  of  liberty,  in 
all  Greece,  would  have  been  thus  crumbled  to 
duft  by  fuch  a  paltry  trick  of  Antalcidas  ? 
Would  the  childifh  humour  of  feparating  into  as 
many  ftates  as  towns  have  ever  been  indulged  or 
permitted  ?  Moil  certainly  they  would  not.  And 
if  the  power  of  negociation  and  treaties,  and  the 
whole  executive,  had  been  in  one  man,  could  the 
perfidious  ambafladors  of  Sparta,  and  the  other 
ftates,  have  intrigued,  and  embroiled  every  thing 
as  they  did  ? 


LETTER 


295 


LETTER    XLIII. 


A    C    H    A    I    A. 

Dear  Sir, 

THE  Achaeans,  whofe  republic  became  fo 
famous  in  rater  times,  inhabited  a  long  but 
narrow  ftrip  of  land  along  the  Corinthian  gulph, 
which  was  deftitute  of  harbours,  and,  as  its  fliores 
were  rocky,  of  navigation  and  commerce;  but 
the  impartial  and  generous  fpirit  of  their  laws, 
if  we  are  to  credit  Polybius  and  their  other  pa- 
negyrifts,  were  fome  compenfation  for  the  natu- 
ral difadvantages  of  their  lituation  and  territory. 
They  admitted  flrangers  into  their  community  on 
equal  terms  with  the  ancient  citizens;  and,  as 
they  were  the  firft,  and,  for  a  long  time,  the  only 
republic  of  Greece  which  had  fuch  liberality,  it 
is  not  ftrange  that  they  fhould  have  enjoyed  the 
praifes  of  all  foreigners.  In  all  other  ftates  of 
Greece,  in  which  the  people  had  any  fhare  in 
government,  there  were  conftant  complaints,  that 
one  powerful  capital  domineered  over  the  inferior 
towns  and  villages,  like  Thebes  in  Boeotia, 
Athens  in  Attica.  In  Laconia,  Lycurgus  avoided 
this  inconvenience  by  two  popular  aflemblies, 
one  for  Sparta,  and  one  for  the  country  ;  but  in 
Achaia  there  was  no  commercial  town,  and  all 
were  nearly  equal,  having  common  laws  and  in- 
ftitutions,  and  common  weights  and  meafures. 
Helice,  which  is  diftinguifhed  by  Homer  as  the 
moft  confiderable  town  of  Achaia,  was  the  place 

of 


296         Ancient  Demcratical  Republics. 

of  aflembly  of  the  congrefs,  until  it  was  fvval- 
lowed  up  in  an  earthquake ;  then  jEgae  became 
the  feat  of  congrefs,  who  annually  appointed  pre- 
fidents  in  rotation,  and  generals,  who  were  re- 
fponfible  to  the  congrefs,  as  the  members  of  con- 
grefs were  to  the  cities  they  reprefented.  This 
is  faid  to  be  an  excellent  fyftem  of  government, 
becaufe  it  checked  the  ambition  of  Achaia,  while 
it  maintained  its  independence :  and  Polybius  is 
full  of  the  praifes  of  this  people  for  their  "  vir- 
*e  tue  and  probity  in  all  their  negociations,  which 
*c  had  acquired  them  the  good  opinion  of  the 
"  whole  world,  and  procured  them  to  be  chofen 
"  to  be  arbitrators  between  the  Lacedemonians 
'*  and  Thebans;  for  their  wife  councils,  and 
"  good  difpofitions ;  for  their  equality  and  liber- 
"  ty,  which  is  in  the  utmofl  perfe&ion  among 
"  them;  for  their  laws  and  inftitutions  ;  for  their 
"  moderation,  and  freedom  from  ambition,"  &c. 
Yet  whoever  reads  his  own  hiftory,  will  fee  evi- 
dent proofs,  that  much  of  this  is  the  fond  par- 
tiality of  a  patriot  for  his  country ;  and  that  they 
had  neither  the  moderation  he  afcribes  to  them, 
nor  the  excellent  government.  Better  indeed  than 
the  other  republics  of  Greece  it  might  be ;  and 
its  congrefs,  as  a  diplomatic  aflembly,  might  have 
governed  its  foreign  affairs  very  well,  if  the  cities 
reprefented  in  it  had  been  well  conftituted  of  a 
mixture  of  three  independent  powers :»— But  it  is 
plain  they  were  not ;  but  were  in  a  continual 
llruggle  between  their  firft  magiftrates,  nobles, 
and  people,  for  fuperiority,  which  occaiioned  their 
ihort  duration,  and  final  ruin.  As  this  example 
deferves  to  be  fully  examined  by  every  Ameri- 
can, let  us  explain  it  a  little  more  particularly. 

Atreus,  king  of  Argos  and  Mycene,  was  the 
fon  of  Pclops,  and  father  of  Agamemnon,  who 

was 


297 

was  the  father  of  Oreftes,  who  was  the  father  of 
Tifamenus :  Pelops,  after  whom  Peloponnefus 
was  named,  was  the  fon  of  Tantalus,  a  king  of 
Phrygia;  and  Tantalus  was  the  fon  of  Jupiter, 
by  the  nymph  Plota. 

Tifamenus,  flying  from  Sparta,  upon  the  return 
of  the  Heraclidse  governed  in  Achaia,  and  was 
the  firft  king  of  that  people.  The  dominion  by 
him  there  founded  was  continued,  in  a  rightful 
fucceflion,  down  to  Gyges.  Notwithftanding  his 
defcent  from  Jupiter,  his  government  was  pro- 
bably like  that  of  Alcinous  in  Phseacia : — Twelve 
archons  prefided  over  the  twelve  cities,  who,  each 
in  his  diftricl:,  was  the  firft  magiftrate ;  and  all 
able  to  make  out  fome  way  or  other,  their  con- 
nection with  fome  of  the  ancient  families,  who 
were  all  alike  honourably  defcended,  at  leaft,  from 
an  inferior  god  or  goddefs.  Tifamenus  made  the 
thirteenth,  and  was  firft  among  equals  at  leaft. 
The  fons  of  Gyges  not  governing  by  Jaw,  but 
defpotically,  the  monarchy  was  abolifhed,  and  re- 
duced to  a  popular  ftate ;  probably  it  was  only 
an  ariftocracy  of  the  twelve  archons.  Thefe  hints 
at  the  genealogy  of  thefe  kings  are  to  fhew  how 
intimately  theology  was  intermixed  with  politics 
in  every  Grecian  ftate  and  city ;  and,  at  the  fame 
time,  to  fhew  that  the  whole  force  of  fuperfti- 
tion,  although  powerful  enough  to  procure*  crowns 
to  thefe  perfons,  yet,  for  want  of  the  balance  we 
contend  for,  was  not  fufficient  to  reftrain  the  paf- 
fions  of  the  nobles,  and  prevent  revolutions  al- 
moft  as  rapid  as  the  motion  of  a  wheel :  nothing 
has  ever  been  found  to  fupply  the  place  of  the 
balance  of  three  powers.  The  abolition  of  this 
limited  monarchy  was  not  effected  by  the  people, 
for  the  purpofe  of  introducing  democracy,  or  a 
mixed  government j  but  by  the  nobles,  for  the 

fake 


298          Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

fake  of  eftablifhing  an  ariftocracy.  The  new  go- 
vernment, confequently,  was  a  confederation  of 
twelve  archons,  each  ruling  as  firfl  magiftrate  in 
a  feparate  city,  with  his  council  and  people,  as 
an  independent  ftate.  The  twelve  archons  met  in 
a  general  aflembly,  fometimes  in  perfon,  and 
fometimes  by  proxy,  to  confult  of  general  affairs, 
and  guard  againft  general  dangers.  This  whole 
flate  could  not  be  larger  than  another  Bifcay,  and 
each  city  muft  have  been  lefs  than  a  merindade, 
and  its  general  aflembly  like  the  junta  general: 
yet  fuch  is  the  paffion  for  independence,  that  this 
little  commonwealth,  or  confederacy  of  common- 
wealths, could  not  hold  together.  The  general 
affembly  was  negledcd ;  the  cities  became  inde- 
pendent :  fome  were  conquered  by  foreigners, 
and  fome  loft  their  liberties  by  domeftic  tyrants, 
that  is,  by  their  firft  magiftrates  afliiming  arbi- 
trary power.  Polybius  difcorers  as  much  affec- 
tion for  this  little  republic  as  RomTeau  did  for 
Geneva,  and  is  very  loth  to  confefs  their  faults  : 
• — He  colours  over  the  revolutions  they  un- 
derwent for  a  courfe  of  ages,  by  faying,  that 
"  though  their  affairs  were  governed  according 
"  to  the  diverlity  of  times  and  occurrences,  all 
<c  poffible  endeavours  were  ufed  to  preferve  the 
"  form  of  a  popular  ftate.  The  commonwealth 
cc  was  compofed  of  twelve  cities,  which  are  in 
"  being  at  this  day,  Olenus  and  Helice  only  ex- 
"  cepted,  which  were  fwallowed  up  by  the  fea  in 
"  an  earthquake  that  happened  not  long  before 
"  the  battle  of  Leuclra;  which  cities  are  Patra, 
ec  Dyma,  Phara,  Trytsea,  Leontium,  ^Egira,  Pel- 
"  lene,  ./Egiuin,  Bura,  Ceraunia,  Olenus,  and 
"  Helice.  After  the  death  of  Alexander,  and  fince 
"  the  Olympiad  we  have  mentioned,  thefe  cities 
"  fell  into  dangerous  difTenfions,  chiefly  by  the 

"  artifices 


Achaia.  299 

rc  artifices  of  the  Macedonian  princes,  when  every 
**  city  apart  meditated  on  nothing  but  their  own 
xe  private  profit  and  ends,  to  the  prejudice  and 
ce  deftru&ion  of  their  neighbours ;  and  this  gave 
<c  occafion  to  Demetrius  and  Caffander,  and  after- 
<c  wards  to  Antigonus  Gonatus,  to  put  garrifons 
"  in  fome  of  their  cities ;  and  that  others  were 
cc  invaded  and  governed  by  tyrants,  who*  in  thofe 
cc  days,  were  very  numerous  in  Greece.  But 
"  about  the  124  Olympiad,  when  Phyrrhus  in- 
cc  vaded  Italy,  thefe  people  began  to  fee  the 
<c  error  of  their  difTeniions,  and  laboured  to  re- 
"  turn  to  their  former  union.  Thofe  who  gave 
<e  the  firft  example  were  Dyma,  Patra,  and  Pha- 
<c  ra :  five  years  afterwards,  ^Egium,  having  caft 
"  out  the  garrifon  that  was  placed  over  them, 
*e  were  received  into  the  confederacy.  Bura  fol- 
"  lowed  their  example,  having  firft  killed  the  ty- 
"  rant ;  and  foon  after  Ceraunia  did  the  like > 
<c  for  Ifeas  their  tyrant,  coniidering  how  that 
"  thofe  of  ^Egium  had  expelled  their  garrifon, 
cc  and  he  who  governed  in  Bura  was  already  flain 
"  by  the  pradices  of  Marcus  and  the  Achaians, 
<c  and  that  it  would  be  his  lot  to  have  them  all 
"  quickly  for  enemies,  he  therefore  refigned  the 
"  dominion,  after  having  firft  ftipulated  with  the 
"  Achaians  for  his  indemnity  for  what  was  patted, 
"  and  fo  incorporated  the  city  into  the  union  of 
"  the  Achaians. 

"  The  cities  then  we  have  mentioned  con- 
"  tinued  for  the  fpace  of  five-and-twenty  years  to 
<c  preferve  this  form  of  government  unchanged, 
"  chooiing  in  their  general  aflembly  two  praetors 
"  (or  prefidents)  and  a  fecretary.  Afterwards 
"  they  concluded  to  have  but  one  praetor  only, 
"  who  fhould  be  charged  with  the  management 
"  of  their  affairs  ;  and  the  firft  who  enjoyed  that 

VOL.  I.  P  p  "  dignity 


3OO          Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

"  dignity  was  Marcus  the  Carian,  who,  after  four 
"  years  of  his  ad  mi  nift  ration,  gave  place  to  Ara- 
"  tus  the  Sicyonian,  who,  at  the  age  of  twenty 
"  years,  after  he  had,  by  hi$  virtue  and  refolu- 
"  tion,  refcued  his  country  from  tyranny,  joined 
"  it  to  the  commonwealth  of  the  Achaians,  fo 
"  great  a  veneration  had  he  from  his  youth  for 
"  the  manners  and  inftitutions  of  that  people. 
cc  Eight  years  after,  he  was  a  fecond  time  chofen 
*c  praetor,  and  won  Acro-corinth,  which  Antigo- 
"  nus  had  fortified  with  a  garrifon,  whereby  Aratus 
"  freed  all  Greece  from  no  fmall  apprehenfion. 
"  When  he  had  reftored  liberty  to  Corinth,  he 
"  united  it  to  the  Achaians,  together  with  the 
"  city  of  Megara,  which  he  got  by  intelligence 
"  during  his  praetorfhip.  In  a  word,  Aratus, 
"  who,  in  a  fhort  fpace,  brought  many  and  great 
fC  things  to  pafs,  made  it  manifeft,  by  his  councils 
<c  and  a&ions,  that  his  greateft  aim  was  the  ex- 
«c  pulfion  of  the  Macedonians  out  of  Pelopon- 
<c  nefus,  to  fupprefs  tyranny,  and  aflert  the  liber- 
"  ty  of  his  country :  fo  that,  during  the  whole 
<c  reign  of  Antigonus  Gonatus,  Aratus  conftantly 
"  oppofed  all  his  defigns  and  enterprifes,  as  he 
cc  did  the  ambition  of  the  ^Ctolians  to  raife  them- 
cc  felves  on  the  ruins  of  their  neighbour  ftates; 
<c  and,  as  in  all  the  tranfa6lions  of  his  adminif- 
"  tration  he  gave  fingular  evidences  of  a  fteady 
"  mind  and  firm  refolution,  all  his  attempts  fuc- 
*c  ceeded  accordingly,  notwithstanding  many  ftates 
<c  confederated  to  hinder  the  union,  and  to  deftroy 
66  the  commonwealth  of  the  Achaians.  After  the 
"  death  of  Antigonus  the  Achaians  entered  into  a 
"  league  with  the  ^Etolians,  and  generoufly  af- 
cc  fifted  them  in  their  war  againft  Demetrius;  fo 
<c  that  the  ancient  hatred  between  thefe  two  peo- 
"  pie  feemed  for  the  prefent  extinguifhed>  and 

«  the 


Achaia.  301 

"  the  defire  of  concord  began,  by  degrees,  to 
(C  grow  in  the  minds  of  the  ^Etolians.  Demetrius 
"  died,  when  many  great  and  noble  occalions  were 
cc  given  to  the  Achaians  of  finifhing  the  project 
<e  they  had  conceived;  for  the  tyrants  who  reign- 
<c  ed  in  Peloponnefus,  having  loft  the  fupport  of 
"  Demetrius,  who  greatly  favoured  them,  began 
<c  now  to  defpair ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  being 
"  awed  by  Aratus,  who  admonifhed  them  to  quit 
cc  their  governments,  on  promife  of  great  honours 
cc  and  rewards  to  fuch  as  voluntarily  refigned, 
"  and  threatening  others  with  hoftility  who  re- 
<e  fufed;  whereupon  they  refolved  to  defpoil 
"  themfelves  of  their  dignities,  reftore  their  peo- 
c<  pie  to  liberty,  and  incorporate  them  with  the 
<c  Achaians.  As  to  Lyfidas,  the  Megalopolitan, 
"  he,  wifely  forefeeing  what  was  likely  to  come  to 
<c  pafs,  frankly  renounced  his  dominion  during 
<c  the  life  of  Demetrius,  and  was  received  into 
ee  the  general  confederacy^of  rights  and  privileges 
"  with  the  whole  nation.  Ariftomachus,  tyrant 
"  of  the  Argicus,  Xeno  of  the  Hermionians,  and 
cc  Cleonymus  of  the  Philiatians,  refigning  their 
<c  authority  at  the  time  we  mention,  were  likewife 
"  received  into  the  alliance  of  the  Achaians.  In 
cc  the  mean  time  the  jEtolians  began  to  conceive 
"  jealouiies  at  the  growing  greatnefs  and  extra- 
"  ordinary  fuccefs  of  the  Achaians,  and  bafely 
<c  entered  into  a  league  with  Antigonus,  who  at 
<c  that  time  governed  Macedon,  and  with  Cleo- 
"  menes,  king  of  the  Lacedaemonians.  Thefe 
"  three  powers,  Macedonia,  Lacedsemon,  and 
<c  /Etolia,  were  to  invade  Achaia  on  all  fides ; 
<c  but  the  great  political  abilities  of  Aratus  de- 
"  feated  the  enterprife.  He  confidered  that  An- 
"  tigonus  was  a  man  of  experience,  and  willing 
"  enough  to  make  alliances;  and  that  princes 

"  have 


Ancient  Detnocratical  Republics. 

"  have  naturally  neither  friends  nor  enemies,  but 
fc  meafure  amities  and  enmities  by  the  rules  of 
<c  intereft :  he  therefore  endeavoured,  after  a  good 
cc  underftanding  with  that  prince,  and  determined 
"  to  propole  the  joining  the  forces  of  the  Acha- 
cc  ians  to  his.  He  propofed  to  cede  him  fome 
<c  towns ;  and  the  alliance  was  formed,  and  the 
<c  Cleomenic  war  commenced.  In  the  profecution 
<c  of  it,  Cleomenes  and  his  Spartans  difplayed  the 
*'  utmtfft  ferocity  and  cruelty,  particularly  at 
ce  ^Egium,  where  he  put  in  practice  fo  many  out- 
<e  rages  and  cruelties  of  war,  that  he  left  not  fo 
"  much  as  any  appearance  that  it  had  been  ever 
"  a  peopled  place."  There  is  great  reafon  to  luf- 
pe6l  that  the  Achaians  were  not  lefs  guilty  of 
cruelty;  for  Polybius  profelTes  to  follow  the  ac- 
count given  by  Aratus  himfelf,  in  a  hiftory  which 
that  praetor  wrote  of  Achaia,  who  may  be  well 
iufpe6ted  of  partiality ;  and  Polybius  himfelf  was 
the  fon  of  Lycortas  of  Megalopolis,  who  perfected 
and  confirmed  the  confederacy  of  the  Achaians, 
and  difcovers  throughout  his  hiftory  a  ftrong  at- 
tachment to  this  people.  If  the  hiftory  of  Clear- 
chus  was  extant,  we  might  poffibly  fee  that  the 
Achaians,  the  Spartans,  and  Macedonians,  were 
equally  liable  to  the  accufation  of  inhumanity. 
Mantinsea  was  fubjecled  to  unfpeakable  calamities 
as  well  as  /Egium ;  but  Polybius  endeavours  to 
cover  this  over  with  a  veil  by  abufing  Clearchus, 
acculing  him  with  departing  from  the  dignity  of 
hiftory  and  writing  tragedies,  by  reprefenting  wo- 
men with  difhevelled  hair  and  naked  breafts,  em- 
bracing each  other  with  melting  lamentations  and 
tears,  and  complaints  of  men,  women,  and  chil- 
dren, dragged  away  promifcuoufly.  He  attempts 
to  juftify  the  punifhment  of  this  city,  by  charg- 
ing it  with  treacheroufly  betraying  itielf  into  the 

hands 


Ackaia.  303 

hands  of  the  Spartans,  and  maflacring  the  Achai- 
an  garrifon  :  but  this  was  no  more  than  the  ufual 
effect  of  the  continual  revolutions  in  the  Greek 
cities,  from  democracy  to  ariftocracy,  from  that 
to  monarchy,  and  back  again  through  the  whole 
circle.  In  every  one  of  thefe  cities  there  were 
three  parties;  a  monarchical  party,  who  deiired 
to  be  governed  by  a  king  or  tyrant,  as  he  was 
then  called ;  an  ariftocratical  party,  who  wifhed 
to  erect  an  oligarchy ;  and  a  democratical  party, 
who  were  zealous  for  bringing  all  to  a  level. 
£ach  faction  was  for  collecting  all  authority  into 
one  centre  in  its  own  way;  but  unfortunately 
there  was  no  party  who  thought  of  a  mixture  of 
all  thefe  three  orders,  and  giving  each  a  negative 
by  which  it  might  balance  the  other  two :  ac- 
cordingly the  regal  party  applied  to  Macedonian 
kings  for  aids  and  garrifons;  the  ariftocratical 
citizens  applied  to  Sparta  for  the  like  afliftance; 
and  the  democratical  factions  applied  to  Aratus 
and  the  Achaian  league.  The  confequence  was, 
as  each  party  prevailed,  they  brought  in  a  new 
garrifon,  and  maflacred  the  old  one,  together 
with  the  leaders  of  the  fa&ion  fubdued.  But  is 
fuch  a  fyftem  to  be  recommended  to  the  United 
States  of  America  ?  Jf  the  Americans  had  no 
more  difcretion  than  the  Greeks,  no  more  hu-. 
inanity,  no  more  confideration  for  the  benign  and 
peaceful  religion  they  profefs,  they  would  ftill 
have  to  confider,  that  the  Greeks  had  in  many 
places  forty  flaves,  and  in  all  places,  ten  to  one 
free  citizen;  that  the  flaves  did  all  the  labour, 
and  the  free  citizens  had  nothing  to  do  but  cut 
one  another's  throats.  Wars  did  not  coft  money, 
in  Greece  ;  happily  for  the  world,  at  prefent 
they  are  very  expeniive.  An  American  foldier  will 
not  ferve  one  year,  without  more  money  for  pay 

than 


304  Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

than  many  of  thefe  Greek  cities  had  for  their 
whole  circulating  medium. — There  is  but  one  pof- 
fible  means  of  realizing  Mr.  Turgot's  idea.  Let 
us  examine  it  well  before  we  adopt  it.  Let  every 
town  in  the  Thirteen  States  be  a  free,  fovereign 
and  independent  democracy :  here  you  may  near- 
ly colled  all  authority  into  one  centre,  and  that 
centre  the  nation.  Thefe  towns  will  immediately 
go  to  war  with  each  other,  and  form  combina- 
tions, alliances,  and  political  intrigues,  as  ably  as 
the  Grecian  villages  did  :  but  thefe  wars  and 
negociations  cannot  be  carried  on  but  by  men  at 
leifure.  The  firft  flep  to  be  taken  then,  is  to  de- 
termine who  mall  be  freemen,  and  who  flaves. 
Let  this  be  determined  by  lot.  In  every  fifty 
men,  forty  are  to  be  flaves,  and  ftay  at  home  un- 
armed, under  certain  overfeers  provided  with  good 
whips  and  fcourges,  to  labour  in  agriculture  and 
mechanic  arts.  All  commerce  and  navigation, 
fifheries,  &c.  are  to  ceafe  of  courfe.  The  other 
ten  are  to  be  free  citizens,  live  like  gentlemen, 
eat  black  broth,  and  go  out  to  war ;  fome  in  fa- 
vour of  tyrants,  fome  for  the  well  born,  and  fome 
for  the  multitude :  for,  even  in  the  fuppoiition 
here  made,  every  town  will  have  three  parties  in 
it;  fome  will  be  for  making  the  moderator  a 
king,  others  for  giving  the  whole  government  to 
the  felecl:  men,  and  a  third  fort  for  making  and 
executing  all  laws,  and  judging  all  caufes,  crimi- 
nal and  civil,  in  town  meeting.  Americans  will 
well  confider  the  confequences  of  fuch  fyftems  of 
policy,  and  fuch  multiplications  and  divifions  of 
flates,  and  will  univerfally  fee  and  feel  the  necef- 
fity  of  adopting  the  fentiments  of  Aratus,  as  re- 
ported by  Plutarch  :  "  That  fmall  cities  could 
"  be  preferved  by  nothing  elfe  but  a  continual 
"  and  combined  force,  united  by  the  bond  of 

"  common 


Crete. 


305 


"  common  intereft;  and  as  the  members  of  the 
<e  body  live  and  breathe  by  their  mutual  com- 
"  munication  and  connexion,  and  when  once 
"  fepa rated  pine  away  and  putrify,  in  the  fame 
"  manner  are  cities  ruined  by  being  difmembered 
<c  from  one  another,  as  well  as  preferved  when, 
"  linked  together  in  one  great  body,  they  enjoy 
"  the  benefit  of  that  providence  and  council 
"  that  governs  the  whole."  Thefe  were  the  fen- 
timents  which,  according  to  the  fame  Plutarch, 
acquired  him  fo  much  of  the  confidence  of  the 
Achaians,  "  that  fince  he  could  not  by  law  be 
"  chofen  their  general  every  year,  yet  every  other 
"  year  he  was,  and  by  his  councils  and  actions 
"  was  in  effect  always  fo;  for  they  perceived  that 
"  neither  riches  nor  repute,  nor  the  friendlhip  of 
"  kings,  nor  the  private  intereft  of  his  own  coun- 
"  try,  nor  any  other  thing  elfe,  was  fo  dear  to  him 
"  as  the  increafe  of  the  Achaian  power  and  great- 
"  nefs." 


LETTER     XLIV. 


CRETE. 

My  dear  Sir, 

THIS  celebrated  ifland,  with  the  fantaftical 
honour  of  giving  birth  to  fome  of  the  gods 
of  Greece,  had  the  real  merit  and  glory  of  com- 
municating to  that  country  many  ufeful  improve- 
ments. Their  infular  fituation  defended  them  from 
invaiions  by  land,  and  their  proximity  to  Egypt 
afforded  them  an  eafy  intercourfe  of  commerce  by 

fea 


306          Ancient  Demcratical  Republics. 

fea  with  the  capital  of  that  kingdom  ;  where 
Rhadamanthus  in  his  travels  had  colledled  thofe 
inventions  and  inllitutions  of  a  civilized  people, 
which  he  had  the  addrefs  to  apply  to  the  con- 
firmation of  his  own  authority.  Minos  is  ftill 
more  diftinguifhed  :  in  his  travels  in  the  eaft,  he 
faw  certain  families  poffeffed  of  unrivalled  ho- 
nours and  unlimited  authority,  as  vicegerents  of 
the  Deity.  Although  the  Greeks  would  never  ad- 
mit, in  the  fulleft  latitude  of  oriental  fuperftition 
and  defpotifm,  this  odious  profanation,  yet  Minos, 
taking  advantage  of  his  own  unbounded  reputa- 
tion, and  that  enthufiafm  for  his  perfon  which  his 
fkill  and  fortune  in  war,  his  genius  for  fcience, 
and  talents  for  government,  had  excited  among 
wandering  credulous  favages,  fpread  a  report  that 
he  was  admitted  to  familiar  converfations  with  Ju- 
piter, and  received  from  that  deity  his  fyflem  of 
laws,  with  orders  to  engrave  it  on  tables  of  brafs. 
The  great  principle  of  it  was,  that  all  freemen 
mould  be  equal,  and  therefore  that  none  mould 
have  any  property  in  lands  or  goods ;  but  that 
citizens  mould  be  ferved  by  flaves,  who  mould 
cultivate  the  lands  upon  public  account.  The 
citizens  mould  dine  at  public  tables,  and  their 
families  fubfift  on  the  public  ftock.  The  mo- 
narch's authority  was  extremely  limited,  except 
in  war.  The  magiftracies  were  the  recompence 
of  merit  and  age ;  and  fuperiority  was  allowed  to 
nothing  elfe.  The  youth  were  reftrained  to  a  ri- 
gid temperance,  modefty,  and  morality,  enforced 
by  law.  Their  education,  which  was  public,  was 
dire&ed  to  make  them  foldiers.  Such  regulations 
could  not  fail  to  fecure  order,  and  what  they  call- 
ed freedom  to  the  citizens;  but  nine-tenths  of 
mankind  were  doomed  to  ilavery  to  fupport  them 
in  total  idlenefs,  excepting  thofe  exerciies  proper 

for 


Crete.  307 

for  warriors,  become  more  neceffary  to  keep  the 
flaves  in  fubje&ion,  than  to  defend  the  ilate  againft 
the  pirates  and  robbers  with  whom  the  age  abound- 
ed. Idomeneus,  grandfon  of  Minos,  and  com- 
mander of  the  Cretan  forces  in  the  Trojan  war, 
was  among  the  moft  powerful  of  the  Grecian 
chiefs,  and  one  of  the  few  who  returned  in  fafety 
from  that  expedition.  Here  was  a  government  of 
all  authority  in  one  centre,  and  that  centre  the 
moft  aged  and  meritorious  perfons  of  the  nation, 
with  little  authority  in  the  king,  and  none  in  the 
reft  of  the  people ;  yet  it  was  not  of  fufficient 
ftrength  to  hold  together.  The  venerable  old 
men  could  not  endure  the  authority,  or  rather  the 
pre-eminence  of  the  king.  Monarchy  muft  be 
abolifhed;  and  every  principal  city  became  early 
a  feparate  independent  commonwealth ;  each,  no 
doubt,  under  its  patriarch,  baron,  noble,  or  archon, 
for  they  all  fignify  the  fame  thing :  and  continual 
wars  enfued  between  the  feveral  republics  within 
the  ifiand;  and  Cretan  valour  and  martial  fkill 
were  employed  and  exhaufted  in  butchering  one 
another,  until  they  turned  all  the  virtues  they  had 
left  againft  mankind  in  general,  and  exerted  them 
in  piracies  and  robberies,  to  their  univerfal  infa- 
my throughout  all  Greece :  nor  was  Crete  ever 
of  any  weight  in  Grecian  politics  after  the  Tro- 
jan war. 


Voi.  I.  G^q.  LETTER 


308         Ancient  Democratical  Republic** 


LETTER    XLV. 


CORINTH. 


My  dear  Sir, 

MONARCHY  remained  in  this  emporium 
of  Greece  longer  than  in  any  other  of  the 
principal  cities  ;  but  the  noble  families  here 
could  no  better  endure  the  fuperiority  of  a  mo- 
narch, than  others  in  all  countries;  and  with  nu- 
merous branches  of  the  royal  family  (named  Bac* 
chidae,  from  Bacchis,  fifth  monarch  in  fucceflion 
from  Aletes)  at  their  head,  they  accordingly  put 
to  death  Teleftes,  the  reigning  monarch;  and 
ufurping  the  government,  under  an  affociation 
among  themfelves,  inftituted  an  oligarchy.  An 
annual  firft  magiftrate,  with  the  title  of  Prytanis, 
but  with  very  limited  prerogatives,  like  a  doge  of 
Venice,  was  chofen  from  among  themfelves.  Se- 
veral generations  pafled  away  under  the  admini- 
flration  of  this  odious  oligarchy ;  but  the  people  at 
length  finding  it  intolerably  oppreffive,  expelled 
the  whole  junto,  and  fet  up  Cuypfelus  as  a  mo- 
narch or  tyrant*  He  had  long  been  the  head  of 
the  popular  party,  and  was  defervedly  a  popular 
character,  poflefled  of  the  confidence  and  affeclion 
of  his  fellow-citizens  to  a  great  degree,  or  he 
never  could  have  refufed  the  guard  which  was 
offered  him  for  the  protection  of  his  perfon  againft 
the  attempts  of  the  defeated  oligarchy.  His  mo- 
deration and  clemency  are  allowed  by  all ;  yet 
he  is  univerfally  called  by  the  Grecian  writers 

Tyrant 


Corinth.    ,  309 

Tyrant  of  Corinth,  and  his  government  a  Tyran- 
ny. Ariftotle,  1.  v.  c.  12,  informs  us  that  his 
tyranny  continued  thirty  years,  becaufe  he  was  a 
popular  man,  and  governed  without  guards.  Pe- 
riander,  one  of  the  feven  wife  men,  his  fon  and 
fucceflbr,  reigned  forty-four  years,  becaufe  he  was 
an  able  general.  Pfampfneticus,  the  fon  of  Gor- 
gias,  fucceeded,  but  his  reign  was  fhort ;  yet  this 
fpace  of  feventy-feven  years  is  thought  by  Arif- 
totle one  of  the  longeft  examples  of  a  tyranny  or 
an  oligarchy.  At  the  end  of  this  period  the  no- 
bles again  prevailed;  but  not  without  courting 
the  people.  The  tyranny  was  demolimed,  and  a 
new  commonwealth  eftablifhed,  in  which  there  was 
a  mixture  of  oligarchy  and  democracy,  to  prevent 
the  firft  from  running  into  excefs  of  oppreffion, 
and  the  other  into  turbulence  and  licence. 

Here  we  find  the  ufual  circle :  monarchy  firft 
limited  by  nobles  only;  then  the  nobles,  becom- 
ing envious  and  impatient  of  the  monarch's  pre- 
eminence, demoliih  him,  and  fet  up  oligarchy. 
This  grows  infolent  and  oppreflive  to  the  people, 
who  fet  up  a  favourite  to  pull  it  down.  The  new 
idol's  poflerity  grow  infolent ;  and  the  people  final- 
ly think  of  introducing  a  mixture  of  three  regular 
branches  of  power,  in  the  one,  the  few,  and  the 
many,  to  controul  one  another,  to  be  guardians 
in  turn  to  the  laws,  and  fecure  equal  liberty  to 
all. 

Ariftotle,  in  this  chapter,  cenfures  fome  parts 
of  the  eighth  book  of  Plato,  and  fays,  "  That  in 
"  general,  when  governments  alter,  they  change 
"  into  the  contrary  fpecies  to  what  they  before 
"  were,  and  not  into  one  like  the  former :  and 
"  this  reafoning  holds  true  of  other  changes.  For 
"  he  fays,  that  from  the  Lacedaemonian  form  it 
fc  changes  into  an  oligarchy,  and  from  thence 

"  intt 


<c 


3  1  o         Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

fc  into  a  democracy,  and  from  a  democracy  into 
<c  a  tyranny;  and  fometimes  a  contrary  change 
"  takes  places,  as  from  a  democracy  into  an  oli- 
*'  garchy,  rather  than  into  a  monarchy.  With  re- 
^  fpe6l  to  a  tyranny,  he  neither  fays  whether 
"  there  will  be  any  change  in  it  ;  or,  if  not,  to 
"  what  caufe  it  will  be  owing;  or,  if  there  is,  in- 
ce  to  what  other  ftate  it  will  alter  :  but  the  reafon 
of  this  is,  that  a  tyranny  is  an  indeterminate 
government;  and,  according  to  him,  every  ftate 
ought  to  alter  into  the  firft  and  moft  perfect  ; 
thus  the  continuity  and  circle  would  be  pre- 
ferved.  But  one  tyranny  often  changed  into 
another;  as  at  Syria,  from  Muros  to  Clif- 
thenes  ;  or  into  an  oligarchy,  as  was  Antileos 
at  Chalcas;  or  into  a  democracy,  as  was  Cha- 
rilaus's  at  Lacedsemon,  and  at  Carthage.  An 
oligarchy  is  allb  changed  into  a  tyranny  :  fuch 
was  the  rife  of  moft  of  the  ancient  tyrannies  in 
Sicily  :  at  Leontium,  into  the  tyranny  of  Pa- 
nsstius;  at  Gela,  into  that  of  Cleander;  at 
Rhegium,  into  that  of  Anaxilaus  ;  and  the  like 
in  many  other  cities.  It  is  abfurd  alfo  to  fup- 
pofe,  that  a  ftate  is  changed  into  an  oligarchy 
becaufe  thofe  who  are  in  power  are  avaricious 
and  greedy  of  money  ;  and  not  becaufe  thofe, 
who  are  by  far  richer  than  their  fellow-citizens, 
think  it  unfair  that  thofe  who  have  nothing 
ihould  have  an  equal  fhare  in  the  rule  of  the 
ftate  with  themfelves,  who  poflefs  fo  much:  for 
in  many  oligarchies  it  is  not  allowable  to  be 
employed  in  money-getting,  and  there  are 
many  laws  to  prevent  it.  But  in  Carthage, 
which  is  a  democracy,  money-getting  is  credit- 
able  ;  and  yet  their  form  of  government  re- 
mains  unaltered." 

Whether  thefe  obfervations  of  Ariftotle  upon 

Plato 


drgos.  311 

Plato  be  all  juft  or  not,  they  only  ferve  to 
ftrengthen  our  argument,  by  fhewing  the  muta- 
bility of  fimple  governments  in  a  fuller  light. 
Not  denying  any  of  the  changes  ftated  by  Plato, 
he  only  enumerates  a  multitude  of  other  changes 
to  which  fuch  governments  are  liable;  and  there- 
fore fhews  the  greater  neceflity  of  mixtures  of 
different  orders,  and  decifive  balances,  to  preferve 
mankind  from  thofe  horrible  calamities  which  re- 
volutions always  bring  with  them. 


LETTER      XLVI. 


A    R    G    O    S 


My  dear  Sir, 

IN  order  to  form  an  adequate  idea  of  the  mife- 
ries  which  were  brought  upon  the  Greeks  by 
continual  and  innumerable  revolutions  of  govern- 
ment, it  fhould  be  confidered,  that  the  whole  Pe^ 
loponnefus  was  fcarcely  two  hundred  miles  in 
length,  and  one  hundred  and  forty  in  breadth, 
not  much  more  exteniive  than  the  fmalleft  of  the 
Thirteen  States  of  America.  Such  an  inherent 
force  of  repulfion,  fuch  a  difpofnion  to  fly  to 
pieces,  as  poffeffed  the  minds  of  the  Greeks, 
would  divide  America  into  thoufands  of  petty 
defpicable  ftates,  and  lay  a  certain  foundation 
for  irreconcileable  wars. 

Although  Thucidydes  and   Ariflotle,  as  well 
as  Homer,  inform  us,  that  kingdoms  were  here- 
ditary, 


312         Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

ditary,  and  of  limited  authority,  yet  the  limita- 
tions appear  to  be  very  confufed;  they  were  the 
limitations  of  nobles  rather  than  of  people;  and 
the  firft  ftruggles  for  power  were  between  kings 
and  archons.  The  kings  had  no  ftanding  ar- 
mies ;  and  all  the  forces  under  their  authority, 
even  when  they  took  the  field,  could  be  com- 
manded only  by  the  nobles,  who  had  their  pecu- 
liar diftricls  of  land  and  people  to  govern :  thefe 
were  illuftrious  and  independent  citizens;  like 
the  barons  who  demanded  the  great  charter,  com- 
municated to  each  other  their  grievances,  and 
took  meafures  to  remove  them:  but,  being  ge- 
nerally as  averfe  to  popular  as  to  regal  power, 
their  conftant  aim  was  an  ariftocracy ;  they  ac- 
cordingly extinguifhed  monarchy,  but  did  not 
fecure  the  rights  of  the  people.  The  immediate 
effec"l  of  this  revolution  only  multiplied  evils. 
Opprefled  by  kings,  Greece  was  much  more  op- 
preffed  by  archons  ;  and,  anciently  too  much  di- 
vided, was  ilill  more  fubdivided  under  the  new 
forms  of  government.  Many  inferior  cities  dif- 
dained  the  jurifdi&ion,  and  even  the  fuperior  in- 
fluence, of  their  refpe&ive  capitals;  ^ffe&ed  inde- 
pendent fovereignty ;  and  each  town  maintained 
war  with  its  neighbours.  Each  independent  ftate 
had  a  right  to  fend  two  members  to  the  Amphic- 
tyonic  council.  The  abolition  of  royalty  render- 
ing the  independent  ftates  more  numerous,  in- 
creafed  the  number  of  Amphi&yons  to  one  hun- 
dred members,  and  more ;  and  an  oath  was  re- 
quired, that  the  member  mould  never  fubveit 
any  Amphidyonic  city  :  yet  every  excefs  of  ani- 
moiity  prevailed  among  the  Grecian  republics, 
notwithstanding  the  interpofition  of  the  Amphic- 
tyons, 

Argos 


313 

Argos  Was  founded  by  Danaus,  the  Egyptian, 
about  the  time  that  Athens  was  fettled  by  Ce- 
crops.  At  the' Trojan  war  it  was  the  firfl  of  the 
ftates,  and  ever  continued  the  rival  of  Sparta. 
Though  the  royal  dignity  feemed  more  firmly 
fettled  under  Agamemnon  than  under  any  other 
chief,  yet  Argos  was  one  of  the  firft  of  the  ftates 
upon  the  continent  to  abolifh  monarchy,  and  that 
as  early  as  on  the  death  of  Celfus,  fon  of  Teme- 
nus,  the  defcendant  of  Hercules.  No  account  of 
its  new  conilitution  is  preferved :  but,  from  ana- 
logy we  may  be  convinced,  that  a  reftlefs  body 
of  nobles  overturned  the  monarchy;  and,  as  it 
was  fubje6t  to  frequent  and  violent  diforders,  that 
the  archons  could  not  agree  upon  the  form  of 
their  oligarchy ;  and  fet  up  for  independency  in 
their  different  diftri&s,  ftates,  or  cities,  a  little 
fooner  than  in  other  republics.  The  higher  and 
lower  ranks  were  continually  at  variance ;  the  de- 
mocratical  fa&ion  was  commonly  fuperior ;  fome- 
times  tyrants  were  fet  up  over  all ;  and  once,  ac- 
cording to  Herodotus,  *  the  ilaves  got  poffeffion 
of  the  city,  took  upon  them  the  adminiftration  of 
affairs,  and  exercifed  the  magiftracies* 

The  government  muft  have  been  ill  confii- 
tuted,  as  no  Rhadamanthus  or  Minos,  no  Ly- 
curgus  or  Solon,  no  Zaleucus  or  Charondas,  nor 
any  other  legiflator  of  fuperior  wifdom  and  pro- 
bity, ever  acquired  the  power;  and  no  fortunate 
coincidence  of  circumftances  ever  occurred,  to 
unite  liberty  and  adminiftration,  law  and  govern- 
ment, upon  a  ftable  bafis.  One  famous  tyrant, 
Pheidon,  lineal  fucceflbr  of  Hercules,  a  prince 
of  great  abilities  but  no  moderation,  raifed  him- 
felf,  rather  than  his  country,  to  a  fuperiority 

which 

*  Lib.  vi. 


314         Ancient  Democratic  at  Republics. 

which  ceafed  with  him.  For  want  of  diftindt 
orders,  and  fteady  balances,  by  which  the  wills 
and  the  forces  of  the  people  might  have  been 
fubjecled  to  the  laws,  Argos  loft  that  pre-emi- 
nence among  the  Grecian  ftates,  which  it  had  ob- 
tained under  a  monarchy.  Every  little  town  in 
Argolis  was  feized  with  the  caprice  of  indepen- 
dence, and  oppofed  the  general  government,  at 
the  fame  time  that  the  metropolis  betrayed  an 
ambition  to  domineer  over  the  inferior  towns. 
Civil  wars  enfued :  Mycense,  Troezene,  Epi- 
daurus,  and  other  villages  of  lefs  confequence, 
were  often  conquered  and  garrifoned,  but  never 
fubdued.  Neceflity  taught  them  to  unite.  They 
reproached  Argos  with  tyranny,  and  Argos  the 
others  with  rebellion.  "Union  enabled  them  to 
fet  at  defiance  their  capital,  by  means  of  in- 
trigues and  alliances  with  Lacedsemon,  the  never- 
failing  refource  of  one  party  or  the  other  in  every 
democratical  ftate.  The  pretence  was,  the  Per- 
fian  war,  which  Argos  declined.  This  was  call- 
ed a  bafe  derelidlion,  and  excited,  by  the  help  of 
Spartan  emiffaries,  hatred  and  contempt  in  Si- 
cyon,  Naupila,  Heliaea,  and  other  towns,  be- 
fides  thofe  mentioned  before.  Argos  alone,  of 
all  the  cities  in  the  Peloponnefus,  openly  efpoufed 
the  caufe  of  Athens.  This  circumftance  alone, 
if  it  was  not  accidental,  is  enough  to  Ihow,  that 
this  city  had  more  fenfe  and  profound  wifdom 
than  all  the  reft;  for  Sparta  was  certainly  then 
leading  all  Greece  to  deftruclion.  In  other  re- 
fpefts  the  Argives  discovered  the  fame  temper, 
and  the  fame  underftanding  with  all  the  others ; 
for  they  led  their  whole  forces  againft  Mycenas, 
took  it  by  ftorm,  decimated  the  inhabitants,  and 
demolifhed  the  town.  Is  it  not  fublime  wifdom, 
to  rufh  headlong  into  all  the  diftra&ions  and  di- 

vifions, 


Iphitus*  315 

vifions,  all  the  aflaflinations  and  maflacres,  all 
the  feditions,  rebellions,  and  eternal  revolutions, 
which  are  the  certain  confequence  of  the  want  of 
orders  and  balances,  merely  for  the  fake  of  the 
popular  caprice  of  having  every  fifty  families  go- 
verned by  all  authority  in  one  centre?  Even 
this  would  not  fatisfy;  the  fifty  families  would 
foon  diflblve  their  union,  and  nothing  would  ever 
content  them  fhort  of  the  complete  individual  in- 
dependence of  the  Mohawks ;  for  it  may  be  de- 
pended on,  that  individual  independence  is  what 
every  unthinking  human  heart  aims  at,  nearly  or 
remotely. 


LETTER    XLVIL 


IPHITUS* 

Dear  Sir, 

ELEIA  had  been  the  fcene  of  athletic  games, 
celebrated  with  great  pomp  by  aflemblies  of 
chiefs  from  various  parts  of  Greece.  Iphitus,  a 
grandfon  of  Oxylus,  fucceeded  to  the  throne  of 
Elis.  Active  and  enterprifmg,  but  not  by  incli- 
nation a  foldier,  he  was  anxious  for  a  remedy  for 
the  diforderly  fituation  of  his  country.  Among 
all  the  violence,  feuds,  and  wars,  fuperftition 
maintained  its  empire,  and  the  oracle  of  Delphi 
was  held  in  veneration. 

Iphitus  fent  an  embafTy  to  fupplicate  informa- 
tion from  the  deity,  "  How  the  anger  of  the  gods, 

VOL.  I.  Rr  "which 


31 6          Ancient  Dernocratical  Republics. 

"  which  threatened  total  deftru&ion  to  Pelopon- 
"  nefus,  through  the  endlefs  hoftilities  among 
"  its  people,  might  be  averted  ?"  He  received  an 
anfwer,  which  he  had  probably  dictated,  "  That 
"  the  Olympian  feftival  muft  be  reftored  :  for 
"  that  the  neglect  of  that  folernnity  had  brought 
"  on  the  Greeks  the  indignation  of  Jupiter  and 
"Hercules;  to  the  firft  of  whom  it  was  dedi- 
"  cated,  and  by  the  laft  of  whom  it  had  been 
"  inftituted."  Iphitus  proceeded  to  model  his  in- 
ftitution;  and  ordained  that  a  feftival  fhould  be 
held  at  the  temple  of  Jupiter  at  Olympia,  near 
Pifa  in  Eleia,  for  all  the  Greeks  to  partake  in, 
and  that  it  fhould  be  repeated  every  fourth  year ; 
that  there  fhould  be  facrifices  to  Jupiter  and  Her- 
cules, and  games  in  honour  of  them;  that  an  ar- 
miftice  fhould  take  place  throughout  Greece  for 
fome  time  before  the  commencement  of  the  fefti- 
val, and  continue  fome  time  after  its  conclusion. 
A  tradition  was  reported,  that  the  Heraclides  had 
appointed  Oxylus  to  the  throne  of  Elis,  and  the 
guardianfhip  of  the  temple  of  Olympian  Jupiter, 
and  confecrated  all  Eleia  to  the  god.  A  reputa- 
tion of  fan6lity  became  attached  to  the  whole  peo- 
ple of  Eleia,  as  the  hereditary  priefthood  of  Ju- 
piter; and  fecluded  them  from  all  neceffity  of 
engaging  in  politics  or  war.-— But  it  was  not 
poffible,  by  any  inftitutions  of  religion,  to  de- 
ftroy  that  elafticity  given  by  nature  to  the  mind 
of  man,  which  excites  continually  to  a&ion,  often 
palpably  againft  men's  interefts,  which  was  ftrong 
in  the  general  temper  of  the  Greeks,  and  which 
can  never  be  fubdued  or  reftrained  in  any  nation 
but  by  orders  and  balances.  Reftlefs  fpirits  arofe> 
not  to  be  fatisfied.  The  Eleians  often  engaged 
as  auxiliaries  in  the  wars  of  other  ftates,  on  pre- 
tence of  aflerting  the  caufe  of  religion;  but  even 

in 


317 

in  that  caufe  itfelf  they  could  not  agree  among 
themfelves.  While  monarchy  fubiifted  in  the 
pofterity  of  Iphitus,  as  it  did  for  fome  genera- 
tions, Eleia  continued  under  one  government ; 
but  at  length  the  fpirit  of  democracy  prevailed 
there,  as  elfewhere  in  Greece,  and  with  the  fame 
effects  :  every  town  claimed  independency ;  Pifa 
and  Elis  became  feparate  commonwealths.  Olym- 
pia  was  iituated  within  the  territory  of  Pifa,  on 
the  northern  bank  of  the  river  Alpheius,  which 
alone  feparated  it  from  that  city.  Elis  was  thirty 
miles  diftant;  but  the  Eleians  retained  the  guar- 
dianfhip  of  the  temple,  and  fuperintendency  of 
the  feftival.  The  Pifeans  now  difputed  their 
right;  wars  arofe  between  the  two  cities;  each 
endeavoured  to  gain  allies.  At  one  time  Phei- 
don,  tyrant  of  Argos,  claiming  to  be  by  birth  the 
proper  reprefentative  of  Hercules,  took  to  himfelf 
the  guardianfhip  of  the  temple,  and  prefided  at 
the  games ;  at  another  time  the  Pifasans  prevailed, 
and  prefided  at  fome  Olympiads.  At  length  the 
Eleians  deftroyed  Pifa  fo  entirely,  that  not  a  ruin 
was  le/t;  and  ever  after,  excepting  in  the  io4th 
Olympiad,  when  the  Arcadians  violently  inter- 
fered, they  held  the  prefidency  undifturbed. 

If  a  democracy  could  ever,  in  any  cafe,  hold 
together,  it  would  be  natural  to  expert  it  in  this 
institution  of  Iphitus,  which,  founded  wholly  on 
religion,  had  procured  fo  much  profperity  and 
veneration  to  his  people ;  but  it  is  as  rational  to 
exped  that  a  glafs  bubble,  with  a  drop  of  water 
inclofed  in  it,  will  refift  the  heat  of  the  fire :  the 
vapqur  within  will  blaft  it  into  duft  and  atoms, 


LETTER 


3 1 8          Ancient  Democratical  Rep ullics* 


LETTER     XLVIIL 


THEBES. 


Dear  Sir, 

FABLE,  and  hiftory  too,  relate  that  this  city 
was  governed  anciently  by  kings ;  fixteen  of 
whom,  from  Cadmus  the  Phoenician,  who  founded 
it,  to  Xanthus,  are  enumerated.  After  the  death 
of  the  laft,  the  Thebans  changed  their  govern- 
ment to  a  democratical  republic.  Their  orders 
and  balances  are  not  known  ;  but  their  factions 
and  diviiions,  as  well  as  their  dulnefs,  is  remem- 
bered. From  the  analogy  of  all  the  other  Grecian 
flates,  it  is  probable  that  archons  prefided  over 
the  feveral  cities  of  Boeotia,  as  their  feparate  dif- 
tri&s,  and  had  a  king  at  their  head,  like  Ulyfles  in 
Ithaca,  and  Alcinous  in  Phaeacia ;  that  the  king, 
whofe  domain  was  Thebes,  had  fometimes  an  in" 
clination  to  favour  his  capital  more  than  the  fub- 
ordinate  towns;  and  that  the  archons  grew  impa- 
tient of  his  monarchy,  and  afpired  at  indepen- 
dency: the  jealoufy  and  rivalry  of  cities  fa- 
voured the  fadious  views  of  the  archons,  and 
were  probably  fomented  for  that  purpofe. 

Is  it  an  inftance  of  their  want  of  penetration, 
or  was  it  from  neceffity,  that  they  chofe  the  two 
heads  of  oppofite  factions  for  their  higheft  annual 
magiftrates  ?  Ifmenias  was  one ;  an  honed  man, 
a  friend  to  liberty,  and  confequently  an  advo- 
cate for  an  equilibrium  of  powers  in  the  confti- 
tution.  Leontidas,  the  other,  was  ambitious  of 
the  whole  power  to  himfelf,  and  of  governing 

by 


Thebes.  319 

by  a  council  of  his  friends ;  but,  finding  his  rival 
more  popular  than  himfelf,  he  fold  the  citadel  to 
a  Spartan  general,  upon  condition  that  he  and  his 
party  fhould  rule.  When  this  was  effeded,  he 
feized  his  colleague,  and  had  him  tried,  condemn* 
ed  and  executed,  for  caballing  again/I  the  govern- 
ment. The  friends  of  Ifmenias  fled  in  a  panic, 
and  were  banifhed  by  a  public  edid  ;  for  it  feems 
that  a  revolution  without  banifhments  and  confif- 
cations,  at  leaft,  is  a  degree  of  moderation  and 
felf-government  of  which  nations  are  wholly  in- 
capable. The  exiled  citizens,  who  in  this  cafe 
were  the  honeft  men  and  friends  of  liberty,  among 
whom  was  Pelopidas,  returned  from  Athens  in 
difguife,  deftroyed  the  tyrant  and  his  crew,  and, 
with  the  help  of  Epaminondas  and  his  friends,  re- 
gained the  citadel.  Thefe  two  fages  and  heroes 
had  now  enough  to  do :  firft,  to  infpire  a  little 
underftanding  and  unanimity  into  their  fellow- 
citizens;  then  to  difcipline  them  for  war,  and 
conquer  their  enemies;  and,  at  laft,  to  frame  a 
good  conftitution  of  government.  They  accom- 
plifhed  all  but  the  laft,  to  their  immortal  glory : 
but  Pelopidas  was  killed  in  battle,  before  the 
war  was  finifhed;  and  Epaminondas  grew  unpo- 
pular, and  was  rejeded  by  fadion  even  from  the 
command  of  the  army :  a  fufficient  proof  that 
the  ariftocratical  and  democratical  fadions  were 
nearly  equal.  He  was  reinftated,  indeed,  after 
the  blunders  and  defeats  of  his  fucceffor  had 
brought  the  citizens  to  repentance  ;  but  was  flain 
in  battle  at  the  moment  of  vidoiy :  fo  that  the 
Theban  republic  never  had  the  benefit  of  his  ad- 
vice in  the  formation  of  a  new  code  of  laws ;  as  fhe 
had  never  made  any  figure,  excepting  a  momenta- 
ry fame  under  thefe  two  great  men,  and  was  at 
length  totally  deftroyed  by  Alexander. 

The 


320          Ancient  Demcratical  Republics. 

The  ruin  of  Boeotia  was  occasioned  by  the  fi- 
nefle  of  Antalcidas,  in  his  Perlian  treaty.  The 
Thebans,  as  well  as  Argives,  had  withheld  their 
afiiftance  in  the  Perfian  war.  Antalcidas  knew 
that  the  fubordinate  cities  of  Thefpiss,  Platea, 
Aulis,  Anthemon,  Larymna,  Afchra,  Coronea, 
Labadea,  Delium,  Alalkomene,  Leu&ra,  Chse- 
ronea,  allwifhed  for  independence;  they  accord- 
ingly rejected  the  jurifdidion  and  fovereignty  of 
Thebes.  The  Thebans  folicited  Sparta  to  take  a 
part  in  their  domeftic  quarrels;  and,  againft  her 
own  favourite  treaty,  made  by  her  artful  ambafla- 
dor,  ihe  accepted  the  propofal.  The  virtuous 
and  amiable  Spartan  fenate  perceived  that  it  was 
equally  their  intereft  that  Argos  fhould  lofe  her 
jurifdidion  over  her  revolted  towns,  and  that 
Thebes,  the  rival  neighbour  of  Athens,  fhould 
recover  her  authority  in  Boeotia ;  but,  notwith- 
itanding  partial  fuccefles,  fhe  could  not  regain 
her  authority  over  all  the  cities,  until  Epami- 
nondas  arofe,  after  eighty  years  of  civil  wars. 
Had  there  been  a  governor  in  Boeotia,  and  a  fe- 
nate, and  a  houfe  of  reprefentatives,  compofed 
of  an  equitable  proportion  of  deputies  from 
Thebes  and  all  the  leffer  cities — and  each  of  thefe 
branches  pofleffed  of  an  independent  negative  in 
the  legiflature,  while  the  whole  executive  was  in 
the  governors-would  thefe  civil  wars  have  hap^ 
pened?  thefe  endlefs  contentions  between  the 
nobles  and  people,  the  capital  and  fubordinate 
cities  ?  thefe  intrigues  of  one  party  with  Athens, 
and  another  with  Sparta?  The  very  difmclination, 
both  in  Thebes  and  Argos,  to  engage  in  the  Per- 
fian war,  arofe  wholly  from  their  domeftic  diflen- 
lions ;  and  thefe  from  the  want  of  judicious  orr 
ders  and  balances. 

After 


Thebes.  321 

After  the  abolition  of  monarchy  in  Bceotia, 
there  was  an  effort  to  colleft  all  authority  into 
one  centre ;  but  the  nation  found,  that,  although 
laws  might  be  thus  made,  they  could  not  be  fo 
executed.  There  muft,  therefore,  be  an  execu- 
tive magiftrate;  but  not  being  able  to  agree,  in 
order  to  pleafe  both  fides,  the  leader  of  each  fac- 
tion muft  be  choien.  They  could  not  agree,  as 
might  have  been  forefeen,  and  fplit  the  nation  at 
once  into  two  hoftile  armies;  one  of  which  fought 
the  alliance  of  Sparta,  and  the  other  that  of  A- 
thens.  Thus  it  ever  was,  and  ever  will  be,  in  fi- 
milar  cafes.  It  is  much  to  be  regretted,  that  Epa- 
minondas  did  not  live  to  difplay  his  talents  as  a 
legiflator;  the  world  might  poffibly  have  been 
blefled  with  fomething  like  an  Englifh  conftitution, 
two  or  three  thoufand  years  fooner  than  it  was* 


LETTER 


322          Ancient  Arijtocratical  Republics, 


LETTER    XLIX. 


ANCIENT  ARISTOCRATICAL  REPUBLICS, 


CROTONA. 


PYTHAGORAS. 

My  dear  Sir, 

PYTHAGORAS,  as  well  as  Socrates,  Plata, 
and  Xenophon,  were  perfuaded  that  the  hap- 
pinefs  of  nations  depended  chiefly  on  the  form  of 
their  government :  they  were  fully  fenfible  of  the 
real  mifery,  as  well  as  dangerous  tendency,  both 
of  democratical  licentioufnefs  and  monarchical 
tyranny  ;  they  preferred  a  well-tempered  arifto- 
cracy  to  all  other  governments.  Pythagoras  and 
Socrates,  having  no  idea  of  three  independent 
branches  in  the  legiflature,  both  thought,  that 
the  laws  could  neither  prevent  the  arbitrary  op- 
preffions  of  magiftrates,  nor  turbulent  infolence 
of  the  people,  until  mankind  were  habituated  by 
education  and  difcipline  to  regard  the  great  du- 
ties of  life,  and  to  conlider  a  reverence  of  them- 
felves,  and  the  efteem  of  their  fellow-citizens,  as 
the  principal  fource  of  their  enjoyment.  In  fmall 
communities,  efpecially  where  the  Haves  were 
many,  and  the  citizens  few,  this  might  be  plau- 
lible ;  but  the  education  of  a  great  nation  can  ne- 
ver accomplifh  fo  great  an  end.  Millions  muft  be 

brought 


Pythagoras.  323 

brought  tip,  whom  no  principles,  no  fentiments 
derived  from  education,  can  reftrain  from  tram- 
pling on  the  laws  :  orders  of  men,  watching  and 
balancing  each  other,  are  the  only  fecurity ; 
power  muft  be  oppofed  to  power,  and  intereft  to 
intereft.  Pythagoras  found  this  by  experience  at 
Crotona,  where  the  inferior  ranks,  elated  with 
the  deftruc~Uon  of  Sybaris,  and  inftigated  by  an 
artful  ambitious  leader,  Cylon,  clamoured  for  an 
equal  partition  of  the  conquered  territory :  this 
was  denied  them,  as  inconfiftent  with  an  arifto- 
cratical  government;  a  confpiracy  enfued  againft 
the  magiit rates,  who  were  furprifed  in  the  fenate- 
houfe,  many  put  to  death,  and  the  reft  driven 
from  their  country.  Pythagoras  was  one  of  the 
bammed,  and  died  foon  afterwards,  in  extreme 
old  age,  at  Metapontum.  The  Crotonians  had 
ibon  caufe  to  repent  their  infurreclion ;  for  they 
were  defeated,  with  all  their  forces,  by  the  Lo- 
crians  and  Rhegians,  with  fmaller  numbers. 

The  other  Greek  cities  of  Italy,  which  had  imi- 
tated the  example  of  Crotona,  in  depoling  their 
magiftrates,  were  harrafled  with  wars  againft  each 
other,  and  againft  their  neighbours.  In  confe- 
quence  of  thefe  diftrefles,  the  difciples  of  Pytha- 
goras, again  recovered  their  reputation  and  influ- 
ence ;  and  about  iixty  years  afterwards,  Zaleucus 
and  Charondas,  the  one  in  Locris,  and  the  other 
in  Thurium,  revived  the  Pythagorean  inftitutions. 
In  forty  year^  more,  a  new  revolution  drove  the 
Pythagoreans  entirely  from  Italy,  and  completed 
the  mifery  of  that  beautiful  country.  Thus  ex- 
perience has  ever  fhewn,  that  education  as  well 
as  religion,  ariftocracy  as  well  as  democracy  and 
monarchy,  are,  fingly,  totally  inadequate  to  the 
bufinefs  of  reftraining  the  paflions  of  men,  of 
preferving  a  fteady  government,  and  protecting 

VOL.  I.  S  s  the 


Ancient  Ariftocratical  Republics. 

the  lives,  liberties,  and  properties  of  the  people. 
Nothing  has  ever  effeded  it  but  three  different 
orders  of  men,  bound  by  their  interefts  to  watch 
over  each  other,  and  ftand  the  guardians  of  the 
laws.  Religion,  fuperftition,  oaths,  education, 
laws,  all  give  way  before  paflions,  intereft,  and 
power,  which  can  be  re  lifted  only  by  paflions, 
intereft,  and  power. 

It  is  no  wonder  that  Mr.  Turgot  fhould  have 
entertained  very  crude  conceptions  of  republican 
legiflation;  it  is  a  fcience  the  leaft  und^rftood  of 
any  in  the  whole  circle :  all  other  orders  of  men 
of  letters  in  Europe,  as  well  as  phyficians,  for  a 
long  time,  have  thought  it  "  litterse  nihil  fanan- 
"  tes."  It  is  a  kind  of  erudition  which  neither 
procures  places,  penfions,  embafiies,  chairs  in 
academies,  nor  fame  nor  pra&ice  in  the  pulpit, 
at  the  bar,  nor  in  medicine.  A  minifter  of  ftate, 
of  great  abilities  and  merit,  as  well  as  reputation, 
advanced  to  the  head  of  the  affairs  of  a  refpeft- 
able  monarchy,  by  one  of  the  greateft  princes  that 
has  ever  lived,  I  mean  the  Baron  de  Hertfberg, 
has  within  a  few  years  fet  an  example,  in  a  royal 
academy  of  fciences,  of  inquiry  into  this  fubjeft* 
In  a  learned  and  ingenious  difcourfe,  delivered  by 
himfelf,  he  has  attempted  to  mow  the  advantages 
of  fimple  monarchy  over  all  kinds  of  republican 
governments,  even  that  beft  fpecies  of  them,  li- 
mited monarchies  :  but  did  this  worthy  minifter 
expe6l  that  auy  of  his  brother  academicians  would 
conteft  with  him  the  merits  of  fuch  governments? 
Men  of  letters  are  not  fond  of  martyrdom  in  this 
age,  nor  of  ruining  their  reputations.  It  is  not, 
however,  my  defign  to  difcufs  any  queftions  at  pre- 
fent  concerning  abfolute  monarchies,  though  the 
principles  I  contend  for  might  be  traced  through 
the  hiftory  of  every  monarchy  and  empire  in  Eu- 
rope. 


Pythagoras.  325 

rope.  Even  in  thefe  there  are  orders,  checks,  and 
balances  contrived,  at  leaft  againft  abufes  in  ad- 
miniftration,  and  for  the  prefervation  of  the  laws. 
The  fcience  of  government  has  received  very  lit- 
tle improvement  lince  the  Greeks  and  Romans. 
The  neceffity  of  a  ftrong  and  independent  execu- 
tive in  a  lingle  perfon,  and  of  three  branches  in 
the  legifiature  inftead  of  two,  and  of  an  equality 
among  the  three,  are  improvements  made  by  the 
Englifh,  which  were  unknown,  at  leaft  never  re- 
duced to  practice,  by  the  ancients.  Machiavel" 
was  the  firft  who  revived  the  ancient  politics : 
the  beft  part  of  his  writings  he  tran dated  almoft 
literally  from  Plato  and  Ariftotle,  without  ac- 
knowledging the  obligation ;  and  the  worft  of  the 
fentiments,  even  in  his  Prince,  he  tranflated  from 
Ariftotle,  without  throwing  upon  him  the  re- 
proach. Montefquieu  borrowed  the  beft  part  of 
his  book  from  Machiavel,  without  acknowledg- 
ing the  quotation.  Milton,  Harrington,  Sid- 
ney, were  intimately  acquainted  with  the  an- 
cients, and  with  Machiavel.  They  were  followed 
by  Locke,  Hoadley,  &c.  The  reputation  which 
is  to  be  acquired  by  this  kind  of  learning  may 
be  judged  of  by  the  language  of  Mr.  Hume : 
"  Compofitions  the  moft  dcfpicable,  both  for 
"  ftyle  and  matter,  fuch  as  Rapin,  Thoyras, 
"  Locke,  Sidney,  Hoadley,  &c.  have  been  ex- 
"  tolled,  and  propagated,  and  read ;  as  if  they 
"  had  equalled  the  moft  celebrated  remains  of 
"  antiquity.  Hume's  Hiftory  of  England,  vol. 
viii.  p.  323. — Such  is  the  ftyle  in  which  this 
great  writer  fpeaks  of  writings  which  he  moft 
probably  never  read.  But  although  the  time  is 
long  iince  paffed  when  fuch  writings  were  extolled, 
propagated,  or  read,  the  contempt  of  them  is  as 
iaihionable,  as  likely  to  procure  places  and  pen- 

fions, 


326         Ancient  ^riftocraiical  Republics. 

fions,  and  to  make  a  book  fell  now,  as  it  was 
when  Mr.  Hume  wrote. 

The  fads  in  thefe  letters  relative  to  Venice, 
are  taken  from  the  Abby  Laugier  and  Moor's 
Travels ;  thofe  relative  to  the  ancient  republics, 
excepting  the  authorities  already  quoted,  are 
taken  from  Robertfon,  Montague,  Potter,  the 
Univerfal  Hiftory,  and  efpecially  from  Mitford, 
Gillies,  and  Fergufon,  three  very  valuable  and 
elegant  productions,  which  deferve  to  be  carefully 
ftudied  by  all  America.  I  have  made  free  ufe  of 
their  expreflions  as  well  as  reflections,  without 
noting  them;  if  you  would  fee  how  much  has 
been  borrowed,  you  muft  read. 

Mr.  Turgot  was  as  little  converfant  in  this 
kind  of  erudition  as  Mr.  Hume.  The  former, 
however,  was  a  lover  of  liberty;  but  it  was  of 
that  kind  of  liberty  which  he  meditated  to  intro- 
duce into  France,  and  could  reconcile  with  a 
fimple  monarchy  :  he  was  too  good  a  fubject  to 
think  of  introducing  a  free  constitution  of  go- 
vernment into  his  own  country.  For  the  liberty 
of  commerce,  the  liberty  of  religious  fentiments, 
and  the  perfonal  liberty  of  the  fubject,  fuch  as 
are  eftablifhed  by  the  laws,  in  a  monarchy,  he 
was  an  enthufiaft;  and  enthufiafm  for  liberty, 
the  common  caufe  of  all  mankind,  is  an  amiable 
fervor,  which  is  pardonable  even  when  it  is  not 
according  to  knowledge  :  but  he  was  neither  an 
enthufiaft  for  a  free  conftitution  of  government, 
nor  did  he  know  in  what  it  confifted. 


LETTER 


Charondas.  327 

LETTER    L. 
ANCIENT  DEMOCRATICAL  REPUBLICS, 

!.  ,  /  •     '  -  v    \  €       -  '•':,.     ;  -,  -f  '     ^.    •     '•  .  :  •  •  \  "     '  •     f-  .  jii 

SYBARIS. 
CHARONDAS. 

My  dear  Sir, 

THE  city  of  Sybaris  was  a  Grecian  colony  in 
Italy,  planted  by  Achaians;  and,  according 
to  Diodoms  Siculus,*  its  beautiful  fituation  be- 
tween two  rivers,  the  Crathis  and  the  Sybaris,  the 
extent  and  fertility  of  its  territory,  and  the  free- 
dom of  its  laws,  had,  in  a  fhort  fpace  of  time, 
drawn  together  a  prodigious  number  of  inhabi- 
tants, and  greatly  enriched  them. 

But  the  common  fate  of  all  nations  and  cities 
attended  them.  They  had  three  parties;  a  chief, 
a  better  fort,  and  a  people.  The  mod  powerful 
citizens  were  caballing  as  ufual  againft  the  chief, 
whofe  name  was  Telys,  and,  whatever  his  cha- 
racter for  virtue  was,  appears  to  have  had  more 
cunning  than  Grecian  chiefs  commonly  had,  at 
leaf!  he  difcerned  better  where  the  balance  lay; 
for  he  courted  the  people,  by  flattering  their  fol- 
lies. He  excited  a  popular  cry  againft  the  arifto- 
cratical  party,  drove  them  from  the  city,  confif- 
cated  their  fortunes  and  diftributed  them  among 
the  reft  of  the  citizens.  The  exiles  fled  to  Cro- 
tona.  Telys  fent  ambafladors  to  demand  them, 
on  pain  of  war.  Pythagoras  thought  the  caufe  of 

his 

•  Lib.  xii.  p.  6. 


328         Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

his  ariftocratical  friends  juft,  and  perfuaded  his  fel- 
low-citizens to  refufe  to  deliver  them  up.  The 
Sybarites  marched  an  army ;  but  were  met  by 
another  from  Crotona,  with  Milo,  the  ftrong 
man,  at  their  head,  whofe  reputation  prevailed ; 
the  Sybarites  were  all  maffacred,  and  their  city 
pillaged,  and  left  a  defart.  Firft  happy  effedl  of 
a  government  without  acknowledged  orders  and 
legal  balances  !— -Fifty-eight  years  afterwards, 
fome  ThefTalians  eftablifhed  themfelves  at  Syba- 
ris :  they  had  not  been  there  five  years,  when  the 
Crotonians  came  and  drove  them  out. — Under 
Callimachus,  archon  of  Athens,  it  was  repeo- 
pled  the  third  time,  and  had  the  name  of  Thu- 
rium.  A  populous  colony  was  fent  there,  un- 
der Lampon  and  Xenocrates,  who  built  a  beau- 
tiful city  for  a  capital,  and  twenty-five  fubor- 
dinate  cities  :  but  the  inhabitants  could  not 
long  live  in  good  intelligence  among  themfelves ; 
they  fell  into  diflenfions,  grew  extravagant,  luxu- 
rious, and  effeminate  to  a  proverb.  The  quar- 
rel began  in  this  manner: — The  old  inhabitants 
of  Sybaris  ere&ed  themfelves  into  a  kind  of  no- 
bility, and  arrogated  to  themfelves  all  the  public 
employments  of  any  diftin&ion,  vouchfafing  to 
the  new-comers  only  thofe  of  leaft  importance ; 
they  infifted,  moreover,  that  their  wives  ftiould 
facrifice  the  firft  to  the  gods,  and  that  the  other 
ladies  ftiould  not  commence  their  devotions  till 
the  firft  had  concluded:  not  content  with  diftinc- 
tions  fo  affuming,  they  went  farther,  and  took 
to  themfelves,  in  the  diftribution  of  the  lands,  all 
thofe  which  were  neareft  the  city,  and  left  only 
the  more  diftant  to  thofe  whom  they  called  fo- 
reigners. The  latter  being  more  numerous  and 
more  brave,  carried  their  refentments  fo  far,  as 
to  put  all  the  old  families  to  death,  and  remained 


Charondas.  329 

fole  pofleffors  of  all  the  territory  within  the  walls. 
Not  having  people  enough  left,  they  invited  others 
from  various  parts  of  Greece,  divided  houfes  and 
lands  among  them,  entered  into  alliance  with  Cro- 
tona,  and  became  opulent.  They  divided  the 
people  into  ten  tribes,  and  eftablifhed  among  them 
a  democratical  government,  and  chofe  for  their 
legiilator  Charondas,  who,  having  examined  to 
the  foundation  the  laws  of  all  countries,  chofe  out 
of  them,  for  his  country,  the  wifeft  and  moft  con- 
venient. Some  others  he  added,  drawn  from  his 
own  meditations.  His  laws  are  loft,  and  therefore 
his  orders  and  balances  are  not  known.  It  is  ne- 
verthelefs  certain,  that  orders  and  balances  exift- 
ed  in  his  mftitution,  from  certain  regulations  pre- 
ferved  by  Diodorus. 

1 .  He  excluded  from  all  his  public  councils  all 
men  who,  having  children,  fhould  marry  a  fecond 
time;  and  thus  mortify  their  children   with  the 
authority  of  a  ftep-mother. 

2.  As  another  check  to  his  democracy,  he  or- 
dained that  all  who  fhould  be  convicted  of  ca- 
lumny, fhould  be  conducted  through  the  ftreets 
crowned  with  tamarin ;  a  punifhment  fo  infamous, 
that  feveral  put  an  end  to  their  own  lives  rather 
than  fubmit  to  it. 

3.  He  prohibited  all  fociety  with  wicked  men  : 
for,  fays  he,  the  difpolition  to  evil  is  very  ftrong ; 
and   many  of  thofe  who  at  firft  love  virtue,  are 
often  drawn  in,  by  the  charms  of  fecret  fedu&ions, 
to  the  greateft  vices. 

4*  He  ordained,  that  all  the  fons  of  every  fa- 
mily mould  learn  to  write  and  read  under  mafters 
in  the  pay  of  the  public.  This  law  alone  has 
merit  enough  to  confecrate  to  immortality  the 
memory  of  this  legiflator,  and  deferves  to  be  imi- 
tated by  every  free  people  at  leaft. 

5.  That 


330         Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

.5.  That  the  property  of  orphans  fhould  be  ad- 
miniftered  by  the  relations  by  the  father;  but 
their  perfons  and  education  entrufted  to  thofe  by 
the  mother. 

6.  All  thofe  who  fhould  refufe  to  take  arms 
for  their  country,  or  quit  their  ranks  in  the  army, 
inftead  of  being  punifhed  by  death,  fhould  be  ex- 
pofed  three  days  in  a  public  fquare  of  the  city  in 
women's  clothes. 

7.  To  preferve  his  democratical  arrangement, 
he  thought  it  neceflary  to  prohibit  all  propofals 
of  changes  in  his  laws.     His  principle  was,  that 
it  was  as  advantageous  to  fubmit  to  the  laws,  as  it 
is  dangerous  to  fubjecl  the  laws  to  individuals ; 
and  therefore  in  trials  he  reprehended  and  filenced 
all  criminals,  who  fubftituted  turns  of  eloquence 
and  arbitrary  interpretations  in  place  of  the  let- 
ter of  the  laws,  and  charged  them  with  violating 
their  authority  and  majefty.  The  queftion  is,  faid 
Charondas,  "  Whether  you  fhall  fave  the  law  or 
"  the  criminal." 

8.  Struck  with  thediforders  and  feditions  which 
he  had  feen  in  many  democratical  cities,  he  ordain- 
ed that  no  citizen  fhould  prefent  himfelf  in  the 
public  afTembly,  to  propofe  any  reformation  or  al- 
teration in  the  law,  without  an  halter  about  his 
neck,  which  he  fhould  wear  till  the  people  had 
deliberated  and  determined :  if  the  people  decreed 
the  propofed  alteration  hurtful  or  unneceflary,  the 
reformer  fhould  be  ftrangled  on  the  fpot.     This 
regulation  filenced  all  new  legiflators  fo  entirely, 
that  only  three  examples  occurred  of  any  changes. 

All  his  precautions  were  inefficient: — Return- 
ing from  the  country  with  his  fword,  which  he 
had  taken  to  defend  himfelf  againft  highwaymen, 
he  found  the  afTembly  in  divifion  and  confufion. 
He  haftened  to  compofe  the  tumult.  One  of  his 

enemies 


Charondas.  331 

fcneftiies  reproached  him  with  violating  his  own 
law,  by  coming  into  the  aflembly  with  an  arm. 
Charondas,  who  had  forgotten  the  fword,  cried,  I 
mean  to  obferve  and  enforce  the  law,  and  plung- 
ed it  into  his  own  heart,  wearied,  moft  probably, 
into  a  contempt  of  life  by  the  diforders  incident 
to  unbalanced  parties. 

When  every  legiilator  who  has  attempted  a  de- 
mocratical  eftablilhment,  has  cpnfefled  its  inherent 
tendency  to  immediate  diffolution,  by  the  ftrongeft 
rigours  againft  propofals  of  innovation,  and  num- 
berlefs  other  provifions  to  coritroul  it,  which  have 
all  been  found  ineffectual,  is  it  worth  while  ftill 
to  cheriih  the  fond  idea,  when  three  branches  are 
found,  by  experience,  fo  effe&ually  to  check  each 
otherj  when  in  two  independent  affemblies  im- 
provements and  reformations  may  be  fo  eaiily  and 
fafely  propofed  and  adopted,  and  fuch  as  are  not 
beneficial  reje&ed? 


LETTER    tt 


ZALEUCUS» 

My  dear  Sir, 

ZALEUCUS  was  of  Locris  in  Italy,  not  far 
diftant  from  Sybaris.     He  was  a  difciple  of 
Pythagoras,  of  noble  birth,  and  admirable  morals. 
Having  acquired  the  efteem  and  confidence  of  his 
fellow-citizens,  they  chofe  him  for  their  legiflator. 
VOL.  I.  T  t  Unfortunately 


332         Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

Unfortunately  little  remains  of  his  laws  but  their 
preamble  :  but  this  is  in  a  ftyle  fo  fuperior  to  all 
the  other  legiflators,  as  to  excite  regret  for  the 
lofs  of  his  code.  In  this  preamble  he  declares, 
that  all  thofe  who  fhall  inhabit  the  city,  ought, 
above  all  things,  to  be  perfuaded  that  there  is  a 
God;  and  if  they  elevate  their  eyes  and  thoughts 
towards  the  heavens,  they  will  be  convinced,  that 
the  difpofnion  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  and  the  or- 
der which  reigns  in  all  nature,  are  not  the  work 
of  men,  nor  of  chance;  that  therefore  they  ought 
to  adore  the  gods,  as  the  authors  of  all  which  life 
prefents  us  of  good  and  beautiful ;  that  they 
Ihould  hold  their  fouls  pure  from  every  vice,  be- 
caufe  the  gods  accept  neither  the  prayers,  offer- 
ings, or  facrifices  of  the  wicked,  and  are  pleafed 
only  with  the  juft  and  beneficent  actions  of  virtu- 
ous men.  Having  thus,  in  the  beginning  of  his 
laws,  fixed  the  attention  of  his  fellow- citizens  up- 
on piety  and  wifdom,  he  ordains,  above  all  things, 
that  there  mould  never  be  among  them  any  irre- 
concilable enmity  ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  that 
thofe  animofities  which  might  arife  among  them, 
fhould  be  only  a  paflage  to  a  fure  and  fmcere  re- 
conciliation ;  and  that  he  who  would  not  fubmit 
himfelf  to  thefe  fentiments,  mould  be  regarded  as 
a  favage  in  a  civilized  community.  The  chiefs  of 
his  republics  ought  not  to  govern  with  arrogance 
nor  pride ;  nor  mould  the  magiftrates  be  guided 
in  their  judgments  by  hatred  nor  by  friendfhip. 

This  preamble,  inftead  of  addreffing  itfelf  to 
the  ignorance,  prejudices,  and  fuperftitious  fears 
of  favages,  for  the  purpofe  of  binding  them  to  an 
abfurd  Tyftem  of  hunger  and  glory  for  a  family 
purpofe,  like  the  laws  of  Lycurgus,  places  re- 
ligion, morals,  and  government,  upon  a  bafis  of 
which  is  rational,  intelligible,  and 

eternal, 


philofoph; 


Zaleucus.  333 

eternal,  fot  the  real  happinefs  of  man  in  fociety, 
and  throughout  his  duration. 

The  principle  adopted  by  this  legiflator,  as  the 
motive  to  a6Uon  next  to  the  fenfe  of  duty  and  fo- 
cial  obligation,  was  the  fenfe  of  honour,  like  that 
of  Lycurgus.  As  Zaleucus  was  a  difciple  of  Py- 
thagoras, whofe  favourite  plan  of  government  was 
a  well-tempered  ariftocracy,  we  may  conje6lure 
that  fuch  was  the  form  recommended  to  the  Lo- 
crians :  but  all  are  loft,  and  certainly  no  argument 
can  be  drawn  from  them  in  favour  of  one  popular 
aflembly.  If,  in  viiiting  the  Sybarites  and  Locri- 
ans,  we  have  found  nothing  in  favour  of  Mr.  Tur- 
got's  fyftem,  nor  any  thing  very  material  againft  it, 
we  have  found  a  greater  advance  towards  civili- 
zation than  in  all  the  laws  of  Lycurgus  and  Solon, 
excepting  only  the  trial  by  jury  inftituted  by  the 
latter;  I  mean  in  the  preamble  of  Zaleucus,  and 
in  the  general  education  to  letters  in  fchools,  at 
the  public  expence,  by  Charondas. 


LETTER 


334          Ancient  Democratical 


LETTER    LII. 


ROME. 


|>LEBEIAgS  SCRAMBLING  AFTER  PATRICIANS?, 
OR  DEMOCRACY  HUNTING  DOWN  ARISTO- 
CRACY; OR  TRIBUNES  IN  CHASE  OF  A  SE- 
NATE. 

1  -'{tfQVgl     ''.:':    '. 
•  /-{'fj.-;  ,;   ;  'j 

My  dear  Sir, 

WE  have  before  feen,in  the  hiftory  of  Rome, 
with  what  eagernefs  the  ariftocracy  pur- 
fued  and  demolilhed  the  monarchy :  the  kings 
are  commonly  reproached  with  tyranny,  and  the 
nobles  are  applauded  for  reiiftance  to  it;  but  it 
is  clear  that  the  nobles  were  as  tyrannical,  and 
that  their  eternal  plots  and  confpiracies  againft 
the  kings,  their  power,  their  crowns,  and  their 
lives,  were  the  caufe  and  the  provocation  to  that 
tyranny.  It  is  impoffible  to  fay  which  were 
worft,  the  nobles  or  kings ;  both  certainly  were 
bad  enough  in  general,  and  both  frequently  vio- 
lated the  laws,  as  it  will  ever  happen  when  there 
are  but  two  branches.  The  people  as  yet  had  no 
adequate  power  to  aid  or  controul  either.  By  the 
inftitution  of  Romulus,  indeed,  the  Roman  peo- 
ple, even  the  loweft  clafs  of  the  citizens,  inftead 
of  being  prohibited  to  engage  in  all  kinds  of  la- 
bour, after  the  example  of  the  Spartans,  were  di- 
re6led  to  apply  themfeves  to  pafturage,  agricul- 
ture, and  mechanic  arts.  This  had  its  natural  ef- 
fect; and  immediately  after  the  revolution,  by 

which 


Rome.  335 

which  the  monarchy  was  abolifhed,  and  ariftocracy 
fet  up,  though  we  find  the  patricians  at  their  ufual 
game  of  encroaching  on  the  people,  yet  we  find 
there  was  a  people,  a  numerous,  hardy,  courage- 
ous people,  who  were  not  difpofed   to  fubmit : 
they  foon  began  a  refiftance,  and  to  demand  more 
power  to  refift ;  and  having  obtained  one  concef- 
fion,  they  required  another,  until  they  obtained  an 
equality  with  the  patricians.     So  far  they  were  in 
the  right ;  and  if  the  two  powers  could  have  re- 
mained equal,  juftice,  liberty,  and  happinefs,  the 
effe6l  of  equal  laws,  might  have  been  enjoyed : 
but  human  nature  can  never  reft — once  in  mo- 
tion, it  rolls,  like  the  ftone  of  Sifyphus,  every  in- 
ftant  when  the  refifting  force  is  fufpended.     Dio- 
dorus  Seculus  is  very  right,  lib.  xix.  when  he  fays, 
<c  It  is  of  the  nature  of  man  to  afpire  continually 
"  at  fomething  greater  than  his  prefent  condition, 
fe  and  to  wifh  that  his  power  might  increafe  in- 
"  ftead  of  decreafing  or  refting  as  it  is."    Dr.  Fer- 
gufon,  who  follows  very  accurately  Dionyiius  of 
Halicarnaffus,  Livy,  and  Polybius,  will  furnifh  us 
with  a  good  account  of  the  fteps  by  which  the 
Roman  people  proceeded  to  augment  their  own 
power,  and  diminim  that  of  the  ienate,  until  they 
pbtained  the  whole.     I  mail  give  an  abridgment 
of  the  ftory  very  nearly  in  Fergufon's  words. — In 
their  career,  however,  the  people  loft  their  morals 
and  their  wifdom,  as  they  ever  will  in  fuch  a  courfe, 
and  were  ready  to  confer  the  fovereignty  on  the 
line  of  Csefars,  even  before  they  had  completely  ob- 
tained it.     Thofe  irregularities,  and  that  final  ca- 
taftrophe,  were  all  occalionedby  the  imperfedions 
in  their  balance.  If  the  confuls  had  been  pofTefled 
of  a  negative  in  the  legislature,  and  of  all  the  exe- 
cutive authority,  and  the  fenate  and  people  had 
been  made  equal  and  independent  in  thefirft  efta- 

bliihment 


336  Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

bliihment  of  the  commonwealth,  it  is  impoffible 
for  any  man  to  prove  that  the  republic  would  not 
have  remained  in  vigour  and  in  glory  at  this 
hour. 

The  government  of  Rome,  in  the  244th  year 
from  the  building  of  the  city  after  the  expulfion 
of  Tarquin,  was  become  wholly  ariftocratical : 
the  nobles,  excluiively,  had  the  legiflative,  execu- 
tive, and  judicial  power,  without  any  third  party 
to  hold  the  balance  between  them  and  the  people ; 
for  the  confuls,  although  they  were  executive  ma- 
giftrates,  united  in  their  perfons  the  dignities  of 
the  ftate :  thofe  of  judges,  magiftrates,  and  mili- 
tary leaders,  were  underftood  to  come  in  the  place 
of  kings,  and  performed  all  the  functions  of  roy- 
alty ;  yet  they  were  only  parts  and  minifters  of 
the  fenate.  While  the  exiled  king  was  endeavour- 
ing, by  continual  invafions,  to  recover  his  power, 
difputes  arofe  between  the  parties  who  had  united 
to  expel  him.  Creditors,  fupported  by  the  arifto- 
cracy,  of  which  the  nobles  were  now  in  full  pof- 
feflion,  became  fevere  in  the  exa&ion  of  debts,  or 
the  patrons  laid  claim  to  more  than  the  clients 
were  willing,  to  pay.  The  ftate  was  diftraded  at 
once  by  its  enemies  from  abroad,  and  by  the  dif- 
fenfion  of  parties  at  home.  The  authority  of  the 
new  government  not  being  fufficient  to  contend 
with  thefe  difficulties,  the  fenate  refolved  to  place 
themfelves  and  the  commonwealth  for  a  limited 
time  under  the  power  of  a  lingle  perfon,  under 
the  title  of  dictator. 

The  inferior  clafs  of  the  people,  almoft  ex- 
cluded from  any  fhare  in  the  new  govern- 
ment, foon  found,  that  under  its  influence 
they  had  more  oppreffion  to  fear  from  their  pa- 
trons than  they  had  ever  experienced  from  the 
prince  they  had  baniftied.  So  long  as  the  king 

and 


Rome.  337 

and  the  fenate  fhared  in  the  powers  of  the  ftate, 
the  one  took  part  with  the  people,  when  the  other 
attempted  to  opprefs  them ;  and  it  was  the  or- 
dinary intereft  and  policy  of  the  prince  to  weaken 
the  nobles,  by  fupporting  the  plebeians  againft 
them.  This  effect  of  the  monarchy  frill,  in  fome 
meafure,  remained,  fo  long  as  the  exiled  king  was 
alive,  maintained  his  pretenfions^  and  made  the 
united  fervices  of  the  people  necefTary  to  the 
fenate;  but,  upon  the  death  of  the  king,  the 
nobles  availed  themfelves  of  their  power,  and  en- 
forced their  claims  on  the  people  with  extreme 
feverity.  In  the  capacity  of  creditors,  they  im- 
prifoned,  ftripped,  and  enflaved  thofe  who  were 
indebted  to  them,  and  held  the  liberties  and  lives 
of  their  fellow-citizens  at  their  mercy.  The  whole 
body  of  plebeians  was  alarmed ;  they  faw  more 
formidable  enemies  in  the  perfons  of  their  own 
nobility,  than  in  the  armies  of  any  nation  whatever- 
Many  who  had  already  mffered  under  the  rod  of 
their  creditors,  when  called  upon  to  enlift,  fhewed 
their  limbs  galled  with  fetters,  or  torn  with  ftripes 
which  they  had  received  by  command  of  their 
mercilefs  patrons.  Thefe  diftradions  obliged  the 
fenate  to  have  recourfe  to  another  didator ;  and 
Valerius,  who  was  appointed  for  his  popularity, 
repelled  the  enemy.  The  fenate,  upon  his  return, 
not  fulfilling  his  promifes  to  the  people,  they  re- 
tired to  the  Sacred  Mountain.  The  fenate  was 
obliged  to  negociate,  to  mitigate  the  feverities 
againft  infolvent  debtors,  and  content  to  the  ap- 
pointment of  tribunes :  this  was  in  the  year  260, 
fixteen  years  after  the  revolution.  Had  the  ple- 
beians difcontinued  their  collective  affemblies  for 
every  purpofe  but  elections,  and  increafed  their 
tribunes  to  four  or  five  hundred  reprefentatives, 
even  this  would  not  have  been  a  radical  cure, 

without 


338  Ancient  Democratical  Republics.     • 

without  feparating  the  confuls  from  the  fenate, 
and  giving  them,  or  one  of  them,  the  executive 
power,  and  a  negative  both  upon  the  fenate  and 
popular  aflembly  in  the  legiilature :  but  there  was 
too  much  prejudice,  and  too  little  knowledge,  for 
fo  great  an  improvement.  The  people  content- 
ed themfelves  with  the  appointment  of  a  leader* 
under  the  name  of  Tribune,  who,  without  power 
to  protect  them  effectually,  had  enough  to  head 
every  popular  tumult,  and  blow  up  every  fpark 
to  a  flame.  An  affembly  of  reprefentatives  would 
have  had  an  equal  right  with  the  fenate  to 
propofe  laws,  to  deliberate,  debate,  alter,  amend^ 
improve :  but  the  tribunes  were  authorifed  only 
to  forbid  any  meafure  they  thought  injurious; 
but  not  to  propofe  any  law,  or  move  any  refolu- 
tion.  Not  permitted  to  mix  with  the  fenators,  they 
had  places  at  the  door  of  the  fenate  houfe,  as  their 
office  was  felt  to  be  a  dangerous  one.  Their  per- 
ions  were  made  facred;  and  every  one  was  de- 
voted to  the  infernal  gods  who  fhould  even  ftrike 
them.  An  oath  was  to  be  taken  to  obferve  this 
law;  and  the  idea  of  the  fanctity  of  a  tribune 
took  fuch  deep  root,  that  the  emperors  after- 
wards were  protected  from  aflaffins  by  this  facred 
title  of  Tribune.  The  college  of  tribunes  at  firft 
was  not  limited  to  any  number;  but  in  procefs  of 
time  they  increafed  from  three  to  ten.  Patricians 
could  not  by  law  be  elected ;  yet  the  people,  to 
fhew  that  they  never  will  be  fteady  to  any  law, 
even  to  thofe  moft  directly  contrived  for  their 
benefit,  fometimes  departed  from  this.  The  tri- 
bunes were  at  firft  elected  in  the  curias,  where 
the  vote  of  the  poorefl  citizen  was  equal  to  that 
of  the  moft  wealthy.  But  even  here  the  patri- 
cians, betides  their  great  influence,  had  even  a 
negative  on  all  proceedings  by  holding  the  au- 

fpices : 


Rome.  339 

fpices  :  for  this  reafon  it  was  thought  neceffaiy  ta 
alter  the  form  of  the  aflembly,  in  which  the  tri- 
bunes were  eleded,  to  that  of  the  tribes;  and  by 
this  means  to  enable  the   people   to  make  their 
eledion  without  any  controul  from   the  nobles, 
either  in  virtue  of  the  authority  of  the  fenate,  or 
the  interpolation  of  the  augurs.  Thefe  would  have 
been    real  improvements  of  the    conftitution,  if* 
they  had  proportionally  augmented  the  authority 
of  the   confuls   at  the  fame   time;  but  probably 
there  would  have  been  as  many  prejudices  againft 
fuch  a  propofal  among  the  people,  as  in  the  fenate. 
All  the  popular  jealoufies  and  alarms  at  regal  au- 
thority, would  have  been  excited  by  demagogues 
in  the  fenate  as  well  as  in  the  comitia ;  for  there 
are  in    all  nations  ariftocratical  demagogues   as 
well   as   democratical.      Thefe  expedients  were 
adopted  by  the  fenate  to  quiet  the  animofities  of 
parties;  but  tended,  in  fad,  only  to  render  the 
conteft  between  them  more  equal,  and  to  multiply 
the  fubjecls  of  difpute.  The  tribunes  being  veiled 
with  power  to  affemble  the  people,  could  not  long 
be  confined  to  the  mere  negative  with  which  they 
were  firfl  entrufted.     The  party  of  the  plebeians, 
with  thefe  magiftrates  at  their  head,  were  then  in 
a  pofture   not  only  to  preferve  their  right,  but 
likewife  to  gain  to  their  order  continual  acceflions 
of  power.     Happily  for  the  ftate  there  was  yet 
much  ground  to  be  gained,  without   tranfgreffing 
the  bounds  of  order  or  the  authority  of  equitable 
government.     The   bar  of  hereditary  diftin&ioa 
was   the    ftrongeft    obftacle   which   the   popular 
leaders  in  this  career  had  to  break  through.     The 
nobles  among  the  Romans,  as  well  as  among  the 
Greeks,  generally  traced  back  their  lineage,  in 
fome  manner  or  other,  to  go-is  and  goddeffes ;  and 
the  divine  original  of  nobility,  and  the  eflential 
VOL.  I.  U  u  diftindliou 


340         Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

diftine~Hon  between  the  two  orders  of  nobles  and 
commons,  the  one  being  believed  a  fuperior  order 
of  beings  to  the  other,  was  founded  in  their  infti- 
tutions  of  religion,  and  in  popular  belief:  and 
although  fome  pretenfions  are  fet  up  frill,  in  many 
parts  of  Europe,  to  the  divine  right  of  nobility, 
yet  they  are  generally  held  in  fo  little  eftimation, 
that  a  modern  can  hardly  form  an  idea  of  the  dif- 
ficulty the  tribunes  muft  have  found  to  overcome 
this  inveterate  prejudice  of  fuperftition.  No  per- 
fonal  merit,  no  adual  fervice,  no  meafure  of  abi- 
lity or  virtue,  could  remove,  as  it  was  pretended, 
the  difqualifi cation  of  plebeian  birth.  One  of  the 
firft  fteps  towards  abolifhing  this  diftin6tion,  was 
to  preclude  every  other  power  in  the  ftate  from 
a  negative  on  their  proceedings.  For  this  pur- 
pofe  it  was  enabled  by  the  tribes,  that  no  one, 
under  pain  of  death,  or  of  a  fine  at  diferetion, 
fhould  interrupt  a  tribune  while  he  was  fpeaking 
to  the  people.  Nothing  can  be  more  curious 
than  thefe  popular  efforts  to  get  the  better  of 
their  own  fuperftitious  prejudices :  they  could 
not  depend  upon  their  own  firmnefs  to  fupport 
their  own  peculiar  rnagiftrate,  till  they  made  them- 
felves  believe  that  his  perfon  was  facred,  as  well  as 
the  other  magiftrates.  Being  thus  provided  againft 
interruption,  as  they  were  by  a  former  law  againft 
violence  to  their  perfons,  they  not  only  took  up 
the  complaints  of  their  conftituents,  but  fuggefted 
new  claims  to  be  made  by  them ;  and  at  every 
fucceflion  to  office,  endeavoured  to  fignalize  their 
term  by  fome  additional  eftablimment  for  the 
benefit  of  the  people.  They  interrupted  the  ftate 
in  its  councils  and  wars,  and  hung  upon  the  wheels 
of  government  until  the  grievances  they  com- 
plained of  were  redrefied,  or  the  demands  they 
made  were  complied  with.  In  order  to  increafe 

the 


Rome.  341 

the  number  of  plebeian  officers,  whofe  aid  the 
tribunes   alledged   was   neceflary  to   themfelves, 
they,  foon  after  their  own   inftitution,    procured 
that  of  the  aediles,  who  were  to  infped  the  market, 
and  have  charge  of  the  public  buildings  and  pub- 
lic fhows.     The  qualifications  of  candidates  for 
the  office  of  conful,  furnifhed,  during  fome  ages, 
the  fubject  of  continual  debates :  civil  and  mili- 
tary tranfactions  were  conftantly  blended   toge- 
ther.    The  fenate  frequently  involved  the  ftate 
in  war,  in  order  to  fufpend  its  inteftine  divifions ; 
and  the  people  as  often  took  occaiion,  from  the 
difficulties  in  which  the  community  was  involved 
by  its  enemies,  to  extort  a  compliance  with  their 
own  demands.     The  firft   fubjeft  of  contention 
was  the  diftribution  of  the  corn  which  the  fenate 
had  purchafed  as  a  provifion  againft  the  famine, 
which  the  late  interruption  of  induftry  and  agri- 
culture, by  the  feceffion  of  the  people,  had  occa- 
fioned.     Coriolanus  was  for  compelling  the  peo- 
ple, by  hunger,  to  part  with  their  tribunes,  and  the 
other  conceffions  which  had  been  extorted  from 
the  fenate.     The  younger  nobility  applauded  his 
fentiments  ;  but  the  majority  were  afraid  of  ano- 
ther ftorm,  and  agreed  to  deliver  corn  from  the 
public  granaries  at  a  moderate  price.     The  peo- 
ple,   however,    were  not   appeafed;    they   were 
greatly  incenfed  againft  Coriolanus  ;  and  the  tri- 
bunes cited  him  to  appear  before  the  tribunal  of 
the  people,  to  anfwer  for  the  infult  he  had  offered 
them.  The  fenate  and  patricians  were  difpofed  to 
protect  him;  but  expected  to  be  able  to  acquit 
him  in  the  comitia  of  the  centuries,  the  only  tri- 
bunal before  which  any  capital  accufation  of  a 
citizen  had  ever  been  tried.     The  tribunes,  how- 
ever, determined  to  introduce  an  innovation,  and 
infifted  that  the  people  fhould  aflfemble  in  their 

tribes. 


342          Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

tribes.     Coriolanus,  feeing  himfelf  already  con- 
demned by  this  method  of  proceeding,  withdrew, 
and  joined  the  enemies  of  his  country.     This  no- 
velty made   a   total  change  in  the  conflitution ; 
for  the  afTembly  of  the  centuries  formed  an  arif- 
tocracy,  that  of  the  tribes  a  democracy.     As  it 
was  not   with  any  precifion  determined  by  law 
what  buiinefs  fhould  be  done  in  one  affembly, 
and  what  in  the  other,  the  patricians  and   ple- 
beians, inftead  of  balancing  each  other  by  regular 
checks,  were  in  danger  of  rendering  the  adminif- 
tration  of  the  ftate  a  continual  fcene  of  contradic- 
tions, which  ferved  to  the  laft   hour  of  the    re- 
public  as    an   object  of  popular   zeal,  and  fur- 
nifhed  a  Ipecious  pretence  to  ambitious  and  de- 
fignmg  men.     This  very  uncertainty,  producing 
continual  altercations  and  wars,  produced  great 
ftatefmen  and  warriors,  no  doubt :  but  a  regular, 
well-ordered  conftitution  will  never  fail  to  bring 
forth   men  capable  of  conducing   the  national 
councils  and  arms  ;  and  it  is  of  infinitely  more 
importance  to  the  national  happinefs,  to  abound 
in  good  merchants,  farmers,  and  manufacturers — 
good  lawyers,  priefts,  and  phyficians— -and  great 
philoicphers,    than   it    is  to   multiply   what  are 
called  great  fratefmen  and  great  generals.     It  is  a 
miferable  fen  itude,  whether  you  call  it  a  repub- 
lic or  a  defpotifm,  where  the  law  is  uncertain  and 
unknown;  and   it  is  only  under  the  fecurity  of 
certain  and  known  laws,  that  arts,  fciences,  agri- 
culture, commerce,  and  grades  can  ever  be  made 
to  flourim.     Another  fubjecl:  of  difpute  was  foon 
introduced,  which  ferved  to  the  laft  hour  of  the 
republic  as  an  object  of  popular  zeal,  and  fur- 
niihed  a  fpecious  pretence  to  ambitious  and  de- 
igning men  to  captivate  the  ears  of  the  populace — 
an  equal  diviiion  of  land,  known  by  the  name  of 

an 


Rome. 


343 


an  Agrarian  Law.  By  this  was  by  no  means  meant 
a  community  of  goods  and  lands,  or  an  equal  di- 
vifion  of  all  the  lands  and  goods;    the  koman 
people  had  too  much  fenfe  and  honefty  ever  to 
think  of  introducing  into  practice  fuch  an  ab- 
furd  figment   of  the   brain  :    but   the   Romans, 
during  the  late  ariftocratical  times,  and  the  wars 
againft  Tarquin,  had  fuiered  the  conquered  lands 
to  pafs  by  connivance,  occupancy,  or  purchafe, 
into  the  bands  of  powerful  citizens,  inflead  of  di- 
viding them  equally  among  the  people.     Sp.  Caf- 
fms,    the  conlul,    who   was   in   favour  with  the 
people,    and  affeded  ftill  farther  popularity  by 
flattering  the  paffions  of  the  inferior  claffes,  fore- 
feeing  that  the  tribunes  would  foou  think  of  this 
objed,  determined  to  make  a  merit  to  himfelf  by 
anticipating  them.     PofTefling  himfelf  of  fome  of 
thefe  lands,  he  oftentatioufly  made  a  diviiion  of 
them  among  the  more  indigent  citizens ;  and  ob- 
tained an  appointment  of  three  commiflloners,  to 
inquire  into  the  evil,  and  confider  of  a  remedy. 
The  patricians  were  alarmed  ;    but  Caffius  had 
numbers  on  his  iide,  and  was  fo  confident  of  fuc- 
cefs,  that  he  betrayed  too  foon  his  ambitious  de- 
fign,  by  offering  the  freedom  of  the  city  to  aliens, 
who   at   his    invitation    crowded   from  all  parts 
to  vote  in  the  afTemblies  of  the  Roman  people. 
This  convinced  all  parties  that  his  views  were,  by 
the  means  of  aliens  and  indigent  citizens,  to  ufurp 
the   government.     All  parties  combined  againft 
him,  and  he  was  condemned  for  treafon.  The  tri- 
bunes had  no  fooner  deftroyed  Caffius,  than  they 
adopted  his  projed,  and  infifted  on  the  law  for 
the  nomination  of  three  commiffioners :  from  this 
time  commences  a  ftruggle  between  the  tribunes 
and  feuate,  patricians  and  plebeians,  the  various 
operations  pf  which   would   take  up  too  much 

fpace 


344          Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

fpace  to  relate.  The  tribunes  were  honoured  in 
proportion  to  the  part  they  took  in  fupport  of  the 
popular  caufe,  and  their  animofity  againft  the  fe- 
nate.  Every  new  tribune  endeavoured  to  figna- 
lize  his  year,  by  fuggefting  fome  new  point  to  be 
gained  by  the  people.  One  law  was  obtained  to 
iubftitute  the  aflembly  of  the  tribes  for  that  of  the 
curias,  in  the  eleclion  of  tribunes;  another  to  ex- 
clude the  patricians  entirely  from  the  aflembly  of 
the  tribes.  The  agrarian  law  they  frequently 
moved  in  the  interval  of  other  pretenfions,  or  to- 
gether with  other  claims,  in  order  to  alarm  the  fe- 
nate,  and  force  them  to  a  compromife.  The 
powers  and  artifices  of  both  parties  were  foon  ex- 
erted in  another  context,  in  which  the  people  were 
in  the  right,  and  purfued  the  mofl  rational  and 
necelTary  object  imaginable — a  new  code  of  laws 
which  ihould  regulate  the  forms  of  judicial  pro- 
ceedings; yet  even  this  was  not  purfued  fo  much 
from  the  love  of  juftice,  or  the  fpirit  of  liberty, 
as  to  gain  a  point  from  the  patricians,  whofe  pow- 
er was  greatly  fupported  by  the  difcretionary  ju- 
dicial powers  they  had  in  their  hands.  This  great 
objecl,  which  the  Englifh  nation  have  purfued  for 
fo  long  a  courfe  of  time,  under  the  names  of 
Folcright  or  Common  Law,  they  alone  have  had 
the  wifdom  to  accompany  with  prerogatives  to  the 
crown,  and  privileges  to  the  nobility,  which  have 
fecured  thofe  two  branches  of  the  conftitution ; 
at  the  fame  time  that,  by  eftabliming  a  body  of 
laws,  and  regular  formal  proceedings  in  the 
courts  of  juftice,  they  have  fecured  their  own 
rights  and  liberties.  The  Roman  people  were 
not  fo  wife;  by  neglecting  to  give  any  ade- 
quate prerogatives  to  the  confuls  ;  and  by  un- 
dermining the  power  of  the  lenate  in  propor- 
tion as  they  introduced  regular  law  to  protect 

their 


Rome.  345 

-'       :     "  '•••>>*  •-•'•'     •  ''     '":'"-• 

their  own  rights,  they  underlined  every  other 
power  in  the  cpnftitution,  and  devolved  the 
whole  upon  themfelves.  In  the  career  they  loft 
all  their  integrity  and  morals  :  they  oppofed  an 
ardour  not  to  be  cooled  or  difcouraged,  or  reftrain- 
ed  by  fcruples  in  the  choice  of  means,  to  the  great 
authority  and  addrefs  of  the  nobles.  A  popular 
party  are  apt  to  think  that  the  rules  of  veraci- 
ty and  candour  may  be  difpenfed  with,  and  that 
deceit  and  violence  may  without  any  fcruple  be 
employed  in  their  own  favour.  With  lefs  ho- 
nour and  dignity  to  maintain  than  their  adver- 
faries,  they  are  lefs  afraid  of  imputations  that 
detradl  from  either;  and  their  leaders,  fupported 
by  the  voice  of  the  more  numerous  party,  are  lefs 
apprehenfive  of  evil  fame.  In  this  conteft,  ac- 
cordingly, fi&itious  plots  and  confpiracies  were 
fabricated  by  the  popular  fide,  and  fictitious  de- 
figns  again  ft  the  liberties  of  the  people  were  im- 
puted to  the  patricians,  in  order  to  render  them 
odious,  and  to  deter  them  from  appearing  in  fup- 
port  of  their  real  pretenfions.  The  fenate  at  laft 
agreed  to  the  nomination  of  three  commi'flioners* 
to  be  fent  to  Greece,  and  make  a  collection  of 
laws.  The  report  they  made  was  accepted,  and 
the  decemvirs  appointed  by  fenate  and  people  to 
compile  a  body  of  laws.  Thefe  ten  were  in- 
tended only  as  a  committee  to  prepare  a  draught 
for  the  confideration  of  the  fenate  and  people: 
yet  they  had  fo  much  credit  with  the  people  as  to 
be  vefted  with  a  temporary  fovereignty  ;  and  fu- 
perfeded  the  authority  of  the  fenate  as  well  as  the 
confuls;  and  had  unlimited  power  over  the  lives 
and  fortunes  of  their  fellow-citizens.  They  pre- 
fented  a  number  of  laws,  engraven  on  ten  tables 
or  plates,  containing  a  fummary  of  the  privileges 

of 


346         Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

of  the  people,  tlie  crimes  to  be  punifhed,  and 
the  forms  of  judicial  proceedings.  They  faid  their 
plan  was  urifinifhed ;  and,  deiiring  a  renewal  of 
their  powers,  obtained  it  for  another  year :    two 
more  tables  were  added,  which,  with  the  former 
ten,  made  the  Law  of  the  Twelve  Tables.     In 
thefe  laws  the  diftin&ion  of  patrician  and  plebeian 
was  fo  great,  that  perfons  of  thefe  different  orders 
were  not  permitted  to  intermarry.     Bankruptcy 
was  made  a  crime;  and,  without  any  diftin£tion 
between  fraud  and  misfortune,  expofed  the  infol- 
vent  debtor  to  the  mercy  of  his  creditors,  who 
might  put  him  to  death,  diffecl,  or  quarter   him, 
and  diftribute  his  members  among  them.     This 
law  was  brought  from   Greece,   and   ihews   the 
atrocious   ideas   and   manners  of  the  age.     Al- 
though we  have  no  account   of  the   law  being 
executed  in  its  utmoft  extent,  we  know  that,  in 
confequence  of  it,  debtors  were,  by  the  courts 
of  law,  delivered  bound  into  the  hands  of  credi- 
tors', and  frequently  fcourged  and  whipped  in  a 
rnoft  cruel  and  unmerciful   manner.     Giving  to 
fathers  the  power  of  magiftrates,  or  the  power 
of  life  and  death,  over  their  children,  may  have 
ibme  reafons  affigned  for  it  :     but   nothing  can 
ever  account  for  the  people's  accepting  fucn  a 
law  of  debtor  and  creditor  among  the  Greeks 
or  Romans,   but   the    fuppofition   that    property 
was  entirely  in  the  hands  of  patricians;  and  that 
the  people  had  the  blindeft  fuperftitious  opinion, 
that  the  patricians,  as  defcendants  of  gods,  were 
a   fuperior   order   of  beings.      It  is  no  wonder 
that  the  people,  after  this,  often   clamoured  for 
an  abolition  or  diminution  of  debts  :    why  they 
never  demanded  an  abolition  of  the  law,  is  ano- 
ther queftion. — One  other  of  thefe  laws  deferves 

particular 

*^i' 


Rome*  347 

Canicular  notice.  In  private,  every  family  were 
free  to  worlhip  the  gods  in  their  own  way ;  and 
in  public,  though  certain  forms  were  required, 
yet  there  was  not  any  penalty  annexed  to  the 
omiffion  of  them,  as  the  puniihment  of  offences 
in  this  matter  was  left  to  the  offended  god.  This, 
probably,  was  the  fource  of  that  wife  and  hu- 
mane toleration  which  does  fo  much  honour  to 
the  Romans,  and  reflects  difgrace  on  almoft 
every  Chriftian  nation.  The  ardour  of  the  peo- 
ple to  obtain  this  code  had  nearly  cofl  them  their 
liberties.  The  power  of  a  magiftrate  was  fup- 
pofed  to  determine  only  by  his  own  refignation. 
The  decemvirs,  taking  advantage  of  this  defecl: 
in  the  conftitution,  continued  the  exercife  of  their 
power;  and  the  people,  to  fhew  that  they  never 
can  be  jealous  of  men  who  are  in  pofleflion  of 
their  confidence,  acquiefced  in  their  ufurpation; 
until  the  father  of  Virginia,  by  exercifing  his 
lawful  authority  in  defence  of  his  daughter's  ho- 
nour, exhibited  a  fpedacle  of  horror  which  gave 
a  turn  to  the  imaginations,  and  aroufed  all  the 
paffions  of  the  people  to  the  expulfion  of  the 
decemvirs,  as  fuch  another  event  had  before  given 
occafion  to  the  abolition  of  monarchy. — Patricians 
and  plebeians  now  united,  and  a  tide  of  mutual 
confidence  began  to  flow.  Two  very  popular 
perfons  were  chofen  confuls :  the  confecration  of 
the  tribunes  was  renewed,  and  extended  to  the 
ssdiles,  and  other  inferior  officers  who  a6led  un- 
der the  tribunes  in  preferving  the  rights  of  the 
people.  The  patricians  confented  to  have  the 
acts  of  the  fenate  formally  recorded,  placed  in 
the  temple  of  Ceres,  and  committed  to  the  care  of 
the  sediles.  As  the  confuls  had  been  hitherto 
the  keepers  and  interpreters  of  their  decrees,  and 
VOL.  I.  X  x  had 


348         Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

had  often  fuppreffed  or  carried  into  execution  their 
afts  at  their  pleafure,  this  was  a  coniiderable  di- 
minution of  the  power  of  the  confuls. 

The  comitia  were  of  three  forts — the  curias,  the 
centuries,  and  the  tribes.  The  centuries  alone, 
in  which  the  patricians  had  an  undoubted  majo- 
rity as  well  as  in  the  fenate,  had  as  yet  the  au- 
thority of  making  laws  for  the  commonwealth: 
this  frill  preferred  the  ariftocratical  character  of 
the  republic.  Now  the  plebeians  denied  the  le- 
giflative  authority  of  the  fenate ;  and  the  fenate 
denied  the  right  of  the  tribes  to  make  laws. 
Equity  required  that  the  plebeians  mould  have  a 
voice  in  the  legiilature;  but  inftead  of  becom- 
ing a  branch  of  it,  inftead  of  aiming  at  a  delibe- 
rative or  negative  voice  in  it,  by  which  they 
might  concur  with  the  fenate  and  comitia  of  the 
centuries,  or,  which  would  have  been  infinitely 
better,  with  the  fenate  and  confuls  as  two  inde- 
pendent branches,  they  obtained  a  feparate  and 
independent  power  of  legiflation.  Hence  the  in- 
tricacy of  this  conftitution ;  hence  three  diftinct 
fources  of  laws — decrees  of  the  fenate,  a&s  of  the 
centuries,  and  refolutions  of  the  tribes — fenatus 
iconiulta,  leges,  plebifcita:  a  fource  of  divifion, 
diffraction,  and  tumult,  which  never  ceafed  to 
ifTue  ftreams  till  the  authority  of  the  fenate  was 
wholly  deftroyed,  and  a  dominatio  plebis  began. 
The  plebeians,  having  removed  thefe  inequali- 
ties, grew  fo  much  the  more  impatient  of  thofe 
which  remained.  They  were  ftill  excluded  from 
the  office  of  conful,  from  that  of  the  priefthood, 
and  were  forbidden  intermarriage  with  the  nobles. 
In  the  year  of  the  city  308,  Canuleius,  a  plebeian 
and  a  tribune,  moved  to  repeal  the  law  of  the 
twelve  tables,  which  prohibited  the  intermarriage 

of 


Rome.  349 

of  patricians  and  plebeians ;  and  the  nine  other 
tribunes  claimed  that  the  office  of  conful  fhould 
be  held  by  plebeians  as  well  as  patricians. 

The  fenate,  and  the  whole  order  of  nobles,  by 
Ihidied  delays,  and  by  the  ufual  artifice  of  involv- 
ing the  ftate  in  foreign  wars,  fufpended  the  de- 
termination of  thefe  queftions;  but  at  length 
were  obliged  to  gratify  the  people  with  the  inter- 
marriages of  different  ranks,  in  order  to  pacify 
them  on  the  refufal  of  their  claim  on  the  confu- 
late.  To  elude  this  demand,  it  was  faid  that  the 
facrifices  and  other  duties  of  the  priefthood,  many 
of  which  were  to  be  performed  by  the  conful, 
could  not,  by  the  facred  laws  of  religion,  be  per- 
formed without  profanation  by  perfons  of  ple- 
beian extraction,  or  by  any  but  thofe  of  noble 
birth.  This  argument  filenced  the  people  for 
fometime;  but  neither  fuperftition  nor  the  true 
religion,  any  more  than  education,  oaths,  mo- 
rals, or  any  other  tie,  will  long  reftrain  an  un- 
balanced party,  urged  by  its  intereft,  and  ftimu- 
lated  by  a  growing  paflion  for  power:  an  eva- 
lion,  a  mere  change  of  a  word,  will  anfwer  the 
purpofe  of  eluding  fuperftitious  fears,  and  even 
the  dictates  of  confcience.  The  title  of  Conful 
was  changed  for  that  of  Military  Tribune;  and 
no  facerdotal  function  being  included  in  the  du- 
ties of  this  office,  plebeians,  though  not  qualified 
to  be  confuls,  were  elected  military  tribunes,  with 
confular  power.  The  military  and  facerdotal 
functions  had  before  been  united;  they  were 
now  feparated,  and,  as  the  people  thought,  with- 
out profanation.  But  another  office  remained  to 
tempt  the  people  and  their  tribunes,  that  of  Cen- 
for.  The  cenfus  had  been  a  principal  object  of 
the  executive  power;  the  kings  had  always  held 
it,  and  after  them  the  confuls :  at  every  period 

of 


Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

of  five  years,  they  could  difpofe  of  every  man's 
rank,  aflign  him  his  clafs,  place  him  in  the  rolls 
of  the  fenate  or  the  knights,  or  ftrike  him  off  of 
either,  degrade  or  disfranchife  him,  as  they  thought 
proper.  A  power  fo  important,  although  it  had 
not  been  hitherto  flagrantly  abufed,  might  eafily 
be  fo ;  and  the  fenate  would  naturally  dread  the 
admiffion  of  the  plebeians  to  it.  While  they  ad- 
mitted them,  therefore,  to  be  ele&ed  tribunes 
with  confutar  power,  they  ftipulated  that  the 
eenfus  mould  be  feparated  from  it,  and  that  this 
charge  fhould  remain  with  perfons  of  patrician 
birth. — The  invafion  of  the  Gauls  had  burnt  the 
city,  and  it  was  thought,  extinguifhed  the  re- 
public for  ever :  Manlius  faved  the  capitol,  and 
Camillus  reftored  the  commonwealth.  During 
a  period  of  one  hundred  and  feventeen  years 
which  followed,  the  Romans  were  involved  in 
perpetual  wars  againft  the  Equi,  the  Volfci,  the 
Hernici,  the  Etrufcans,  and  fome  of  their  own 
Latin  confederates ;  yet  thefe  did  not  wholly  fuf- 
pend  their  internal  convulfions,  which  gave  birth 
to  new  political  inftitutions.  The  plebeians,  far 
from  being  fatisfied  with  their  paft  acquisitions, 
made  continual  efforts  to  extend  their  privileges. 
The  tribunes,  by  traducing  the  fenate,  and  by 
difplaying  in  their  harangues  the  feverities  of  the 
patrician  creditor,  and  the  fufferings  of  the  ple- 
beian debtor,  ftill  enflamed  the  animofity  of  the 
popular  party.  The  republic  itfelf  was  lo  feebly 
eftablifhed,  that  ambitious  citizens  were  encou- 
raged, by  means  of  fadions  raifed  among  perfons 
of  the  lower  clafs,  to  entertain  thoughts  of  fub- 
verting  the  government.  In  this  manner  Man- 
lius, the  champion  of  the  capitol,  prefuming  on 
his  merit,  thought  himfelf  above  the  laws,  and 
incurred  the  imputation  of  afpiring  to  be  king. 

Four 


(TOT: 


OP  THB 


v  TTNIVEP 
Rome. 

Four  hundred  citizens,  whom  he  had  redeemed 
from  their  creditors,  and  releafed  from  chains— 
the  fpoils  of  thirty  enemies  flain  by  himfelf  in 
battle — forty  badges  of  honour,  conferred  on  him 
by  generals  under  whom  he  had  ferved — many 
citizens  whom  he  .had  refcued  from  the  enemy, 
among  whom  was  Servilius,  the  fecond  in  com- 
mand to  the  didlator — could  not  fave  him  from 
being  thrown  from  the  rock  on  which  he  had  fo 
lately  fignalized  his  valour.  Such  was  the  in- 
fluence of  the  fenate ;  fuch  "  the  treafons  for 
"  which  the  friends  of  the  people  were  to  be  fa- 
"  crificed  to  the  fenate,"  as  he  faid ;  and  fuch 
the  popular  prejudice  againft  the  name  of  a  king. 
Yet  it  is  certain  that  the  beft  thing  the  Roman 
people  could  have  done  at  that  time,  would  have 
been  to  have  made  him  a  king,  with  a  negative ; 
preferring  at  the  fame  time  their  own  negative, 
and  that  of  the  fenate.  The  plebeians  had  been 
now  above  forty  years  in  poffeffion  of  a  title  to 
hold  the  office  of  confular  tribune,  but  had  not 
been  able  to  prevail  over  the  influence  of  the  pa- 
tricians at  any  ele&ion :  by  the  increafe  of  their 
numbers  in  the  firft  and  fecond  clafles,  by  their 
intermarriages  with  patrician  families,  and  by  the 
afliduity  and  influence  of  individuals  who  afpired 
to  the  office,  they  at  laft  obtained  the  dignity  of 
confular  tribune  for  one  of  their  own  order,  and 
from  thenceforward  began  to  divide  the  votes  of 
the  centuries  with  the  patrician  candidates. — 
They  foon  afpired  to  the  title  of  confuls,  Stolo 
and  Sextius  were  placed  in  the  college  of  tri- 
bunes, to  urge  this  point.  They  propofed  three 
laws: — I  ft,  For  relief  of  infolvent  debtors,  by 
cheating  their  creditors  of  part  of  their  debts. 
2dly.  To  limit  eftates  in  land  to  five  hundred 
jugera,  about  three  hundred  acres,  odly.  To 

reftore 


352          Ancient  Democratical    Rep  til  lies. 

reftore  the  election  of  confuls,  in  place  of  confu- 
lar  tribunes,  with  an  exprefs  provifion  that  at 
leaft  one  of  the  confuls  fhould  be  of  plebeian 
defcent.  The  patricians  prevailed  upon  fome  of 
the  tribunes  to  diflent  from  their  colleagues,  and 
fufpend,  by  their  negatives,  all  proceedings  upon 
thefe  laws.  Licinius  and  Sextius,  in  their  turn, 
fufpended  the  ufual  election  of  magiftrates,  and 
put  a  ftop  to  all  the  ordinary  affairs  of  ftate.  An 
anarchy  of  five  years  enfued.  The  patricians 
flill  infifted  on  the  facrilege  and  profanation  that 
would  be  incurred  by  fuffering  the  rites  ufually 
performed  by  the  confuls  to  pafs  into  plebeian 
hands.  The  tribunes,  to  elude  this  myfterious 
objection,  which  laid  faft  hold  on  the  fuperfli- 
tious  minds  of  the  people,  contrived  a  fhift. 
They  moved,  that  the  ordinary  attendants  on  the 
facred  rights  fhould  be  augmented  from  two  to 
ten;  and  that  of  thefe  one  half  fhould  be  named 
of  plebeian  extraction.  The  patricians  ftruggled 
as  long  as  they  could,  but  were  at  laft  obliged 
to  give  way — ift.  To  the  acts  in  favour  of  in- 
folvent  debtors,  zdly.  To  the  agrarian  law,  or 
limitation  of  property  in  land.  3dly.  To  the 
new  eftablifhment  relating  to  the  priefthood,  and 
to  the  communication  of  the  confulate  itfelf  to 
perfons  of  plebeian  rank.  The  plebeian  party 
prevailed  in  all  their  points,  and  raifed  Sextius, 
the  tribune,  to  the  office  of  conful :  and,  from 
one  ftep  to  another,  they  obtained  that  all  the 
offices,  whether  of  praetor  or  sedile,  of  dictator 
or  cenfor,  were  in  procefs  of  time  filled  with 
perfons  of  either  rank,  and  the  diftinction  of  pa- 
trician or  plebeian  became  merely  nominal.  The 
only  effect  it  now  had  was  favourable  to  the  ple- 
beians, as  it  limited  the  choice  of  tribunes  to 
*heir  own  order ;  while,  in  common  with  the  pa- 
tricians, 


Rome.  353 

tricians,  they  had  accefs  to, every  other  dignity 
in  the  ftate.  In  this  account  of  the  Roman  con- 
ftitution,  we  are  now  come  nearly  to  that  ftate  of 
its  maturity,  at  which  Polybius  began  to  admire 
the  felicity  of  its  inftitutions,  and  the  order  of 
its  adminiftration.  The  mafs,  however,  was  far 
from  being  fo  well  compacted,  or  the  unity  of 
power  fo  well  eftablifhed,  as  it  is  in  the  Englifh 
conftitudon;  the  fenate  and  the  popular  affem- 
blies,  in  their  legiflative  capacities,  countera&ed 
one  another.  However,  from  this  time  forward, 
through  a  long  period  of  wars,  with  Greeks, 
Gauls,  Italians,  and  Carthaginians,  the  domeftic 
policy  of  the  ftate  appears  to  be  wife  and  orderly. 
The  diftin&ion  between  patrician  and  plebeian 
was  become  altogether  nominal ;  the  defcendants 
of  thofe  who  had  held  the  higher  offices  of  ftate 
were,  in  confequence  of  the  preferments  of  their 
anceftors,  confidered  as  noble;  and,  as  the  ple- 
beians now  found  no  difficulty  in  obtaining  the 
offices  of  ftate,  they  were  continually  opening  the 
way  of  their  pofterity  to  the  rank  of  nobles.  The 
plebeians  were  entitled  by  law  to  claim  one  of 
the  conful's  feats,  and  frequently  occupied  both. 
The  authority  of  the  fenate,  the  dignity  of  the 
equeftrian  order,  and  the  manners  of  the  people 
in  general,  were  guarded,  and  in  a  great  meafure 
preferved,  by  the  integrity  and  ftridt  exercife  of 
the  cenforial  power.  The  wifeft  and  moft  re- 
fpefted  of  the  citizens,  from  every  condition, 
were  raifed  into  office ;  and  the  aflemblies,  whe- 
ther of  the  fenate  or  the  people,  without  envy 
and  without  jealoufy,  fuffered  themfelves  to  be 
governed  by  the  counfels  of  a  few  able  and  vir- 
tuous men.  The  fpirit  of  the  people  was,  how- 
ever, in  a  high  degree  democratical ;  and  though 
they  fuffered  themfelves  to  be  governed  by  the 

filent 


354         Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

Jilent  influence  of  perfonai  authority  in  a  few  of 
their  citizens,  yet  they  could  not  endure  any  fpe- 
cies  of  uncommon  pre-eminence,  even  that  which 
arofe  from  the  luftre  and  well-founded  preten- 
iions  of  diftinguimed  merit. 

The  condudt  of  the  Romans  towards  the 
Greeks  fhould  not  be  forgotten ;  fince  it  appears 
to  have  been  copied  from  the  policy  of  Antalci- 
das  in  his  Perfian  treaty.  The  ftates  of  the 
Achaean  league,  already  on  the  decline,  haften- 
ed,  by  the  temerity  and  diftra&ions  of  their  own 
councils,  the  career  of  their  fortunes  to  its  ter- 
mination. The  Romans,  even  while  they  fuf- 
fered  this  famous  republic  to  retain  the  fhew  of 
its  independence,  had  treated  its  members,  in 
many  particulars,  as  fubjecls.  At  the  clofe  of 
the  war  with  Perfeus,  they  had  cited  to  appear 
at  Rome,  or  taken  into  cuftody  as  prifoners  of 
ftate,  many  citizens  of  Achaia :  of  thefe  they  had 
detained  about  a  thoufand  in  different  prifons  of 
Italy.  After  a  period  of  feventeen  years,  three 
hundred  who  remained  alive  were  fet  at  liberty. 
Polybius  was  one  of  them  :  he  attached  himfelf 
to  Scipio,  the  fon  of  Emilius,  and  no  doubt  con- 
tributed much  to  his  education  and  great  cha- 
racter. 

The  Romans,  while  they  detained  fo  many 
Greek  prifoners,  afliimed  the  adminiftration  of 
affairs  in  Greece,  difpofed  of  every  diftin&ion, 
whether  of  fortune  or  power,  to  their  own  tools. 
They  received  appeals  from  the  judgment  of 
the  Achaean  council,  and  encouraged  its  mem- 
bers, contrary  to  the  exprefs  conditions  of  their 
league,  to  fend  feparate  embaflies  to  Rome.  The 
Spartans,  having  been  forced  into  the  Achaean 
confederacy,  continued  refra&ory  in  moft  of  its 
councils.  By  fome  of  their  complaints  at  Rome, 

they 


Rome.  355 

they  obtained  a  deputation  from  the  fenate,  to 
hear  parties  on  the  fpot,  and  to  adjuft  their  dif- 
ferences. The  Achaean  council,  incenfed  at  this 
infult  which  was  offered  to  their  authority,  pro- 
ceeded to  enforce  their  own  decrees  againft  the 
republic  of  Sparta,  marched  an  army,  and  de- 
feated the  inhabitants  of  that  city  who  ventured 
to  oppofe  them.  The  Roman  commiflioners  ar- 
riving after  thefe  hoftilities,  fummoned  the  par- 
ties to  afTemble  at  Corinth,  and,  in  the  name  of 
the  fenate,  gave  fentence — That  Lacedcemon,  Co- 
rinth, ^4rgos,  Heraclea,  and  Orchomenos,  not  having 
been  original  members  of  the  j4ch<zan  confederacy, 
Jhould  now  be  disjoined  from  it ;  and  that  all  the 
cities  which  had  been  refcued  from  the  dominion 
of  Philip  mould  be  left  in  full  poffeffion  of  their 
freedom  and  independency.  A  war  enfued,  in 
which  Metellus  and  Mummius  defeated  the 
Greeks,  and  the  Achaean  league  was  diffolved. 

The  enmity  and  the  friendship  of  the  Romans 
was  equally  fatal.  As  the  Achaean  league  was 
dhTolved,  on  having  incurred  their  refentment; 
fo  the  remnant  of  the  Spartan  republic  periihed, 
in  having  accepted  their  prbte6tion  :  and  nothing 
could  be  more  juft  than  that  the  Spartans  fhould 
perim  under  an  inlidious  policy,  which  they 
themfelves  had  firft  invented,  pra&ifed,  and  fug- 
gefted  to  the  Romans ;  who,  under  the  command 
of  Flaminius,  about  fifty  years  before  this  date, 
in  order  to  detach  the  Grecian  cities  from  Philip, 
proclaimed  with  fo  much  oftentation,  at  the  Ifth- 
mus  of  Corinth,  general  independence,  and  the  free 
exercife  of  their  own  laws,  to  all  the  republics  of 
Greece.  The  Achaean  league  was  diffolved,  and 
all  their  conventions  annulled.  The  ftates  which 
had  compofed  it  were  deprived  of  their  fove- 
reignty,  fubjeded  to  pay  a  tribute,  and  placed 

VOL.  I.  Y  y  under 


356         Ancient  Democratical  Republics* 

under  the  government  of  a  perfon  annually  fent 
from  Rome  with  the  title  of  Praetor  of  Achaia.— 
But  the  fuccefs  of  the  Roman  arms  abroad,  be- 
came the  fource  of  a  ruinous  corruption  at  home. 
In  the  ftate  itfelf,  the  governing  and  the  governed 
felt  feparate  interefts,  and  were  at  variance  from 
motives  of  avarice,  as  well  as  ambition.  Two 
hundred  and  thirty  years  had  elapfed  iince  the 
animofities  of  patrician  and  plebeian  were  ex- 
tinguifhed  by  the  equal  participation  of  public 
honours.  This  diftindion  itfelf  was,  in  a  great 
meafure,  obliterated,  and  gave  way  to  a  new  one, 
which,  under  the  denomination  of  nobles  and 
commons,  or  illuftrious  and  obfcure,  without  in- 
volving any  legal  difparity  of  privileges,  gave  rife 
to  an  ariftocracy,  which  was  partly  hereditary, 
founded  on  the  repeated  fucceffion  to  honours  in 
the  fame  family ;  and  partly  perfonal,  founded  on 
the  habits  of  high  ftation,  and  in  the  advantages 
of  education,  fuch  as  never  fail  to  diftinguiih  the 
conditions  of  men  in  every  great  and  profperous 
ftate.  Thefe  circumftances  conferred  a  power  on 
the  nobles,  which,  though  lefs  invidious,  was  not 
lefs  real  than  that  which  had  been  poflefTed  by  the 
ancient  patricians.  The  exercife  of  this  power  was 
lodged  with  the  fenate,  a  body  which,  though  by 
the  emulation  of  its  members  too  much  diipofed  , 
to  war,  and  ambitious  of  conqueft,  was  never  fur- 
pafled  in  magnanimity,  ability,  or  in  fteadinefs, 
by  any  council  of  ftate  whatever.  The  people  had 
fubmitted  to  the  fenate,  as  pofleffed  of  an  authori- 
ty which  was  founded  in  the  prevailing  opinion  of 
their  fuperior  worth ;  and  even  the  moft  afpiring 
of  the  commons  allowed  themfelves  to  be  govern- 
ed by  an  order  of  men,  amongft  whom  they  them- 
felves, by  proper  efforts  and  fuitable  merit,  migljt 
hope  to  afcend.  The  knights,  or  the  equeftrian71 

order, 


Rome.  357 

order,  being  perfons  pofTefTed  of  eftates  or  effe&s 
of  a  certain  valuation,  and  fecluded  from  the  pur- 
fuit  of  political  emolument  or  honour,  formed, 
between  the  fenate  and  the  people,  an  intermedi- 
ate rank,  who,  in  confequence  of  their  having  a 
capital,  and  being  lefs  engaged  than  the  fenators 
in  affairs  of  ftate,  became  traders,  contra6lors,  far- 
mers of  the  revenue,  and  conftituted  a  fpecies  of 
moneyed  intereft.  Circumflances  which  appear  to 
be  fixed  in  the  political  ftate  of  nations,  are  often 
no  more  than  a  paflage  in  the  fhifting  of  fcenes, 
or  a  tranlition  from  that  which  a  people  have  been, 
to  what  they  are  about  to  become.      The  nobles 
began  to  avail  themfelves  of  the  high  authority 
and  advantages  of  their  ftation,  and  to  accumulate 
property  as  well  as  honours.     Citizens  contended 
for  offices  in  the  ftate,  as  the  road  to  lucrative  ap- 
pointments abroad;  and  when  they  had  obtained 
this  end,  and  had  reigned  for  a  while  in  fome  pro- 
vince, they  brought  back  from  their  government  a 
profufion  of  wealth  ill  acquired,  and  the  habit  of 
arbitrary  and  uncontrouled  command.    When  dif- 
appointed  iri  the  purfuits  of  fortune  abroad,  they 
became  the  leaders  of  dangerous  fa&ions  at  home ; 
or,  when  fuddenly  pofleffed  of  great  wealth,  they 
became  the  agents  of  corruption,  to  difTeminate 
idlenefs  and  the  love  of  ruinous  amufements  in 
the  minds  of  the  people.     The  city  was  gradually 
crowded  with  a  populace,  who,  tempted  with  the 
cheap  or  gratuitous  diftribution  of  corn,  by  the 
frequency  of  public  fhows,  by  the  confequence 
they  enjoyed  as  members  of  the  popular  affem- 
blies,   flocked    to    Rome.      There    they    were 
corrupted  by  idlenefs  and  indigence;   and  the 
order    itfelf   was    continually    debafed   by   the 
frequent  acceflion  of  emancipated  flaves.   A  tur- 
bulent populace  tyrannized,  in  their  turn,  over 

the 


358         Ancient  Demacratical  Republics. 

the  matters  of  the  world,  and  wreaked  on  the 
conquerors  of  fo  many  nations  the  evils  which 
they  themfelves  had  fo  freely  inflicted  on  man- 
kind.     Citizens,  of    this   extra&ion   could   not 
for  ages  arrive  at  any  places  of  truft,  in  which 
they  could,  by  their  peribnal  defects,  injure  the 
commonwealth ;  but  they  increafed,  by  their  num- 
bers and  their  vices,   the  weight  of  that   dreg, 
which,  in  great  and  profperous  cities,  ever  finks, 
by  the  tendency  pf  vice  and  mifcondudl,  to  the 
loweft  condition.     They  became  a  part  of  that 
faclion,  who  are  ever  a&u^ted  by  envy  to  their 
fuperiors,  by  mercenary  views,  or  by  abject  fear; 
who  are  ever  ready  to  efpoufe  the  caufe  of  any 
leader,  againft  the  reftraints  of  public  order;  dif- 
pofed  to  vilify  the  more  refpectable  ranks  of  men, 
and,  by  their  indifference  on  the  fubjects  of  juftice 
or  honour,  to  fruftrate  every  principle  that  may 
be  employed  for  the  government  of  mankind,  be- 
fides  fear  and  compuliion.     Although  citizens  of 
this  defcription  \\ere  yet  far  from  being  the  ma- 
jority at  Rome,  yet  it  is  probable  that  they  were 
in  numbers  fufficient  to  contaminate  the  whole 
body  of  the  people;    and   if  enrolled  promif- 
cuoufly  in  all  the  tribes,  might  have  had  a  great 
weight  in  turning  the  fcale  of  political  councils. 
This  effect,  however,  was  happily  prevented,  by 
the  wife  precaution  which  the  cenfors  had  taken, 
to  confine  all  citizens  of  mean  or  ilavifh  extrac- 
tion to  four  of  the  tribes.     Thefe  were  called  the 
tribes  of  the  city,  and  formed  but  a  fmall  propor- 
tion of  the  whole.     Nothwithftanding  this  precau- 
tion, we  muft  fuppofe  them  to  have  been  very 
improper  parties  in  the  participation  of  fovereign- 
ty,  and  likely  enough  to  difturb  the  place  of  af- 
fembly  with  diforders  and  tumults.     While  the 

inferior  people  funk  in  their  chara&ers,  or  were 

i  i    i*  i 
debafed 


Rmt.  559 

debafed  by  the  circumftances  mentioned,  the  fu- 
perior  ranks,  by  their  application  to  affairs  of 
fiate,  by  their  education,  by  the  ideas  of  high 
birth  and  family  diftin&ion,  by  the  fuperiority  of 
fortune,  began  to  rife  in  their  estimation,  in  their 
pretenfions,  and  in  their  power ;  and  they  enter- 
tained fome  degree  of  contempt  for  perfons,  whom 
the  laws  ftill  required  them  to  admit  as  their  fel- 
low-citizens and  equals.  In  this  difpoiition  of 
parties,  fo  dangerous  in  a  commonwealth,  and 
amidft  materials  fo  likely  to  catch  the  flame,  fome 
fparks  were  thrown,  that  foon  kindled  up  anew 
all  the  popular  animofities,  which  feemed  to  have 
been  fo  long  extinguifhed.  Tiberius  Gracchus, 
born  of  a  plebeian  family,  but  ennobled  by  the 
honours  of  his  father,  by  his  defcent,  on  the  fide 
of  his  mother,  from  the  firft  Scipio  Africanus, 
and  by  his  alliance  with  the  fecond  Scipio,  who 
had  married  his  fitter,  being  now  a  tribune  of  the 
people,  and  poflefled  of  all  the  accomplifhments 
required  in  a  popular  leader,  great  ardour,  refolu- 
tion,  and  eloquence,  formed  a  project  in  itfelf  ex- 
tremely alarming,  and  in  its  confequences  danger- 
ous to  the  peace  of  the  republic.  Being  called 
to  account  for  his  conduct  as  quseftor  in  Spain, 
the  feverity  he  experienced  from  the  fenate,  and 
the  protection  he  obtained  from  the  people,  filled 
his  breaft  with  animofity  to  the  one,  and  a  prepof- 
feffion  in  favour  of  the  other.  A&uated  by  thefe 
difpoiitions,  or  by  an  idea  not  uncommon  to  en- 
thufiaftic  minds,  that  the  tmequaldiftributionofpro*. 
ferty,  Jo  favourable  to  the  rich,  is  an  injury  to  the, 
foor,  he  propofed  a  revival  of  the  law  of  Licinius, 
by  which  Roman  citizens  had  been  retrained 
from  accumulating  eftates  in  land  above  the  value 
of  five  hundred  jugera,  little  more  than  half  as 
many  acres.  This  was  become  impracticable,  and 

even 


360         Ancient  Democratical  Republics. 

even  dangerous,  in  the  prefent  ftate  of  the  repub- 
lic. The  diftinftions  of  poor  and  rich  are  as  neceffary, 
in  ftatesof  confiderable  extent,  as  labour  and  good  go- 
vernment. The  poor  are  deftined  to  labour  ;  and  the 
rich,  by  the  advantages  of  education,  independence, 
and  leifure,  are  qualifedforjuperior  flattens.  The 
empire  was  now  greatly  extended,  and  owed  its  fafe- 
ty,  and  the  order  of  its  government,  to  a  refpedable 
ariflocracy,  founded  on  the  pofleflion  of  fortune, 
as  well  as  perfonal  qualities  and  public  honours. 
The  rich  were  not,  without  fome  violent  convul- 
fion,  to  be  ftript  of  eftates  which  they  themfelves 
had  bought,  or  which  they  had  inherited  from 
their  anceftors.  The  poor  were  not  qualified  at 
once  to  be  railed  to  a  ftate  of  equality  with  per- 
fons  inured  to  a  better  condition.  The  project 
feemed  to  be  as  ruinous  to  government  as  it  was 
to  the  fecurity  of  property,  and  tended  to  place 
the  members  of  the  commonwealth,  by  one  ram 
and  precipitate  ftep,  in  fituations  in  which  they 
were  not  at  all  qualified  to  aft.  For  thefe  rea- 
fons,  as  well  as  from  motives  of  private  intereft 
affe&ing  the  majority  of  the  nobles,  the  proje&  of 
Tiberius  was  ftrenuoufly  oppofed  by  the  fenate; 
and,  from  motives  of  envy,  intereft,  or  miftaken 
zeal  for  juftice,  as  warmly  fupported  by  the  op- 
pofite  party.  A&ing  in  concert  with  Appius 
Claudius*  whofe  daughter  he  had  married,  a  fe- 
nator  of  the  family  of  Craffus,  who  was  then  at 
the  head  of  the  priefthood,  and  Mutius  Scasvola 
the  conful,  he  exhaufted  all  his  art,  and  difplayed 
all  his  eloquence  in  declamation ;  but  when  he 
came  to  propofe  that  the  law  fhould  be  read, 
he  found  that  his  opponents  had  procured  M. 
O&avius,  one  of  his  colleagues,  to  interpofe  his 
negative,  and  forbid  any  further  proceeding  in  the 
bufmefs.  Here,  according  to  the  law  and  the  confti-* 


Rome.  361 

fution,  the  matter  fliould  have  dropped  \  but  inflamed 
and  unbalanced  parties  are  not  to  be  retrained  by 
laws  and  conftitutions.  The  tribunes  were  infti- 
tuted  to  defend  their  own  party,  not  to  attack 
their  opponents  ;  and  to  prevent,  not  to  promote 
innovations.  Every  lingle  tribune  had  a  negative 

on  the  whole. The  reft  of  the  ftory  I  muft 

leave. — The  conftitution  thus  violated,  Gracchus 
next  violated  the  facred  character  of  his  colleague 
the  tribune.  The  fenate  were  tranfported  with 
indignation ;  violence  enfued,  and  the  two  Gracchi 
fell.  Afterwards  Marius  carried  the  popular  pre- 
teniions  ftill  higher;  and  Sylla  might,  if  he  would, 
have  been  emperor.  .Csefar  followed,  and  com- 
pleted the  cataftrophe. 

This  commonwealth,  by  the  fplendor  of  its 
a&ions,  the  extent  of  its  empire,  the  wifdom  of 
its  councils,  the  talents,  integrity,  and  courage  of 
^  multitude  of  characters,  exhibits  the  faireft  pro- 
fpe&  of  our  fpecies,  and  is  the  moft  lignal  exam- 
ple, excepting  England,  of  the  wifdom  and  uti- 
lity of  a  mixture  of  the  three  powers  in  a  com- 
monwealth: on  the  other  hand,  the  various  vici£ 
fitudes  of  it^^brtune,  its  perpetual  domeftic  con- 
tefts,  and  internal  revolutions,  are  the  cleareft 
proofs  of  the  evils  arifing  from  the  want  of  com- 
plete independence  in  each  branch,  and  from  au 
ineffectual  balance. 


LETTER 


362  Conclufion. 


LETTER    LIII. 


CONGRESS. 

My  dear  Sir, 

BY  the  authorities  and  examples  already  re- 
cited, you  will  be  convinced,  that  three 
branches  of  power  have  an  unalterable  foundation 
in  nature;  fthat  they  exifl  in  every  fociety  natural 
and  artificial  ;f  and  that  if  all  of  them  are  not  ac- 
knowledged in  any  conflitution  of  government,  it 
will  be  found  to  be  imperfect,  unftable,  and  foon 
enflaved:  that  the  legiflative  and  executive  au- 
thorities are  naturally  diftinc~t ;  and  that  liberty 
and  the  laws  depend  entirely  on  a  feparation  of 
them  in  the  frame  of  government :  that  the  legif-' 
lative  power  is  naturally  and  neceflarily  fovereign 
and  fupreme  over  the  executive;  and  therefore 
that  the  latter  muft  be  made  an  efTential  branch 
of  the  former,  even  with  a  negative,  or  it  will  not 
be  able  to  defend  itfelf,  but  will  be  foon  invaded, 
undermined,  attacked,  or  in  fome  way  or  other 
totally  ruined  and  annihilated  by  the  former.  This 
is  applicable  to  every  ftate  in  America,  in  its  indi- 
vidual capacity:  but  is  it  equally  applicable  to 
the  United  States  in  their  federal  capacity  ? 

The  people  of  America,  and  their  delegates  in 
congrefs,  were  of  opinion,  that  a  fmgle  affembly 
Was  every  way  adequate  to  the  management  of  all 
their  federal  concerns ;  and  with  very  good  rea- 
fon,  becaufe  congrefs  is  not  a  legiflative  aflembly, 
nor  a  reprefentative  aflembly,  but  only  a  diplo- 
mat^ 


Congrefs.  363 

matic  aflembly.  A  {ingle  council  has  been  found 
to  anfwer  the  purpofes  of  confederacies  very  well. 
But  in  all  fuch  cafes  the  deputies  are  refponiible 
to  the  ftates ;  their  authority  is  clearly  afcertain- 
ed ;  and  the  ftates,  in  their  feparate  capacities,  are 
the  checks.  Thefe  are  able  to  form  an  effectual 
balance,  and  at  all  times  to  controul  their  dele- 
gates. The  fecurity  againft  the  dangers  of  this 
kind  of  government  will  depend  upon  the  accu- 
racy and  decilion  with  which  the  governments  of 
the  feparate  ftates  have  their  own  orders  arranged 
and  balanced.,  'The  neceffity  we  are  under  of  fub- 
mitting  to  a  federal  government,  is  an  additional 
and  a  very  powerful  argument  for  three  branches, 
and  a  balance  by  an  equal  negative,  in  all  the 
feparate  governments.  Congrefs  will  always  be 
compofed  of  members  from  the  natural  and  arti- 
ficial ariftocratical  body  in  every  ftate,  even  in  the 
northern,  as  well  as  in  the  middle  and  fouthern 
ftates.  Their  natural  difpoiitions  then. in  general 
will  be  (whether  they  ftiall  be  fenfible  of  it  or  not, 
and  whatever  integrity  or  abilities  they  may  be 
poffefled  of)  to  diminiih  the  prerogatives  of  the 
governors,  and  the  privileges  of  the  people,  and 
to  augment  the  influence  of  the  ariftocratical  par- 
ties. There  have  been  caufes  enough  to  prevent 
the  appearance  of  this  inclination  hitherto ;  but  a 
calm  courfe  of  profperity  would  very  foon  bring 
it  forth,  if  effectual  provilion  againft  it  be  not 
made  in  feafon.  It  will  be  found  abfolutely  ne- 
ceffary,  therefore,  to  give  negatives  to  the  gover- 
nors, to  defend  the  executives  againft  the  influence 
of  this  body,  as  well  as  the  fenates  and  reprefen- 
tatives  in  their  feveral  ftates". '  The  neceffity  of  a 
negative  in  the  houfe  of  reprefentatives,  will  be 
called  in  queftion  by  nobody. 

VOL.  I.  Z  z  '  Dr. 


364  Conclusion. 

Dr.  Price  and  the  Abbe  de  Mably  are  zealous 
for  additional  powers  to  congrefs. — Full  power  in 
all  foreign  affairs,  and  over  foreign  commerce, 
and  perhaps  fome  authority  over  the  commerce  of 
the  ftates  with  one  another,  may  be  neceflary; 
and  it  is  hard  to  fay,  that  more  authority  in  other 
things  is  not  wanted :  yet  the  fubjec~l  is  of  fuch 
extreme  delicacy  and  difficulty,  that  the  people 
are  much  to  be  applauded  for  their  caution. — To 
colledl  together  the  ancient  and  modern  leagues — 
the  Amphy&ionic,  the  Olynthian,  the  Argive,  the 
Arcadian,  and  the  Achaean  confederacies,  among 
the  Greeks — the  general  diet  6f  the  Swifs  can- 
tons, and  the  ftates  general  of  the  United  Nether- 
lands— the  union  of  the  Hanfe- towns,  &c.  which 
have  been  found  to  anfwer  the  purpofes  both  of 
government  and  liberty ;  to  compare  them  all, 
with  the  circumftances,  the  fituation,  the  geo- 
graphy, the  commerce,  the  population,  and  the 
forms  of  government,  as  well  as  the  climate,  the 
foil,  and  manners  of  the  people,  and  confider 
what  further  federal  powers  are  wanted,  and  may 
be  fafely  given,  would  be  a  ufeful  work.  If  your 
public  engagements  allow  you  the  time  to  under- 
take fuch  an  inquiry,  you  will  find  it  an  agreeable 
amufemenu 


LETTER 


Locke,  Milton,  and  Hume.  365 


LET  T  E  R    LIV. 


LOCKE,    MILTON,    AND    HUME. 


My  dear  Sir, 

CHIMERICAL  fyftems  of  legiflation  are  nei- 
\^s  ther  new  nor  uncommon,  even  among  men 
of  the  moft  refplendent  genius  and  extenlive  learn- 
ing. It  would  not  be  too  bold  to  fay,  that  fome 
parts  of  Plato  and  Sir  Thomas  Moore,  are  as  wild 
as  the  ravings  of  Bedlam.  A  philofopher  may 
be  perfect  matter  of  Defcartes  and  Leibnitz,  may 
purfue  his  own  inquiries  into  metaphyfics  to  any 
length  you  pleafe,  may  enter  into  the  inmoft  re- 
ceffes  of  the  human  mind,  and  make  the  noblefl 
difcoveries  for  the  benefit  of  his  fpecies ;  nay,  he 
may  defend  the  principles  of  liberty  and  the  rights 
of  mankind,  with  great  abilities  and  fuccefs ;  and, 
after  all,  when  called  upon  to  produce  a  plan  of 
legiflation,  he  may  aftonifti  the  world  with  a  fig- 
nal  abfurdity.  Mr.  Locke,  in  1663,  was  em- 
ployed to  trace  out  a  plan  of  legiflation  for  Caro- 
lina; and  he  gave  the  whole  authority,  executive 
and  legiflative,  to  the  eight  proprietors,  the  lords 
Berkley,  Clarendon,  Albemarle,  Craven,  and  Aih- 
ley;  and  Meflieurs  Carteret,  Berkley,  and  Colle- 
ton,  and  their  heirs.  This  new  oligarchical  fove- 
reignty  created  at  once  three  orders  of  nobility ; 
barons,  with  twelve  thoufand  acres  of  land  ;  ca- 
ciques, with  twenty- four  thoufand,  &c. ;  and 
landgraves,  with  eighty  thoufand.  Who  did  this 
legiflator  think  would  live  under  his  government? 

He 


366  Conclusion. 

He  fhould  have  firft  created  a  new  fpecies  of  be- 
ings to  govern,  before  he  inftituted  fuch  a  go- 
vernment. 

A  man  may  be  a  greater  poet  than  Homer, 
and  one  of  the  moft  learned  men  in  the  world  ; 
he  may  fpend  his  life  in  defence  of  liberty,  and 
be  at  the  fame  time  one  of  the  moft  irreproachable 
moral  characters  ;  and  yet,  when  called  upon  to 
frame  a  conftitution  of  government,  he  may  de- 
monftrate  to  the  world,  that  he  has  refleded  very 
little  on  the  fubje£l.  There  is  a  great  hazard  in 
faying  all  this  of  John  Milton ;  but  truth,  and 
the  rights  of  mankind,  demand  it.  In  his  "  Ready 
"  and  Eafy  Way  to  eftablifh  a  Free  Common- 
"  wealth,"  this  great  author  fays,  "  I  doubt  not  but 
cc  all  ingenuous  and  knowing  men  will  eafily  agree 
"  with  me,  that  a  free  commonwealth,  without 
"  fingle  perfon,  or  houfe  of  lords,  is  by  far  the 
"  beft  government,  if  it  can  be  had;  for  the 
"  ground  and  bails  of  every  juft  and  free  govern- 
"  ment,  is  a  general  council  of  ableft  men  chofen 
"  by  the  people  to  confult  of  public  affairs,  from 
<f  time  to  time,  for  the  common  good.  In  this 
"  grand  council  muft  the  fovereignty,  not  tranf- 
<?  ferred,  but  delegated  only,  and,  as  it  were,  de- 
<c  ppfited,  relide ;  with  this  caution,  they  muft 
<c  have  the  forces  by  fea  and  land  committed  to 
<c  them  for  prefervation  of  the  common  peace  and 
"  liberty;  muft  raife  and  manage  the  public  re- 
<c  venue,  at  leaft  with  fome  infpeclors  deputed 

for  fatisfadlion  of  the  people  how  it  is  employ- 
"  ed  ;    muft  make  or  propofe  civil  laws,  treat  of 

commerce,  peace,  or  war  with  foreign  nations; 
'  and,  for  the  carrying  on  fome  particular  affairs 

with  more  fecrecy  and  expedition,  muft  elecl:, 

as  they  have  already,  out  of  their  own  number 
c  and  others,  a  council  of  ftate.     And  although 

"  it 


Locke,  Milton,  and  Hume.  367 

c*  it  may  feem  ftrange  at  firft  hearing,  by  reafon 
cc  that  men's  minds  are  prepoflefled  with  the  no- 
"  tion  of  fucceflive  parliaments,  I  affirm  that  the 
"  grand  council,  being  well  chofen,  fhould  be  per- 
"  petual ;  for  fo  their  bulinefs  is,  or  may  be,  and 
"  oftentimes  urgent;  the  opportunity  o?  affairs 
cc  gained  or  loft  in  a  moment.  The  day  of  coun- 
cc  cil  cannot  be  fet  as  the  day  of  a  feftival,  but 
cc  muft  be  ready  always,  to  prevent  or  anfwer  all 
<c  occafions.  By  this  continuance  they  will  be- 
<c  come  every  way  Ikilfulleft,  beft  provided  of  in- 
<e  telligence  from  abroad,  beft  acquainted  with  the 
cc  people  at  home,  and  the  people  with  them.  The 
"  ihip  of  the  commonwealth  is  always  under  fail; 
"  they  lit  at  the  ftern,  and  if  they  fteer  well,  what 
<c  need  is  there  to' change  them,  it  being  rather 
"  dangerous  ?  Add  to  this,  that  the  grand  coun- 
"  cil  is  both  foundation  and  main  pillar  of  the 
"  whole  ftate;  and  to  move  pillars  and  founda- 
"  tions,  not  faulty,  cannot  be  fafe  for  the  build- 
"  ing.  I  fee  not,  therefore,  how  we  can  be  ad- 
<c  vantaged  by  fucceflive  and  tranfitory  parlia- 
<c  ments ;  but  that  they  are  much  likelier  continu- 
"  ally  to  unfettle,  rather  than  to  fettle  a  free  go- 
"  vernment;  to  breed  commotions,  changes,  no- 
"  velties,  and  uncertainties;  to  brin'g  negjed  upon 
"  prefent  affairs  and  opportunities,  while  all  minds 
"  are  fufpenfe  with  expectation  of  a  new  aflem- 
<c  bly,  and  the  aflembly  for  a  good  fpace,  taken 
fe  up  with  the  new  fettling  of  itfelf,  &c.  But  if 
"  the  ambition  of  fuch  as  think  themfelves  in- 
fc  jured,  that  they  alfo  partake  not  of  the  go- 
*e  vernment,  and  are  impatient  to  be  chofen,  can- 
cc  not  brook  the  perpetuity  of  others  chofen  be- 
"  fore  them ;  or  if  it  be;  feared  that  long  con* 
*'  tinuance  of  power  may  corrupt  fincereft  men, 

"  the 


Conclusion. 

"  the  known  expedient  is,  that  annually  a  third 
"  part  of  fenators  go  out/'  &c. 

Can  you  rea3,  without  fhuddering,  this  wild  re- 
verie of  the  divine  immortal  Milton?  If  no  bet- 
ter fyftems  of  government  had  been  propofed,  it 
would  have  been  no  wonder  that  the  people  of 
England  recalled  the  royal  family,  with  all  their 
errors,  follies,  and  crimes  about  them.  Had 
Milton's  fcheme  been  adopted,  this  country  would 
have  either  been  a  fcene  of  revolutions,  carnage, 
and  horror,  from  that  time  to  this,  or  the  liber- 
ties of  England  would  have  been  at  this  hour  the 
liberties  of  Poland,  or  the  ifland  would  have  been 
a  province  of  France.  What !  a  iingle  aiTembly 
to  govern  England  ?  an  aflembly  of  fenators  for 
life  too  ?  What !  did  Milton's  ideas  of  liberty 
and  free  government  extend  no  further  than  ex- 
changing one  houfe  of  lords  for  another,  and 
making  it  fupreme  and  perpetual?  What!  Crom- 
well, Ireton,  Lambert,  Ludlow,  Waller,  and  five 
hundred  others,  of  all  feels  and  parties,  one  quar- 
ter of  them  mad  with  enthufiafm,  another  with  am- 
bition, a  third  with  avarice,  and  a  fourth  of  them 
honeft  men,  a  perpetual  council,  to  govern  fuch 
a  country!  It  would  have  been  an  oligarchy  of 
decemvirs,  on  the  firft  day  of  its  fitting  ;  it 
would  have  inftantly  been  torn  with  all  the  agita- 
tions of  Venice,  between  the  ariftocracy  and  oli- 
garchy, in  the  aflembly  itfelf.  If,  by  ballots 
and  rotations,  and  a  thoufand  other  contrivances, 
it  could  have  been  combined  together,  it  would 
have  ftripped  the  people  of  England  of  every 
fhadow  of  liberty,  and  grown  in  the  next  gene- 
ration a  lazy,  haughty,  oftentatious  group  of  pa- 
latines :  but  if  they  rjad  fallen  into  divilions, 
they  would  have  deluged  the  nation  in  blood, 

till 


Locke,  Milton,  and  Hume.  369 

till  one  defpot  would  have  ruled  the  whole. 
John  Milton  was  as  honefl  a  man  as  this  nation, 
ever  bred,  and  as  great  a  friend  of  liberty :  but 
his  greatnefs  moft  certainly  did  not  confift  in  the 
knowledge  of  the  nature  of  man  and  of  govern- 
ment, if  we  are  to  judge  from  this  performance, 
or  from  "  The  prefent  Means  and  brief  Delinea- 
"  tion  of  a  free  Commonwealth,"  in  his  letter  to 
General  Monk.-— Americans  in  this  age  are  too 
enlightened  to  be  bubbled  out  of  their  liberties, 
even  by  fuch  mighty  names  as  Locke,  Milton, 
Turgot,  or  Hume  ;  they  know  that  popular  elec- 
tions of  one  effential  branch  of  the  legislature,  fre- 
quently repeated,  are  the  only  poffible  method  of 
forming  a  free  conftitution,  or  of  preferving  the 
government  of  laws  from  the  domination  of  men, 
or  of  preferving  their  lives,  liberties,  or  properties 
in  fecurity ;  they  know,  though  Locke  and  Milton 
did  not,  that  when  popular  elections  are  given  up, 
liberty  and  free  government  muft  be  given  up. 
Upon  this  principle,  they  cannot  approve  the  plan 
of  Mr.  Hume,  in  his  "  Idea  of  a  perfect  Common- 
ce  wealth." — "  Let  all  the  freeholders  of  twenty 
"  pounds  a  year  in  the  county,  and  all  the  houfe- 
<c  holders  worth  five  hundred  pounds  in  the  town 
cc  parifhes,  meet  annually  in  the  parifh-church, 
"  and  choofe,  by  ballot,  fome  freeholder  of  the 
"  county  for  their  member,  whom  we  lhall  call 
*c  the  county-reprefentative.  Let  the  hundred 
*c  county-reprefentatives,  two  days  after  their 
"  election,  meet  in  the  county-town,  and  choofe 
"  by  ballot,  from  their  own  body,  ten  county- 
"  magiftrates,  and  one  fenator.  There  are  there- 
cc  fore,  in  the  whole  commonwealth,  one  hun- 
"  dred  fenators,  eleven  hundred  county-magif- 
<c  trates,  and  ten  thoufand  county-reprefentatives ; 
"  for  we  ihall  beftow  on  all  fenators  the  autho- 

"  rity 


3  7°  Conclusion* 

cc  rity  of  county-magiftrates,  and  on  all  county- 
"  magiftrates  the  authority  of  county-reprefenta- 
"  tives.  Let  the  fenators  meet  in  the  capital, 
"  and  be  endowed  with  the  whole  executive 
cc  power  of  the  commonwealth;  the  power  of 
"  peace  and  war,  of  giving  orders  to  generals, 
"  admirals,  and  ambafladors*  and,  in  fhort,  all 
"  the  prerogatives  of  a  Britim  king,  except  his 
"  negative.  Let  the  county-reprefentatives  meet 
"  in  their  particular  counties,  and  poffefs  the 
"  whole  legiflative  power  of  the  commonwealth  ; 
"  the  greater  number  of  counties  deciding  the 
cc  queftion ;  and  where  thefe  are  equal,  let  the 
<c  fenate  have  the  cafting  vote.  Every  new  law 
"  mufl  firft  be  debated  in  the  fenate ;  and,  though 
cc  rejected  by  it,  if  ten  fenators  iniift  and  protefl, 
"  it  muft  be  fent  down  to  the  counties :  the  fe- 
<c  nate,  if  they  pleafe,  may  join  to  the  copy  of 
"  the  law  their  reafons  for  receiving  or  rejecting 
"  it,"  &c. — The  fenate,  by  the  ballot  of  Venice 
or  Malta,  are  to  choofe  a  protedor,  who  re- 
prefents  the  dignity  of  the  commonwealth,  and 
prefides  in  the  fenate;  two  fecretaries  of  ftate, 
and  a  council  of  Hate,  a  council  of  religion  and 
learning,  a  council  of  trade,  a  council  of  laws, 
a  council  of  war,  a  council  of  the  admiralty — 
each  of  five  perfons,  all  fenators;  and  feven  com* 
miffi oners  of  the  treafury. 

If  you  compare  this  plan,  as  well  as  thofe  of 
Locke  and  Milton,  with  the  principles  and  exam- 
ples in  the  foregoing  letters,  you  will  foon  form 
a  judgment  of  them ;  it  is  not  my  defign  to  enlarge 
upon  them.  That  of  Hume  is  a  complicated  arifto- 
cracy,  and  would  foon  behave  like  all  other  arifto- 
cracies.  It .  is  enough  to  fay  that  the  reprefenta- 
tives  of  the  people  may  by  the  fenators  be  de- 
prived of  a  voice  in  the  legiilature  ;  becaufe  the 

fenate 


Locke 3  Milton,  and  Hume.  371 

fenate  have  their  choice  of  fending  the  laws  down, 
either  to  the  county-magiftrates  or  county-repre- 
fentatives.  It  is  an  ingenious  device,  to  be  fare, 
to  get  rid  of  the  people  and  their  reprefentatives ; 
befides  that  the  delays  and  confuiions  would  be 
endlefs,  in  fending  the  laws  to  be  debated  in  as 
many  feparate  commonwealths  as  there  are  coun- 
ties. But  the  two  decilive  objections  are,  i.  Let^ 
ting  the  nobility  or  fenate  into  the  management  of 
the  executive  power;  and,  2d.  Taking  the  eyes  of 
the  people  off  from  their  reprefentatives  in  the  le- 
giilature.  The  liberty  of  the  people  depends  en- 
tirely on  the  conftant  and  direct  communication 
between  them  and  the  legiflature,  by  means  of 
their  reprefentatives. 

The  improvements  to  be  made  in  the  Englifh 
conftitution  lie  entirely  in  the  houje  of  commons. 
If  county-members  were  abolifhed,  and  reprefent- 
atives proportionally  and  frequently  chofen  in 
fmall  diftricts,  and  if  no  candidate  could  be  chofeii 
but  an  eftablifhed  long-fettled  inhabitant  of  that 
diftrict,  it  would  be  impoflible  to  corrupt  the  peo- 
ple of  England,  and  the  houfe  of  commons  migh.t 
be  an  immortal  guardian  of  the  national  liberty. 
Inftead  of  projects  to  abolifh  kings  and  lords,  if 
the  houfe  of  commons  had  been  attended  to,  wild 
wars  would  not  have  been  engaged  in,  nor  count- 
lefs  millions  thrown  away,  nor  would  there  have 
remained  an  imperfection  perhaps  in  the  Englifh 
conftitution.  Let  the  people  take  care  of  the  ba- 
lance, and  efpecially  their  part  of  it :  but  the  pre- 
fervation  of  their  peculiar  part  of  it  will  depend 
ftill  upon  the  exigence  and  independence  of  the 
other  two;  the  inftant  the  other  branches  are  de- 
ftroyed,  their  own  branch,  their  own  deputies,  be- 
come their  tyrants. 

VOL.  I.  A3  LETTER 


Conclusion' 


LETTER     LV. 


CONCLUSION. 


Grofoenor-fqwre,  Dec.  21,  1786, 

My  dear  Sir, 

ACCORDING  to  Mr.  Turgot's  idea  of  a 
perfed  commonwealth,  a  iingle  aflembly  is 
to  be  poffefled  of  all  authority,  legiflative,  exe- 
cutive, and  judicial.  It  will  be  a  proper  conclu- 
fion  of  all  our  fpeculations  upon  this,  the  moft 
interefting  fubjeft  which  can  employ  the  thoughts 
of  men,  to  coniider  in  what  manner  fuch  an  af- 
fembly  will  conduft  its  deliberations,  and  exert 
its  power.  The  executive  power  is  properly  the 
government ;  the  laws  are  a  dead  letter  until  an 
adminiftration  begins  to  carry  them  into  execu- 
tion. Let  us  begin  then  with  this.  If  there  is 
an  army  to  raife,  this  iingle  aflembly  is  to  ap- 
point all  its  officers.  The  man  of  the  moft  am- 
ple fortune,  the  moft  honourable  defcent,  the 
greateft  abilities,  efpecially  if  there  .is  any  one 
among  them  who  has  had  experience,  rendered 
important  fervices,  and  acquired  fame  in  war, 
will  be  chofen  general.  This  event  is  a  great 
point  gained  by  the  ariftocracy;  and  a  great  ad- 
vance towards  the  fele&ion  of  one,  in  cafe  of con- 
vulfions  and  confufions,  for  monarchy.  The  ge- 
neral has  vaft  influence,  of  courfe,  with  the  whole 

nation, 


A  f? 

OF  TTTTS 

TVERSI1 


Conclusion.  375 

nation,  and  efpecially  with  the  officers  of  his  ar- 
ray; whofe  articles  of  war,  and  whofe  habits, 
both  of  obedience  and  command,  eftablifh  a  fyf- 
tem  of  fubordination  of  which  he  is  the  centre, 
and  produce  an  attachment  that  never  wears  out. 
The  general,  even  without  being  fenfible  of  it, 
will  naturally  fall  in  with  the  views  of  the  arifto- 
cratical  body,  in  promoting  men  of  family,  pro- 
perty, and  abilities;  and  indeed,  in  general,  it 
will  be  his  duty  to  do  this,  as  fuch  are  undoubt- 
edly, in  general,  the  fitteft  for  the  fervice  :  his 
whole  corps  of  officers  will  grow  habitually  to 
refpect  fuch  only,  or  at  leaft  chiefly;  and  it  muft 
be  added,  becaufe  experience  proves  it,  and  the 
truth  requires  it  to  be  mentioned,  to  entertain 
fome  degree  of  contempt  for  the  reft  of  the  peo- 
ple, as  "  rank  and  file."  The  general's  recom- 
mendation will  have  great  weight  in  the  aflem- 
bly,  and  will  in  time  be  given  chiefly,  if  not 
wholly,  to  men  who  are  either  of  the  ariftocrati- 
cal  body  themfelves,  or  at  leaft  recommended  by 
fuch  as  are  fo.  All  the  other  officers  of  the  army 
are  to  be  appointed  by  this  afTembly  ;  and  we 
muft  fuppofe  that  all  the  general  officers  and 
field  officers  will  be  of  patrician  families,  be- 
caufe each  candidate  will  be  unknown  to  nine- 
tenths  of  the  aflembly.  He  comes  from  a  part 
of  the  ftate  which  a  vaft  majority  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  aflembly  do  not  particularly  reprefent, 
and  are  unacquainted  with  ;  they  muft  therefore 
take  his  character  upon  truft  from  his  patron  in 
the  houfe,  fome  member  who  is  his  neighbour, 
and  who  perhaps  owes  his  ele&ion  to  him  or  his 
particular  friends.  —  Here  is  an  endlefs  fource  of 
debate  and  delay.  When  there  are  two  or  more 
candidates  for  a  commiflion,  and  there  will  ge- 

nerally 


374  Conclusion* 

nerally  be  feveral,  how  fliall  an  affembly  of  five 
hundred  or  one  hundred  men,  colle&ed  from  all 
the  mod  diftant  parts  of  a  large  ftate,  become  in- 
formed of  the  merits  and  preteniions  of  each  can- 
didate ?  It  can  only  be  done  in  public  or  in  pri- 
vate. If  in  public,  it  expofes  the  chara&ers  of 
the  candidates  to  a  public  difcuffion,  which  few 
men  can  bear;  it  confumes  time  without  end; 
and  it  will  frequently  happen,  that  the  time  of  the 
whole  affembly  fhall  be  wafted,  and  all  the  pub- 
lic affairs  delayed,  for  days  and  weeks,  in  delibe- 
rating and  debating,  affirming  and  denying,  con- 
tradicting and  proving,  in  the  appointment  of  a 
lingle  officer ;  and,  after  all,  he  who  has  friends 
of  the  moft  influence  in  the  houfe,  who  will  be 
generally  of  the  ariftocratical  complexion,  will 
be  preferred.  It  is  moderate  to  fay  that  the  lofs 
of  time  and  delay  of  bufinefs  will  be  a  greater 
burthen  to  the  ftate  than  the  whole  fupport  of  a 
governor  and  council,  If  there  is  a  navy,  the 
fame  procefs  muft  be  gone  through  refpedling  ad- 
mirals, captains,  and  all  other  officers.  All  the 
officers  of  revenue,  police,  juftice,  muft  be  ap- 
pointed in  the  fame  way.  Ambaffadors,  confuls, 
agents  to  foreign  countries,  muft  be  appointed 
too  by  vote  of  aflembly. — This  branch  of  bufi- 
nefs alone  would  fill  up  the  whole  year,  and  be 
more  than  could  be  done.  An  aflembly  muft  be 
informed  before  it  can  a6l,  The  underftanding 
and  conference  of  every  member  mould  be  clear- 
ly fatisfied  before  he  can  vote.  Information  is 
to  be  had  only  by  debate,  and  examination  of 
evidence.  Any  man  may  fee  that  this  muft  be 
attended  with  difficulty;  but  no  man  who  has 
not  feeri  the  infide  of  fuch  an  affembly,  can  con- 
ceive the  confufion,  uncertainty,  and  procrafti- 

nation 


Conclusion.  375 

nation  of  fuch  proceedings.  The  American  pro- 
vincial congreffes  had  experience  enough  of  this  ; 
and  gentlemen  were  more  convinced,  by  what 
they  there  faw,  heard,  and  felt,  of  the  neceflity 
of  three  branches,  than  they  would  have  been  by 
reafoning  or  reading ;  it  was  generally  agreed, 
that  the  appointment  of  officers  by  lot  would 
have  been  a  more  rational  method. — But  this  is 
not  all:  the  army,  the  navy,  revenue,  excife, 
cufloms,  police,  juflice,  and  all  foreign  minifters, 
rnuft  be  gentlemen,  that  is  to  fay,  friends  and 
connections  of  the  rich,  well-born  and  well-edu- 
cated members  of  the  houfe ;  or,  if  they  are  not, 
the  community  will  be  filled  with  flander,  fufpi- 
cion,  and  ridicule  againfl  them,  as  ill-bred,  ig- 
norant, and  in  all  refpecls  unqualified  for  their 
trulls;  and  the  plebeians  themlelves  will  be  as 
ready  as  any  to  join  in  the  cry,  and  run  down 
their  characters.  In  the  fecond  place,  there  ne- 
ver was  yet  a  people  who  muft  not  have  fome- 
body  or  fomething  to  reprefent  the  dignity  of  the 
ftate,  the  majefty  of  the  people,  call  it  what  you 
will — a  doge,  an  avoyer,  an  archon,  a  prelident, 
a  conful,  a  fyndic ;  this  becomes  at  once  an  ob- 
ject of  ambition  and  difpute,  and,  in  time,  of  di- 
viiion,  fadlion,  fedition,  and  rebellion. — The  next 
inquiry  is,  concerning  the  adminiftration  of  juf- 
tice.  Shall  every  criminal  be  brought  before  this 
affembly  and  tried  ?  ihall  he  be  there  accufed  be- 
fore five  hundred  men?  witneffes  introduced, 
counfel  heard  ?  This  again  would  take  up  more 
than  the  whole  year;  and  no  man,  after  all, 
would  coniider  his  life,  liberty,  or  property,  fafe 
in  fuch  a  tribunal.  Thefe  all  depend  upon  the 
difquiiitions  of  the  counfel,  the  knowledge  of  the 
law  in  the  judges,  the  confrontation  of  parties 

and 


376  Conclusions 

and  witneffes,  the  forms  of  proceedings,  by  which 
the  facts  and  the  law  are  fairly  ftated  before  the 
jury  for  their  decifion,  the  rules  of  evidence,  by 
which  the  attention  of  the  jury  is  confined  to 
proper  points,  and  the  artifices  of  parties  and 
counfel  avoided.  An  affembly  of  five  hundred 
men  are  totally  incapable  of  this  order,  as  well 
as  knowledge ;  for,  as  the  vote  of  the  majority 
muft  determine,  every  member  rnuft  be  capable, 
or  all  is  uncertain :  belides,  it  is  the  unanimity 
of  the  jury  that  preferves  the  rights  of  mankind — 
muft  the  whole  five  hundred  be  unanimous  ? — 
Will  it  be  faid  that  the  affembly  fhall  appoint 
committees  ta  try  caufes  ?  But  who  are  to  make 
thefe  appointments  ?  Will  not  a  few  haughty  pa- 
latines in  the  affembly  have  influence  enough  to 
determine  the  ele6iion  in  favour  of  their  friends  ? 
and  will  not  this  make  the  judges  the  tools  of  a 
party?  If  the  leaders  are  divided  into  parties, 
will  not  one  prevail  at  one  year,  and  another  the 
next  ?  and  will  not  this  introduce  the  moft 
wretched  of  fervitudes,  an  uncertain  jurifpru- 
dence  ?  Will  it  be  faid  that  the  affembly  fhall 
appoint  committees  for  the  nomination  of  offi- 
cers ?  The  fame  intrigues  and  greater  ftruggles, 
would  be  introduced  for  the  place  of  a  com- 
mittee-man ;  and  there  would  be  frequent  ap- 
peals from  thole  committees  to  the  body  that 
appointed  them.  Shall  the  affembly  appoint  a 
governor  or  prefident,  and  give  him  all  the  exe- 
cutive power  ?  Why  fhpuld  not  the  people  at 
large  appoint  him  ?  Giving  this  power  to  the 
affembly  will  open  a  wider  door  to  intrigue  for 
the  place ;  and  the  ariftoeratical  families  will  be 
fure,  nine  times  in  ten,  to  carry  their  choice  in 
this  way;  and,  what  is  much,  worfe,  the  firft  ma- 
gi ft  rate 


Conclusion.  377 

giftrate  will  be  coniidered  as  dependent  on  every 
obfcure  member  of  the  houfe,  but  in  reality  he 
will  be  dependent  only  on  a  dozen  or  a  fcore, 
perhaps  on  two  or  three,  of  the  whole.  He  will 
be  liable  to  daily  motions,  debates,  and  votes  of 
cenfure.  Inftead  of  thinking  of  his  duty  to  the 
people  at  large,  he  will  confine  his  attention  chief- 
ly to  the  affembly,  and  believe,  that  if  he  can 
fatisfy  them,  or  a  majority  of  them,  he  has  cjone 
his  duty.  After  all,  any  of  thefe  devices  are  only 
changing  words  ;  they  are,  in  reality,  erecting  dif- 
ferent orders  of  men,  and  aiming  at  balances, 
as  much  as  the  fyftem  which  fo  much  difpleafes 
Mr.  Turgot ;  they  are  introducing,  in  effect,  all 
the  inequalities  and  difputes  that  he  fo  greatly 
apprehends,  without  any  of  that  fecurity  to  the 
laws,  which  ought  to  be  the  principal  object ;  they 
render  the  executive  power,  which  is  in  truth  the 
government,  the  inftrument  of  a  few  grandees. 
If  thefe  are  capable  of  a  combination  with  each 
other,  they  will  feldom  difagree  in  their  opinion, 
which  is  the  richefl  man  and  of  the  firft  family ; 
and,  as  thefe  will  be  all  their  inquiries,  they  will 
generally  carry  their  election  :  if  they  are  divided, 
in  conitant  wrangles  with  each  other,  and  perpe- 
tual attacks  upon  the  prefident  about  the  difcharge 
of  his  functions,  they  will  keep  the  nation  anxi- 
ous and  irritated,  with  controverfies  which  can 
never  be  decided  nor  ended.  If  they  agree,  and 
the  plebeians  ftill  carry  the  vote  againft  them, 
the  choice  will  neverthelefs  probably  fall  upon 
one  of  their  number,  who  will  be  difpofed  to  fa- 
vour them  too  much ;  but  if  it  falls  upon  a  ple- 
beian, there  commences  at  once  a  feries  of  con- 
tefts  between  the  rich  and  the  poor,  which  will 
never  end  but  in  the  ruin  of  the  popular  power 

and 


378  Conclusion. 

and  the  national  liberty — or  at  leaft  in  a  revo- 
lution and  a  new  conftitution.  As  the  executive 
power,  the  eflence  of  government,  is  ever  odious 
to  popular  envy  and  jealoufy,  it  will  ever  be  in 
the  power  of  a  few  illuflrious  and  wealthy  citizens 
to  excite  clamours  and  uneaiinefs,  if  not  commo- 
tions and  feditions,  againft  it.  Although  it  is  the 
natural  friend  of  the  people,  and  the  only  defence 
which  they  or  their  reprefentatives  can  have 
againft  the  avarice  and  ambition  of  the  rich  and 
diftinguifhed  citizens,  yet  fuch  is  their  thought- 
lefs  fimplicity,  they  are  ever  ready  to  believe  that 
the  evils  they  feel  are  brought  upon  them  by  the 
executive  power.  How  eafy  is  it  then  for  a  few 
artful  men,  among  the  ariftocratical  body,  to  make 
a  preiident,  thus  appointed  and  fupported,  unpo- 
pular, though  he  conducts  himfelf  with  all  the 
integrity  and  ability  which  his  office  requires  ? 

But  we  have  not  yet  confidered  how  the  legif- 
lative  power  is  to  be  exercifed  in  this  lingle  af- 
fembly  ? — Is  there  to  be  a  conftitution  ?  Who 
are  to  compofe  it?  The  aflembly  itfelf,  or  a 
convention  called  for  that  purpofe  ?  In  either 
cafe,  whatever  rules  are  agreed  on  for  the  prefer- 
vation  of  the  lives,  liberties,  properties,  and  cha- 
racters of  the  citizens,  what  is  to  hinder  this  af- 
fembly  from  tranfgreffing  the  bounds  which  they 
have  prefcribed  to  themfelves,  or  which  the  con- 
vention has  ordained  for  them  ?  The  convention 
has  publifhed  its  code,  and  is  no  more.  Shall  a 
new  convention  be  called,  to  determine  every 
queftion  which  arifes  concerning  a  violation  of 
the  conftitution  ?  This  would  require  that  the 
convention  ftiould  lit  whenever  the  affembly  fits, 
and  confider  and  determine  every  queftion  which 
is  agitated  in  it.  This  is  the  very  thing  we  con- 
tend 


Conclusion.  3*79 

tend  for,  viz.  that  there  may  be  two  aflemblies ; 
one  to  divide,  and  the  other  to  choofe.  Grant 
me  this,  and  I  am  fatisfied,  provided  you  will 
confine  both  the  convention  and  aflembly  to  le- 
giflation,  and  give  the  whole  executive  power  to 
another  body.  I  had  almoft  ventured  to  propofe 
a  third  aflembly  for  the  executive  power  ;  but 
the  unity,  the  fecrecy,  the  difpatch  of  one  man, 
has  no  equal ;  and  the  executive  power  fhould  be 
watched  by  all  men ;  the  attention  of  the  whole 
nation  fhould  be  fixed  upon  one  point,  and  the 
blame  and  cenfure,  as  well  as  the  impeach- 
ments and  vengeance  for  abufes  of  this  power, 
mould  be  directed  folely  to  the  minifters  of  one 
man. — But  to  purfue  our  iingle  aflembly.  The 
firft  year,  or  the  firft  feven  years,  they  may  be 
moderate ;  efpecially  in  dangerous  times,  and 
while  an  exiled  royal  family,  or  exiled  patricians 
or  nobles,  are  living,  and  may  return ;  or  while 
the  people's  paffions  are  alive,  and  their  attention 
awake,  from  the  frefh  remembrance  of  danger 
and  diftrefs  :  but  when  thefe  tranfitory  caufes  pafs 
away,  as  there  is  an  affe&ion  and  confidence  be- 
tween the  people  and  their  reprefentatives,  fup- 
pofe  the  latter  begin  to  make  diftin&ions,  by 
making  exceptions  of  themfelves  in  the  laws  ? — 
They  may  frank  letters ;  they  are  exempted  from 
arrefts;  they  can  privilege  fervants — One  little 
diftinclion  after  another,  in  time  makes  up  a 
large  fum.  Some  few  of  the  people  will  com- 
plain ;  but  the  majority,  loving  their  reprefenta- 
tives, will  acquiefce.  Prefently  they  are  ex- 
empted from  taxes.  Then. their  duration  is  too 
fhort;  from  annual  they  become  biennial,  trien- 
nial, feptennial,  for  life ;  and  at  length,  inflead 
of  applying  to  conftituents  to  fill  up  vacancies, 
VOL.  I.  B  the 


380  Conclusion. 

the  aflembly  takes  it  upon  itfelf,  or  gives  it  to 
their  president.  In  the  mean  time,  wars  are 
concluded  by  heroes  to  triumph  and  conqueft, 
negociations  are  carried  on  with  fuccefs,  com- 
merce flourifhes,  the  nation  is  profperous; — the 
citizens  are  flattered,  vain,  proud  of  their  feli- 
city, envied  by  others  :  it  would  be  the  baf- 
eft,  the  moft  odious  ingratitude,  at  leaft  it  would 
be  fo  reprefented,  to  find  fault  with  their  rulers. 
In  a  word,  as  long  as  half  a  fcore  of  capital 
charadlers  agree,  they  will  gradually  form  the 
houfe  and  the  nation  into  a  fyftem  of  fubordi- 
nation  and  dependence  to  themfelves,  and  go- 
vern all  at  their  difcretion— -a  fimple  ariftocracy 
or  oligarchy  in  effect,  though  a  iimple  demo- 
cracy in  name  :  but  as  every  one  of  thefe  is 
emulous  of  others,  and  more  than  one  of  them 
is  conftantly  tormented  with  a  defire  to  be  the 
firft,  they  will  foon  difagree ;  and  then  the  houfe 
and  the  nation  gradually  divides  itfelf  into  four 
parties,  one  of  which  at  leaft  will  wifh  for  mo- 
narchy, another  for  ariftocracy,  a  thirol  for  de- 
mocracy, and  a  fourth  for  various  mixtures  of 
them  ;  and  thefe  parties  can  never  come  to  a 
decifion  but  by  a  ftruggle,  or  by  the  fword. 
There  is  no  remedy  for  this,  but  in  a  convention 
of  deputies  from  all  parts  of  the  ftate :  but  an 
equal  convention  can  hardly  be  obtained,  except 
in  times  like  thofe  we  have  lately  feen,  when  the 
danger  could  only  be  warded  off  by  the  aid  and 
exertions  of  the  whole  body  of  the  people :  when 
no  fuch  danger  from  without  mail  prefs,  thofe 
who  are  proud  of  their  wealth,  blood,  or  wit, 
will  never  give  way  to  fair  and  equal  eftablifh- 
ments.  All  parties  will  be  afraid  of  calling  a 
convention  ;  but  if  it  muft  be  agreed  to,  the 

ariftocratieal 


Conclusion.  381 

ariftocratical  party  will  pufh  their  influence,  and 
obtain  ele6tions  even  into  the  conventions  for 
themfelves  and  their  friends,  fo  as  to  carry  points 
there,  which  perhaps  they  could  not  have  carried 
in  the  afTembly. 

But  ihall  the  people  at  large  elecl;  a  governor 
and  council  annually  to  manage  the  executive 
power,  and  a  fmgle  aflembly  to  have  the  whole 
legiilative  ?  In  this  cafe,  the  executive  power, 
inftead  of  being  independent,  will  be  the  inftru- 
ment  of  a  few  leading  members  of  the  houfe ;  be- 
caufe  the  executive  power,  being  an  object  of  jea- 
"loufy  and  envy  to  the  people,  and  the  legiflative 
an  objeft  of  their  confidence  and  affe&ion,  the  lat- 
ter will  always  be  able  to  render  the  former  un- 
popular, and  undermine  its  influence. — But  if  the 
people  for  a  time  fupport  an  executive  difagreea- 
ble  to  the  leaders  in  the  legiflative,  the  conftitu- 
tion  will  be  difregarded,  and  the  nation  will  be  di- 
vided between  the  two  bodies,  and  each  muft  at 
laft  have  an  army  to  decide  the  queftion.  A  con- 
ftitution  confiding  of  an  executive  in  one  fingle 
aflembly,  and  a  legiflative  in  another,  is  already 
compofed  of  two  armies  in  battle  array;  and  no- 
thing is  wanting,  but  the  word  of  command,  to  be- 
gin the  combat. 

In  the  prefent  flate  of  fociety  and  manners  in 
America,  with  a  people  living  chiefly  by  agricul- 
ture, in  fmall  numbers,  fprinkled  over  large  trafts 
of  land,  they  are  not  fubjed  to  thofe  panics  and 
tranfports,  thofe  contagions  of  madnefs  and  folly, 
which  are  feen  in  countries  where  large  numbers 
live  in  fmall  places,  in  daily  fear  of  perifhing  for 
want :  we  know,  therefore,  that  the  people  can 
live  and  increafe  under  almoft  any  kind  of  go- 
vernment, or  without  any  government  at  all.  But 


382  Conclusion. 

it  is  of  great  importance  to  begin  well ;  mifar- 
rangements  now  made,  will  have  great,  extenfive, 
and  diftant  confequences;  and  we  are  now  em- 
ployed, how  little  foever  we  may  think  of  it,  in 
making  eftablifhments  which  will  affed  the  hap- 
pineis  of  an  hundred  millions  of  inhabitants  at  a 
time,  in  a  period  not  very  diftant.  All  nations, 
under  all  governments,  mufl  have  parties  ;  the 
great  fee  ret  is  to  controul  them :  there  are  but  two 
ways,  either  by  a  monarchy  and  ftanding  army, 
or  by  a  balance  in  the  conftitution.  Where  the 
people  have  a  voice,  and  there  is  no  balance,  there 
will  be  everlafting  fluctuations,  revolutions,  and 
horrors,  until  a  ftanding  army,  with  a  general  at 
its  head,  commands  the  peace,  or  the  neceffity  of 
an  equilibrium  is  made  appear  to  all,  and  is  adopt- 
ed by  all. 

I  am, 

My  dear  Sir, 

With  much  efteem  and  afieftion, 
Yours, 

JOHN  ADAMS. 
William  Stephens  Smith,  Efq. 


POSTSCRIPT. 


(    333    ) 
POSTSCRIPT. 

THE  foreign  gazettes  and  journals  have  an- 
nounced to  the  world  that  the  Abbe  De  Ma- 
bly  was  applied  to  by  the  United  States  of  Ame- 
rica for  his  advice  and  affiftance  in  the  formation 
of  a  code  of  laws.  It  is  unneceffary  to  fay  any  thing 
to  this,  only  that  it  is  a  part  of  a  million  volumes  of 
lies,  according  to  the  beft  computation,  which  are 
to  be  impofed  upon  pofterity,  relative  to  Ameri- 
can affairs.  The  Abbe  himfelf  in  his  obferva- 
tions,  has  faid  that  I  defired  his  fentiments.  This 
is  true ;  but  the  manner  of  the  requeft  ought  to 
be  known,  that  thofe  who  think  it  of  any  con- 
fequence  may  underftand  in  what  fenfe  it  is  true. 
Upon  my  arrival  in  Paris,  in  October  1 782,  upon 
the  bufinefs  of  the  peace,  the  Abbe  De  Mably's 
book,  upon  the  manner  of  writing  hiftory,  was 
put  into  my  hands.  At  the  concluiion  of  that 
publication  he  declared  his  intention  of  writing 
on  the  American  revolution.  Meeting  the  Abbe 
foon  afterwards,  at  dinner,  at  Moniieur  De  Cha- 
lut's,  the  farmer  general,  my  friends  the  Abbes 
De  Chalut  and  Arnowe,  who  were  of  the  party, 
informed  me  that  their  friend  was  about  writing 
the  hiftory  of  the  American  revolution,  and  would 
be  obliged  to  me  for  any  fads  or  memorials  that 
might  be  in  my  power.  The  queftion  was  afked, 
What  part  of  the  revolution  he  intended  to  write  ? 
The  whole. — Where  had  he  obtained  the  mate- 
rials? It  was  fuppofed  they  might  be  obtained 
from  the  public  papers,  and  inquiry  of  indivi- 
duals.— In  anfwer  to  this  a  few  difficulties  were 
ftarted,  and  the  converfation  fpun  into  length. 
At  laft  the  gentlemen  alked  to  have,  in  writing, 
what  had  been  then  faid  upon  the  fubje6l,  as,  the 
converfation  being  in  French,  it  might  not  have 
been  fully  comprehended.  Accordingly,  in  a  few 

days, 


384  Pojlfcript. 

days,  I  wrote  the  Abbe  a  letter,  the  tranflation  of 
which,  by  a  friend,  into  French,  is  here  inclofed ; 
the  original,  in  Englifh,  not  being  in  my  poffef- 
iion.  By  this  you  will  fee,  that  the  requeft  to  the 
Abbe  to  write  upon  American  affairs,  was  a  mere 
civility ;  and  rather  a  deiire  that  he  would  not 
expofe  himfelf,  by  attempting  an  hiftory  that  he 
was  altogether  unprovided  for,  than  any  formal 
lequeft  that  he  fhould  write  at  all. — We  ought  to 
be  obliged  to  any  gentleman  in  Europe  who  will 
favour  us  with  his  thoughts :  but,  in  general,  the 
theory  of  government  is  as  well  underftood  in 
America  as  it  is  in  Europe ;  and  by  great  numbers 
of  individuals  is  every  thing  relating  to  a  free  con- 
ftitution,  infinitely  better  comprehended  than  by 
the  Abbe  De  Mably  or  Mr.  Turgot,  amiable, 
learned,  and  ingenious  as  they  were. 

A  Monsieur  fAble  de  Mably. 

cc  C'eft  avec  plaiiir  que  j'ai  appris  votre  deflein 
"  d'ecrire  fur  la  Revolution  ^4mericaine,iparceque 
"  vos  autres  ecrits,  qui  font  beaucoup  admires 
"  des  Americains,  contiennent  des  principes  de 
"  Legiflation,  de  Politique  &  de  Negociation  qui 
"  font  parfaitement  analogues  auxleurs;  de  forte 
cc  que  vous  ne  pourrez  guere  ecrire  fur  ce  fujet 
"  fans  produire  un  ouvrage  qui  fervira  a  1'inftruc- 
"  tion  du  public,  &  furtout  a  celle  de  mes  Conci- 
cc  toyens.  Mais  j'efpere  que  vous  ne  m'accufe- 
"  rez  pas  de  prefomption  d'affeclation  ou  de  fin- 
"  gularite,  fi  je  hazarde  de  vous  dire  que  je  fuis 
"  d'opinion  qu'il  eft  encore  trop-tot  pour  entre- 
"  prendre  une  Hiftoire  complette  de  ce  grand 
*c  evenement,  &  qui'il  n'y  a  perfonne  ni  en  Europe 
"  ni  en  Amerique,  qui,  jufqu'a  prefent,  foit  en 
"  etat  de  la  faire  &  qui  ait  les  materiaux  requis 
"  ou  neceffaires  pour  cela." 

"  Pour  entreprendre  un  tel  ouvrage,  un  Ecri- 

<c  vain 


Pofifcript.  385 

"  vain  devrait  divifer  1'Hiftoire  de  1'Amerique  en. 
"  plufieurs  periodes," 

"  i°.  Depuis  le  premier  etabliflement  des  Co- 
"  lonies  en  1600,  jufqu'au  commencement  de 
"  leurs  brouilleries  avec  la  Grande-Bretagne  in 
"  1761. 

"  2°.  Depuis  ce  commencement  (occafionne 
"  par  un  ordre  du  Bureau  de  Commerce  &  des 
"  Plantations  dans  la  Grande-Bretagne,  donne  aux 
"  officiers  de  la  Douane  en  Amerique,  de  faire 
<c  executer  d'une  maniere  plus  rigourieufe  les 
"  a&es  du  Commerce,  &  d'avoir  recours  aux 
"  cours  de  la  juftice  pour  avoir  des  decrets  d'af- 
"  fiftance  a  cette  fin)  jufqu'au  commencement 
"  des  hoftilites,  le  19  d'Avril  1775.  Pendant 
ec  cette  periode  de  14  ans  il  n'y  eut  qu'une  guerre 
*c  de  plume. 

"  3°.  Depuis  la  Bataille  de  Lexington  jufqu'a 
"  la  fignature  du  Traite  avec  la  France,  le  6  FCN 
"  vrier  1778.  Durant  cette  periode  de  3  ans,  la 
"  guerre  le  fit  uniquement  entre  la  Grande-Bre- 
"  tagne  &  les  Etats-Unis. 

<c  4°.  Depuis  le  Traite  avec  la  France  jufqu'- 
cc  aux  hoftilites  entre  la  Grande-Bretagne  &  la 
"  France  premierement ;  puis  avec  1'Efpagne, 
"  enfuite  jufqu'au  developpement  de  la  Neutra- 
"  lite  armee,  &  a  la  guerre  contre  la  Hollande. 
<c  Enfin,  toutes  ces  f9enes  trouvent  leur  denou- 
cc  ment  dans  les  Negociations  de  la  Paix. 

"  Sans  une  connaiflance  diftinde  de  1'Hiftoire 
"  des  Colonies  dans  la  premiere  periode,  un  Ecri- 
"  vain  fe  trouvera  toujours  embarafle,  depuis  le 
"  commencement  de  fon  ouvrage  jufqu'a  la  fin, 
<c  pour  rendre  compte  des  evenements  &  des  ca- 
<c  rac^eres  qui  fe  prefenteront  a  decrire  a  chaque 
<c  pas,  a  mefure  qu'il  avance  vers  la  feconde,  la 
"  troifieme,  &c  la  quatrieme  periodes.  Pour  ac- 
cc  queriruneconnaifiancefuffifantede  la  premiere 

periode 


386  Pofljcript. 

«  periode,  il  faudrait  lire  toutes  les  Chartes  accor- 
<c  dees  aux  Colonies  &  les  CommiJJions  and  Injlruc- 
c<  tions  donnees  aux  Gouverneurs,  tous  les  Codes  de 
"  Loi  des  differences  Colonies  (&  Treize  Volumes 
"  in  Folio  de  Statuts  fees  et  rebutans  qui  ne  fe 
"  lifent  guere  avee  .plaifir  ni  en  pen  de  terns)  tous 
"  les  Regiflres  de  la  Legijlature  des  differ  entes  Co/o- 
<c  nies ;  que  1'on  ne  trouvera  qu'en  manufcrit  & 
<c  en  voyageant  en  perfonne,  depuis  News-Hamp- 
<c  fhire  jufqu'a  la  Georgie ;  les  Regiftres  des  Bu- 
"  reaux  de  Commerce  &  des  Plantations  dans  la 
"  Grande-Eretagne  depuis  leur  inftitution  jufqu'a 
cc  leur  diffolution,  comme  aufli  les  Papiers  des 
"  Bureaux  de  quelques-unes  des  Secretaireries  d'Etat. 

"  II  y  a  une  autre  branche  de  ledure,  dont  Ton 
£C  ne  faurait  fe  difpenfer,  quand  Ton  pourrait  fe 
cc  pafler  des  autres.  Je  parle  de  ces  ecrits  qui 
"  ont  paru  en  Amerique  de  terns  a  autre,  je  ne 
K  pretends  cependantpas,  dans  la  place  ou  je  fuis, 
<e  eloigne  de  tous  les  livres  &  ecrits,  en  faire  une 
"  exadle  enumeration — Les  Ecrits  des  anciens  Gou- 
"  verneurs  PP'intkrop  £«f  Win/low,  du  Dr.  Mather, 
"  Mr.  Prince ;  Neals  Hifloire  de  la  Nou<ue//e  Angle- 
"  terre  ;  Douglas  Sommairefur  les  premieres  Planta- 
"  tions;  ^amelioration progrejfi've  des  terres& Tetat 
<c  prefent  des  Colonies  Britanniques;  Hutchivjon  Hif. 
"  toire  de  MaJfachufetts-Bay ;  Smith  Hifloire  de 
16  Ne<w-Tork ;  Smith  Hifloire  de  New-JerJey,  les 
"~  0uv rages  de  William  Penn;  Dummers  Defenje 
"'  des  Chartes  de  la  Nouvelle-^ngleterre ;  r Hifloire 
"  de  Virginie,  &  pluiieurs  autres.  Tout  cela  etait 
^anterieur  a  la  difpute  prefente,  qui  commen9a 
"-  en -i  761. 

"  Durant  lafeconde  periode,  les  ecrits  font  plus 
<£  nombreux,  &  plus  difFiciles  a  fe  procurer ;  il 
"  fut  alors  donne  au  public  des  Ouvrages  de 
"  grande  importance  :  dans  les  debats  entre  ceux 

qui  furent  adeurs  dans  cette  fcene  en  qualite 

cc  d'Ecrivains, 


Pojlfcript.  387 

"  d'Ecrivains,  il  en  eft  qui  meritent  d'etre  dif- 
<c  tingues.     On  compte  parmi  eux  les  Gouver- 
tc  neurs  du  Roi  Povunal,  Bernard,  &  Hutchinjon  ; 
£C  Le  Lieutenant  Gouverneur  Oliver;  Mr.Sewal, 
"  Juge  d'Amiraute  pour  Halifax,  Jonathan  May- 
"  hew,  D.  D.  James  Of  is,   Oxenbridge  Thatcher  ; 
cc  Samuel  4 dams  ;  Jojiah  2>itiniy,  Jofeph  Warren; 
fc  &:  peut-etres  les  fuivants  n'ont  pas  etc  nioins 
"  importants  qu'aucun  des  autres,favoir  les  ecrits 
"  de  Mr.  Dickinfon,  de  Mr.  W'ilfon,  &   du  Dr. 
"  Rufh  de  Philadelphie,  de  Mr.  Livingston  &  de 
<c  Mr.  Dougal  de  New- York;    du  Colonel  Eland 
"  &  $  Arthur  Lee  de  Virginie^  &  de  plufieurs  au- 
tc  tres.     Les  Regiftres  de  la  Ville  de  Bojion  &  par- 
<c  ticulierement  cTun  Comite  de  Correjpondance  ;  du 
<c  Bureau  des  CommiJJions  de  la  Douane  ;  de  la  Cham- 
"  bre  des  Reprefentans  &  du  Bureau  du  Conseil  de 
"  Maff'achusetts-Bay  ;   en  outre  les  Gazettes  de  la 
<c  Ville  de  Bofton  dans  les  derniers  terns,  pour  ne 
"  pas  dire  ceiles  de  New-York  8?  de  Philadelphie, 
"  doivent  etre  ramaflees  &  examinees  depuis  Tan. 
£C  1760.        Tout  cela  eft  neceflaire  pour  ecrire 
"  avec  precilion  &  en  detail  1'Hiftoire  des  debats 
cc  avant  que  les  hoftilites  euflent  commence,  com- 
"  pres  la  periode  de  1'annee   1761  jufqu'au  19 
ec  Avril  1775. 

<e  Durant  les  troiiieme  &  quatrieme  periodes 
"  les  Regiftres,  Pamphlets  &  Gazettes  des  Treize- 
cc  Etats  doivent  etre  recueillis,  ainfi  que  les  Jour- 
"  naux  du  Congrts  (dont  cependant  une  partie  eft 
<c  encore  fecrete)  &  la  Collection  des  NouveHes  Con- 
cc  flitutions  des  diners  Eftats,  le  Remembrancer  &  le 
"  Rtgiftre  Annuel,  papiers  periodiques  publics  en 
"  Angleterre.  Les  Affaires  de  f  Angleterre  8?  de 
"  P-slmerique,  &  le  Mercure  de  France,  public  a 
"  Paris,  &  le  Politique  Hollandais  imprime  a  Am- 
£e  fterdam,  toute  la  fuite  de  la  Correspondance  du 
<f  General  It'ajhington  avec  le  Congres  depuis  le 
VOL.  I.  C  3  "  mois 


388  Pofl  script. 

"  mois  de  Juillet  1775  jufqu'a  ce  jour,  qui  n'a 
"  pas  encore  ete  public,  &  qui  ne  le  fera  pas  non 
"  plus  jufqu'a  ce  que  le  Congres  Fait  ordonne 
"  ou  permis;  &  permettez-moi  de  vous  dire  qu'a 
"  moins  que  cette  vafte  fource  foit  ouverte,  il  ne 
"  fera  guere  poffible  a  perfonne  d'entreprendre 
"  une  Hiftoire  de  la  Guerre  Americaine  :  II  eft 
(c  encore  d'autres  ecrits  d'importance  dans  les  Bu- 
"  reaux  du  Comite  Secret,  dans  le  Comite  du  Com" 
ic  merce,  dans  le  Comite  despairs  etr  anger  es,  dans 
"  le  Comite  de  la  7resorerie,  dans  le  Comite  de  la 
"  Marine,  dans  le  Bureau  de  la  Guerre  (autant 
<c  qu'il  fubfifte)  &  du  Departement  de  la  Guerre, 
"  de  la  Marine,  des  Finances  &  des  Affaires  etran- 
"  geres,  depuis  leur  inftitution.  II  y  a  aufli 
u  des  Lettres  des  Ministres  Americains  en  France^ 
"  Espagne,  Hollande,  &  d'autres  parties  de  1'Eu- 
"  rope. 

<c  La  plupart  des  documents  &  materiaux  etant 
a  encore  fecrets,  c'efl  une  demarche  prematuree 
cc  que  d'entreprendre  une  Hiftoire  generale  de  la 
cc  Revolution  Americaine;  mais  Ton  ne  faurait 
ce  mettre  trop  d'aclivite  &  de  foins  a  faire  la  col- 
"  ledion  des  materiaux.  II  exifte  cependant,  a 
"  la  verite  deja  deux  ou  trois  Hiftoires  generales 
<c  de  la  Guerre  &  Revolution  Americaine,  pu- 
"  bliees  a  Londres,  &  dex  ou  trois  autres  pu- 
"  bliees  a  Paris ;.  celles  en  langue  Anglaife  ne  font 
ec  que  des  materiaux  informes  &  confus  fans  dif- 
"  cernement,  &  toutes  ces  Hiftoires  foit  en  An- 
<c  glais  foit  en  Fran^ais,  ne  font  autre  chofe  que 
"  des  monuments  de  1'ignorance  complette  de 
"  leurs  auteurs  fur  ce  fujet. 

"  II  faudrait  la  vie  entiere  &  la  plus  longue,  a 
"  comniencer  des  Tage  de  20  ans,  pour  affembler 
"  de  toutes  les  Nations  &  de  toutes  les  parties 
(C  du  monde,  dans  lefquels  ils  font  depof<^s,  les 
f(  documents  prop  res  a  former  une  Hiftoire  com- 

"  plette 


Poflscrift.  389 

"  plette  de  la  Guerre  Americaine;  parce  que  c'eft 
"  proprement  1'Hiftoire  du  Genre-humain  dans 
"  toute  cette  epoque.  11  faut  y  reunir  1'Hiftoire 
cc  de  France,  d'Efpagne,  de  Holiande,  d'  Angle- 
vff  terre,  &  des  PuifTances  neutres,  auffi  bien  que 
"  de  FAmerique.  Les  materiaux  en  devraient 
"  etre  aflembles  de  toutes  ces  Nations,  et  les  do- 
"  cuments  les  plus  importans  de  tous,  auffi  bien 
"  que  les  caraderes  des  Acleurs  &  les  reflbrts  fe- 
<e  crets  des  Actions,  font  encore  receles  dans  les 
"  Cabinets  &  en  chiffres. 

<c  Soit  que  vous,  Monfieur,  entrepreniez  de 
* c  donner  une  Hiftoire  generale,  ou  fi mplement  des 
"  remarques  &  obfervations,  femblables  a  celles 
<c  que  vous  avez  donnees  fur  les  Grecs  £?  les  Ro- 
"  mains  ;  vous  produirez  un  Ouvrage  extreme- 
"  ment  intereffant  &  inftru£lif,  pour  la  Morale, 
"  la  Politique,  la  Legiflation,  &  je  me  ferais  un 
cc  honneur  &  un  plaifir  de  vous  fournir  tous  les 
cc  petits  fecours  qui  feront  en  mon  pouvoir  pour 
"  la  facilite  de  vos  recherches.  II  m'eft  impoffi- 
cc  ble  de  vous  dire  fi  le  Gouvernement  de  ce  pays 
"  fouhaiterait  de  voir  quelque  ouvrage  profonde- 
"  ment  ecrit,  &  par  un  Auteur  d'une  grande  ce- 
"  lebrite,  en  langue  Fran9aife.  11  eft  queftion 
d'expofer  des  principes  de  gouvernement,  fi 
differens  de  ce  qu'on  trouve  en  Europe,  fur- 
tout  en  France,  qu'on  ne  verrait  peut-etre  pas 
une  entreprife  pareille  d'un  oeil  indifferent : 
c'eft  cependant  une  chofe  dont  je  ne  me  crois 
;:;?*f'pas  le  juge  competent. 

"  Permettez,  Monfieur,  que  je  finifle  cette  Let- 

"  tre  en  vous  donnant  une  clef  pour  toute  cette 

"  Hiftoire.     II  y  a  une  analogic  generale  dans  les 

"  Gouvernements  &  les  Caradteres  de  tous   les 

,"  TreizeEtats;  mais  ce  ne  fut  que  lorfque  les 

**  debats  &  la  guerre  commencerent  en  Mafla- 

iixg,  chufetts-Bay,    la   principale   Province    de   la 

((  Nguvelle- 


"  Nouvelle-Angleterre,  que  les  inftitutions  pri- 
"  mitives  firent  leur  premier  effet.  Quatre  de  ces 
cc  inftitutions  devraient  etre  bien;Ctudiees  &  ana- 
"  plement  examinees  par  quiconque  voudrait 
cc  ecrire  avec  connaiffance  de  caufe  fur  ce  fujet; 
"  car  elles  ont  produit  ua  efFet  decifif,  non-feule- 
"  ment  dans  les  premieres  determinations  desde- 
<c  bats,  dans  les  Confeils  publics,  &  les  premieres 
"  refolutions  de  re  lifter  par  les  armes,  mais  aufii 
<c  par  1'influence  qu'elles  eurent  fur  les  efprits 
tc  des  autres  Colonies  en  leur  donnant  1'exemple, 
<?  d'adopter  plus  ou  moins  les  memes  inftitutions 
"  &  des  mefures  femblables. 

Les  quatre  inftitutions  mentionnees  font 

1.  Les  Villes  ou  Diftridis. 

2.  Les  Eglifes. 

3.  Les  Ecoles. 

4.  La  Milice. 

I.  "  Les  Villes  font  de  certaines  etendues  de 
cc  pays,  ou  diftrids  de  territoire,  dans  lefquels 
"  etaint  divifes  le  MajGTachufetts-Bay,  le  Connec- 
<c  ticut,  le  New-Hamplhire  &  le  Rhode-riflancl. 
ec  Chaque  Ville  contierit  1'une  dans  Tautre  fix 
"  milles  ou  deux  lieues  quarrees.  Les  habitans 
<c  qui  vivent  dans  ces  limites  doivent  former,  en 
cc  vertu  de  la  loi,  des  corporations  ou  corps  po- 
cc  litiques,  &  font  inveftis  de  certains  pouvoirs 
"  &:  privileges  :  comme  par  exemple,  de  reparer 
<c  les  grands  chemins,  d'entrenir  les  pauvres,  de 
<c  choiiir  les  elus,  les  conftables,  les  colledleurs 
ec  des  Taxes  &  d'autres  officiers,  &  furtout  leurs 
cc  Reprefentans  dai  s  la  Legiflature  ;  comme  aufli 
<c  du  droit  de  s'aflembler  toutes  le.s  fois  qu'ils 
cc  foot  avertis  par  leurs  Elus,  dans  les  affemblees 
"  de  Villes,  afin  de  deliberer  fur  les  affaires  pu- 
"  bliques  de  la  Ville,  ou  de  donner  des  inftruclions 
££  a  leurs  Reprefentans.  Les  confequences  de 

"  cette 

• 


Poflfcript.  391 

ft  Cette  inftitutiori  -bnt  etc,  que  tous  les  habitants 
"sayant  acquis  des  leur  enfance  une  habitude  de 
"  difcuter,  de  deliberer,  &  de  juger  des  affaires 
"  publiqiies,  $'a  ete  dans  cette  etendue  de  Villes 
<c  ou  diftricls,  que  les  fentiments  du  Peuple  fe 
5C  font  formes  premierement,  &  que  leurs  refolu- 
"  tions  ont  ete  prifes,  depuis  le  commencement 
*c  jufqu'a  la  fin  des  debats  &  de  la  guerre. 

*2.  "  Les  Eglifes  font  des  Societes  Religieufes, 
cc  qui  comprennant  le  Peuple  entier.  Chaque 
ec  diftricl:  contient  une  ParohTe  &  une  Eglife.  La 
cc  plupart  n'en  ont  qu'une,  &  quelques-uns  en  ont 
"  pluiieurs.  Chaque  Paroifle  a  une  maifon  d'af- 
<c  lemblee,  &  un  Miniftre  entretenu  a  fes  propres 
<c  depens.  Les  Conftitutions  des  Eglifes  font 
cc  extremement  populaires,  &  le  Clerge  a  peu 
"  d'influence  ou  d'autorite,  a  Texception  de  celies 
"  que  leur  propre  piete,  leur  vertu,  leurs  iumieres 
tt*leur  donnent  naturellement.  Us  font  choifis 
".par  le  peuple  de  leur  Paroifle,  &  re9oivent 
<c  leur  ordination  du  Clerge  voilin,  Us  font  tous 
ce  maires,  ont  des  families,  &  vivent  avec  leurs 
"  Paroiffiens  dans  une  parfaite  amite  &  intimate. 
c*''Ils  vont  voir  les  malades,  exercent  la  charite 
"  envers  les  pauvres,  afliftent  a  tous  les  manages 
"  &  enterremens,  &  prechent  deux  fois  chaque 
*e  ^Dimanche;  le  moindre  reproche  fait  a  leur  ca- 
"  :radere  moral,  leur  ferait  perdre  leur  influence, 
"  &  leur  nuirait  a  jamais.  De  forte  que  ce  font 
"  des  hommes  fages,  vertueux  &  pieux.  Leurs 
"  fentiments  font  en  general  adaptes  a  ceux  du 
"  peuple,  &  ils  font  amis  jaloux  de  la  Liberte. 

3.  "  11  y  a  des  Ecoles  dans  chaque  ville  ;  elles 
"  .font  etablies  par  une  Loi  expreffe  de  la  Colo- 
"  nie  ;  chaque  ville  coniiftant  en  Ibixante  families, 
*e  eft  obligee  fous  peine  d'amende,  de  maintenir 
"vconftamment  une  Ecole  &  un  maitre  qui  en- 
*'  ^eigne  a  lire,  a  ecrire,  rarithmetique,  &  les  prin- 

"  cipes 


Poftfcript. 

<c  cipes  des  langues  Latine  &  Grecque.  Tous 
"  les  enfans  des  habitans,  ceux  des  riches  comme 
cc  des  pauvres,  ont  le  droit  d'aller  dans  cette  E- 
<c  cole  publique.  On  y  forme  les  Etudians  pour 
"  les  Colleges  de  Cambridge,  de  New-Haven,  de 
"  Warwich,  &  de  Darthmouth;  &  dans  ces  Col- 
<c  leges  on  eleve  des  Maitres  pour  ces  Ecoles, 
"  des  Miniftres  pour  1'Eglife,  des  Dodleurs  en 
"  Droit  &  en  Medecine,  &  des  Magiflrats  & 
"  Officiers  pourle  Gouvernement  du  Pays. 

4.  "  La  Milice  comprend  tout  le  Peuple.  En 
"  vertu  des  Loix  du  pays  chaque  habitant  male 
<c  entre  16  &  60  ans,  eft  enrole  dans  une  Com- 
*c  pagnie  &  Regiment  de  Milice,  completement 
"  pourvu  de  tous  fes  officiers.  II  eft  oblige  de 
"  tenir  toujours  dans  fa  maifon  &  a  fes  propres 
<e  depens,  un  moufquet  en  bon  ordre,  une  corne 
"  a  poudre,  une  livre  de  cette  poudre,  douze 
<c  pierres  a  feu,  vingt-quatre  balles  de  plomb, 
<c  une  boete  a  cartouche,  &  un  havre-fac.  De- 
<c  forte  que  toute  la  Contree  eft  prete  a  marcher  a 
"  fa  defenfe  au  premier  fignal.  Les  Compagnies 
<c  &c  Regiments  font  obliges  de  s'affembler  a  un 
"  certain  terns  de  1'annee,  fur  les  ordres  de  leurs 
<e  officiers,  pour  la  vilitation  de  leurs  armes  & 
"  munitions,  &  de  faire  leurs  manoeuvres. 

"  Voici,  Monfieur,  une  petite  efquifle  des 
"  quatre  fources  principales  de  cette  fagefle  dans 
"  les  Confeils,  de  cette  habilete,  de  cette  bravoure 
<c  militaire,  qui  ont  produit  la  Revolution  Ame- 
<c  ricaiue,  &  qui,  j'efpere,  feront  faintement  con- 
<c  fervees  comme  les  fondemens  de  la  Liberte,  du 
<c  bonheur  &  de  la  profperite  du  peuple.  S'il 
"  eft  d'autresparticulariteslur  lefquelles  je  puifle 
<c  vous  donner  des  informations,  vous  me  ferez 
"  Tamite  de  me  le  faire  favoir.  J'ai  Fhonneur 
<c  d'etre 
1782.  "JOHN  ADAMS." 


\SR 


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GENERAL  LIBRARY  -  U.C.  BEBKELEY 


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